



United Nations Environment Programme

**Terminal Evaluation of project GF/6010-06-03 (4907) Enhancing
Conservation of the Critical Network
of Sites required by Migratory Waterbirds
on the African/Eurasian Flyways
“Wings Over Wetlands” GFL-2328-2712-4907**



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Evaluation Office

Dr. Phillip Edwards

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Acknowledgements

This is not really the work of the Terminal Evaluator but that of all the staff and people connected with the Wings Over Wetlands Project who gave freely of their time and ideas to make the evaluation process a success. There are far too many people to mention by name – and hopefully everyone who contributed is included in the lists of names annexed to this report – but special mention must be made of the Project Operations Manager Camillo Ponziani, who gave unstintingly of his time to help me track down answers to, or point me in the right direction for, every question I asked and to discuss the points I took every opportunity to raise. He was also responsible for coordinating all of my international travel and the in-country logistics, and thanks to his efforts the whole evaluation process ran like clockwork.

Following completion of the Draft Report on 22nd October 2010, review comments were received from UNEP, the PSC Chair, the PCU, WI, BLI, AEW, BfN/BMU and the UNEP Evaluation Office by 11th November 2010. These comments have either been included into the revised text where these related to factual inaccuracies in the draft, or have been reproduced in full and unedited as footnotes to the appropriate text to ensure a fair hearing for all parties' views. The Evaluator has made responses to some of these comments. I thank each of the reviewers sincerely for their efforts and insights and their considerable time which have undoubtedly improved this final report.

The views expressed in this report are intended to offer an overview of, and some of the lessons learned from, the Wings Over Wetlands Project as it comes to its conclusion. I have tried to balance my thoughts and to offer fair perspectives of what was observed and learned from people far more knowledgeable about the Project and its context than I will ever be. As will be noted from some of the comments included, my views do not always coincide with those of all parties. Furthermore, in a complex project where there are many parties, and where some views are counterposed, it is impossible to find a form of words that would be acceptable to all in all cases. Nonetheless, I offer my sincere apologies in advance if anyone should take anything written to be anything other than constructive criticism.

I would like to express my thanks to all of those whose linguistic skills surpassed my solitary grasp of English and without whom, none of this would have been possible. There are too many of you to name individually, but if you spoke to me in English, even in a rudimentary fashion, you have my sincere gratitude. Special thanks are also due to Gabin Agblonon, who acted as my unofficial interpreter and logistics arranger in Senegal, Mauritania and Niger, to Abdoulaye Ndiaye for his interpretation skills in Mauritania, and to Kadri Yacouba for acting as my official interpreter in Niger. My thanks are also due to Umberto Gallo-orsi for his considerable work in providing me with a clear summary of the exceptionally complex finances pertaining to this project.

And finally, one of the delights of this sort of work remains that of visiting new and extremely welcoming countries and going home again having made new friends (and in this case renewing many old ones), seen new things, and witnessed with great admiration the dedication and enthusiasm that so many people bring to their work in conserving the important places of the world. I would like to thank them and wish them every success in their continuing endeavours.

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11th November 2010

ACRONYMS AND TERMS

AEWA	African-Eurasian Waterbird Agreement
BfN	Bundesamt für Naturschutz (Federal Agency for Nature Conservation; Germany)
BLI	BirdLife International
BMU	Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit (Ministry of Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety; Germany)
c.	circa (about)
COP	Conference of Parties
CSN	Critical Site Network
DGIS	Directoraat Generaal Internationale Samenwerking (Directorate General for International Cooperation; Netherlands)
DPN	Direction des Parcs Nationaux, Senegal
DPWM	Department of Parks and Wildlife Management, The Gambia
FIBA	Foundacion International du Banc d'Arguin
FTK	Flyway Training Kit
GEF	Global Environment Facility
GTZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (German Society for Technical Cooperation)
ha	Hectare(s)
IBA	Important Bird Area
IWC	International Waterfowl Census
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MOC	Memorandum of Cooperation
MOP	Meeting of Parties
MTE	Mid-term evaluation
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
ONCFS	Office National de la Chasse et de la Faune Sauvage (National game and Wildlife Agency; France)
PAMETT	Protected Areas Management Effectiveness Tracking Tool
PCU	Project Coordination Unit
PDF-B	Project Development Facility – Block B
PIR	Project Implementation Report
PSC	Project Steering Committee
ROI	Review of Outcomes to Impacts
RSCN	Royal Society for the Conservation of Nature (Jordan)
SAR	Semi-annual Report
TE	Terminal evaluation/evaluator
ToR	Terms of Reference
ToT	Training of Trainers
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNEP-WCMC	World Conservation Monitoring Centre
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
US\$	United States Dollar
USFWS	US Fish and Wildlife Service
WBDB	World Bird Database
WI	Wetlands International
WIA	Wetlands International Africa (Dakar, Senegal).
WIWO	Working Group on International Wader and Waterfowl Research
WPE4	<i>Waterbird Population Estimates 4th edition</i>
WWF	World Wide Fund for Nature

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

KEY POINTS

OVERALL RATINGS TABLE

Criterion	Evaluator's Summary Comments	Evaluator's Rating
A. Attainment of project objectives and results (overall rating) Sub criteria (below)	Despite a budget grossly under-funded for the Project's ambition, subsequent co-funding shortages, and a range of institutional issues, the Project actually achieved most of its objectives in a reduced lifespan. Although it has not appeared to have succeeded in achieving its developmental or immediate objective indicators, in part this is down to poor measurement and, in the TE's opinion, the indirectness of the links between the indicator and the Project's activities. A perusal of Annex IV will show that all eight of the nine component indicators that have been measurable or estimable have been fully achieved, and that of the 29 immediate objective indicators defined for the 11 demonstration projects (Annex V), 18 (62%) have been fully achieved and six (21%) nearly achieved – a very creditable performance and one which at the halfway stage of the Project did not look possible.	S
A. 1. Effectiveness - overall likelihood of impact achievement (ROtI rating)	The CSN tool (BC) and the Flyway Training Kit (BB) show every sign of achieving their intended impacts, although the latter will require more funding. The demonstration projects together (C) are unconvincing as showcases for best practice and the knowledge generated has not been communicated across the Flyway. Individually, the projects are rated: AA+ (2); AA (1); AC (2); BA+ (1); BD (2); C (2); D (1).	S BB to C – likely to unlikely
A. 2. Relevance	The Project has produced two excellent flyway-scale tools but the relevance of these remains questionable since both appear supply-driven rather than demand-driven, and has implemented ten demonstration projects that have made significant contributions to site-based and regional-level wetland conservation needs, but which have not acted in concert to demonstrate a flyway-scale approach.	MS
A. 3. Cost-effectiveness	Overall, the cost-effectiveness has been extremely high mainly through significant voluntary contributions that would be unsustainable in the long-term.	HS
B. Sustainability of Project outcomes (overall rating) Sub criteria (below)	Evaluation made on basis of CSN tool and Flyway Training Kit only since 11 demonstration projects too disparate from these two components and each other to provide a single rating. Demonstration Projects rated individually on five elements in text (see Table 12, paragraph 144) of which 3L 3ML, 2 MU, 2 HU and 1 project failed.	ML
B. 1. Financial	CSN tool requires little in the way of finance to maintain it. The Flyway Training Kit requires little immediate maintenance, but if it is to be useful it will require significant funding for its delivery. The Project's failure to fulfil its original co-financing budget bodes poorly for continued finance, but establishment of WOW Partnership may attract future funding.	ML
B. 2. Socio-political	Project elements enjoy considerable political support through membership of AEWa and Ramsar.	L
B. 3. Institutional framework and governance	Extremely strong – new WOW Partnership carries achievements forward under a recognisable brand with resolute commitment to sustainability.	L
B. 4. Environmental	CSN tool and FTK have no direct environmental risks associated with them.	n/a
C. Catalytic Role	Very good at all levels. Project highly innovative in acting at flyway scale and this level of approach should be replicated. CSN tool also highly innovative and can be championed by project partnership. FTK requires little change to be reproduced elsewhere. Demonstration projects generally of high enough quality to be used as a demonstration resource for other projects. Some of these already successful in leveraging catalytic finance or other means of replication within national borders.	HS

Criterion	Evaluator's Summary Comments	Evaluator's Rating
D. Stakeholders involvement	High at all stages with a huge number of people and organisations involved. All components highly participatory. Conversion of WOW project into WOW programmatic partnership is a particularly encouraging outcome not foreseen within the design.	HS
E. Country ownership / driven-ness	In some ways this is irrelevant since conceptually the project is driven at a supra-national level through the MEAs, particularly AEWA, and through which country driven-ness is implicit. Government involvement in demonstration projects varies from high (Estonia) to absent (e.g. Hungary, Nigeria, Turkey) but although where driven-ness has been overt this has helped the success of projects, its absence has not necessarily meant failure (Hungary and Nigeria being notable successes).	MS
F. Achievement of outputs and activities	Two excellent new resources – the CSN tool and Flyway Training Kit – have been produced for use across the region and ten out of 11 demonstration projects produced successful results to different standards although these largely do not respond to flyway-scale imperatives.	S
G. Preparation and readiness	The project was wholly unprepared for the myriad of problems it inherited from the design, ranging from under-budgeting and a major partner inexperienced in the GEF culture and requirements, to a poorly-led Steering Committee, different management styles and institutional cultures, and strong personalities. No inception period/workshop was undertaken where many of these could have been identified and remediated or averted.	HU
H. Implementation approach	The Project suffered a traumatic early period with significant institutional tensions and inadequately functioning oversight. However, through excellent adaptive management, which was also applied to overcome an acute shortage of finance, it solved these problems and ended with a smoothly functioning implementation team. Administrative and technical management have been of the highest order. Only because the early problems cannot be overlooked has the implementation approach not been assessed more highly.	S
I. Financial planning	Financial planning has been extremely effective throughout showing much creativity to deal with a chronic cash-flow crisis induced by a significant shortage of pledged co-financing from AEWA ¹ .	HS
J. Monitoring and Evaluation (overall rating) Sub criteria (below)	Outstanding progress monitoring through reporting fatally undermined by the lack of an M&E Plan, no budget allocation for M&E, and generally poor impact monitoring at demonstration sites.	MU
E. 1. M&E Design	No M&E Plan was included in the design, but this was well before GEF's improved M&E policy. Long delays between design and implementation resulted in recognition of need to review and update logframe indicators which was done, but no M&E Plan was ever developed.	U
E. 2. M&E Plan Implementation (use for adaptive management)	Excellent progress monitoring and generally good internal activity monitoring badly let down by poor or absent impact monitoring.	MS
E. 3. Budgeting and Funding for M&E activities	No budget allocated for M&E in the original design. No specific budget allocated subsequently, but allowances made with the PCU allocations to enable basic activities to take place. Budgets for both external evaluations limited resulting in a "light" MTE and a one- not three-person mission for the TE.	MU
K. UNEP Supervision and backstopping	UNEP have provided the necessary level of backstopping and supervision, but no more. Stronger inputs made earlier in the Project, or perhaps adopting the role of a neutral arbiter or providing some form of conciliation service, would likely have eased some of the institutional tensions.	MS

* Note: HS = Highly satisfactory; S = Satisfactory; MS = Marginally satisfactory; MU= Marginally unsatisfactory; U = Unsatisfactory; HU = Highly unsatisfactory; L = Likely; ML = Moderately likely.

¹ **AEWA comment:** *The financial planning has been strongly influenced by shortening the project duration with 1 year. This means that AEWA had 1 year less to fundraise. It should be good also to highlight why the project duration has been shortened because increasing management costs of UNOPS. The actual shortage cause by AEWA was relatively small.* **TE response:** This is a little chicken-and-egg. It is not only the overall amount of co-funding that was lacking from AEWA, but the delay in the arrival of much of the rest that was promised (see paragraph 99 and Figure 2). It is because of this delay that the PSC agreed to shorten the Project – which may in turn then have shortened the period available for fund-raising. If the co-funding that had been promised had been available at the outset the Project would not have needed to be shortened nor further fund-raising undertaken.

Key successes – a state-of-the-art interactive internet-based tool enabling rapid access to all available data on important wetland sites and waterbird species' populations within the Africa-Eurasia Flyway along with the development of two new criteria to identify critical sites; a high quality, fully-comprehensive, almost encyclopaedic, modular-based training kit (in English, French, Russian and Arabic) to form the basis for a training of trainers programme to raise the capacity of all of those involved with conservation of wetlands and waterbirds within the Africa-Eurasia Flyway; a Memorandum of Cooperation between the four project partners (two MEAs and two international NGOs), the leading proponents of wetland and waterbird conservation within the region, to turn the WOW Project partnership into a programmatic partnership to build on the WOW approach and to translate WOW's initial achievements into a long-term, collaborative, flyways-scale programme to achieve conservation of migratory waterbirds and improved management of wetlands; being instrumental in having Africa's first trans-boundary Ramsar site designated in Senegal and Gambia, and in facilitating international cooperation between Lithuania and Russia in protecting the Nemunas River Delta; leveraging US\$ 5.5 million of catalytic finance from national and EU Structural Development funds for large-scale (c. 150 ha) restoration of open meadows in the Nemunas River Delta; breaking new ground in demonstrating new ideas at several demonstration sites – the first management plan to be written at the commune level in Niger, a new method for biodiversity-friendly economically-viable fish-farming in Hungary, a community-based approach to wetland restoration providing significant economic as well as environmental benefits in Nigeria, and a comprehensive language and technical training programme to fully-equip eco-guides for employment in Mauritania; integrated management plans covering a total of 3,435 km² of wetlands within the Flyway – 27,184 ha Estonia, 27,000 ha in Lithuania, 66,820 ha in Niger, 80,940 ha in Senegal/Gambia, 128,900 ha in Turkey, 12,626 ha in Yemen.

Key problem areas – poor design and design process; the lack of an adequate inception process to clarify roles and responsibilities, and to harmonise expectations and management styles; chronic under-funding; questionable relevance of the two key deliverables^{2,3} – the CSN tool and the Flyway Training Kit⁴; no link between the demonstration projects and the flyway-scale approach.

The terminal evaluation (TE) of the Project was conducted over a period of 38 days between 1st March and 22nd October 2010 by a single international consultant. It was carried out over a number of months in the final year of the Project's programme in order to cover several demonstration sites, projects which were closing/had closed in the early part of 2010, as well as to allow coverage of the two key outputs, namely the Critical Sites Network Tool and the Flyway Training Kit which were published in June 2010. The Evaluation's ToR is given in [Annex I](#), its itinerary in [Annex II](#) and the list of people interviewed in [Annex III](#). A list of the Project's indicators, their end of Project achievement level, together with performance rating is given in [Annex IV](#) while the same for the demonstration projects' immediate objective indicators is given in [Annex V](#). The draft report was submitted on 22nd October and was finalised on 11th November 2010 after receipt of all comments by the same day.

² **PSC Chair comment:** ... the results are described: "very good products like CSN and FTK, never seen such quality high output in projects" etc., but then on other pages the relevance of the products are challenged! I do not understand that: they are good or they are not good. **TE response:** A product can be measured on a number of criteria as here. A Rolls Royce is undeniably a high quality product, but it is of little use (relevance) for driving off-road in; a jumbo jet is also a high quality product but of little use as a military interceptor. The CSN tool and the FTK are undeniably high quality products – but their relevance as to the roles foreseen for them, or as the tools to bring about the changes expected, is very definitely open to question – as many members of the Project team voiced to the TE.

³ **WI comment:** If no 'proof' of relevance has been seen by the TE, at least part of that is due to the fact that time has not allowed such proof to build up since the completion of the deliverables. There are at least signs that indicate their relevance, e.g. in the strong interest displayed by other flyway initiatives in developing similar tools for their flyway.

⁴ **PSC Chair comment:** In the light of the above, I have my doubts about mentioning the questionable relevance of the two key deliverables as a key problem. There was simply no time to show the relevance and it does not reflect the way CSN and FTK have been developed and the way these have been received. Give it two years and then evaluate its relevance.... Moreover the spin-off of the process of developing for instance the CSN tool has been extremely high in bringing WI and Birdlife much closer together on data-sharing, data management, collection, etc. something which before was not the case on that level and with that intensity.

RESULTS

Outcome 1.1: The network of critical sites is available as a tool for use by practitioners to underpin planning and management of and catalyse site level activity in flyway conservation – Highly Satisfactory. A new, easy-to-use, web-based portal developed that seamlessly brings together data from a wide variety of databases and presents them on a flyway scale. Two new criteria developed to identify critical sites on the Flyways.

Outcome 1.2: Primary data resources that underpin flyway conservation, planning and management activities enhanced to include all critically important sites in the AEWA region – Highly Satisfactory. Excellent participatory gap-analysis undertaken on a regional level with priority gaps identified. Many of these, primarily in Africa, had surveys undertaken.

Outcome 1.3: Flyway data gathering and monitoring capacity strengthened to support the updating and maintenance of primary data resources that underpin conservation of the network of critical sites – Satisfactory. Improved mechanisms of coordination were identified and put in place. Training courses on waterbird and wetland monitoring were undertaken at a wide range of sites. A significant amount of optical and other equipment was provided to stakeholders.

Outcome 1.4: Species and critical site knowledge base supports management and planning decision-making in flyway conservation – Marginally Satisfactory. A literature review of the ecological requirements was completed for all 294 species included on the CSN tool. Clear guidance for site managers on habitat management emerged as a gap in the information available for most species, but lack of funding precluded any further work.

Outcome 2.1: Transferable Model Training and Awareness Raising Programme framework produced for developing wetland and waterbird conservation capacity – Highly Satisfactory. A new Flyway Training Kit, a 553-page ring-bound modular document and four CDs resource tool produced for trainers using the Training of Trainers model. Its content is exhaustive, covering everything there is known about waterbird flyways and wetland conservation, soundly based on the latest scientific advances, and up-to-date on policy issues and teaching principles.

Outcome 2.2: Wetland and waterbird conservation Training and Awareness Raising Programmes produced ready for implementation in four sub-regions – Satisfactory. Training and awareness programmes developed through four Regional Training Boards for implementation once additional funding identified. Flyway Training Kit translated into Arabic, French and Russian. Initial courses piloted in Jordan, Cameroon, and Kazakhstan.

Outcome 3.1: Demonstrations of best practice management of migratory waterbirds and wetlands available across the flyway – Marginally Satisfactory. Eleven demonstration projects undertaken, ten completed successfully. The quality varied and there is no flyway-scale link apparent, each responding to national needs rather than to flyway-level imperatives. The projects are:

Estonia:	Haapsalu Noarootsi Bays – Strengthen conservation management capacity	Highly Satisfactory
Hungary:	Biharugra Fish Ponds – demonstrate harmonization of conservation and local economic interests	Satisfactory
Lithuania:	Nemunas River Delta – improve the conservation status and sustainable use of the Nemunas River delta	Highly Satisfactory
Mauritania:	Banc d'Arguin – increase in equitable biodiversity-friendly tourism	Marginally Unsatisfactory.
Niger:	Namga-Kokorou Wetlands – demonstrate community-owned sustainable use planning process	Satisfactory

Nigeria:	<i>Hadeija-Nguru Wetlands – demonstrate wetland restoration through community participation Highly</i>	<i>Satisfactory</i>
Senegal-Gambia:	<i>Saloum-Niumi complex – demonstrate transboundary cooperation and community participation</i>	<i>Satisfactory</i>
South Africa:	<i>Wakkerstroom Wetland – demonstrate multi-faceted tourism development and income generation</i>	<i>Marginally Satisfactory</i>
Tanzania:	<i>Dar es Salaam Wetlands – change attitudes to waterbirds of key stakeholders and resource-users</i>	<i>Highly Unsatisfactory</i>
Turkey:	<i>Burdur Gölü – raise awareness among key local stakeholders on the socio-economic and ecological importance of Lake Burdur</i>	<i>Satisfactory</i>
Yemen:	<i>Aden Wetland – demonstrate sustainable approaches to resource use and planning</i>	<i>Marginally Satisfactory</i>

Outcome 4.1: Mechanisms for governments and NGOs to communicate between themselves and with each other strengthened – *Marginally Satisfactory*. A curious mixture of activities that could actually help strengthen communication between governments and/or NGOs and those that were purely about communicating the Project to interested parties. Because of funding difficulties, most of the former were down-graded or given secondary status, hence it is difficult to see how the Outcome can have been achieved. An excellent website was produced and maintained.

Outcome 4.2: Mechanisms of exchange between and within sub-regions for improved flyway-level migratory waterbird and wetland management established – *Unsatisfactory*. This Outcome suffered from the under-budgeting and over-optimism inherent in the Project Document. Only a limited number of exchange visits could be afforded to little demonstrable effect.

Outcome 4.3: Wise-use of migratory waterbirds and wetlands is better understood and implemented by governments in focal sub-regions – *Unsatisfactory*. This Outcome was also reduced significantly due to insufficient funding and the proposed development of a sub-regional mentoring capacity was abandoned. A number of key MEA texts were translated.

KEY ISSUES

The Wings Over Wetlands Project has overcome significant challenges bequeathed to it by an overly-long and fragmented design and approval phase, foremost amongst which has been a chronic shortage of funding brought about initially by a mismatch between re-budgeting iterations without concomitant restructuring of the Project's activities to match. This was then seriously compounded by failures in the overall delivery and timing of committed co-financing leading to acute financial problems. Dangerously high levels of institutional tensions, poor governance, and related issues which could have been rectified had an inception period and workshop taken place, came very close to derailing the Project completely during its first two years, and yet not only has it survived these, it has gone on to thrive and produce very good results largely as a result of the sheer determination and extraordinary levels of commitment that all involved have shown. The Project has produced two resource tools that will benefit conservation measures for wetlands and waterbirds throughout the African/Eurasian Flyways and which could be replicated in other flyways if funding can be found. Although there remains a degree of contention over the relevance of both, there is no doubting their high quality and scientific credentials. The project also implemented 11 demonstration projects in countries spread across the region, ten of which can report varying levels of success, with only one failure. Although these lack cohesiveness at the flyway-scale, nevertheless they have resulted in some serious conservation gains including designation of Africa's first trans-boundary Ramsar site in Senegal/Gambia, leveraging US\$ 5.5 million of catalytic finance for large-scale restoration of open

meadows in Lithuania, the first management plan to be written at the Commune level⁵ in Niger, and integrated management plans covering a total of 3,435 km² of wetlands in seven countries along the Flyway. Finally, one achievement not envisaged by the Project Document, yet considered by many on the Project team to be its greatest achievement, has been the signing of a Memorandum of Cooperation between the four project partners (two MEAs and two international NGOs), the leading proponents of wetland and waterbird conservation within the region, to turn the WOW Project partnership into a programmatic partnership to build on the WOW approach and to translate its initial achievements into a long-term, collaborative, flyways-scale programme.

Recommendations and Lessons Learned are listed on pages 77 and 78 respectively.

⁵ Niger's administrative structure is State; Region; District; Commune – where commune comprises several villages.

APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY

1. The Monitoring and Evaluation Policy at the project level in UNEP/GEF has two overarching objectives, namely to promote accountability for the achievement of GEF objectives through the assessment of results, effectiveness, processes and performance of the partners involved in GEF activities; and to promote learning, feedback and knowledge sharing on results and lessons learned among the GEF and its partners, as basis for decision-making on policies, strategies, programme management, and projects and to improve knowledge and performance. With this in mind, this Terminal Evaluation (TE) was initiated by the Evaluation Office of UNEP as the GEF Implementation Agency for the project entitled *Enhancing Conservation of the Critical Network of Sites required by Migratory Waterbirds on the African/Eurasian Flyways* more commonly known as, and hereinafter referred to as, the *Wings Over Wetland (WOW) Project*, to assess the actual performance and results of the Project against the planned project activities and outputs, at the regional, national, and local levels.

2. The TE was conducted over a period of 38 days between 1st March and 22nd October 2010 by a single international consultant. It was carried out over a number of months in the final year of the Project's programme in order to cover several demonstration site projects which were closing/had closed in the early part of 2010, as well as to allow coverage of the two key outputs, namely the Critical Sites Network Tool and the Flyway Training Kit which were published in June 2010. The approach was determined by the terms of reference (Annex I) and focuses on nine key questions (see page 5 of the TOR) and the four-year implementation period, but includes an assessment of the Project's design, and makes recommendations related to the Project's post-implementation period. A detailed itinerary is given in Annex II. The report was finalised on 11th November 2010 after receipt of final comments on the same day. These comments have either been included into the revised text where these related to factual inaccuracies in the draft, or have been reproduced in full and unedited as footnotes to the appropriate text to ensure a fair hearing to all parties⁶. The Evaluator has made responses to some of these comments.

3. The Evaluation was conducted through the following participatory approach:

- extensive face-to-face, skype, and telephone interviews with the project management and technical support staff, including all members of the Project Steering Committee (PSC), the Project Coordination Unit (PCU), the lead contractors Wetlands International and BirdLife International, and seven of the demonstration sites. Throughout the evaluation, particular attention was paid to explaining carefully the importance of listening to stakeholders' views and in reassuring staff and stakeholders that the purpose of the evaluation was not to judge performance in order to apportion credit or blame but to measure the relative success of implementation and to determine lessons for the wider GEF context. The confidentiality of all interviews was stressed. Wherever possible, information collected was cross-checked between various sources to ascertain its veracity, but in some cases time limited this. A full list of people interviewed is given in Annex III.
- face-to-face interviews with national and local stakeholders, particularly the beneficiaries, at four of the demonstration sites;
- a thorough review of project documents and other relevant texts, including the project documents, outputs, monitoring reports, such as progress and financial reports to UNEP and GEF annual Project Implementation Reviews (PIR) reports, relevant correspondence, other project-related material produced by the project staff or partners, and relevant material available on the Project's website (<http://www.wingsoverwetlands.org/>);

⁶ Both the PSC Chair and WI provided fairly long, generalised comments in covering letters or preambles to the effect that an evaluation concerning a very complex project as here with a great number of problems, needs to be well-balanced in its views and analyses and the comments of those closely involved over a long time, deserve to be taken well into account and should lead to changes in the draft text and should not only appear as footnotes. The TE has indeed taken all comments into account and has changed the draft text in places to rectify two serious lapses in his understanding, and also to correct what both commentators believed to have been apparent bias, or at least lack of balance, in certain wording. In all other cases, comments have been appended as footnotes, since in the TE's experience this represents the most effective way of ensuring the independence of the evaluation is maintained while concomitantly ensuring complete transparency of all views concerned.

- field visits to four of the demonstration sites, namely the Biharugra Fishponds in Hungary; Parc National Banc d'Arguin in Mauritania; Namga-Kokorou wetland complex in Niger; and Wakkerstroom Wetland in South Africa. The South African site was selected on the grounds of efficiency – the final PSC meeting was held there between 9th and 12th March 2010 giving the opportunity for the TE to meet key members of the project and visit a demonstration site – while the others were selected on criteria related to continent (Africa and Europe), habitat (coastal/inland and natural and man-made), as well as nature of project (supporting commercial/self-sufficiency/tourism related activities). The TE recognises that it would have been better if a demonstration site in the Middle East or East Africa could have been included, but the site in Tanzania had not reached its objectives and had been closed in May 2009, while a visit to Yemen was not possible because of security concerns. Turkey was not selected because the project manager was available for interview in South Africa along with those from Lithuania and Nigeria.
- a questionnaire about the CSN tool run through www.surveymonkey.co.uk, the link to which was sent in an e-mail to over 4,000 persons on the AEWA and Ramsar distribution lists; placed on the AEWA Technical Committee Workspace and the Ramsar Scientific Technical Review Panel Support Service website; and placed on the front page of the tool itself. By 14th October a total of 288 respondents started the questionnaire (Q.s 1-3), but for unknown reasons, only 166 completed it. The results are summarised in Annex VII.

4. Wherever possible the TE has tried to evaluate issues according to the criteria listed in the *GEF Monitoring and Evaluation Policy*, namely:

- A. Attainment of project objectives and results
 - A. 1. Effectiveness - overall likelihood of impact achievement (ROtI rating)
 - A. 2. Relevance
 - A. 3. Efficiency
- B. Sustainability of Project outcomes
 - B. 1. Financial
 - B. 2. Socio Political
 - B. 3. Institutional framework and governance
 - B. 4. Environmental
- C. Catalytic Role and Replication
- D. Stakeholders involvement
- E. Country ownership/driven-ness
- F. Achievement of outputs and activities
- G. Preparation and readiness
- H. Implementation approach
- I. Monitoring and Evaluation
 - I. 1. M&E Design
 - I. 2. M&E Plan Implementation (use for adaptive management)
 - I. 3. Budgeting and Funding for M&E activities
- J. Financial planning
- K. UNEP Supervision and backstopping
- L. Complementarity with UNEP Medium Term Strategy and Programme of Work

Lessons learned have been placed in boxes and cross-referenced with a number hyperlinked to the “*Lessons Learned*” section where further discussion can be found.

5. The TE has evaluated the Project’s performance against these according to the current six-point evaluation scale provided to it by the GEF. This is reproduced in Table 1 for clarity.

TABLE 1: SCALE USED TO EVALUATE THE PROJECT BY THE TERMINAL EVALUATION

Highly Satisfactory (HS)	Project is expected to achieve or exceed all its major global environmental objectives, and yield substantial global environmental benefits, without major shortcomings. The project can be presented as “good practice”.
Satisfactory (S)	Project is expected to achieve most of its major global environmental objectives, and yield satisfactory global environmental benefits, with only minor shortcomings.
Marginally Satisfactory (MS)	Project is expected to achieve most of its major relevant objectives but with either significant shortcomings or modest overall relevance. Project is expected not to achieve some of its major global environmental objectives or yield some of the expected global environment benefits.
Marginally Unsatisfactory (MU)	Project is expected to achieve some of its major global environmental objectives with major shortcomings or is expected to achieve only some of its major global environmental benefits.
Unsatisfactory (U)	Project is expected not to achieve most of its major global environment objectives or to yield any satisfactory global environmental benefits.
Highly Unsatisfactory (HU)	The project has failed to achieve, and is not expected to achieve, any of its major global environment objectives with no worthwhile benefits.

In addition, other scales have been used to cover sustainability (Table 2), monitoring and evaluation, and to assess impacts. The Review of Outcomes to Impacts (ROtI) method also requires ratings to be made for outcomes achieved by the project and the progress made towards the ‘intermediate states’ at the time of the evaluation. The rating scale is given in Table 3 while Table 4 shows how the two letter ratings for “*achievement of outcomes*” and “*progress towards intermediate states*” translate into ratings for the “*overall likelihood of impact achievement*” on a six-point scale. A rating is give a ‘+’ notation if there is evidence of impacts accruing within the life of the project which moves the double letter rating up one space in the six-point scale.

TABLE 2: SCALE USED TO EVALUATE THE SUSTAINABILITY OF THE PROJECT

Likely (L)	There are no risks affecting this dimension of sustainability.
Moderately Likely (ML)	There are moderate risks that affect this dimension of sustainability.
Moderately Unlikely (MU)	There are significant risks that affect this dimension of sustainability.
Unlikely (U)	There are severe risks that affect this dimension of sustainability.

TABLE 3: RATING SCALE FOR OUTCOMES AND PROGRESS TOWARDS “INTERMEDIATE STATES”

Outcome Rating	Rating on progress toward Intermediate States
D: The project’s intended outcomes were not delivered	D: No measures taken to move towards intermediate states.
C: The project’s intended outcomes were delivered, but were not designed to feed into a continuing process after project funding	C: The measures designed to move towards intermediate states have started, but have not produced results.
B: The project’s intended outcomes were delivered, and were designed to feed into a continuing process, but with no prior allocation of responsibilities after project funding	B: The measures designed to move towards intermediate states have started and have produced results, which give no indication that they can progress towards the intended long term impact.
A: The project’s intended outcomes were delivered, and were designed to feed into a continuing process, with specific allocation of responsibilities after project funding.	A: The measures designed to move towards intermediate states have started and have produced results, which clearly indicate that they can progress towards the intended long term impact.

TABLE 4: RATING SCALE FOR THE “OVERALL LIKELIHOOD OF IMPACT ACHIEVEMENT”.

Highly Likely	Likely	Moderately Likely	Moderately Unlikely	Unlikely	Highly Unlikely
AA AB BA CA BB+ CB+ DA+ DB+	BB CB DA DB AC+ BC+	AC BC CC+ DC+	CC DC AD+ BD+	AD BD CD+ DD+	CD DD

6. This Review of Outcomes to Impacts (RoTI) methodology has only recently been introduced by GEF and this evaluation represents one of its earliest uses by the UNEP Office of Evaluation. Unfortunately, the TE discovered a flaw in its logic when trying to apply it, since the table showing the ratings scale for the overall likelihood of impact achievement (Table 4) assumes a two-letter coding running from AA to DD with all possible combinations in between. However, while the explanation of these letter codes (Table 3) suggests that all two letter codes are possible, a perusal of the examples given in Annex 7 of the TE’s TOR (attached in full with complete annexes in Annex I of this evaluation report) shows this not to be possible since under the application of codes D and C it states:

“Funds were spent, outputs were produced, but nothing in terms of outcomes was achieved. People attended training courses but there is no evidence of increased capacity. A website was developed, but no one used it. (Score – D)”

“Outcomes achieved but are dead ends; no forward linkages to intermediary stages in the future. People attended training courses, increased their capacities, but all left for other jobs shortly after; or were not given opportunities to apply their new skills. A website was developed and was used, but achieved little or nothing of what was intended because intended end users had no access to computers. People had meetings that led nowhere. Outcomes hypothesized or achieved, but either insignificant and/or no evident linkages forward to intermediary stages leading towards impacts. (Score – C)”

From these, it is clear that if there are no linkages forwards to an intermediary stage, then it is not possible to then continue forwards and apply a coding to that intermediary stage; and indeed the example paragraph goes on to state:

“Outcomes” scored C or D. If the outcomes above scored C or D, there is no need to continue forward to score intermediate stages given that achievement of such is then not possible.”

As a result, the TE has dispensed with any two letter combination for any component assessed as C or D in relation to its outputs and has simply called C as Unlikely, and D as Highly Unlikely (although again he concedes that logically “Impossible” would be a better term since if the outcomes were not achieved he cannot see an intermediary stage ever being achievable).

PROJECT PREPARATION

BACKGROUND

7. The concept note for the Project was approved by UNEP in March 2000 and by the GEF in April 2000, and the PDF-B became operational in August 2000. Unfortunately in the autumn of 2001, the Africa, Europe and Middle East division of the project’s main proponent, Wetlands International, became insolvent which led to significant delays with the PDF-B. The uncertainties associated with the fragility of that organisation meant that UNEP-GEF and the project partners decided that WI was not strong enough institutionally to implement the project and hence an agreement was made to introduce UNOPS to reduce risks and maintain project viability. The Project Document and associated papers were completed and finally submitted for STAP review in January 2003 and this was duly carried out in February 2003. Unfortunately, on 26th February 2003 a US\$ 10 million portion of the co-financing earmarked as coming from the Dutch Directorate General for International Cooperation (DGIS) vanished when government restructuring re-allocated priorities. This meant that the proposal had to be withdrawn and the training component re-worked, in effect removing its delivery activities. The proposal was re-submitted, with its co-funding budget reduced from US\$ 20.3 million to US\$ 12 million, had its second STAP review in August

2003, and was submitted to the GEF Council in October 2003 for inclusion in the November 2003 Work Programme.

8. Comments from GEF Council and GEFSec required the adjustments of some key project elements and management set-up. GEFSec comments in particular proved difficult because there appeared to be a fundamental antipathy towards the flyway approach. Coincidentally, a change in the UNEP-GEF programme manager resulted in a review of the budget during which a) there was deemed to be a shortfall in the allocations for UNOPS and b) the rates which WI were charging were found to be above UNEP-GEF guidelines. Both of these resulted in significant re-working of other budget lines. In addition, the German Federal Agency for Nature Conservation (BfN)⁷, who were supplying € 1 million in co-financing, were involved in an iterative process of requiring more and more detail regarding budgets and activities. With no additional resources available from a financially fragile WI, no PDF-B funds left, and the key designer promoted and re-allocated within WI, responses to all of these issues took considerable time and resulted in significant further delays. A full resubmission was finally made some two years later in late 2005, crucially with the original GEF contribution now reduced from US\$ 9 million to US\$ 6 million and the co-financing now reduced to US\$ 6.2 million.

9. GEF CEO endorsement was received, on 14th December 2005 as a Full-sized Project under Operational Programme #2 – Coastal, Marine and Freshwater Ecosystems and as part of Biodiversity Strategic Priorities “*I. Catalyzing sustainability of Protected Areas*” and “*IV. Generation and Dissemination of Best Practices for Addressing Current and Emerging Biodiversity Issues*” of the GEF Business Plan. UNEP-GEF signed the Project Document with UNOPS (Executing Agency) on 4th April 2006, thereby commencing the Project. Project endorsement from the participating Governments was reflected in their endorsement letters of 2003 thereby negating the need for them to sign the Project Document. First disbursements were made on 20th June 2006. No project inception workshop was organised but the Project Coordination Unit was fully staffed by 31st July 2006 and the first technical workshop (for the CSN⁸ tool) was held on 30th August 2006.

CONCEPT AND DESIGN

10. This Project is one of the first to address the conservation of migratory species at a flyway scale and is to be congratulated on its innovation. It was designed to respond to the continued loss and degradation of wetland sites along key migration routes within the African-Eurasian Flyway that threatens the survival of many waterbird species. Although the Project Document is lucidly written, well structured, and largely cogently argued, it states that the root causes of these threats are:

“generally due to unsustainable development pressures on natural resources, weak coordination and cooperation between government agencies and NGOs, insufficient technical capacity to manage sites locally and within the flyway context, low awareness amongst a wide variety of stakeholder groups (from decision-makers to site-based practitioners to community leaders) and poor access to resources to inform and assist conservation activity”.

which tends to overstate the role of NGOs in the decision-making process. It goes on to stress that:

“limitations and weaknesses generally stem from gaps in provision of certain types of resources (generally and within specific sub-regions) and a lack of strategic coordination of and access to those that exist across the flyway. As a result uneven capacity to plan and manage flyways exists; this is a major barrier to effective flyway conservation”.

However, there are key gaps in its design logic, its budgeting, and its organisational arrangements.

⁷ Subsequently the responsibility for this moved to the Ministry of Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety; Germany (BMU).

⁸ The TE makes a pedantic observation over the general nomenclature – sites within this tool have become known as CSN sites (i.e. Critical Site Network sites!) when perhaps it would have been better to call it the CNS tool (Critical Network of Sites tool) and refer to such sites as CN sites, in keeping with the Project’s Title “*Enhancing Conservation of the Critical Network of Sites required by Migratory Waterbirds on the African/Eurasian Flyways*”.

Design Logic

11. The Project concept appears to have arisen from a presentation by Wetlands International to the first AEWA Meeting of Parties in October 1999. At that time, activities at a range of sites throughout the Flyway were envisaged as central to it and this is still evident from its official title “*Enhancing Conservation of the Critical Network of Sites required by Migratory Waterbirds on the African/Eurasian Flyways*”. Initial enquiries were made to people or organisations at a number of key sites to identify interest in being included in such a project, prior to approval of the concept note by UNEP in March 2000; e.g. a letter acknowledging receipt of such a proposal from Mauritania was dated 6/12/99. As this original concept was developed, its focus was clarified to be one of:

“enhancing capacity and catalysing new initiatives by raising awareness and enhancing access to information and techniques”.

However, in the final article, there is a degree of confusion right at the heart of this design for within its rationale under paragraph 32 of the Project Document, three main areas are identified where this approach is most urgently needed, namely:

“the improved identification and protective designation of wetlands, the development of technical and decision making capacity in specific sub-regions, and the enhancement of communications capacity for stakeholders at the site and decision-making level”.

A fourth idea, that of demonstration sites, became lumped in with these in language that suggests that this was either an afterthought or, as interviews suggest, maintenance of the original concept that no longer clearly fitted, thus:

“Site-based demonstration projects are also embedded in this approach, but their rationale is as showcases for best practice across the project area to catalyse other activity”.

12. In many ways, the design as proposed misses some real chances to be properly integrated. Although the TE recognises that GEF requirements have changed over the years and greater flexibility now appears possible in terms of a Project’s acceptable length, a design whereby a first phase delivered the CSN tool and the Flyway Training Kit, and a second phase demonstrated key management issues at sites selected to be linked in some way by the CSN tool (e.g. critical sites for certain representative species, transboundary sites, key unprotected sites) and where the Flyway Training Kit could also be brought into play, would seem to be better integrated. Such a design would have clearly required a different approach to the management, funding, and crucially the timing of the project, perhaps making it a seven or ten year one, but then again perhaps the project acting at the flyway scale was sufficient innovation for GEF in one project and anything further might have been a step too far to have gained approval.

#2	Lesson learned: The current requirements of GEF funding have perversely formed an obstacle to the logical development of a broad-based (as opposed to species-specific) flyway-scale project.
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13. The logframe was also weak. A consultancy⁹ let in October 2007 with the objective of revising and updating the monitoring and evaluation framework noted that while it was stronger than in many projects with good development objective indicators, those at the immediate objective level were poorer but those at the component level were absent altogether – although in fairness it has to be noted that GEF requirements and experience have come a long way from when the Project was designed. This same consultancy picked up on the confusion noted above, suggesting that the demonstration projects were “*not sufficiently emphasised or clarified*” and that:

“more strategic thought needs to be given as to how [these] can optimally contribute to the project’s development objective and the project’s immediate objective”.

14. The Project was extremely ambitious in both its scale and nature, yet there appear to be a number of flaws in its components. The Critical Site Network tool (Component 1) addresses the need to increase access to existing data sets to improve decision-making and planning in a coordinated way throughout the Flyway, and yet it takes an overly narrow view of this focussing upon “*the improved identification and protective designation of wetlands*” rather than, say, a wider planning tool of direct use to the sectoral

⁹ Dennis Fenton.

ministries of Governments of States within the region. While this is at first appearance rather odd, it is wholly understandable given the nature of the lead design organisation, Wetlands International, one of whose prime responsibilities is to provide technical data support to the AEWA and Ramsar secretariats. However, the relevance of this approach is questionable (see paragraph 130) in the light of the fact that designation of sites by a country does not necessarily lead to their protection, and the internal logic appears to owe more to what the organisation has to offer in terms of a project than it does about meeting an espoused need from the decision-makers; some interviewees considered the Project to be “*supply driven rather than demand driven*”. The continued focus on identification and protective designation through environment ministries (or equivalents), traditionally amongst the least influential in any government, renders the end product of questionable effectiveness in the overall fight to conserve sites effectively¹⁰.

15. In the same vein, the demonstration sites (Component 3) appear to add little to the overall rationale of the Project appearing to have no apparent logic in either their geographic selection or their range of disciplines. While the idea of making some sort of link through sites/activities important to one or more species was apparently mooted (and apparently rejected by GEF on the grounds that a species-based flyway project was already underway – the Siberian Crane Wetland Project¹¹), such a link would undoubtedly have increased the relevance and credibility of the demonstration programme. A link demonstrating just one or two key activities (e.g. transboundary management planning) would have provided the same result. Similarly, the geographic selection lacks logic. The rationale of the Project Document talks about the root cause being present:

“across the African/Eurasian region but its intensity is not uniformly distributed, being particularly intense in specific sub-regions intensity”

and given that the design of the rest of the components specifically takes into account and focuses upon four sub-regions – eastern and southern Africa; western and central Africa; Middle East; and Caucasus and Central Asia – it is a little strange (although possibly understandable in terms of logistics) that three of the demonstration sites lie within Eastern Europe, and none within Caucasus and Central Asia. This in turn leads on to weaknesses inherent in the design of the exchange programme, since exchanges between different demonstration sites involving different activities in different regions will not facilitate the needs of:

“practitioners who often have similar issues to resolve but have relatively little direct contact to discuss these and learn from one another”.

Budgeting

16. The approach to budgeting throughout the design and approval process has been one of over-optimism and is inherent in most aspects of the design. As indicated in paragraphs 6-7, the tortuous design process resulted in a project initially costed as somewhere approaching US\$ 30 million (GEF US\$ 9 million; co-financing US\$ 20.3 million) eventually being approved with a budget of US\$ 12.2 million – but crucially without its intended deliverables being adequately re-designed to fit these increased limitations. Instead, enthusiasm and optimism flourished where a dose of cold reality might have been better applied. The most remarkable example of this can be found in the revised Project Document where the idea of developing networks to bring non-project practitioners to training events and demonstration sites had been hit by cuts in co-financing. The revised statement of approach, i.e.:

“The programme will offer funding to initiate exchange, and establish the structure within which it will work. Part of the programme will focus on the generation of financing to enable the Programme to develop. Other agencies, particularly in Europe, are anticipated to offer co-support to the evolving networks.”

is unsubstantiated and overly optimistic, while:

“The exchange programme will be developed as a framework with minimal funding to implement it. The extent to which this will be implemented in each sub-region will then be

¹⁰ **AEWA comment:** *Although I see the point it must be said that the CSN Tool is the first step for follow up work incl. designation and protection of sites under RAMSAR and perhaps even if it the sites does not qualify to be designated as RAMSAR site to develop a new tool under AEWA for designation of AEWA sites. This process has meanwhile started within AEWA.*

¹¹ The full title of the project is “*Development of a Wetland Site and Flyway Network for Conservation of the Siberian Crane and Other migratory Waterbirds in Asia*”.

dependent on the engagement of other donors in response to requests by local stakeholders who will also be expected to assist in pursuing this financing. This will ensure that the Programme is driven by the enthusiasm and commitment of the relevant agencies and not purely by project funding.”

is nothing short of fanciful (and as time proved, futile). No amount of “*enthusiasm and commitment*” is going to be able to surmount the need for hard funding to implement an exchange programme which by its very nature involves travel costs. It is strange that in two otherwise excellent STAP reviews, this latter statement was overtly condoned.

17. This issue of optimism in regard of budgeting and a blinkered approach to re-designing components to fit funding, has continued elsewhere in the project, e.g. belief in AEWA’s commitment of co-funding in spite of early signals that this might not be forthcoming (see paragraph 96) and WI’s continued commitment to the expensive training of trainers (ToT) model for the training materials when cheaper alternatives existed (see paragraph 105). While WI has to shoulder much of the responsibility for these faults as the lead designer, its lack of a track record for financial adroitness was evident for all involved to see, given the insolvency of its Africa, Europe and Middle East division during the Project’s design, and this should have increased the levels of vigilance and ensured that the budgets proposed were adequately reviewed in detail. In some areas, and by some people, they were – and yet here the emphasis appeared to be on making cuts to fit certain criteria (e.g. keeping management costs below a certain proportion of the overall budget) without keeping in view the whole picture of the activities proposed or the scale at which the project was going to work. Indeed, if some of the activities were themselves under-budgeted, perhaps the worst underestimates ended up being those related to management, where a number of items were not adequately factored in, e.g.:

- staffing, support, and travel costs for the PCU;
- WI requested two full-time posts for supervision and liaison which were not approved leaving them with staff time for supervision of just 20 days per year;
- a part-time communications officer to cover the needs of liaison with 34 of the donors, and partners and stakeholder in 19 countries;
- no budget for a project website;
- inadequate budget for monitoring and evaluation, particularly for the external evaluations.

As such, all those involved in the various reviews are culpable of letting, as the Mid-term Evaluation (MTE) succinctly puts it,

“a globally-relevant pilot initiative start with an inadequate budget and funding uncertainties”.

#10	Lesson Learned: Budgeting has to be based on reality, not optimism.
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#11	Lesson Learned: One size does not fit all. The proportion of money spent on management and coordination of a highly complex, multi-scale, multi-country project has to be bigger than on a simpler single country one.
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Organisational Arrangements

18. The organisational arrangements in the design appear to have failed to keep track with its dynamic evolution. Initially, WI, as the main Project proponent, was to have been the executing agency for the Project, but its insolvency led to the introduction of UNOPS into that role through a PCU. In itself, this appears never to have been fully discussed with WI and the MTE suggests that WI never consented to this arrangement. What is clear subsequently is that this decision clearly, and possibly quite rightly, rankled with WI so there was always a strong likelihood of tension between the two bodies. However, what enabled these tensions to escalate dangerously and become issues of ownership, was the inability of the design to have clarified the roles and responsibilities of the two organisations and to have had a clear reporting structure making it clear who was ultimately responsible for delivery of the Project. On the one hand, the PCU was clearly responsible for the management of GEF funds, but WI had been charged with managing an equal amount of co-financing, sometimes through completely separate bilateral contractual arrangements (e.g. with

BfN), hence there was room for ambiguity; particularly so with an NGO without previous experience of GEF project implementation and an understanding that in such a project, GEF always assumes paramountcy. These deficiencies extend to other areas such as the Project Steering Committee whose terms of reference were not adequate to cover the degree of engagement that such a complex project would clearly require. The MTE notes that these ambiguities are “*surprising for a project that invested several years and considerable funds in its design*”, but any one or more of at least three factors could explain it:

- the same optimism, enthusiasm, and the slightly naïve belief that all parties are working towards a common goal, that is apparent over the budgeting issues applied similarly here;
- the introduction of the PCU came at a late stage in the project causing difficulties for an over-stretched design team with then limited resources (see paragraph 8) to respond to;
- a failure of WI as the chief designer to recognise fully the implications of the introduction of the PCU and perhaps an unwillingness to take account of something that they did not consent to having foisted upon “their” project.

UNEP Programming Context

19. At the time of its design, the WOW Project was deemed to be congruent with the strategic objective: “*...promoting multi-country cooperation directed to achieving global environmental benefits*” detailed in the “*Action Plan on Complementarity Between the Activities Undertaken by UNEP under the GEF and its Programme of Work (1999)*” by proposing to improve international cooperation mechanisms for the conservation of a network of globally important wetlands in Africa and Eurasia required for the survival of migratory waterbirds including a number of globally endangered species. It is also linked to the strategic objective “*...relating national and regional priorities to global environmental objectives*” through proposing to build the capacity for flyway conservation at national and sub-regional levels and by directing resources towards project activities that will achieve global benefits (such as conservation of internationally important wetlands and threatened waterbird species). Even though the start of its design preceded the *UNEP Medium Term Strategy (MTS)/Programme of Work 2010/11* by 12 years, the Project’s Outcomes are still complementary with, and will actively promote, two of the “*Expected Accomplishments*” articulated under the focal area of Ecosystem Management, namely:

- (a) “*That countries and regions increasingly integrate an ecosystem management approach into development and planning processes; and*
- (b) *That countries and regions have capacity to utilize ecosystem management tools*”.

While the magnitude and extent of these contributions cannot as yet be measured because the products have only recently been delivered, the causal link is obvious – the CSN tool is specifically designed to increase the integrated management of the African-Eurasian Flyway as an entity, and the Flyway Training Kit is designed to build the capacity of all those involved in working with flyways including the ability to use the CSN tool and other ecosystem management tools.

20. The Outcomes of the Project are also complementary with two of the Objectives (and two sub-objectives) of the Bali Strategic Plan, namely:

- (a) “*To strengthen the capacity of Governments of developing countries as well as of countries with economies in transition, at all levels:*
- (iii) *To comply with international agreements and implement their obligations at the national level;*
- (vi) *To develop national research, monitoring and assessment capacity to support national institutions in data collection, analysis and monitoring of environmental trends and in establishing infrastructure for scientific development and environmental management, in order to ensure sustainability of capacity-building efforts; and*
- (c) *To provide a framework for capacity-building to ensure the effective participation of developing countries as well as countries with economies in transition in negotiations concerning multilateral environmental agreements;”*

while the involvement of numerous countries in Africa, Middle East, and Central Asia in collecting, sharing, and using data to a common purpose, and in contributing to the development and implementation of the Flyway Training Kit through regional centres, provides excellent examples of South-South cooperation.

Objectives and Components

21. As indicated in paragraph 13, in October 2007 the Project's logical framework and those of the demonstration projects were revised to help improve them as management tools for monitoring and evaluation and to take account of developments since the original design, particularly in respect of the Project's context and baseline which had changed significantly due to the dynamic process related to UNEP-AEWA; to inflation in many countries over the Project's prolonged gestation making the available project budget may be less than the actual costs; and to reduced levels of funding in the GEF contribution and certain sources of co-financing. This current logframe with four Components, ten Outputs, and 14 indicators has been used throughout as the basis for this evaluation (see [Annex IV](#)), as have the Immediate Objective indicators from the logframes of the demonstration projects (see [Annex V](#)). The following are the key objectives formulated for the Project¹²:

Goal (Development Objective)

To conserve globally significant migratory waterbirds and wetlands in the African-Eurasian flyways.

Objective (Immediate Objective)

To strengthen strategic capacity to plan and manage the conservation of migratory waterbirds and the critical sites along their flyways.

Component 1

Conservation activities strengthened through the development and use of a comprehensive, flyway scale, critical site network planning and management tool.

Component 2

Establishing a basis for strengthening decision-making and technical capacity for wetland and migratory waterbird conservation.

Component 3

Improved conservation status at sites critical for waterbirds, and knowledge is generated on how to enhance conservation across the African-Eurasian flyways

Component 4

Catalyzing the exchange of information for wetlands and migratory waterbird conservation.

READINESS

22. It is clear with the 20-20 vision that hindsight brings, that the Project's partners were not ready to implement this project at the outset. The Project Document was clearly inadequate as the basis on which to frame the Project's institutional arrangements (see paragraph 18) since it was designed by an organisation that a) had expected to implement the project itself; b) had little or no practical knowledge of the GEF project cycle; c) had had management changes for the project foisted upon it; and d) had over-stretched resources to complete the design (see paragraph 8). There are no indications that lessons from any other project were incorporated into the design, and partnership arrangements were not properly identified nor were roles and responsibilities negotiated prior to project implementation – indeed the issue of introducing a UNOPS-staffed Project Coordination Unit (PCU) appears to have been either non-consensual or at least contentious.

23. The different understandings, expectations, management styles, and institutional cultures involved coupled with an over-optimistic budget and a failure of donors to deliver the expected co-funding generated a volatile cocktail that almost killed the Project. Amazingly, there was no formal inception period – no workshop, no report – during which organisations and people that had never worked together before could spend time discovering differences between themselves, analysing different styles and dynamics, assessing

¹² This new logical framework was endorsed officially by the WOW Steering Committee in January 2008.

capacities and chemistry, defining roles, and forging common approaches and understandings. In the TE’s view, this was a major error. In particular, WI’s inexperience in undertaking GEF projects should have been identified as a potential problem from the outset, and BLI’s knowledge of the rapidity and difficulty of this learning period, garnered through its recent immersion in implementing other GEF projects, could have been fruitfully brought to bear. The politics of introducing the PCU as the main management vehicle late on in the design should also have been recognised, since it is only human nature that a degree of resentment should continue to simmer not far below the surface when “WI’s” project (conceptualised, designed, led, and expected to be implemented by them) was removed from their control. While much has been made of the ambiguities in the various sets of TORs, the basic lack of understanding of UN-agency-implemented GEF project monitoring and reporting requirements lies at the core of many of the problems experienced by the WOW Project, exacerbated by WI’s apparent unwillingness to readily accept GEF’s primacy in the project and the role of the CTA as the person with overall responsibility for its delivery¹³. As the MTE eloquently puts it,

“There are basic management concepts that are taken for granted within the UN universe, yet need to be “de-mystified” (and if necessary adapted) with external partners to harmonise expectations and ensure common understanding. Even the Chief Technical Advisor’s title suggests an advisory, team-player role that is partly misleading given the CTA’s hierarchical position and management/decision-making attributes”.

However, as WI has indicated, it was not that it was unwilling to accept such primacy so much as to express a concern over the tendency of the PCU to confuse responsibility for delivery with the lead in determining how to achieve successful delivery. The two main components that WI was assigned the technical lead over (the CSN tool and the Flyway Training Kit) were built on novel approaches that had been constructed over years of careful preparation and based on WI’s experience in those fields. Any unwillingness displayed was in relation to letting go of the technical lead of components that were at the core of what the Project was aiming for, set against a background of unfamiliarity of the PCU with these topics coupled with a tendency of the PCU to possibly over-step the mark in the degree to which it got involved in the technical substance of the deliverables rather than facilitating their delivery by the partners themselves. This heady mix of problems was yet further complicated by the involvement of a number of strong-minded personalities; a Project Steering Committee (PSC) neither correctly manned to be properly impartial nor readily primed to be engaged adequately to address the problems encountered; and a pervasive sense of WI’s ownership¹⁴ of the WOW concept (if not brand) that has permeated almost all aspects of the Project to the other partners’ displeasure (e.g. agreeing the design of the website, and the form of the Flyway Training Kit) and which to some extent still does so, witness the drawn-out process of agreeing the Memorandum of Cooperation for turning the WOW Project into a Programme¹⁵. If ever a project required an inception period, this was the one.

#4	Lesson Learned: All projects require an inception period; complex projects require one even more.
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24. On the financial front, the Project was under-budgeted from the start (see paragraphs 16-17) even if all promises of co-financing were to be honoured. Unfortunately, AEWA’s promises were built on misconceptions and much of the expected co-financing from that source failed to appear (c. US\$ 1 million) which severely hampered implementation and led to significant strategic decisions over management and duration of the Project. Only at a later stage, when AEWA managed to undertake significant fund-raising

¹³ **AEWA comment:** Personally I often felt that having the PCU based at the Wetlands International Office also had a negative impact on the relationship between WI and UNOPS.....I offered to host the PCU from the beginning in Bonn but that was refused by WI.

¹⁴ **WI comment:** WI indeed displayed strong ownership of the WOW concept, in the positive sense: a strong belief in, and commitment to, even identification with the concept, not so much the brand. In relation to the brand WI showed much less ownership, there was (and is) even doubt within its ranks that the brand is needed for the concept to be successful. Therefore these issues should not be presented in one here, because it creates the wrong picture.

¹⁵ **WI comment:** WI is indeed still committed to the Flyway approach and the WOW concept, again in the positive sense. The fact that the signing of the partnership took the time it did, is to be interpreted as a sign that WI takes partnerships very seriously, it is one of our core working values, and we have a partnership policy for creating new partnerships. This policy prescribes the process for developing such partnerships, sets conditions and includes several consultation steps and endorsement at the level of our governance. Although this takes time it should NOT be seen as a negatively interpreted ‘pervasive sense of WI’s ownership’. **TE response:** The TE hopes that this comment will help reassure its partners who expressed the view given in the text.

activities, was much of this deficit in co-financing made good¹⁶. The issue was seriously compounded by the substantial weakening of the US dollar, firstly during the prolonged period from design to inception, falling from US\$ 1 = € 0.863 in November 2003 when the Project entered the GEF Work Programme to US\$ 1 = € 0.794 in June 2006 when first disbursements to the Project were made (an 8% devaluation), and secondly during the lifetime of the Project itself, falling to US\$ 1 = € 0.623 in mid April 2008 (a 28% devaluation). While the converse is true for the German Government's co-financing, and a gain of 17.1% resulted from the relatively strong Euro, because the size of the GEF funding was four times that of the BfN co-finance, the overall effect was negative. The MTE makes a serious point on this matter which is worth repeating since it:

“goes beyond the project and relates to general budgeting practices. Ways of ensuring some form of protection or “hedge” for such eventualities should be found for projects of this nature – i.e. currency conversions, short-term deposits yielding high interest – that is compatible with UNEP/GEF administrative regulations.”¹⁷

But while currency fluctuations and to some extent co-financing difficulties are effectively beyond the Project's control, the issue of under-budgeting is not. It appears that sufficient money was simply not allocated to project management, exchange programmes, workshops, publications, communications, monitoring or evaluation, and this evaluation can only concur in the strongest possible terms with the point made by the MTE, that:

“It is surprising that a project of WOW's magnitude and global relevance could have been approved without sufficient funds ... The oversights and omissions in the approved budget raise questions on the effectiveness of project appraisal and approval practices within GEF and UNEP.” [the TE's emphasis.]

Demonstration sites

25. The delays in the design and approval stages also had effects on the demonstration projects, the baseline contexts and implementing frameworks for which had in many cases changed significantly over the intervening period, and which resulted in time-consuming and costly re-designs before implementation could commence. This was most notable in the case of Lithuania where Government money had been provided to the local administrative authority of the regional park to undertake a feasibility study for water management in the floodplains of the Nemunas River delta, with the understanding (via a formal agreement) that the funds would be reimbursed to Lithuania by WI through the first GEF payment anticipated in early 2002. This subsequently failed to materialise, and resulted in Lithuania terminating its membership of WI. By the time the WOW Project finally commenced, the land tenure arrangements for the proposed project had changed because Lithuania had joined the EU (2004) and much of the state land on which the demonstration project had been planned had become private. This, plus the fact that inflation and economic growth had increased prices by ten times meant that the project had to be completely re-designed and re-budgeted – the latter which resulted in a considerable increase in co-funding. However, not all countries fared so well, and elsewhere the delays resulted in the loss of significant amounts of co-financing which cost the poorer countries dear (see final bullet point, paragraph 96).

The design and approval process bequeathed a myriad of problems to the Project, both overt and covert, at many levels and in many different guises. This, together with inadequate preparation, e.g. no inception period or workshop, meant that it was totally unready to tackle most of its significant challenges, hence preparation and readiness have been evaluated as **Highly Unsatisfactory**.

¹⁶ **AEWA comment:** *I partly disagree because I promised US \$ 1.3 million and as far as I know we managed to get nearly 1 million. The fact that the project duration was shortened had a negative impact on the fundraising (less time) and of course the economic crisis has had a impact (less volycons [STET]).* **TE response:** Again this misses the point that the delay in the arrival of much of this promised funding lead to cash flow problems and was as, if not more, important as the overall shortfall (see paragraph 99 and Figure 2). The cash flow issue led to the Project being shortened. See also footnote #1.

¹⁷ **AEWA comment:** *In principal GEF should allocate the funds in the currency that is mainly used ... so in Europe we should use € ... by doing so the risk are lower.* **TE response:** The TE agrees completely.

PROJECT RESULTS

ATTAINMENT OF OBJECTIVES

Summary of Achievements

26. The WOW Project has struggled through some serious implementation issues, foremost amongst which has been a chronic shortage of funding brought about initially by a mismatch between re-budgeting iterations during the design process without a concomitant restructuring of the Project's activities to match. This was then seriously compounded by failures in the overall delivery and timing of committed co-financing. Dangerously high levels of institutional tensions, poor governance, and related issues came very close to derailing the Project completely during its first two years, and yet not only has it survived, it has gone on to thrive and produce very good results. Although it has not appeared to have succeeded in achieving its developmental or immediate objective indicators, in part this is down to poor measurement and, in the TE's opinion, the indirectness of the links between the indicator and the Project's activities. A perusal of Annex IV will show that all eight of the nine component indicators that have been measurable or estimable have been fully achieved, and that of the 29 immediate objective indicators defined for the 11 demonstration projects (Annex V), 18 (62%) have been fully achieved and six (21%) nearly achieved – a very creditable performance and one which at the halfway stage did not look possible. Furthermore, the Project partners have put their differences behind them and gone on to sign a Memorandum of Cooperation to consolidate the achievements made and turn the WOW Project into a Programme which will provide a strong institutional framework for the long-term sustainability of the Project's outputs and continuity for building upon its achievements. These achievements also have to be assessed in the context of its ambition and logistical requirements – it is one of the first to work at a flyway scale, involved 106 activities in 11 countries¹⁸, and required the management and coordination of 17 contractors and sub-contractors, 314 NGO staff, 320 Government staff, and 2,869 volunteers.

Overall, the Project has achieved most of its major relevant objectives and yielded satisfactory global environmental benefits, with only minor shortcomings, and hence its attainment of objectives and results is evaluated as **Satisfactory**.

27. Key Project achievements include:

- a state-of-the-art interactive internet-based tool enabling rapid access to all available data on important wetland sites and waterbird species' populations within the African-Eurasian Flyways along with the development of two new criteria to identify critical sites;
- a high quality, fully-comprehensive, almost encyclopaedic, modular-based training kit (in English, French, Russian and Arabic) to form the basis for a training of trainers programme to raise the capacity of all of those involved with conservation of wetlands and waterbirds within the Africa-Eurasia Flyway;
- a Memorandum of Cooperation between the four project partners (two MEAs and two international NGOs), the leading proponents of wetland and waterbird conservation within the region, to turn the WOW Project partnership into a programmatic partnership to build on the WOW approach and to translate WOW's initial achievements into a long-term, collaborative, flyways-scale programme to achieve conservation of migratory waterbirds and improved management of wetlands;
- being instrumental in having Africa's first trans-boundary Ramsar site designated in Senegal and Gambia, and in facilitating international cooperation between Lithuania and Russia in protecting the Nemunas River Delta;
- leveraging US\$ 5.5 million of catalytic finance from national and EU Structural Development funds for large-scale (c. 150 ha) restoration of open meadows in the Nemunas River Delta;
- breaking new ground in demonstrating new ideas at several demonstration sites:
 - the first management plan to be written at the Commune level in Niger;

¹⁸ The 11 demonstration projects. In addition, staff involved in activities were also located in the Netherlands, United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, Canada, Switzerland, Jordan, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Kenya.

- a new method for biodiversity-friendly, economically-viable fish-farming in Hungary;
 - a community-based approach to wetland restoration providing significant economic as well as environmental benefits in Nigeria; and
 - a comprehensive language and technical training programme to fully-equip eco-guides for employment in Mauritania.
- integrated management plans covering a total of 3,435 km² of wetlands within the Flyway – 27,184 ha Estonia, 27,000 ha in Lithuania, 66,820 ha in Niger, 80,940 ha in Senegal/Gambia, 128,900 ha in Turkey, 12,626 ha in Yemen.

28. The main problem areas identified by the TE are:

- poor design and design process;
- the lack of an adequate inception process to clarify roles and responsibilities, and to harmonise expectations and management styles;
- chronic under-funding;
- questionable relevance of the two key deliverables – the CSN tool and the Flyway Training Kit¹⁹; and
- no link between the demonstration projects and the flyway-scale approach.

29. A Review of Outcomes to Impacts is given in Table 5 and a summary evaluation by Project Output is given in Table 6. A more detailed evaluation of the level of achievements made against the indicators of success contained in the logframe is given in Annex IV, and the same for the Immediate Objective indicators of the demonstration projects is given in Annex V. A description of Project achievements is given below by Project Outcome while key sectoral and cross-cutting issues are discussed in the ensuing sections.

Development Objective Indicators

30. Development objectives are those to which the project will *contribute towards* but which are not expected to be achievable within the lifetime of the project. In this case, the indicators selected are well beyond the Project's ability to influence and, although considered "good" by the M&E consultant improving the logframes in October 2007, the TE believes them to be nothing but distant targets for a project mostly focussed on improving access to information and building capacity within the flyway. At the time of the TE, one indicator has been achieved, albeit through coincidental issues, while the other two have fallen short of their targets.

- Overall extinction risk of AEWA waterbirds, as measured by the red list index for AEWA region (in line with AEWA SAP, 2009-17).
 - End of Project assessment being made for 15th December 2010, but indications are that the expected value will show a small decrease to around 0.93.

The Project's Outcomes may ultimately influence this indicator positively, but only after a considerable period of time.

- The numbers of sites designated using Ramsar Convention criteria 5, 6 (specific criteria based on waterbirds) as Internationally Important wetlands under the Ramsar Convention in the 119 countries of the AEWA region.
 - As of 14th October 2010 a total of 589 sites had been designated as Ramsar sites using Ramsar Convention criteria 5 and 6 – an increase of 391 over the baseline or an increase of 197% – but this is largely because of the Ramsar Secretariat processing and clearing a huge backlog of applications rather than being attributable to the WOW Project's activities.
- The number of countries ratifying AEWA (in line with AEWA SAP, 2009-17).
 - As of 14th October 2010, 64 countries have become Contracting Parties to AEWA (+ 11 with respect to baseline – an increase of 21%); which is below the target of 85.

¹⁹ See footnotes # 2-4 by the PSC Chair and WI given under the Executive Summary.

Both these indicators effectively measure a political response to waterbird conservation in general. The effectiveness of the former could certainly be influenced by the CSN tool, but it remains hard to see how the Project Outcomes could directly affect the political will of countries towards waterbird conservation – either a) countries are already amenable to designating more sites (in which case the CSN tool will help) or to joining AEWA (in which case the Project has little influence) or b) they are not amenable to designating more sites or joining AEWA in which case the results of the project will have little if any effect in changing their collective mind.

Immediate Objective Indicators

31. The Immediate Objective is something that the project is trying to achieve in its lifetime or shortly thereafter, and is a key element in the M&E framework because it defines the project’s target. In the case of the WOW Project, one of the two indicators’ target levels has been achieved.

- Aggregate score of WOW Capacity Scorecard
 - Indicator altered to average score because of differences in sample sizes arising from changes in number of persons active in training boards – see indicator I1 in Annex IV and related footnote. Scores show a 2% increase against a 10% target.

This indicator is a little narrow, concentrated as it is on a single limited group of stakeholders, the Regional Training Boards, who were actually selected to work with the Project because of their already acknowledged high capacity; but in the light of the projected training programme being severely curtailed, they form a moderately useful indication of progress.

- The level of satisfaction with the WOW products across the AEWA network practitioners (members of WOW team database).
 - This was not measured in the way envisaged. Nonetheless, the TE questionnaire and exit surveys from ToT courses suggest that there is general satisfaction with the WOW products.

This indicator is good because although a subjective-based measure, the level of satisfaction of the WOW products provides a direct indication of the likelihood that they will be adopted by practitioners across the Flyway and hence affect the development goal if not its indicators.

Effectiveness

Review of Outcomes to Impacts

32. Table 5 provides a review of the likelihood of outcomes being translated into intended impacts using the recently-introduced methodology described in paragraph 5, with alterations because of logical gaps described in paragraph 6.

TABLE 5: REVIEW OF OUTCOMES TO IMPACTS AT THE END OF PROJECT SITUATION

Component	Findings	Review of Outcomes to Impacts ²⁰
<p>Component 1: Conservation activities strengthened through the development and use of a comprehensive, flyway scale, critical site network planning and management tool</p>	<p>The CSN tool has been produced ahead of schedule within a shortened project lifespan and is available for use on the internet. Implicit forward linkages are evident through its adoption by various meetings of the AEWA and Ramsar networks of government personnel and other practitioners. Use of the tool is now in its earliest stages, thus it is too early for them to have produced results, but it is clear that the tool will be adopted by the professional fraternity to identify and designate new protected areas and to prioritise conservation actions and resources.</p>	<p>BC : Moderately Likely</p>

²⁰ See Appendix 7 of TOR in Annex I.

Component	Findings	Review of Outcomes to Impacts ²⁰
Component 2: Establishing a basis for strengthening decision-making and technical capacity for wetland and migratory waterbird conservation	The Flyway Training Kit has been published and explicit forward linkages are evident through its adoption onto the curricula of the École de Faune Garoua (Garoua Wildlife School) in Cameroon, and by the Royal Society for Conservation of Jordan, as well as having been used by the Kenya Wildlife Service Training Institute and the Ramsar Regional Centre in Iran. Agreements to formalise these arrangements are in hand. Funding is still being sort by Project partners to roll out implementation of the Training of Trainers programme originally envisioned in the Project's design. However, there is no firm indication that the long-term impacts can be achieved.	BB : Likely
Component 3: Improved conservation status at sites critical for waterbirds, and knowledge is generated on how to enhance conservation across the African-Eurasian flyways	Conservation status improved at most of the sites with demonstration projects, but the rationale that they act “ <i>as showcases for best practice across the project area to catalyse other activity</i> ” (see paragraph 11) has simply not been demonstrated convincingly; there are no explicit or implicit connections between them, they cover a disparate range of issues, and with one or two notable exceptions, cannot actually be said to be “ <i>best practice</i> ” rather than a response to national priorities and not to a flyway scale agenda. The knowledge generated has not been communicated across the Flyway in the way the design originally envisaged; and at the time of the TE, the expected publication summarising lessons learned from these activities had still not materialised – although it is believed to be still planned as part of a more general publication.	C : Unlikely
Estonia: Haapsalu-Noarootsi Bays	Integrated management plan produced with implicit forward linkages through political support, e.g. Government joining AEWA. Global environmental benefits within reach through application made for Ramsar designation and increases in globally significant bird populations achieved within lifespan of project.	BA+ : Highly Likely
Hungary: Biharugra Fishponds	New methods of fish-farming adopted by Agropoint Ltd. so explicit forward link into continued site management. Measurable impacts and increases in globally significant bird populations achieved within lifespan of project. Interest in replication established.	AA+ : Highly Likely
Lithuania: Nemunas River Delta	New bird observatory established and local monitoring scheme incorporated into State Monitoring Programme. Pilot habitat restoration, which has achieved increases in globally significant bird populations within lifespan of project, scaled up with finances leveraged by Project.	AA+ : Highly Likely
Mauritania: Parc National du Banc d’Arguin	Eco-guides trained to a fairly high standard, but no opportunities apparent for most of them to use these skills because of a downturn in tourism and insufficient efforts made to provide forward linkages (e.g. guiding association).	C : Unlikely
Niger: Namga-Kokorou Wetlands	Management plan produced with explicit forward linkage through its endorsement by Government bodies and its integration into the Department Development Plan, though necessary finance remains a concern. Replication of approach started at another Ramsar site in 2009.	AC : Moderately Likely

Component	Findings	Review of Outcomes to Impacts ²⁰
Nigeria: Hadejia-Nguru Wetlands	Main activity of <i>Typha</i> clearing has resulted in explicit forward linkages through demonstrable economic benefits to local communities. Intermediate states established through local tax (offset by increased income) to pay for continued management, and exploration of commercial uses for cleared <i>Typha</i> e.g fuel briquettes. Nearby communities requesting assistance with replication.	AA : Highly Likely
Senegal/Gambia: Saloum-Niumi complex	Transboundary management plan produced with explicit forward linkages through its endorsement by both Governments, and its integration through a single administrative structure. Some joint activities have started, e.g. bird monitoring, but it is too early to assess if they can progress towards the intended long-term impact, although initial signs are good.	AC : Moderately Likely
South Africa: Wakkerstroom Wetland	The Project has delivered its outputs but the design for these to feed into a continuing process is at best weak and no discernible progress towards intermediate states is apparent.	C : Unlikely
Tanzania: Dar es Salaam Wetlands	Project failed to deliver outputs.	D : Highly Unlikely
Turkey: Burdur Gölü	Project has delivered a Ramsar Management Plan and an increase in environmental awareness about the lake, and although there are implicit forward linkages through the Local Wetland Commission and voluntary groups, there is significant risk that these will dead-end because of insufficient funding now the project has ended ²¹ .	BD : Unlikely
Yemen: Aden Wetlands	Management plan delivered and nominal implicit forward linkages established through its endorsement by Aden Governorate and Environmental Protection Agency, but progress likely to “dead-end” unless it is included into Aden’s Economic Masterplan, progress with which has so far drawn a complete blank.	BD : Unlikely
Component 4: Catalyzing the exchange of information for wetlands and migratory waterbird conservation	The Project has worked effectively throughout in catalyzing information exchange, even if it has failed to deliver strengthened mechanisms for communication between governments and/or NGOs. There were no forward linkages to intermediary stages designed within the Project, but as a result of a) the Memorandum of Cooperation signed by the WOW partners to take the Project forward as a Programme; b) networks that have been galvanised by Project activities; and c) improvements to, and streamlining of, the IWC and IBA volunteer arrangements, implicit linkages are now evident. There are no measures yet evident of a move towards an intermediate state, but the TE does not believe this represents a “dead-end”, simply a state too early in the process for anything to be yet evident.	BC : Moderately Likely

²¹ **WI comment:** Given the long history of Doğa Derneği’s (the local implementing NGO) involvement and cooperation with the local authorities, it is likely activities will continue. **TE response:** History is no guide to the future. The Project Manager indicated that there was no further funding foreseen (at the time of interview) for activities and that her continuation in working both for Doğa Derneği and at the site would have to be on a voluntary basis. The assessment is made upon that information.

As a result of the review of outcomes to impacts (ROtI), the overall likelihood of impact achievement, the Project is expected to achieve most of its major global environmental objectives, and yield satisfactory global environmental benefits, with only minor shortcomings, hence effectiveness is evaluated as Satisfactory.

ACHIEVEMENT OF PROJECT OUTPUTS AND ACTIVITIES

TABLE 6: EVALUATION OF THE END OF PROJECT SITUATION AS PER THE LOGFRAME

Component	Evaluation*					
	HS	S	MS	MU	U	HU
Outcome 1.1 The network of critical sites is available as a tool for use by practitioners to underpin planning and management of and catalyse site level activity in flyway conservation	■					
Outcome 1.2 Primary data resources that underpin flyway conservation, planning and management activities enhanced to include all critically important sites in the AEWA region	■					
Outcome 1.3 Flyway data gathering and monitoring capacity strengthened to support the updating and maintenance of primary data resources that underpin conservation of the network of critical sites		■				
Outcome 1.4 Species and critical site knowledge base supports management and planning decision-making in flyway conservation			■			
Outcome 2.1 Transferable model Training and Awareness Raising Programme framework produced for developing wetland and waterbird conservation capacity	■					
Outcome 2.2 Wetland and waterbird conservation Training and Awareness Raising Programmes produced ready for implementation in four sub-regions		■				
Outcome 3.1 Demonstrations of best practice management of migratory waterbirds and wetlands available across the flyway			■			
Outcome 4.1 Mechanisms for governments and NGOs to communicate between themselves and with each other strengthened			■			
Outcome 4.2 Mechanisms of exchange between and within sub-regions for improved flyway-level migratory waterbird and wetland management established					■	
Outcome 4.3 Wise-use of migratory waterbirds and wetlands is better understood and implemented by governments in focal sub-regions					■	

* Note: HS = Highly satisfactory; S = Satisfactory; MS = Marginally satisfactory; MU= Marginally unsatisfactory; U = Unsatisfactory; HU = Highly unsatisfactory. Components are hyperlinked to relevant section.

Two excellent new resources – the CSN tool and Flyway Training Kit – have been produced for use across the region and ten out of 11 demonstration projects produced successful results to different standards. Some of the communication-focussed outcomes were seriously cut as a result of funding shortages, hence the achievement of outputs and activities is evaluated as **Satisfactory**.

Component 1: Conservation activities strengthened through the development and use of a comprehensive, flyway scale, critical site network planning and management tool

Outcome 1.1: The network of critical sites is available as a tool for use by practitioners to underpin planning and management of and catalyse site level activity in flyway conservation

33. This Outcome has resulted in the Critical Site Network (CSN) tool, a web-based portal that makes it easy to access a wide range of information on wetland sites and waterbirds occurring in Africa, Europe, and western and central Asia. The tool is a portal that seamlessly brings together data from a variety of existing databases, all maintained independently, and displays it through a map-based GIS system together with pop-up windows providing information on populations, e.g. numbers at sites, time series. The tool covers 294 species (see [Annex IX](#) for details of how these were selected) but presents the data at one level below this, i.e. for 561 populations – an extremely important development when dealing with conservation on a flyway

level since it provides the key link between sites – thereby facilitating analysis of information at the biogeographical population level, and providing a comprehensive basis for management and decision-making. Specific criteria, derived from Ramsar and IBA criteria, have been developed by the CSN team and discussed with the members of the AEW Technical Committee. Two criteria were defined for identifying sites considered to be critical for these populations during their annual lifecycle, thus:

CSN criterion 1: The site is known or thought to hold significant numbers of a population of a globally threatened waterbird species on a regular or predictable basis²².

CSN criterion 2: The site is known or thought to hold $\geq 1\%$ of a flyway or other distinct population of a waterbird species on a regular or predictable basis²³.

As a result, the tool contains details on 3,020 such sites that make up the Critical Site Network.

34. So, what do you get on the screen? Firstly, a highly-detailed, physical map of the world showing relief, rivers, forests, etc. along with political boundaries, roads, and towns, which scales down to 1:c.320,000 (half a centimetre to a mile) the world over, and to 1:12,500 where more detailed coverage is available; and a box enabling one to interrogate the data by site or by species. Under sites, it is possible to get boundaries of the critical sites themselves, those of nationally protected areas and Ramsar sites, along with the centre points and names of the IWC sites. There are pop-boxes which provide information on those species that the site is considered important for and this includes the flyway or population that they belong to, the season the site is important for each species, the number of birds present, the percentage of the flyway population that this represents, and links to a) the IWC data, which provides a time-series graph; and b) one to a species factsheet providing information on IUCN Red List category, population estimates and links to IBA data, ecology (behaviour, habitat, diet, breeding site, and management information) and threats. Under species, on selecting one there is the option for viewing a range map (according to the time of year it is present), a polygon outlining the flyway boundaries of its constituent populations, the location of important bird areas and critical sites (coded according to a whole range of criteria that can be selected, e.g. constituent flyway, season of importance, protection status (all by colour) or population size or percentage of flyway population occurring (by circle size)) along with pop-up tables with the foregoing data text form; the location of IWC sites with population time series appearing when the mouse is passed over them; time series data for a user-defined area (which the TE could not get to work); and flyway population estimates; along with links to the aforementioned species factsheet and the Global Register of Migratory Species page.

35. This sort of data manipulation and presentation is the sort of work that the three technical partners (UNEP-WCMC, WI, and BLI) excel at and on which their reputations as leading international conservation organisations has been founded. The CSN tool has been undertaken to the same exceedingly high scientific standards as much of their other work e.g. WI's "*An Atlas of Wader Populations in Africa and Western Eurasia*" and BLI's "*Important Bird Areas of ...*" series of publications. Its production and launch will not only enhance those reputations but, and of more importance, provide an extremely important tool for

²² i.e. species classified globally as Critically Endangered, Endangered or Vulnerable; where "significant numbers" is defined as the regular presence of a Critically Endangered or an Endangered species, irrespective of its abundance, or of 10 pairs or 30 individuals of a Vulnerable species; where "regular" excludes vagrancy, marginal occurrences and ancient or historical records; and "predictable" is intended to cover instances where conditions are suitable, and hence the species is present, only at more extended intervals, (e.g. at temporary wetlands in areas of erratic rainfall).

²³ i.e. species that are vulnerable, at the population level, to site-based threats by virtue of their congregating behaviour when breeding, wintering and/or on passage. The delimitation of "flyway or other distinct populations" and the associated 1% threshold figures follow *Waterbird Population Estimates 4th edition* (WPE4). In cases where the 1% threshold exceeds 20,000 individuals, or for species with large populations for which no accurate estimates exist, the 1% threshold for the population is set at 20,000 individuals, in accordance with Ramsar Criterion 5. The words "regular" and "predictable" are defined in the same way as under criterion 1, but with the following qualification – a wetland "regularly" supports a population of a given size if: a) the requisite number of birds is known to have occurred in two-thirds of the seasons for which adequate data are available, the total number of seasons being not less than three; or b) the mean of the maxima of those seasons in which the site is internationally important, taken over at least five years, amounts to the required level (means based on three or four years may be quoted in provisional assessments only). In some instances, however, for species occurring in very remote areas, or where there are particular constraints on national capacity to undertake surveys, areas may be considered suitable on the basis of fewer counts. For some countries or sites where there is very little information, single counts (e.g. gap filling surveys) can help to establish the relative importance of the site for a species. If, at any time, a site supports parts of more than one population of the same species, efforts should be made to distinguish between the relevant populations by investigating their origins and destinations, and/or the seasonal pattern of occurrence for each population using the site. If it is not possible to separate them, the 1% threshold relating to the largest population is used to identify critical sites.

accessing the most recent scientific data to assist in decision-making, and for focussing conservation efforts on, and prioritising resources to, those sites providing the greatest conservation returns. The tool has been designed to help a range of different target users including conventions (primarily AEWA and Ramsar but also being relevant to the EU Birds Directive and the Bern Convention's Emerald Network), development agencies, international and national NGOs, national governmental conservation agencies, national protection management bodies, site managers, site conservation groups, and birders. It is also hoped that other target users may include sectoral policy makers and planners, e.g. agriculture, tourism, fisheries, transport, and energy (but see paragraphs 130-131).

36. Technical development of the CSN tool was led by the World Conservation Monitoring Centre (UNEP-WCMC) as identified in the Project Document in partnership with WI and BLI and the work was undertaken in a highly participatory and consultative manner using the voluntary networks that underpin the massive data gathering exercises of the IBA and IWC systems. Although it appears superficially to be a fairly simple, web-based, interactive resource, it has in fact required a huge amount of intricate, complex, and painstaking work to complete, much of which was beyond the specifications of the original Project Document, and if any reader is interested in learning more about, is summarised in [Annex X](#). The participatory nature of its development is very clear in that Annex, but some key examples include:

- working groups established inter-operability between the main data sources (computer jargon for ensuring they “talk” to each other) and this involved activities such as standardising species taxonomy and nomenclature, and site names and locations – on the face of it a fairly simple activity but when it was discovered that 3,338 sites had no central coordinates, 3,072 sites had no site codes, and some sites had inaccurate central coordinates and/or duplicate records, more than 27,000 site records then had to be checked individually to enable accurate linkage between the IBA and IWC sites, and which was delegated to the Project's Regional Centres;
- regional workshops for Eastern and Southern Africa, Western and Central Africa, Central Asia and Caucasus, and the Middle East were specially convened to combine IBA population, WI flyway, and species/country distribution information from the WBDB to identify priority populations by season for individual countries; and to identify gaps in poorly-covered populations and poorly-covered areas;
- the CSN portal was developed and refined collaboratively between partners at technical meetings and the second demonstration version was presented at the AEWA MOP 4 in Madagascar in September 2008 for consultation; and a further version with an improved layout was consulted on with stakeholders in North and West Africa at a December 2009 WetCap²⁴ project meeting in Morocco and also with a narrow group of demonstration site managers in March 2010 in South Africa aiming at promoting the tool and identifying functions most useful to site managers;
- the final look and feel of the portal, its functionalities, help functions, and languages, incorporating inputs from all the meetings and consultation, was agreed in March 2010 in Cambridge, and the tool was launched in The Hague on 14th June 2010 in the plenary session of the AEWA 15th Anniversary Symposium, as a consultative version complete with an interactive system for users to report bugs and problems – testing and tweaking will continue until conclusion of the Project in December 2010; and
- the results of the application of the CSN criteria were sent out in January 2010 for consultation to relevant experts (Specialist Groups, regional, national IWC coordinators, IBA officers, AEWA and Ramsar Focal Points), for priority setting with each national contact receiving a national list, and specialist groups the relevant species' site list.

37. It is intended that a user manual for the CSN Tool will be developed under the EU-funded AEWA project (co-financing) by the end of the year. At present, the consultative version of the tool is only reasonably intuitive and user-friendly, provided the user has some basic experience with simple GIS systems, while many other features require basic exploration to understand their workings. An on-line manual

²⁴ *Strengthening waterbird and wetland conservation capacities in North Africa* – a three year project started in March 2009 under the auspices of AEWA, focused on capacity building activities in Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt and Mauritania, funded by the Spanish development cooperation agency Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo (AECID), coordinated by Sociedad Española de Ornitología (BirdLife partner in Spain), with technical support from BirdLife International, Wetlands International, and local partner organisations.

(promised by the end of 2010) or even a help function is a basic requirement if the tool is to be understandable and usable by all who come across it, for example, of the 166 people completing the questionnaire, only 53% rated the tool's accessibility as high or very high (Q.9, [Annex VII](#)). There were a very large number of bugs and problems present in the consultative version, and despite the designers working very hard to fix these, considerable problems continue to exist in October 2010, four months after its launch, for example:

- the TE was still having screen resolution issues with the legends and the boxes not fitting on a 17" laptop screen even at maximum resolution (1600x900)²⁵;
- the protocols for zooming in and out on the map or from one screen to another are counter-intuitive to say Google Maps (to zoom in on Google Maps centre the interest point on the screen and click the + magnifier; whereas on CSN tool one first has to click the + magnifier and then draw a box around the point of interest)²⁶;
- the percentage totals of certain species occurring at various sites hold many times the total flyway population for those species (e.g. Djoudj wetlands, Senegal, all species are above 100% of the total flyway population – great egret has a wintering population of 3,413 which apparently represents 3,728% of the flyway population!)²⁷; and
- the boundaries of the Ramsar site that the TE is intimate with are not accurate which raises concerns over the accuracy of others (Bridgwater Bay is not included within the site index and while it may be included under "Severn Estuary" when that map is displayed, the Ramsar polygon still does not include it²⁸).

Bugs and errors clearly bedevil almost any new product, and the TE is not being critical for the sake of it. However, many likely users will evaluate the CSN tool's potential on the basis of their first (and possible second) visit (see quote in paragraph 40 as an example) and if significant issues such as screen resolution and basic mathematical errors are apparent, the Project may be set to lose a large proportion of its target audience at a very early stage. On the same basis, the User Manual promised for the Project end cannot be ready too soon.

The MTET recommends that the bugs and errors in the consultative version of the CSN tool be rectified as soon as possible so as to a) avoid a loss of momentum inevitable when the Project ends; and b) avoid reducing the size of the target audience who will assess the tool's usefulness to them on their initial one or two visits.

<i>Responsibility</i>	<i>Task</i>	<i>Time frame</i>	<i>Deliverable</i>
UNEP-WCMC/WI	Removal of bugs and rectification of errors on CSN tool	By December 2010 if possible, or as soon afterwards as possible	Defect-free CSN tool List of problems rectified

38. The publication of a *Directory of the Critical Network of Sites* on CD ROM and in printed format was dropped because of funding shortages²⁹. It was eventually felt that it was not a cost-effective use of funds since Internet capacity within Africa and across the AEWA region continues to improve rapidly and the vast majority of potential users (e.g. government staff in the main urban centres) have relatively good access. As a trade-off, the bandwidth necessary to operate the CSN portal was lowered; the CSN tool was translated into French, Arabic and Russian; and adding features not originally planned, e.g. a "print" feature on the portal

²⁵ **WI comment:** *It should work at this resolution. Boxes are moveable since August.* **TE response:** Sadly the TE recorded this problem in October and still does so on 11th November. A new website address was supplied by Szabolcs Nagy (<http://dev.unep-wcmc.org/csn2/default.html#state=info>) and in that version no information comes up in the main box on the right hand side of the screen. It may be something to do with the TE's computer's settings, but then again ...

²⁶ **WI comment:** *Google Map does not need to provide links, while double click on a site provides link to the site page in the CSN Tool.*

²⁷ **WI comment:** *Programming error being addressed.*

²⁸ **WI comment:** *Ramsar site boundaries are provided by Contracting Parties. Hence, data is dependent on what is submitted to the Ramsar Secretariat.*

²⁹ **BLI comment:** *it is worth noting that there were also considerable technical problems with producing a CD-ROM based version - not least the inability to provide interactive maps in this format which undermined the rationale for producing such a version.*

menu allows end-users to print the network of sites of interest and by country thereby offsetting the need for a printed Directory.

39. The CSN concept has been presented as part of WOW Project presentations by all project partners as a central component of the WOW Project to a wide range of internal and external audiences at numerous meetings throughout the Project's lifetime, in national and international contexts. A single A0-sized poster was produced for display at international meetings and two one-page A4-size colour leaflets (both produced with German funding) have seen wide distribution at various project meetings and external events covering a wide geographic area. The CSN tool has also been widely publicised at major meetings which were selected carefully to reach the most relevant target groups focussing particularly on external audiences, i.e. those not directly involved in the IBA or IWC data collection nor directly involved in the WOW Project. For a full list, see paragraph 14 in Annex X.

This Outcome has achieved all its major objectives, and yielded substantial global environmental benefits, without major shortcomings. The outcome can be presented as “good practice”, hence is evaluated as Highly Satisfactory.

40. There is, however, one significant problem that the WOW partnership needs to address, not within the Project's lifetime, but as soon as possible thereafter. This relates to the need to keep the databases underpinning the CSN tool more up to date and inclusive. The issue has been raised by an uncomfortably high number of interviewees ranging from the demonstration site personnel, the CSN development team, the PSC, and from the broader set of end-users in response to the questionnaire. In all cases, the issue strikes right at the heart of the credibility of the CSN tool for there is no point in having a tool to improve access to information for decision-making purposes if that information remains many years out of date or incomplete. For example, the TE examined data for Common Shelduck, a common species at his home on the Severn Estuary, only to find that the only data from the IWC counts is dated 1968! A perusal of sites for the same species in continental Europe finds single point data of the same age is common. It maybe that the IWC no longer counts at these sites, but if that is the case, they should be coded so, or excluded altogether. Single point data that is 42 years old is of no use to decision-makers. The point was raised by a respondent to the questionnaire from the spatial planning ministry of a European government (perhaps one of the most important long-term target user groups):

“... The CSN apparently offers several tools, that sound promising for a potential user, like time-series data for species and sites and flyway population estimates. I have just checked data for one species (corncrake), and it looks like the database on which CSN is run is not very full even with the most relevant data (e.g. for most of Europe there are no IBAs for this species shown). Asking a potential user about usefulness of this tool is like asking a potential buyer of a car, how he likes this car, where you have given him only the shelf of the car to test it. Testing a car makes sense, when you have a car, which is able to drive, and testing of CSN will make sense, when the database on which CSN is run has enough data in it.”

and while the issue s/he raised turned out to be a bug since rectified, his/her comments underline the need for the tool to be credible from the outset. Decision-makers are usually time-pressured and demanding of tools. If something that promises much fails to meet the expectations generated, there will be little inclination to re-visit it.

41. The issues are technical, complex, and will require considerable work, particularly those relating to inclusion of data. The BfN/BMU makes the point that waterbird monitoring is undertaken throughout the year in Germany and this should be reflected in the CSN tool, but since only January counts go into the IWC database, this gives the wrong picture. Similarly, counts are made throughout the year for the EU Habitat^{30,31} and Birds Directives but these do not reach the IWC or IBA databases. The end product is that in the BfN/BMU's opinion, the CSN cannot be used as a planning tool and does not add value for Europe – so why has so much been paid for a tool that has no additional value to the German Government (see also paragraph

³⁰ **WI comment:** Factual inaccuracy: The EU Habitat Directive does not bear relation to the monitoring of birds.

³¹ **BfN/BMU comment:** Counts for the Habitats and Birds directive are not regularly undertaken throughout the year. However, data records from Natura 2000 sites could also be a useful source of information for the CSN tool.

134)^{32,33,34}? The inclusion of data is further complicated by the fact that the counts from various schemes come from overlapping but not coincidental areas (something which the Project has wrestled with long and hard) and where counts have included areas external to IBA or IWC site boundaries within a single set of records³⁵, this negates their use in either database, e.g. data from the Lithuanian demonstration sites cannot be included³⁶. This problem is systemic to volunteer-based data collection – people go where they want, when they want, and for lengths of time that suit them, and although guidelines can be set to direct them, in the end they remain just that; guidelines³⁷. The Project has taken significant steps forward in trying to coordinate systematic survey work (see Outcome 1.3) but more needs to be done to enable casual, or less rigorously geographically-defined data to be included³⁸, perhaps in a similar way to the British Breeding and Winter Atlases.

42. Notwithstanding the above, one issue that could be addressed more quickly remains the currency of the data held in the databases, particularly the IWC. Many interviewees acknowledge, or make reference to, the significant time lag that exists between the data being collected and the same being included in the database – it having to be fed through national coordinators, regional coordinators, and WI's headquarters team. This inevitably leads to backlogs and delays. Some national-based surveys, e.g. the British Trust for Ornithology's atlas schemes, have started to use online data entry systems which enable data so entered to be displayed on the internet within minutes and, as the Project recognises elsewhere in its reasoning for dropping production of a CD-ROM version of the tool, Internet capacity within Africa and across the AEW region is improving rapidly with relatively good access in most urban areas. The TE understands that WI has begun to explore possibilities towards this end³⁹. However, further progress on this issue may be negated by lack of finance, since it has also emerged from interviews that WI is facing a major funding crisis for its waterbird monitoring programme because WI's core long-term business of waterbird monitoring has been under-resourced thereby decreasing the level of service to WI members who consequently are questioning

³² **WI comment:** *The IWC is meant to be limited to Mid Winter (January) in Europe, West Asia and Mediterranean and January and July in sub Saharan Africa, as it is aimed at monitoring distribution and abundance and providing information on size of waterbird populations. There is simply not a scheme aimed at collecting the now vast amount of data collected in Europe following the implementation of the Birds Directive.* **TE response:** Agreed – but WI should therefore take this up with the BfN/BMU.

³³ **WI comment:** *The CSN Tool never aimed at overtaking the role of national information systems in EU Member States which all have their well established systems. The value of the CSN Tool for them is rather providing contextual data at flyway level. Such competition with the national partners would be not desirable anyway, because it would undermine the funding of national schemes that feed into the CSN Tool. On the other hand, the CSN Tool can assist developing (GEF eligible) countries in getting access to information held in international datasets.* **TE response:** as to footnote #32.

³⁴ **BfN/BMU comment:** *It is clearly not the opinion of the BfN/BMU, that the tool has no additional value to the German government. Moreover we see the great future potential of the tool. However, we all, implementing organisations as well as donors, have to bear in mind that those responsible for landscape planning in the countries will expect an additional value from the CSN tool for their daily work, and that we have to respond to their critical questions. In the light of legal frameworks such as the European Birds or Habitats Directive, the data record behind the CSN tool would need to be further updated and completed to allow the use as a reliable planning tool for decision makers. We see this as a continuing process beyond the duration of the project.* **TE response:** While the TE recognises the German Government's comment, he respectfully points out that the question raised in the text was the exact question posed by the BMU and noted down during the interview on 9th June 2010.

³⁵ **WI comment:** *Factually wrong: The project is not mixing data with different spatial definitions. This mismatch (which cannot be corrected retrospectively) is one of the reasons, why the IWC and IBA data are presented as different layers.* **TE response:** WI misunderstands the point being made. The TE is not suggesting that data with different spatial definitions are being mixed; he is pointing out the difficulties associated with data that has been received from counters counting inside and outside of an IBA or IWC site and presenting that data to WI or BLI as a single dataset, which then negates its use.

³⁶ **WI comment:** *The Lithuanian data will be used if sent to BirdLife International in the frame of the IBA monitoring and the Mid January data (if collected and sent to WI), will contribute to the IWC. The site, if regularly monitored, will eventually be re assessed versus the CSN Criteria based on the revised IBA data and most recent IWC data. The CSN Tool is not and was never intended as an online database of random records.* **TE response:** The TE agrees wholeheartedly. The TE was again simply pointing out the difficulties involved in data collection and analysis which the Project has had to wrestle with.

³⁷ **WI comment:** *IWC counts are closely coordinated at national level and implemented at defined times of the year.* **TE response:** Agreed, but not all counts are IWC counts – perhaps WI should take a wider view.

³⁸ **WI comment:** *This seems to be contradictory to the previous sentence.* **TE response:** But it isn't. The point being made is that however good guidelines may be, some people ignore them or count outside of the general structure of the organised count. The BTO have recognised this and gone to considerable lengths to find ways to incorporate such casual data. The TE is simply making a suggestion that the Project (now the WOW Programme) might want to develop means of capturing such valuable data.

³⁹ **WI comment:** *It is important to recognise that all information in the CSN Tool relies on the continued existence of national level data collection and that coordination is needed due to language and cultural differences. Hence, such delays are somewhat inevitable.* **TE response:** An extremely valid and well-made point.

continued funding⁴⁰. While WI's governance and strategic direction form no part of this evaluation, if true, such a situation does pose a significant risk to the long-term sustainability of the CSN tool since if these datasets are not maintained, the tool will quickly lose its utility. The TE declines to make any recommendations for post-Project actions on these issues since while they could have important repercussions for the sustainability of the tool, the issues themselves and their remediation are outside the TE's remit. However, in discussing them here, it is hoped to draw their attention to the Project partnership, perhaps to be addressed in the future by the newly-formed WOW programme.

Outcome 1.2: Primary data resources that underpin flyway conservation, planning and management activities enhanced to include all critically important sites in the AEWA region

43. Gaps in the data underpinning the CSN tool were identified for both sites and species through a participatory process. Four sub-regional gap-filling and monitoring workshops were planned and facilitated by the joint WI, BLI and UNEP-WCMC technical teams in collaboration with the Regional Waterbird Officers, and held for Eastern and Southern Africa in Naivasha, Kenya, on 17-21 November 2007; for Central and Western Africa in Accra, Ghana, on 10-15 December 2007; for Caucasus and Central Asia in Tbilisi, Georgia, on 13-16 March 2008; and for the Middle East in Amman, Jordan on 14-18 April 2008. Maps of existing sites (IBAs, IWC, Ramsar) were sent to national delegates ahead of the workshops for national priorities to be identified, and workshop participants used these to identify first a list of sub-regional priorities for surveys, and then one at the regional level. Priority species for further surveys were also identified, along with additional information on known sites not presented on the maps, but that might be important for the poorly-covered populations. A total of 295 sites were identified as priorities – Eastern and Southern Africa 106 sites; Western and Central Africa 106; Caucasus and Central Asia 41; and Middle East 42. Given the shortage of funding, the PSC decided that the Project should neither provide additional funds to, nor focus fund-raising efforts on, additional gap-filling efforts but use only existing earmarked funds until they were exhausted. As a result, the Regional Waterbird Officers continued to implement a gap-filling strategy but the priority shifted away from filling gaps of unexplored areas where anticipated significant concentrations of migratory birds could exist, to building the monitoring capacity to survey underexplored sites already included in the CSN to enhance the quality of data already in the tool. This strategy was deemed more effective in ensuring the long-term quality of data on which the portal is based. Surveys were performed in January 2007 to cover approximately 80 of these sites in East and West Africa and Central Asia, mainly using additional co-funding (US\$ 75,000) mobilized by WI and focusing on some of the obvious gaps in coverage emerging from the initial stages of CSN development. Within Africa field censuses were implemented at c. 70 sites in nine countries thus – Angola (2 sites); Congo (1); Cameroon (c. 10); Kenya (c. 5); Eritrea (c. 5); Ethiopia: (c. 25); Sudan (c. 10); Malawi (c. 5); and Nigeria (c. 5). An additional € 12,000 was mobilized by WI for census work in Central Asia in January 2008, coordinated through the WI Moscow office covering the Caspian coast in Russia and Azerbaijan (c. 20 sites between the two countries), Uzbekistan (2 sites) and Armenia (1 site). In 2008 in Africa, surveys were carried out in Togo (18 sites), Senegal (17 sites), Benin and Niger (16 sites each), Democratic Republic of Congo (14 sites), Guinea (eight sites), Gabon (seven sites), Côte d'Ivoire and Somaliland (five sites each), Kenya (two sites), and Burundi, Madagascar, Rwanda, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, (one site each).

This Outcome has achieved all its major objectives within its funding constraints, and yielded substantial global environmental benefits, without major shortcomings. The outcome can be presented as “good practice”, hence is evaluated as **Highly Satisfactory**.

Outcome 1.3: Flyway data gathering and monitoring capacity strengthened to support the updating and maintenance of primary data resources that underpin conservation of the network of critical sites

44. Improved coordination between the IWC and IBA schemes at the sub-regional level was reviewed and discussed at various meetings, and dedicated working sessions were held at each of the four workshops focussing on analysing the current level of coordination between IBA/IWC at the national level. Obstacles to better coordination were highlighted by participants and each country present produced a national action plan for improving coordination between the schemes. These, together with the fact that both IBA and IWC

⁴⁰ **WI comment:** *Factually incorrect. During 2010, WI is in the process of restructuring and strengthening its global and regional coordination of the IWC. WI has been undertaking work to update its online web capabilities to streamline the IWC data collection, processing and reporting systems – these will result in improvements as early as in the 2011.*

monitoring manuals already contained reference to each other, meant no further manuals were deemed necessary. Improved integration will be achieved through better coordination at national and other appropriate levels, and a draft form combining requirements of the two schemes has been suggested by the BirdLife Africa Secretariat.

45. Sub-regional surveys to provide training on integrating monitoring activities were implemented in the Lake Chad region by the French National Game and Wildlife Agency⁴¹ (ONCFS) (a planned in-kind contribution to the Project with small GEF and WI support) in 2005/06, 2006/07 and 2007/08. ONCFS produced a leaflet with information about these counts. The Working Group on International Wader and Waterfowl Research (WIWO) also conducted censuses in Oman and, in collaboration with WI, in southern Sudan⁴². In December 2008, the PSC decided that all funds allocated for fieldwork were to be used also for training, hence training courses on waterbird and wetland monitoring were undertaken in December 2009 in a) the Central African Republic (18 people trained) by the WI Africa Office and b) Mozambique by WI and BLI (14 people trained). In January-February 2010, surveys with strong training components were conducted in Central Africa Republic (six sites), Benin (23 sites), Guinea (13 sites), Guinea Bissau, Senegal, Somalia, Rwanda, Zimbabwe, Iraq (2 trained) and Syria (1 trained). A training course planned for southern Sudan in March 2010 had to be postponed because of security concerns. A further training was carried out also in Mauritius (14 people trained). In 2009 in Central Asia the main gap was the Russian Arctic. As it would have been impossible to cover the entire area, a detailed inventory of the areas surveyed in the Russian Arctic during last 15-20 years was carried out. Field surveys were conducted in the Bukhara region of Uzbekistan, as part of the IWC work. It covered a range of artificial wetlands which were known to be important wintering sites for migratory waterbirds and three local volunteers were trained. Surveys were also carried out in Kazakhstan (five sites, two trained), Uzbekistan (three sites, five trained) and Turkmenistan (three sites, five trained) in cooperation with the Association for Conservation of Biodiversity in Kazakhstan.

46. A significant amount of optical and other equipment was provided to stakeholders. Six telescopes with tripods and 75 binoculars funded by BfN, were purchased by WI and shipped to the East and West Africa sub-regional WOW centres in Nairobi and Dakar for distribution. Five additional binoculars and other field equipment (e.g. waders, boots, torches) were bought and delivered directly to Nigeria by WI staff on mission. During the four gap-filling and monitoring workshops, second-hand pairs of binoculars were provided by BirdLife from the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds' (UK) scheme to the Regional Centre in East Africa to distribute to participant countries. An additional 30 pieces of optical equipment were purchased by WI for Eastern and Southern, and Western and Central Africa, using BfN funds. Three new scopes, several second hand binoculars and 25 copies of *Birds of Africa South of Sahara* were acquired for East Africa and delivered through the UN Diplomatic Pouch system to avoid loss of material and time while clearing customs. Three telescope eye-pieces and 800 copies of the ONCFS field guide to the waterbirds in West Africa (the books provided as in-kind contribution) were acquired and distributed. However, the planned development and printing of a field guide in Russian was dropped from the main work plan by the PSC because of a shortage of AEWA funding⁴³.

This Outcome has achieved most of its major global environmental objectives, and yielded satisfactory global environmental benefits, with only minor shortcomings, hence is evaluated as **Satisfactory**.

Outcome 1.4: Species and critical site knowledge base supports management and planning decision-making in flyway conservation

47. A contract was issued by WI to BirdLife International to compile a review of existing knowledge on species' migratory characteristics, site function, and population delimitation. The task turned out to be more time-consuming than expected and an extension was agreed. The ecological content of the web portal was agreed in August 2007 and compiled for a small number of species as a test template. A literature review of

⁴¹ Office National de la Chasse et de la Faune Sauvage (ONCFS)

⁴² WI collaborates with WIWO in conducting training surveys outside of the WOW Project in Iran, Oman, Sudan and Nigeria (Chad basin).

⁴³ **PCU comment:** This issue was discussed at length during the third SC meeting in Rome (December 2008). During the meeting the PSC engaged in a thorough "pruning exercise" to prioritise resources for core project deliverables. While co-funding was definitely a concern when this activity was dropped, the SC felt this activity was of relatively minor importance vis a vis the achievement of the project's main objectives and could therefore be achieved post-project if funding were made available.

the ecological requirements (habitat, diet, behaviour, breeding site, and migration patterns) was completed for all 294 species included on the CSN tool. Clear guidance for site managers on habitat management emerged as a gap in the information available for most species, but in the light of the shortage of AEWA funding, this and other research to cover the gaps in knowledge of the use of sites by migratory waterbirds and of population limitations had to be dropped.

This Outcome has achieved most of its major global environmental objectives, but with some significant shortcomings and did not yield some of the expected global environmental benefits, hence is evaluated as Marginally Satisfactory.

Component 2: Establishing a basis for strengthening decision-making and technical capacity for wetland and migratory waterbird conservation

Outcome 2.1 Transferable model Training and Awareness Raising Programme framework produced for developing wetland and waterbird conservation capacity

48. This Outcome has produced the Flyway Training Kit (FTK), a resource tool for trainers; the aim being to transmit this information through a series of Training of Trainers (ToT) courses for onward transmission to targeted trainees. The Kit itself is divided into three modules and comprises a folder containing a 553-page ring-bound resource document (it is not a manual) and four CDs, thus:

- Module 1 – Understanding the flyway approach to conservation comprising 12 chapters covering the ecological reasons for migration, the implications for conservation, and an understanding of basic issues such as population dynamics, site conservation and flyway-scale initiatives, with the learning objectives defined as an understanding of:
 - “the main characteristics of migration and flyways,
 - the roles of key sites in supporting the different life stages of migratory waterbirds,
 - the diverse threats along the flyways”;
- Module 2 – Applying the flyway approach to conservation comprising nine chapters covering information on species conservation, site conservation and management needs in a flyway context including local communities’ needs, policy issues, valuation techniques and networking, with the defined learning objectives for participants to be able to:
 - “apply flyway conservation practice,
 - influence policies
 - and strengthen networks”;
- Module 3 – Communicating the flyway approach to conservation comprising seven chapters on learning issues and advocacy so that participants should be able to:
 - “understand what is needed to communicate the flyway approach
 - review, adapt and develop training modules on the flyway approach to conservation”;
- A comprehensive set of references for further reading on modules 1 and 2;
- An outline workshop programme covering objectives and session plans for all three modules;
- Workshop exercises and case studies for modules 1 and 2;
- A series of annexes covering technical information; and
- four CDs holding detailed information on:
 - Modules, references and annexes – technical information such as waterbird count forms, site management planning guide, species action plan model;
 - Session plans, presentations and exercises – a CD version of the written section on workshop exercises and case studies for modules 1 and 2 above, plus 34 ready-to-use Powerpoint slide shows divided amongst the three modules;
 - The Ramsar Convention – providing Ramsar documents including the Ramsar Convention Manual, the 17 Wise Use Handbooks, various resolutions, and a guide to participatory action planning and techniques for facilitating groups; and
 - AEWA – providing AEWA official texts and documents such as the 39 volume Technical Series, 10 volume Conservation Guidelines, and various films and presentations.

49. The FTK has been produced to the highest standards. Its content is exhaustive, covering everything there is known about waterbird flyways and wetland conservation, soundly based on the latest scientific advances, and up-to-date on policy issues and teaching principles. It is clearly laid out, beautifully illustrated and reproduced, and frankly a joy to read. Textual examples, case studies, photographs, and illustrations are drawn from a huge variety of sources across the African-Eurasian Flyway giving immediacy to the content for the audience in almost all countries in which it will be used. The TE has no expertise in training, but the material on workshop programmes, learning objectives and session plans seems comprehensive, insightful, and practical, providing a sound framework within which the mass of material provided can be taught. The case exercises appear subjectively to be somewhat weak, but the 34 presentations on the CD are an excellent resource, cross-referenced as they are with the various sections of the modules and with all illustrations and maps explained. Although the TE has some reservations about its relevance (see paragraphs 135-136), as a product it is one of the best that he has ever seen produced from any project.

50. The FTK has been produced through a highly consultative and participatory process. It was led by a capacity development expert and involved 43 wildlife training institutions, NGOs and governmental bodies in all aspects of its design from the initial “road map” through production of the draft framework, to inputs at various stages and the regionalisation of the document. Such a process has stimulated wide ownership of the Kit and provided a sound foundation for its implementation and the collaboration of partners across the region. Perhaps the most innovative mechanism was the development of four regional training boards comprising key wildlife training organisations within the four focal regions (see paragraph 52). These met at various points through the development process, and have been used to assist in defining the contents of the modules and played the lead role in providing the regionalisation of the FTK. Given the shortage of funds available and the extensive review programme the draft had already been through, the PSC agreed that there should be no formal external evaluation of the modules but a process of final review, proof-reading, and cross-checking was carried out in-house along with a review by a senior ornithologist from the UK’s Joint Nature Conservation Committee. The final version was then endorsed by representatives of all the Regional Training Boards as well as the key project partners, and this was used as the basis for all subsequent translations. The English version was printed and the Kit was formally launched at a side event at the CBD SBSTTA-14⁴⁴ meeting in Nairobi, Kenya on 14th May 2010. The first copies were presented formally to the GEF, Kenya Wildlife Service Training Institute, Ramsar Convention, UNEP/AEWA Secretariat, and to the German Government in recognition of their support during the Project’s implementation. Shipment of the 1,500 copies printed is being effected through the UN Pouch System to the Regional Centres for onward transmission to the various partners.

This Outcome has achieved all its major objectives, and yielded substantial global environmental benefits, without major shortcomings. The outcome can be presented as “good practice”, hence is evaluated as Highly Satisfactory.

Outcome 2.2: Wetland and waterbird conservation Training and Awareness Raising Programmes produced ready for implementation in four sub-regions

51. Initially, during the design of the Project, it was intended that the FTK would be rolled out through a series of ToT programmes in the four focal regions. With the financial cuts made during the design process, this became impossible to sustain and this Outcome was re-designed to prepare the training and awareness programmes ready for implementation once additional funding, to be raised through this Outcome, had been sourced.

52. Four Regional Training Boards were established (for a full list of members, see [Annex XI](#)) and inaugural meetings held thus:

- Middle East on 9th-11th November 2007 in Amman, Jordan;
- Eastern and Southern Africa on December 6-7th 2007 in Entebbe, Uganda;
- Western and Central Africa on 18-19th February 2008 in Dakar, Senegal; and
- Central Asia on 8-10th April 2008 in Almaty, Kazakhstan.

⁴⁴ 14th meeting of the Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technical and Technological Advice.

Guidelines on what the regional training boards were expected to do in order to regionalize the modules were circulated to all Regional Capacity Development Officers. Twenty-five participants from the four Regional Training Boards met in Amman, Jordan from 8-16th June 2008 to review and test the draft modules and initiate a local ownership process. Originally, the idea proposed in the Project Document was that a generic English version would be produced and this would then be regionalised with pertinent examples from the four sub-regions and each translated into the local lead language (French, Arabic and Russian) but it was identified that this would lead to four versions of the Kit that were all different from each other and none of which would be presenting an overall Flyway-wide version with examples from other regions – thereby partially defeating the object. Instead, the design was modified whereby the English version was regionalised using examples from all regions. This was done through regional workshops which endorsed the generic English version and adapted this text through the provision of relevant examples. In the event, only two workshops were held, one in Benin in May 2009, and one in Ethiopia in November 2009. For the Middle East and the Central Asia regions the process did not take place through face-to-face meetings but through an e-mail consultation process.

53. A ToT session was carried out in Amman by the Middle East Regional Centre from 9th-14th August 2009. It was implemented by the training department of the Royal Society for the Conservation of Nature (RSCN) in Jordan with external support from one of the FTK's authors. A similar session for Western and Central Africa was held in Limbé, Cameroon, in November 2009 in conjunction with the Garoua Wildlife College. Three trainees from Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia, and the WetCap Coordinator also participated to help build the initial capacity for the expansion of WOW in North Africa. These sessions, using the draft material, were not included in the Project Document as being part of the WOW project implementation. In fact, this aspect of the initiative was actually removed by GEF during the design and final approval stage as part of the cost-cutting exercise. Nonetheless, it was deemed important to refine the modules on the basis of these "test runs" and therefore, at the suggestion of the respective Training Boards, surplus funds and those mobilized by the US Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) (part of WI's co-funding) were used to achieve this. Unfortunately, no ToT session will be run for Eastern and Southern Africa during the Project's lifetime. Although the USFWS indicated that they would provide the funding, the BirdLife Africa Partnership Secretariat failed to respond appropriately in re-working the West Africa funding proposal and the opportunity was missed – a serious mistake in a Project beset throughout by funding difficulties. Whereas, the first two ToT sessions used a draft of the English version, the session undertaken in the Central Asia region from 25-30th October 2010 in the Korgalzhyn Nature Reserve near Astana in Kazakhstan, was delivered in Russian using materials designed and printed in Russian.

54. Translation into French was carried out in October 2009 with funds made available by Ramsar, but these were insufficient to print final copies in French and no further funding had been sourced for this task by the end of the TE. The AEWA Wet-Cap project contributed to the translation in Arabic which was completed in September 2010⁴⁵ along with laying out print-ready copies, but again no funding has yet been sourced for it to be printed⁴⁶. Translation into Russian was being carried out in-house during the TE by the Capacity Development Officer of the Regional Centre for Caucasus and Central Asia and funding had been obtained from the Nagao Foundation (Japan) to enable it to be designed and printed. A brochure promoting the ToT modules was produced in November 2008, and the training programme has been promoted heavily at a number of Project events and external meetings, e.g. the Convention on Migratory Species COP 9 in Rome in December 2008, and the Adriatic Flyway Conference held in Ulcinj (Montenegro) in April 2009. Numerous funding proposals have been submitted, but there has been a high failure rate, almost certainly as a result of the global credit squeeze. The onus now falls on the Regional Centres post-project to fund raise for the delivery of the ToT sessions and to secure the uptake of the FTK by relevant institutions. In some cases, the portents are good – formal letters have been received by both the RSCN and Garoua Wildlife College indicating that they will formally adopt it as part of their curricula by the end of 2010; while the Kenya Wildlife Service has indicated interest, and the Ramsar Regional Centre in Iran has expressed interest

⁴⁵ Although all modules have now been translated and laid out in the WOW design, BirdLife Middle East Division is unhappy with some of the translation of some sections of the document(s) (particularly in Module 1 and 2) and will go over the translation to refine the language and terminology. Another ToT session will take place within the region in December 2010 using the Arabic version.

⁴⁶ **WI comment:** *The printing of the regionalised (i.e. translated) modules will take place 'on demand' based on the implementation of ToT courses.*

in being involved in both further training in the Middle East and Central Asia regions and it is hoped they will adopt the FTK in their work⁴⁷.

This Outcome has achieved most of its major global environmental objectives, but with some significant shortcomings although these have been offset to a large degree by additional unscheduled achievements. Overall, it has yielded satisfactory global environmental benefits, hence is evaluated as **Satisfactory**.

Component 3: Improved conservation status at sites critical for waterbirds, and knowledge is generated on how to enhance conservation across the African-Eurasian flyways

Outcome 3.1: Demonstrations of best practice management of migratory waterbirds and wetlands available across the flyway

55. Eleven demonstration projects were implemented in 12 countries (one project being transboundary) across the flyway with the intention of showcasing best practice in managing, or in achieving certain conservation aims, at 11 key sites across the Flyway. The importance of these sites was confirmed after the CSN criteria were developed and all sites were confirmed as being critical for between one (Niger) and 23 (Estonia and Senegal/Gambia) species. The projects have broken ground in a number of areas, e.g. in Senegal/Gambia the first transboundary site in Africa has been designated; in Niger community involvement in management planning has been achieved for the first time in the country; in Mauritania an 18-month in-depth training course covering eight modules and a language course have been integrated to deliver high quality eco-guides; and in Hungary an economically-improved fish-farming method capable of maintaining bird populations has been developed and promoted. These, and others, have achieved notable successes, but as a component of a flyway-scale project they are unconvincing on two counts – a) there is a lack of cohesion to the overall demonstration programme, it seeming to respond to national or local agendas rather than to flyway requirements as a whole (see paragraph 137 for further discussion); and b) the quality of the demonstration projects themselves is variable and rarely can they be said to be unequivocally acting as “*showcases for best practice across the project area to catalyse other activity*” (see paragraph 11). The cohesion of a flyway scale approach has been further undermined by the loss of the original idea of implementing exchange programmes between the sites to promote learning and knowledge, since this fell foul of the funding shortages (see paragraphs 7-8 and 16); and even the publication summarising the lessons learned from the demonstration project activities and thereby drawing together the disparate elements of the programme into a flyway-level overview was still in doubt at the time of the TE, its feasibility still in question due to co-financing shortages. The PSC clearly recognises its importance to the Project and has agreed its publication in-house, but the modalities of how to achieve this have not yet been identified. This lack of an overall flyway-scale approach undoubtedly represents the biggest missed opportunity of the Project⁴⁸. Finally, it is important to note that significant changes to the timescales of all of these demonstration projects were made when, in response to the financial problems encountered, it was anticipated that the PCU would close in July 2009. As a result, the projects’ timescales were shortened from around three-and-a-half years in the original Memoranda of Agreement to two, yet the general level of success has been achieved in spite of these difficulties.

Taking all the factors into account and weighing the overall performance of the individual projects together as best one can, the component appears to have achieved most of its major relevant objectives but with significant shortcomings and hence has been evaluated as **Marginally Satisfactory**.

#3

Lesson learned: To be effective, demonstration projects must be relevant at the conceptual scale and include a component to “market” the demonstration.

⁴⁷ **WI comment:** It contributed also some financial support to its implementation.

⁴⁸ **PCU comment:** It is important to note that the local demo project team in Lithuania shared the Ramsar methodology for a joint transboundary management plan (based on its efforts in the Kaliningrad region of Russia) with its counterparts in Saloum-Niumi. Evidently both project fall within the East Atlantic Flyway. Also, the Lithuanian demo project consulted with the project team in Nigeria (located on same Flyway) with respect to wetland restoration methodology and potential commercial uses of Typha, and the Estonian demo project team assisted the local team at Niumi National Park with monitoring and inventory skills; a necessary backbone for the Saloum-Niumi transboundary management plan. **TE response:** see also paragraphs 63 and 64.

56. The following paragraphs describe the main activities and achievements of each project with an evaluation of each at the end. The achievement of each of the projects' Immediate Objective indicators are evaluated in [Annex V](#).

Estonia: *Haapsalu Noarootsi Bays – Strengthen conservation management capacity*
Implemented by Environmental Board of Estonia
Source: Reports

57. The Project compiled an integrated management plan for three areas covering 300 km² of protected area, concentrating on reducing the risks from oil pollution and potential offshore windmills in Nõva-Osmussaar SPA; the conservation of the semi-natural communities (coastal meadows, alvars) in Silma Nature Reserve and Osmussaar Landscape Reserve; and demonstrating the settlement history of Osmussaar Island and its potential to become a UNESCO World Heritage site. The necessary documentation (digital site map; Ramsar Information Sheet (RIS)) for Ramsar site designation was produced, and the National Ramsar Committee decided at its Meeting in May 2009 to send these to the Ramsar Bureau for approval. Acceptance by the Ministry of Environment for establishing Haapsalu-Noarootsi as a Ramsar site with was a major achievement, and on 13th April and 20th July 2010 they went on to approve the management plans for Osmussaar Landscape Reserve and the Nõva-Osmussaar Special Protected Area respectively. Estonia also joined AEW. A 12-day exchange mission was made to the Saloum-Niumi Demonstration site in Senegal and The Gambia) in January 2009 to provide training on water bird monitoring, practical bird counts, and implementing the International Waterbird Census. A nature centre, previously housed in a small office in Saunja, was moved and re-developed in the Haapsalu office. The new location is more accessible for visitors and there has been an increase in the number of visitors. Software about wetland birds has been developed for the centre. Tents and sleeping bags were purchased to facilitate camps for outdoor training, as well as bird and plant identification guides, and books for children. A total of 87 ha of coastal grassland have been restored. The main project activities were documented in small publication released in June 2009. At least in part due to the Project, the number of some endangered bird species is increasing at Haapsalu-Noarootsi demonstration site. During spring 2009 the Project area was the main stopover site for at least 30 Lesser White-fronted Geese (*Anser erythropus*), the largest flock documented during last ten years in western Estonia. After a gap of 15 years, Ruff (*Philomachus pygnaeus*) was recorded as a breeding species again on the coastal meadows in Silma Nature Reserve. As a result of wetland restoration, the number of Barnacle Geese (*Branta leucopsis*) has been increased to 10,000 birds during migration. Waterbird counts show that at least ten waterbird species now use Haapsalu Bay in internationally important numbers.

This Project achieved or exceeded all of its major global environmental objectives, and yielded substantial global environmental benefits, without major shortcomings. The project can be presented as “good practice”, hence is evaluated as **Highly Satisfactory**.

Hungary: *Biharugra Fish Ponds – demonstrate harmonization of conservation and local economic interests*
Implemented by Madártani és Természetvédelmi Egyesület (MME) (BirdLife Hungary)
Source – Site visit

58. All the project activities were implemented during the lifetime of the project. A nature friendly fish-farming technique based on replacing direct feeding of fish with corn and using inorganic fertilizers with just the use of organic fertilizers was introduced successfully by Agropoint Ltd, the main operators of the Biharugra fish-ponds. This was also promoted to other fish-farming operations in the region through a short book on how to make profitable nature-friendly fish-farming in a protected area, and two workshops were held for fish-farmers and conservationists. It is claimed that the new technique has made Agropoint's commercial management of the ponds profitable, but their accounts show this not to be clear-cut, as Table 7 shows, although significant savings have been made on fish feed. Certainly, the returns during the Project average higher than the four years previous. What is important is that Agropoint Ltd. have decided to continue to work the fish ponds, which was the Project's original aim, and now with the added benefit of using a more sensitive management technique.

TABLE 7: INCOME AND EXPENDITURE RELATING TO AGROPOINT LTD.'S COMMERCIAL MANAGEMENT OF THE BIHARUGRA FISH PONDS.

(thousands Hungarian forints)	Pre-Project				During Project	
	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Income from fish sale	10,049	23,472	40,165	24,932	74,396	50,189
Habitat and other supports	0	22,774	23,413	24,915	27,012	27,558
WOW project	0	0	0	0	4,677	3,629
Total income	10,049	46,246	23,350	49,847	106,085	81,376
Personnel	3,693	5,484	3,720	6,372	7,085	7,832
Stocking material, other costs	56,000	46,100	15,500	88,026	55,862	60,277
Fish feed	12,820	8,954	5,149	6,725	2,893	320
Organic manure	7,300	926	2,350	0	4,677	3,629
Water	6,214	9,035	12,432	10,998	16,032	14,119
Energy	981	883	1,077	1,229	1,515	1,920
Servicies	0	0	0	3,362	7,530	8,403
Total expenditure	87,008	71,382	40,228	116,712	95,594	96,500
Deficit/Profit	-76,959	-25,136	23,350	-66,865	10,491	-15,124

59. Originally, it had been intended to re-furbish the MME facility in the nearby village as an education/accommodation centre for visitors to the fishponds, but investment by the Körös-Maros National Park in building a new facility in the period between project design and implementation rendered this activity redundant. Therefore, the Project used this money for other things. Four towers were built to a very high standard around the ponds for use by birdwatchers and visiting school groups as well as the guards of the fish-farming companies who use them for watching for poachers. Information boards were provided beside each tower indicating the bird species likely to be seen from each tower and a map of the area. Eight large, inter-related, education displays were produced, four of which are housed at the national Park's new Birdwatcher's Retreat, and four of which are in the Bihar Public Foundation's centre, which is currently undergoing renovation independently from the WOW Project. A film (already shown on regional television) was made about the fish-farming and wildlife of the ponds and its wider surroundings and two versions are available with the commentary in either Hungarian or English. The fish ponds were promoted to visitors through the publication of two leaflets, a poster, and an article in the widely-distributed MME/BirdLife Hungary's magazine.

This Project achieved most of its major global environmental objectives, and yielded satisfactory global environmental benefits, with only minor shortcomings, hence is evaluated as **Satisfactory**.

Lithuania: Nemunas River Delta – improve the conservation status and sustainable use of the Nemunas River delta

Implemented by Institute of Ecology, Vilnius University

Source – Interview with project manager; reports

60. A new Bird Observatory was constructed on Rusne Island as a regional centre for waterbird research and environmental education including laboratory facilities, and staff and visitor accommodation. Special information posters for visitors were produced. A new route for visitors including an observation tower and parking was opened officially in May 2008, since when more than 40,000 visitors have used it. A training seminar was held at the new observatory in April 2009 for about 30 persons representing all local stakeholders, and included presentations on the importance of the site for migratory birds, guided field surveys of waterbirds, and round-table discussions on conservation management of migratory waterbirds. Large-scale public events involving thousands of people and media were arranged at the site. The Nemunas River Delta Regional Park received the 2009 European Destination of Excellence (EDEN) Award from the European Commission⁴⁹. A book “*The Nemunas River Delta Regional Park*” and two booklets describing its nature values, particularly its importance for migratory waterbirds, were published. To demonstrate the

⁴⁹ Launched by the European Commission in 2006, the EDEN award recognizes places where tourism is managed and supports growth in a socially, culturally and environmentally sustainable way.

effectiveness of floodplain restoration, small-scale restoration works of degraded, seasonally-flooded meadows were restored. The restored habitat now holds several globally threatened birds: up to 15 lekking males of Great Snipe (*Gallinago media*), several pairs of the Aquatic Warbler (*Acrocephalus paludicola*), and over 70 calling male Corncrakes (*Crex crex*) have been counted. This success enabled mobilization of US\$ 5.5 million of new national and EU Structural Development funds for large-scale (c. 150 ha) restoration of open meadows in 2009, after termination of the WOW demonstration project. The monitoring scheme of migratory waterbirds in the site was included into the State Monitoring Programme, thereby guaranteeing its long-term implementation after termination of the project. Also as a result of this Project, international collaboration over conservation and wise management of cross-border wetlands was established and in the Russian part of the Nemunas River delta, the new State Nature Reserves “Diuny” and “Zapovedny” (c. 30,000 ha in total) were established in January 2010. It is planned to establish a transboundary Ramsar site on this wetland complex.

This Project achieved or exceeded all of its major global environmental objectives, and yielded substantial global environmental benefits, without major shortcomings. The project can be presented as “good practice”, hence is evaluated as **Highly Satisfactory**.

Mauritania: Banc d’Arguin – increase in equitable biodiversity-friendly tourism

Implemented by Wetlands International Africa Programme

Source – Site visit

61. The start of this Project was delayed by six months due to difficulties in finalizing administrative arrangements between WIA, Fondation Internationale du Banc d’Arguin (FIBA) as executing agency, and Parc Nationale Banc d’Arguin (PNBA) as implementing agency, and in obtaining staff; and thereafter it continued to face considerable difficulties, e.g. all official (non-NGO) multilateral and bilateral funding ceased for a year following the August 2008 military coup d’état; the original budget of US\$ 450,000 was reduced to US\$ 342,000. In trying to bring about an “*increase in equitable biodiversity-friendly tourism*”, the idea was to improve the management strategy, services and products for bird tourism within the park, but it soon became apparent that there was not even a basic ecotourism strategy in place. FIBA agreed and with the Project’s help, they produced one as part of the Park’s Management and Infrastructure Development Plan for 2010-2014 produced by a GTZ⁵⁰ project running parallel to WOW. The WOW-funded bird ecotourism strategy, which includes identification of the key sites (important to waterbirds and with high tourism potential) within the park and their classification under a directory, is nested within this. Fact sheets on these sites with tourism guidelines were also produced. A Communications Strategy for bird ecotourism was also developed for the Park and finalised in March 2010. However, the main thrust of the project was the training of 18 eco-guides including five women selected from the full complement of imraguen (fishing) villages within the Park. This entailed development and delivery of an 18-month curriculum covering French language training and eight modules on ecology, ornithology, geography, history and imraguen society, GPS usage and cartography, Park administration (law), communication skills, and eco-guiding – a considerable achievement given that the trainees spoke almost no French at the beginning (the local language is Hassaniya) and had no prior formal schooling. PNBA were supposed to provide a training centre at Mamghar, but the one they renovated was inadequate and eventually they commandeered a building owned by a previous, Spanish-funded, project. Training in French commenced in October 2008 and the technical courses started in March 2009 – in French – with lessons on every week day. Trainees signed a contract to be trained and were paid € 160 per month (less than they got from fishing but they were interested), from which money was docked for absences. Exchange visits were organised as part of the course for the trainees and key local community representatives to Bamboung, and to Djoudj in Senegal. Unfortunately, the trained guides need some sort of accreditation from PNBA to provide them with a competitive edge with tourists but this is complicated by inter-ministerial politics and another project, and international tourism in Mauritania has been severely curtailed by terrorist activity in 2008/9, although the strong national market appears unaffected. Finally, equipment including binoculars and uniforms were provided for the guides, a booklet on the main bird species occurring in the Park for tourists and the guides was produced, and two bird-watching hides were constructed near the Mamghar centre.

This Project achieved some of its major global environmental objectives, and yielded substantial global environmental benefits but with major shortcomings, hence is evaluated as **Marginally Unsatisfactory**.

⁵⁰ Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (German Society for Technical Cooperation).

Niger: *Namga-Kokorou Wetlands – demonstrate community-owned sustainable use planning process*
Implemented by Wetlands International Africa Programme
Source – Site visit

62. A tripartite agreement was negotiated between the Niger Ministry of Environment, WWF West Africa Freshwater Programme Coordination Office in Niger, and WIA to act as a framework for implementation, with WWF acting as the execution agency and the Ministry as the implementing agency. The Project produced a five-year management plan for the Namga-Kokorou wetlands to an international standard through a highly-participatory, community-based approach. The process was led by the project team and consultants who also trained seven local mobilisers (animators) to lead the process locally, one within each of the seven local communities within the Kokorou commune. Environment Committees, elected by each of the communities, worked on identifying threats to the wetland complex and identifying solutions and selecting activities necessary to remediate them. Members met displayed a good understanding of local environmental issues. Consultants worked up the Committees' ideas and re-presented them to joint meetings of the Committees. This is the first time in Niger that communities have been motivated and involved in doing such work for themselves and this is understood to be the first management plan written at the commune level. The management plan has been endorsed and adopted by a meeting in April 2010 chaired by the Secretary General to the Governor of Tillaberi Province and including a representative from the Ministry of Environment, the Director General of Environment and the Prefect of Terra Department which apparently gives it some form of legal status; certainly it will be integrated into the Department Development Plan. Local Councils have been strengthened through capacity-building activities of local government representatives and communities' leaders to facilitate the plan's implementation. Concurrently, a local advisory panel was set up as the legal framework to regulate and approve the interventions and any actions in and around the wetland complex area; a local code of laws was developed for participative management and sustainable use of the natural resources within the complex; and villages' management committees were established to enforce and follow up the consensual rules. Sensitization and training was provided to facilitate a better understanding of wetland values and wise-use practices at the local level (e.g. wetlands management techniques, local governance, self-promotion, conflict management) amongst the local communities and local councils' members, including a study visit for local communities' leaders and political authorities to Mare d'Oursi in Burkina Faso, and material support to women's groups in the villages for the development of alternative income-generating activities. Efforts were made to identify financial support for initial implementation of the management plan which resulted in a roundtable held in February 2010 with potential institutional donors and government agencies as well as the development of small initiatives with other actors at the site. In addition, a short video focussing on the wetlands and highlighting local community activities within the framework of the management plan was produced, and some technical equipment was procured to support a community radio station.

This Project achieved most of its major global environmental objectives, and yielded satisfactory global environmental benefits, with only minor shortcomings, hence is evaluated as **Satisfactory**.

Nigeria: *Hadeija-Nguru Wetlands – demonstrate wetland restoration through community participation*
Implemented by the Nigerian Conservation Foundation
Source – Interview with project manager; reports

63. A total length of 25km of the Marma Channel was cleared of *Typha* which has increased the flow of water to the Nguru/Punjumu lakes and resulted in an increase in incomes for the people of several local villages. The fish harvest has improved significantly with daily catches rising from 1-20 kg/day to 20-60 kg/day, thereby empowering these communities economically, e.g. annual incomes in the village of Dabar Magini are understood to have doubled. *Typha* clearance also reduced flooding in these communities, and helped in regaining both arable and grazing land which had dried out. Increased areas of open water also resulted in an appreciable increase in waterbirds, the total rising from 57,042 in 2008 to 119,000 in 2010 (52 % increase) and the number of species from 48 to 56 (17% increase). The Project has also looked at finding commercial uses for *Typha*, helped by the Lithuanian demonstration project team. Meetings with various stakeholders and line agencies were held to promote ecotourism in the area. Copies of educational materials were produced and distributed among stakeholders, and the information at the wetlands conservation centre was updated. As a result, the number of tourists to the area rose from 600 in 2008 to 2,000 in 2009. An

environmental education awareness programme succeeded in reaching a wide audience by using global events, e.g. World Wetlands Day, World Environment Day and World Migratory Birds Day, as a platform to create awareness over the wise use concept, to educate school children in the area, and to promote advocacy. Wide coverage was achieved through national newspapers and the internet. The project lent its voice against the construction of the Kafin Zaki dam on the Jamare River which supplies 40% of the water to the Kamadugu Yobe River Basin. A five-day intensive training course on bird counting, identification and IBA monitoring was provided to ten participants from State line government agencies who have been participating in the annual water bird census. A list of local bird names was compiled in Hausa. A praiseworthy element of the Project, and an example that perhaps all projects should include, was the production of a sustainability plan outlining some activities that communities can follow to help sustainability, and perhaps replication of the Project in other areas.

This Project achieved or exceeded all of its major global environmental objectives, and yielded substantial global environmental benefits, without major shortcomings. The project can be presented as “good practice”, hence is evaluated as **Highly Satisfactory**.

Senegal-Gambia: Saloum-Niumi complex – demonstrate transboundary cooperation and community participation

Implemented by Wetlands International Africa Programme

Source - Reports

64. The Project facilitated the development of transboundary cooperation in the conservation of the Saloum-Niumi wetland complex. Working with the authorities of both Parks in the two countries, the Project guided the participants in first getting Niumi National Park designated as a Ramsar site in November 2008, and subsequently obtaining designation for the entire Saloum-Niumi complex as the first transboundary Ramsar site in all of Africa – an excellent achievement. In concert with the authorities, the Project worked at developing a trans-boundary management plan for the complex which included agreement of a single management authority with staff from two countries’ agencies. The final technical review of this plan by all relevant stakeholders and technical partners took place on the 17-18th May 2010 during which some revisions and other changes were suggested, and which were carried out by a small technical committee comprising both the Direction des Parcs Nationaux (DPN) in Senegal and the Department of Parks and Wildlife Management (DPWM) in The Gambia. As of 1st October 2010, the final transboundary management plan had been endorsed by the DPN’s technical committee, and is now with the DPWM for their observations. Following the DPWM’s endorsement (expected by the end of October) the document will be considered to be formally adopted. Work was also undertaken to restore and install facilities in Niumi National Park to encourage tourism, to improve the capacity and infrastructure of both parks’ headquarters through procurement of some field materials and equipments, and to produce and install signboards within the complex. The technical capacity of the parks’ staff and some volunteers was built in areas such as bird monitoring, and tourist guiding, and the use of GPS, and bird counts and monitoring activities within the complex were arranged using mixed teams from the parks’ staffs. These included two international waterbird counts. Within Niumi National Park, eco-guard groups were established using volunteers from the local communities. Capacity of staff and volunteers was also built with the help of the Lithuanian demonstration team who shared knowledge of the Ramsar methodology for joint transboundary management plans; through an international visit from members of the WOW demonstration team in Estonia who assisted with monitoring and inventorying skills; and through a West Africa regional exchange visit with Eurosite including exploration and discussion on the possibilities of establishing an African site managers’ network. In another direction, the capacity of approximately 60 community members (especially women’s groups) was built in the sustainable use of natural resources in the complex through training sessions on topics including nature-friendly collection of oysters, sustainable use of fisheries, vegetable farming, and management of small income-generating activities. Awareness-raising activities on the importance of the transboundary cooperation for improved wetland management were undertaken at the national level through the Parks’ Departments and some special meetings, e.g. with the Gambian Minister of Environment, and other awareness-raising activities addressed various categories of communities’ members in and around the complex e.g. through local radio programmes (Saloum) and folkloric public animations with a local drama group (Niumi) and discussion sessions for children in local schools.

This Project achieved most of its major global environmental objectives, and yielded satisfactory global environmental benefits, with only minor shortcomings, hence is evaluated as **Satisfactory**.

South Africa: Wakkerstroom Wetland – demonstrate multi-faceted tourism development and income generation
Implemented by BirdLife South Africa
Source – Site visit

65. The Project has established six community projects including a community vegetable garden, wood crafts, beading, bird guiding, reed fencing, and wire crafts. Of these, the Iguglethu vegetable garden appears to be the most successful involving a 17-woman cooperative cultivating a 4 ha plot provided by the municipality to supply high quality local produce produced by permaculture methods to the tourist hotels. Of particular note is the support provided to the income-generating activities (IGAs) through the business development course run by the project in the form of tools for long-term sustainability, e.g. business planning, savings accounts, and marketing. Help has also been provided to integrate them into the main tourist trades within the town through the Wakkerstroom Tourism Association. The Project has re-developed a resource/environmental education centre at the BirdLife South Africa (BLSA) centre on the outskirts of Wakkerstroom, which is open to all learners and community members. This includes a classroom, accommodation, interpretive materials, trails, and new and refurbished hides. A management plan for the entire wetland catchment has been developed and the multi-stakeholder Wakkerstroom Wetland Reserve Management Committee established to oversee its implementation. On the BLSA land, this includes reed-cutting, hay-bailing, and grass-burning – all methods used to demonstrate management. Significant work has been carried out on environmental education with local schools, especially farm schools, and on awareness-raising for locals and tourists, all of which have include wetland and bird conservation issues. The Project continues to train three community members in environmental education to assist in providing environmental education to local schools and centre visitors. The local farmer outreach programme has been successfully implemented in Wakkerstroom by the Endangered Wildlife Trust's (EWT) South African Crane Working Group (SACWG). BLSA and EWT partnered taking an outreach programme in the Zulu language to farm schools between May 2009 and May 2010. A collaborative project has been established with the EWT to monitor and analyse how cranes respond to the wooden decoys to attract them to feeding sites. Monitoring will occur in 2009 to 2011. If this response is positive for Grey Crowned Crane, then similar feeding sites will be rolled out to neighbouring farm lands where crane occur.

66. The Project has also devoted significant time and resources to oppose open-cast mining and plans to erect a coal fired power station on the banks on the Heyshope Dam which, although located far from Wakkerstroom, would have an impact on the Heyshope Dam water supply and increase the demand for local coal supplies thereby threatening more land in the Wakkerstroom catchment. While largely successful to date, and clearly relevant to the continued conservation of Wakkerstroom wetland *per se*, the TE remains unsure of how this relates to the stated objectives of the WOW Project.

This Project achieved some of its major global environmental objectives, but with major shortcomings, hence is evaluated as **Marginally Satisfactory**.

Tanzania: Dar es Salaam Wetlands – change attitudes to waterbirds of key stakeholders and resource-users
Implemented by the Wildlife Conservation Society of Tanzania
Source – Reports

67. This project was terminated by UNOPS on 13th May 2009. Successive and increasing bureaucratic delays over a period of two years meant that the construction of the proposed Wetland Education Centre in Kigamboni was not commenced. Despite the PCU and BLI helping the Wildlife Conservation Society of Tanzania (WCST) to draft alternative plans, none of these were adopted by WCST who insisted on staying with the original plans in spite of the emerging constraints. In March 2009, the Government placed a moratorium on all further new building in the area while awaiting a feasibility study into proposals for the future development of Kigamboni New City. Such a moratorium meant that construction of the WEC within the remaining timescale of the Project was now impossible. Despite further help and visits by the PCU and BLI, WCST ignored suggested alternative options for completing the project, instead opting for their own alternative proposal which the PCU/BLI consider to be “*not realistically feasible in the limited time*”

remaining for implementation”⁵¹. Given WCST’s inability to deliver on any of the project objectives despite incurring expenditure of US\$ 23,896 over two years and evidence of “consistent suboptimal management capacity” with “no evidence of significant education and awareness activities carried out in the project area” and “no awareness and education plan developed even in a draft form”, the matter was referred to the PSC for a decision on whether to proceed with WCST’s new proposals or whether to terminate the contract and close the project. The PSC chose the latter.

This Project failed to achieve any of its major global environmental objectives, with no worthwhile benefits, hence is evaluated as **Highly Unsatisfactory**.

Turkey: *Burdur Gölü – raise awareness among key local stakeholders on the socio-economic and ecological importance of Lake Burdur*
Implemented by Doğa Derneği
Source – Interview with project manager; reports

68. The Project developed a team of volunteers and worked with local authorities to increase understanding of the value of the lake and its conservation at the local level. A local Wetlands Commission was formed and prepared a management plan for Lake Burdur through a process involving two field trips, six meetings with local government officials (164 participants), and eight lobbying meetings involving 621 people from the local villages. The Ramsar Management Plan was formally drafted and officially endorsed by the national government authorities at the National Wetlands Commission in November 2008 and is now being implemented by the local Wetlands Commission with the active participation of 105 volunteers, overseen by a steering committee headed by the regional Governor. An environmental education programme was developed and implemented using 65 volunteers in four pilot schools around the lake. This was then expanded to 34 schools. Over 1,000 environmental education packages have been handed out in 51 schools with the participation of the Governor, Mayor, Provincial Director of Education, teachers and volunteers. Capacity-building activities were undertaken for the Burdur Bird-watching Group through the annual International Waterfowl Counts and regular field trips. Group members organized stands and activities at important events such as World Migratory Bird Day. The project office became well known and was visited by approximately 40 visitors each month, e.g. primary, high school, and university students; teachers; local authorities; farmers; retired people; and birdwatchers.

This Project achieved most of its major global environmental objectives, and yielded satisfactory global environmental benefits, with only minor shortcomings, hence is evaluated as **Satisfactory**.

Yemen: *Aden Wetland – demonstrate sustainable approaches to resource use and planning*
Implemented by BirdLife Middle East
Source – Interview with project manager; reports

69. The Project used a participatory approach to develop a new management plan for the Aden wetlands, an area covering five sites protected under ministerial decree. The new plan includes updated studies for all baseline environmental and socio-economic components, and site delineation for all key wetlands within Aden. Surveys of waterbirds have made significant findings and records for the first time, and data have been uploaded at www.worldbirds.org that is connected to the CSN tool. The plan makes recommendations for the site management and is framed according to the Ramsar guidelines and standards. Those recommendations are developed to facilitate conservation and wise-use of these wetlands to maintain, and where practical restore, the ecological values for which it could be recognized as a Ramsar site. The Project has greatly contributed to raising local awareness of the importance of the site for migratory waterbirds which has been achieved through publications, media coverage, meetings and awareness events, and campaigns involving various target groups such as schools, government institutions and local community. The new management plan has been endorsed by the Aden Governorate and the Ministry of Environment and a management structure is in place to enable its implementation. However, the Project has been unable to mainstream the plan into the overarching Aden Master Plan developed by the World Bank that is adopted by the Yemeni Cabinet, hence has not managed to meet its stated outcome of having the plan implemented by the Yemeni Government – despite intensive efforts to do so. Meantime, efforts are progressing currently through the WOW-ME regional centre to raise funds to implement the management plan at the key sites.

⁵¹ Quotes from Issue Paper for the WOW Project Steering Committee on The Case of Tanzania, dated 20th April 2009.

One of the key sites within the Aden wetlands, Al Heswa, has also received large co-financing through a UNDP project that established a plan for the site, created several facilities for visitors and for monitoring purposes. In October 2010, as a result of the Project's facilitation, the Yemeni Cabinet approved accession to AEWA. The WOW Project also facilitated the training of local people, who were also equipped with field guides and equipment, on bird-watching and undertaking simple monitoring.

This Project achieved some of its major global environmental objectives, but with major shortcomings, hence is evaluated as Marginally Satisfactory.

Component 4: Catalyzing the exchange of information for wetlands and migratory waterbird conservation

Outcome 4.1: Mechanisms for governments and NGOs to communicate between themselves and with each other strengthened

70. Activities associated with this Outcome caused most of the tensions between Project partners and the bad feeling engendered between certain individuals has undoubtedly led to some missed opportunities even if the overall Outcome has not been unduly harmed. A Communications Strategy was developed led by WI⁵², but the quality of the draft was questioned and BLI and the PCU streamlined it to make it more effective. Once agreed and operative, it proved extremely important in that protocols were in place for things like getting agreement for press releases, and house style established for all documents, thus it was central to establishing the WOW brand. In retrospect, some members of the communications team indicate that it could (and should?) have been pre-prepared by partners during the Project's design and included as an appendix to the Project Document⁵³, thereby increasing the Project's efficiency and reducing the time spent, and difficulties involved, during the Project's implementation. Significant difficulties were encountered in developing the Project's website, the process of which started in 2006 but it was not launched until April 2008, because of intense disputes over identity. The Project Document identified that the website would be a sub-page of the AEWA website, but WI appear to have insisted on it being hosted on their site whose server had just been upgraded but then, because they were hosting it, believed it should reflect their identity something the other partners disputed wanting the WOW brand used instead. This problem was further exacerbated by the fact that there was no money available for its development, so the AEWA Communications Officer, aided and guided by the PCU, led the development in-house. Putting the problems aside, once launched, the website has proved to be a re-sounding success. It is attractive, informative, and kept up-to-date with news and documents, and acts as a readily accessible archive of information about the Project. It has been promoted regularly through news digests, containing stories drafted by the Project team, circulated to all main partners and to a wide range of regional and national WOW partners, thereby having reached a large number of interested stakeholders worldwide. It has also been presented consistently by all WOW partners at all international meetings, as part of the Project.

#16	Lesson learned: In multi-partner projects, an agreed basic communication strategy developed as part of the project design would save much time during, and facilitate efficient delivery of, the project.
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⁵² **WI comment:** *Factual inaccuracy: WI had to offer to step in, taking over the initiative from the Communication Officer under the responsibility of AEWA, after the Communication Strategy was not delivered by the appointed staff in the first place.* **TE response:** This appears to be WI trying to revise history. Development of a Communications Strategy was not within the Communications Officer's TOR although he attempted to help out as much as his other AEWA commitments allowed. Therefore, it was decided to let the Communications Strategy as a contract which was bid by three parties. While another party was considered to provide best value, the difference was close, and given the added benefits that could be derived by developing WI's capacity, the contract was awarded to WI in June 2007. The ensuing document produced by WI was deemed inadequate as is testified by the discussion that can be found in Section 8 of the Minutes to the second PSC Meeting held in January 2008.

⁵³ **WI comment:** *Factual inaccuracy: The project document does contain a Communications Strategy developed during the PDF-B (Annex 8-H: Project Communications Strategy).* **TE response:** Annex 8-H does not match the TE's definition (or many other peoples' understanding) of what a communications strategy should be (no target audiences, no key messages, no identification of tools or mechanisms, no protocols) – as is clear from the fact that the decision was made to produce the WOW communications strategy from scratch. What something is called is one thing, but what it is called doesn't necessarily make it that.

#17

Lesson learned: In multi-partner projects, it is important that the Project is developed with its own identity (brand) to ensure that it has its own unique visibility that is more than the sum of its component partners.

71. The idea of creating an intranet facility on the website was delayed on the grounds that the needs of the WOW team were well-served by the public pages of the site where all relevant project documents and outputs were posted, and other options were available, e.g. e-mail. Late in the Project the facility was eventually provided and was used by the PSC members, but it is clear that its provision was not demand-driven. The creation of an e-mail discussion group was abandoned on the basis of cost and the lack of persons who could commit to act as facilitators, and because a similar vehicle had been developed separately during the Project by AEWA, that is a forum called the Technical Community Workspace. Similarly, the idea of compiling a stand alone contacts database containing information on key individuals within relevant organisations was also dropped on the basis that it would be unsustainable post-project because there would be no facility or person to maintain it. Instead, the PSC have agreed that a page in the CSN Tool will be created to facilitate finding contacts but this will point to institutional contacts rather than individuals within those institutions.

72. A total of four “newsletters” have been produced (one of which will be the final project report), the middle two of which have taken the form of large, beautifully produced (and perhaps needlessly expensive) booklets which have been disseminated widely; a number of tailored brochures on the project in general (1), the CSN tool (2), and the capacity development component (1); two roll-up displays on general flyway issues for use at conferences; a 4m wide by 3m high exhibition stand for use at international conferences; five mini-exhibition stands in the same format for smaller meetings (one each for use by WI, BLI, AEWA, BfN, and the PCU); and a two-and-a-half minute video trailer for use in introducing WOW at meetings. Most of the publications were translated into French and Russian, but because Arabic reads the other way (right to left) it requires everything to be completely re-designed which proved too expensive for the Project to achieve.

73. This Outcome is a curious mixture of activities that could actually help strengthen communication between governments and/or NGOs and those that are purely about communicating the Project to interested parties. In the event, most of the former were down-graded or given secondary status, hence it is difficult to see how the Outcome (as separate from the designed activities) can have been achieved. The Project has, however, worked hard on an unrealistic budget to fulfil much of the design requirements.

This Outcome has achieved some of its major global environmental objectives, but with major shortcomings, hence is evaluated as **Marginally Satisfactory**⁵⁴.

Outcome 4.2: Mechanisms of exchange between and within sub-regions for improved flyway-level migratory waterbird and wetland management established

74. This Outcome suffered from the under-budgeting and over-optimism inherent in the Project Document. An Exchange Programme Planning Workshop was held in conjunction with the WOW team meeting in Wageningen at the end of January 2008 where it was concluded that given the funding limitations, the most cost-effective option was for the Regional Waterbirds Officers of WOW to act as focal points for one or more flyways, and to focus exchange activities on the demonstration projects’ teams. Because of the shortfall of AEWA funds, the only money available for the exchange programme was that from BfN which was geographically restricted for use in the Africa region, hence all activities were restricted to the demonstration projects in Africa. Thus, exchange planning workshops were held for demonstration project staff from Nigeria, South Africa and Tanzania, as well as from the Regional Centre for Eastern and Southern Africa in Dar Es Salaam in November 2008, but from which the products produced are reported as poor; and for West Africa demonstration sites and a number of other “megasites” in conjunction with

⁵⁴ **PSC Chair comment:** *In this case I really believe that the rating is too low, given all work on communications; personally believe it could have been Satisfactory.* **TE response:** The communications have been excellent, but have not resulted in “*Mechanisms for governments and NGOs to communicate between themselves and with each other [being] strengthened*” according to the aim of the Outcome or the Project Document. The TE has to evaluate the gains made against the intentions proposed, independently from how much good work has been done. Therefore, the rating stands.

Eurosite⁵⁵ and WWF NL⁵⁶ at the Saloum-Niumi Delta National Park in Senegal in February 2009. Only a very small number of exchanges were actually effected (although not truly exchanges since the visits were all made only in one direction), namely staff from the demonstration projects in Tanzania and Senegal/Gambia participated in a two-week ecotourism training course organised by BirdLife South Africa at the Wakkerstroom demonstration site July 2008; surplus funds from the Estonian demonstration project enabled team members to visit the Senegal/Gambia site in January 2009 and undertake training on survey and monitoring techniques; and local community members involved in developing the management plan in Niger visited Mare d'Oursi in Burkina Faso to learn about community management and the implementation of management plans. Finally, the eco-guides in Mauritania visited Bamboung National Park, Mauritania, in October 2009 and Djoudj National Park, Senegal, in February 2010. The Project has also been working in close concert with Eurosite to initiate a twinning programme with demonstration sites in Africa, and Eurosite has confirmed interest in developing this in follow up of the exchange event held in February 2009 in Senegal. This will most likely reach fruition post-project. Exchange visits are also planned for late 2010 in cooperation with Eurosite members who will be asked to be involved in the programme based on the needs identified in the two exchange programme workshops held in Tanzania and Senegal.

This Outcome has not achieved most of its major global environment objectives and despite some significant efforts, it has still yielded few satisfactory global environmental benefits, hence it is evaluated as **Unsatisfactory**.

Outcome 4.3: Wise-use of migratory waterbirds and wetlands is better understood and implemented by governments in focal sub-regions

75. This Outcome has also been reduced significantly due to insufficient funding. The proposed development of a sub-regional mentoring capacity was abandoned according to a PSC decision in December 2008. A number of key MEA texts were selected as a priority for translation in consultation with Ramsar Convention Secretariat and AEWA Secretariat; these included the AEWA Conservation Guidelines, AEWA Implementation Priorities, the text of the Ramsar Convention, and the Ramsar Convention Handbooks for Wise Use of Wetlands. Shortage of funding meant that plans to translate the first of these into French and all into Russian had to be scrapped. However, funding was secured through the WetCap Project to translate all of them into Arabic which was completed on 20th September 2010 (see paragraph 54 and its footnote).

This Outcome has not achieved most of its major global environment objectives and has yielded few satisfactory global environmental benefits, hence it is evaluated as **Unsatisfactory**⁵⁷.

PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION

PARTICIPATING AGENCIES

76. The Project has been implemented through the **United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)** and its execution has been contracted through the **United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS)** Kenya Operations Centre based in Nairobi. UNEP authorised UNOPS to enter into contractual arrangements with physical and legal persons on their behalf, and to make direct payments against all categories of the project budget, and to manage project funds, including budget planning, monitoring, revisions, disbursements, record keeping, reporting and auditing that all observe UNEP rules. Thus, the Project has

⁵⁵ Eurosite was established in 1989 and has 96 members from 26 different countries across Europe. It is one of the largest pan-European organisations bringing together governmental and non-governmental organisations, as well as private bodies, in active collaboration for the practical management of Europe's nature. Its mission is "To exchange, enhance and promote expertise in the management of sites for nature, throughout Europe".

⁵⁶ **WI comment:** No actual involvement of WWF in the workshop. The confusion may have been generated by the fact that the Eurosite CEO moved soon after the Senegal meeting to work for WWF NL. In 2009 Eurosite ran into financial problems and was therefore unable to follow up on its interest of cooperation with the Project although its interest was reconfirmed in late 2010.

⁵⁷ **PSC Chair comment:** I have a similar problem with the rating of this outcome where the funding shortage has had such a big influence and where it is very hard to determine the long-term spin-off and the fact that it is almost impossible to measure what by the end has been absorbed by e.g. governments, staff etc. **TE response:** The funding shortage undoubtedly is the reason behind the failure of this Outcome. Nonetheless, it has not achieved most of its major global environment objectives and has yielded few satisfactory global environmental benefits, therefore the rating has to be Unsatisfactory.

been executed in accordance with the standard rules and procedures of the UNEP external execution modality. All technical activities have been contracted through a UNOPS-staffed Project Coordination Unit (PCU) to a “Senior Lead Contractor” – **Wetlands International** (WI) – and a “Lead Contractor” – **BirdLife International** (BLI) and in some cases onward through them to other organisations, e.g. The World Conservation Monitoring Centre (UNEP-WCMC)⁵⁸. All co-funding has been routed through, and accounted for by, Wetlands International.

Stakeholder Participation

77. In addition to the two lead contractors, the Project brought together two multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) – the African-Eurasian Waterbird Agreement (AEWA) and the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands – as principal project partners. While it may seem too obvious to state that project partners participated, this is the first time that these four organisations have been involved collectively in a single project. While this partnership was not always easy (see paragraphs 23, 79, and 85-86), it has ultimately proved to be extremely successful, and is widely viewed as one of the most important outcomes of the Project. This is evident from the fact that all four partners signed a Memorandum of Cooperation (MOC) in The Hague on 14th June 2010 to consolidate and progress a programmatic partnership on the foundations laid by this Project (see paragraph 138).

78. The Project has also worked closely with a large number of stakeholders throughout. Even during the conceptualisation of the design, invitations were requested from a large number of countries and organisations as to their interest in participating and ideas for inclusion. During actual implementation, the active engagement of stakeholders has been vital to fulfilling the achievements, in all three of the main components:

- Critical Sites Network Tool – the extensive voluntary-based survey networks of both the International Waterfowl Census (IWC) and the Important Bird Areas (IBA) were critical in verifying much of the data on which the tool depends. The national organisers were instrumental in checking the coordinates of some 27,000 sites individually to enable accurate linkage of IWC and IBA sites. Gap-filling surveys were organised in numerous countries (see paragraph 42) using local expertise. Awareness of the tool was raised amongst stakeholders through an extensive communication campaign focussed on international meetings of potential users (see paragraph 14 of [Annex X](#)), and once the tool was formally launched on-line, a facility was included for providing feedback from users to make improvements and fix bugs.
- Flyway Training Kit – invoked the innovative idea of Regional Training Boards in which 43 wildlife training institutions, NGOs and governmental bodies took part in four Boards involved in all aspects of the Kit’s design, production and the regionalisation thereby stimulating wide ownership of it and providing a sound foundation for its future implementation across the region.
- Demonstration sites – these involved a great many actors in the form of governmental agencies and their staff, non-governmental and academic organisations, private sector companies, local community administrations and organisations, and individuals. Results from questionnaires conducted as part of the MTE showed that:

“more than 90% of the demonstration project managers feel that their institutions participated “very much” in the design of their projects, while 80% gave the same rating concerning the adaptations introduced after approval.”

In the demonstration sites the TE visited, awareness of the overall WOW Project and the issues pertaining to the local project was almost universally high amongst stakeholders, whether this be community gardeners in Wakkerstroom (South Africa), village representatives on the Community Environmental Committee at Kokorou (Niger), or the trainee eco-guides in Banc d’Arguin (Mauritania) although see also paragraph 133.

The Project has also placed considerable store in maintaining close links with other players involved in the conservation of the Flyway through excellent communication at many levels – an outstanding and informative website which was frequently updated with a whole raft of reports through which progress and technical issues could be tracked by interested parties; an annual Project newsletter; a number of high quality

⁵⁸ **WI comment:** *Contracts were also developed by the PCU with the Sub regional centres.*

and attractive booklets and brochures; and presentations to numerous international meetings. As a result, the vision described by one project member as having AEWA and WOW as the spider in the centre of the web of flyway conservation for the region has been turned from an abstract concept into a concrete reality. Not only has the Project developed major tools for the two MEAs to do their work but it has increased and invigorated the networks that support the achievement of that work.

The Project has worked closely with a large number of stakeholders throughout and the active engagement of stakeholders has been vital to fulfilling the achievements in all three of the main components, hence stakeholder participation is evaluated as **Highly Satisfactory**.

IMPLEMENTATION APPROACH

Project Oversight

79. Project oversight has been undertaken at the strategic level by a **Project Steering Committee (PSC)**. This comprised one representative from each of the key project partners (UNEP, UNOPS, WI, BLI, AEWA, Ramsar, BfN) plus a Chair who is a Professor on Sustainable Development at Wageningen University, who was nominated by WI and agreed unanimously by the other parties at the first PSC Meeting held on 8th December 2006. In addition, the PSC also decided there was value in having a vice-chair, unattached to any organisation but universally respected for his long-term contributions to waterbird conservation in the region. The PSC met approximately once or twice a year⁵⁹ and held two teleconferences⁶⁰, the minutes of which are recorded with great clarity. It is clear in retrospect that the initial structure and terms of reference of the PSC were inadequate for dealing with the extensive pressures and problems that the Project faced in its early years, notably the impending financial crisis and the institutional tensions. At that time, the PSC was not viewed by all as the politically neutral, trusting, and positively motivated forum in which problems could be aired and decisions taken, since the impartiality and performance of the Chair was in question. Despite his best efforts at mediation, many of the methods used were taken from the private sector and were not amenable to the cultures represented by international NGOs and MEAs. The second PSC meeting in January 2008, described by several members as cathartic, represented the nadir of the Project when institutional and personal differences brought about a full realisation of the imminence of its complete failure and corresponded to a shift in attitudes to save it⁶¹.

80. Subsequent to that meeting, the Chair stepped down in May 2008 and was replaced by the vice-chair, since when the PSC has functioned to great effect through it becoming a much more focussed and efficient decision-making body⁶². Ideas for an executive committee or sub-committees were mooted but rejected in favour of members becoming more directly engaged with the Project, rather than adding additional layers of complexity and, as a result, the frequency of meetings between members (both formal and informal) was increased, often by teleconference to reduce costs. While this appears to have worked to a degree, a three-person executive body (chair, WI, BLI) with which the PCU could have worked with closely from the start may have been more effective in avoiding many of the problems encountered. By design or coincidence, the influence of political observers from certain partner organisations also decreased with their replacement by management or technical ones. That the PSC had let the Project drift into such dangerous territory is reprehensible, but that it had the courage and determination to redress the situation, and to do it so successfully, can only be admired.

#5

Lesson Learned: In a partnership-executed project, it is important that the chair of the Project Steering Committee is independent from the organisations involved to avoid intimations of bias.

⁵⁹ Dec. 2006, Jan. 2008, Dec 2008, Nov. 2009, Mar. 2010 and Dec 2010 (proposed).

⁶⁰ May and Sept. 2008.

⁶¹ **WI comment:** *The first chair has not been interviewed or otherwise consulted. Statements like these are therefore inappropriate.*
TE response: The TE strongly disagrees. If during interviews an almost unanimous opinion is obtained, there is a fair chance that it is true. The paragraph reflects that – the issues are described as from those interviewed, and interviewing or not interviewing the first Chair concerned is not going to change those opinions. To suggest, that because the TE did not interview the first Chair, reporting those views is inappropriate is disingenuous.

⁶² **PSC Chair comment:** *The direct link between me becoming Chair and the better functioning of the PSC may also be a little overdone. A fact is that after that January 2009 set of meetings and clashes, discussions etc. there was more openness and I indeed could invest much more time and energy than the previous Chair could.*

81. Each of the demonstration projects also had its own steering committees, the quality, capacity, and engagement of which varied greatly amongst the countries involved, as did the representativeness of stakeholders, e.g. in the four projects visited by the TE:

- in Niger, there was excellent involvement of all relevant government departments, local administration, and the NGOs involved, but surprisingly no representative from the communities themselves;
- in Mauritania there was a simple three-person committee representing the three actors involved, the national park, and the two NGOs FIBA and WIA⁶³ with the Project Manager acting as secretary;
- in South Africa there was good representation of local government, local stakeholders and national NGOs and agencies, but surprisingly included three members of the project implementation team thereby clouding the separation of oversight and management functions;
- in Hungary the steering committee appears to have been put together from amongst the friends and colleagues of the Project Manager rather than through more formal channels, with four of its six members being involved directly in its implementation; and while it did include a representative of Agropoint Ltd. (the private company acting as project partner), surprisingly it did not include anyone from the Körös-Maros National Park in which the site was located.

Frequency of meetings also varied from “*every semester*” (quarterly) in Senegal/Gambia to never in Hungary where it was claimed in the reports that “*Regular SC meetings were not feasible because of the big distances the members live/work from each other*” and yet travel from Budapest to the site took the TE only a few hours. Largely, these committees appear to have functioned adequately, since ten of the 11 projects resulted in varying degrees of success, but no minutes of their deliberations have been lodged with the PCU, and in most cases seem never to have been taken in the first place.

82. The inclusion of implementation staff on these steering committees coincided with some strange decisions regarding changing project activities⁶⁴. For example, in South Africa, project funds appear to have been used in support of awareness-raising activities against planning applications by mining companies which threaten the site as a legitimate project activity, even though of course it could in no way have been included in the original project document and still doesn't appear in the logframe. No record of the decision-making process to include this activity has been able to be obtained⁶⁵. In Hungary, changes were made to the

⁶³ Fondation Internationale du Banc d'Arguin and WI West Africa Programme.

⁶⁴ **PCU comment:** *While observations on the weakness of the demo projects' governance structures are indeed valid to a certain degree, all demo projects were clearly instructed from the onset to revert to the PCU and BLI/WI should there be any deviation of the original workplan and budget. Therefore, the PCU together with BLI/WI did act as an additional check & balance layer to local governance structures. As such, the local team did not have carte blanche and to get things rubber stamped by a friendly local Steering Committee. We did not formally request any minutes from the local Steering Committee sessions and did not see a need to delve into local governance issues provided that they project stuck to the overarching plan. Throughout the project the PCU did engage in numerous budget and activity revisions as situations changed in order to re-assess the local implementing organization's plan for activities and their budget allocations. This strategy did manage to catch gross mismanagement, as in the case of Tanzania. The PCU assumed - perhaps naively as pointed out - that any procurement or tendering would be done to national standards which would then be scrutinized when that entity went through an audit. The PCU also requested official external audit reports as a condition for the disbursement of funds.*

⁶⁵ **PCU comment:** *Because the mining issue was so central in the long-term health of the wetland, project funds were used for running awareness campaigns about the dangers of mining and to counter local perceptions of the short-term benefits of mining jobs by educating people about on the long-term value of keeping the wetland intact. The mining issue catalysed the three large conservation NGOs working in the area (namely BLSA, WWF-SA and Botanical Society of South Africa) to form a tripartite alliance. While the mining issue was not part of the project document, it was deemed to be a risk of critical importance for the long-term sustainability of project outcomes and warranted attention. It was an important parallel event during the lifetime of the demo project and captured a lot of time and energy of the local team, and might appear to be woven into the project activities. The lodging of a formal objection does in fact appear in progress report #6 as a key project achievement during the reporting period, but only because this was such an important issue for the local community. **TE response:** While there is no argument over the importance of the campaign run, the use of GEF funds for this purpose remains questionable. GEF did not make the funds available for the conservation of Wakkerstroom *per se* but for the demonstration of conservation-related activities. While it may be argued that campaigning against a damaging operation could be regarded as demonstrating advocacy (and successfully), by the time the third tranche of GEF money was being disbursed, GEF's priorities had moved away from site-specific conservation towards broader mechanisms. Despite the action being reported in Progress Report #6, there is no evidence of any formal enquiry to, or agreement*

Project plan to drop some activities and use the money saved to make a film about the site⁶⁶. While the adaptive management is praiseworthy, having the film directed by one of the PSC members is naive. While no impropriety is alluded to in any way by the TE, nonetheless some of these decisions are questionable, or at least would have had greater credibility if they had been taken in a more orthodox manner. Undoubtedly inexperience appears to be the root cause for this, but these examples certainly suggest a lack of sufficient oversight by the main PSC, the PCU, and/or the two main project contractors who were responsible for the demonstration projects.

Project Management

83. The Project's implementation has closely followed the logframe throughout through a complex but logical structure at three scales:

- i) the flyway scale as defined by the AEWA;
- ii) the sub-regional level in four sub-regions namely Western and Central Africa, Eastern and Southern Africa, the Middle East States, and Central Asia/Caucasus States; and
- iii) the site level (11 demonstration sites in 12 countries).

Management and coordination of the entire Project has been the responsibility of the **Project Coordination Unit (PCU)**, which comprised a full-time two-man team hired by UNOPS, namely a **Chief Technical Advisor**

Dr. Edoardo Zandri – 31st July 2006 to 16th February 2009

and an **Operations Manager**

Mr. Camillo Ponziani – 5th July 2006 to present.

In February 2009 the CTA left to take up the post of UNEP Task Manager, and the Operations Manager's TOR were revised to reflect new roles and responsibilities. The PCU was based originally in Wetlands International's offices in Wageningen, The Netherlands, but relocated to the AEWA Secretariat in Bonn in July 2009. At the sub-regional level, coordination has been through Regional Centres (note the loose terminology is ingrained the project and "regional" and "sub-regional" seem to be used interchangeably) which are staffed by a Flyway Officer or a Regional Waterbird Officer (again used interchangeably) responsible for the regional focus and liaison for the development of the CSN tool, and a Regional Capacity Officer leading the regional aspects of the Flyway Training Kit and the Training of Trainers programme. All the Regional Centres used the regional structures of WI and BLI, thus:

- Western and Central Africa – WIA office in Dakar, Senegal;
- Eastern and Southern Africa – BLI's African secretariat in Nairobi, Kenya;
- Central Asia and the Caucasus – WI's Moscow office (flyway officer) and the Association for Conservation of Biodiversity of Kazakhstan in Almaty (capacity officer); and
- Middle East – BLI's Middle East Division in Amman, Jordan.

At the country level, each demonstration site was managed differently, but had a clearly identified person responsible for delivery – a Project Director, a Project Manager, or a Project Coordinator.

84. In total, the Project has involved 17 contractors and sub-contractors, 314 NGO staff, 320 Government staff, and 2,869 volunteers in 106 activities, each with their own administrative and logistical needs. As the MTE points out,

“Even under the best circumstances – with adequate staffing and funds – this is a very difficult project to manage”.

from, UNEP for GEF funds to be used for this purpose.

⁶⁶ **BLI comment:** *The identified weaknesses in the national governance structures in several of the demonstration projects are a valid point, and noted by the PCU and BLI during project initiation. This specific decision in Hungary was, however, taken with the full involvement and agreement of the PCU and BLI, and was an adaptive management response to maximise the promotion opportunities for the site and WOW project (recognised positively elsewhere in this TE), using funds previously allocated to activities that had become redundant.*

Project Coordination Unit

85. The PCU has functioned as the coordination hub for the entire Project, although it has been directly responsible for the disbursement of only the GEF funds. It has played a difficult role at times, particularly in the early stages of the Project when relations between individuals in the PCU and WI were tense, in part because of the way UNEP apparently foisted the PCU on the Project, in part because of misunderstandings over the extent of its authority, and in part because of differences over management style. Nonetheless, even during the dark days when the working environment at WI's offices in Wagenigen was hostile^{67,68}, the PCU has undertaken its task effectively and efficiently ensuring contracts and ToRs were produced on time (17 contracts established and let within 12 months), procuring equipment, facilitating activities at all levels, and producing reports of the highest standard. An example of its innovativeness to ensure efficiency was its introduction of a common template for all reporting (except to GEF) at whatever level, thereby reducing what would otherwise have become an overly-burdensome task. It produced excellent Semi-annual Reports and other materials to the PSC, enabling the latter to function increasingly effectively as a decision-making body and allow effective adaptive management (see paragraph 90). The CTA was extremely experienced, and appears to have done an outstanding job, although it is clear that his management style was not to everyone's liking. There were significant issues over what seemed to some to be excessive interference in technical issues and while this may have resulted partly from a misunderstanding over recognition that the CTA is ultimately responsible to GEF for the quality of the technical delivery of the Project, there is also a case to be made for giving a technical specification to a contractor and letting them get on with it (see also paragraph 117). Certainly, in a project where institutional tension was high, it is now conceded that a softer, more diplomatic, approach may have been more productive. As a consequence of financial stringency the CTA re-deployed as the UNEP Task Manager^{69,70,71}, and this led to the PCU stepping back and taking a less proactive role in the Project's management, handing over more to the PSC which became more proactive. The Junior Operations Manager proved himself to be anything but "junior"⁷², displaying high levels of coordination skills, outstanding communication skills, and being highly responsive throughout to the queries and needs of everyone, and in delivering extremely clear and well-structured reports. Despite the difficulties that the Project has faced at various times, one unanimous view pervades, and that is the excellence of the job that the PCU performed⁷³.

Wetlands International

86. WI⁷⁴ clearly struggled with this Project over the first two years of its implementation. Three factors seem to have been at play:

⁶⁷ **PSC Chair comment:** *Was the working environment really hostile or is this a too generic expression of what indeed was the case: a strong clash between some personalities and the continuous discussions on "the ownership" issue? It is quite a strong expression which I believe has more to do with the relations between some people than the general atmosphere.* **TE response:** The description was used independently by both members of the PCU – it seemed therefore the right way to describe it.

⁶⁸ **WI comment:** *If hostility has been experienced it has not been between WI and PCU, but between individuals of both entities. The WI Project Supervisor has personally worked hard at being open, friendly and accommodating at all times towards the PCU, not experiencing hostility in that relationship.* **TE response:** The TE understands that the PCU agrees with the second sentence here.

⁶⁹ **UNEP comment:** *It may be relevant to clarify here that when the CTA moved to UNEP in February 2009, approx 90% of GEF funds were already expended and almost 100% committed – hence it was natural for the PCU to downsize and step back when the BfN funds became the primary source of funding for the final stages of the project. The period February 2009 to December 2010 was mainly dedicated to finalising and wrapping-up GEF-funded activities. The decision of UNEP to assign the former CTA as Task Manager for WOW was not taken immediately when I moved to Nairobi (Feb 2009), but a few months later, in April 2009, following internal consultation and the normal internal portfolio re-allocation that occurs when a new Task Manager joins the UNEP team in Nairobi.*

⁷⁰ **PCU comment:** *The WOW PSC was formally notified of the transfer of Task Management responsibilities on 16 March 2009 (one month after the former CTA joined UNEP in Nairobi), due to an internal re-allocation of project portfolios within UNEP/DGEF.*

⁷¹ **UNEP comment:** *The former UNEP Task Manager (Esther Mangi) still works with UNEP and in her same job. It is just that the management responsibility of the WOW project was shifted to a newly arrived Task Manager. This happens regularly when a new TM joins the team or as part of an internal re-organisation of the very broad portfolio of UNEP/DGEF projects.*

⁷² **PSC Chair comment:** *I cannot more agree with the sentence "the Junior Manager proved himself to be anything but "junior"!"*

⁷³ **WI comment:** *Wetlands International recognises the important role the PCU has played and the professionalism it has displayed in management of the GEF processes. On the other hand, failure to bring the team together may also be seen as a failure of the CTA as responsible for successful delivery of the project.*

⁷⁴ **WI comment:** *and the PCU.* **TE response:** WI's view is noted, but the TE does not agree.

- i) The inadequate deployment of financial resources both in terms of staff capability and in terms of time (i.e. finance). Undoubtedly, much of this problem arose from the cuts to the budget late in the design stage (see paragraph 8) leaving WI very exposed since money that had been allocated originally to them for management was cut through reduced rates of payment and through a re-allocation to fund the PCU. Since WI had previously had the lion's share of the management budget, they suffered hardest as a result of this. Examples of the consequences included that the senior officer tasked with supervision had been under-resourced by cuts in the Project's budget leaving him with only 20 days per year (see paragraph 17) – clearly insufficient time to achieve this role in the Project; and incongruence of expectations in that WI's focus was on the technical aspects of producing the Project's outputs rather than on meeting the necessary reporting requirements (particularly of GEF), while the PCU naturally had a rather more process-oriented expectations. Such under-resourcing and differences in focus resulted in the inadequate delivery of reports, the quality of which was also not always acceptable to the CTA. This in turn escalated the significant tensions already apparent from ii) below.
- ii) WI's inexperience of GEF (this being their first GEF project⁷⁵) and a basic lack of understanding of UN-agency-implemented GEF project monitoring and reporting requirements was significantly exacerbated by the degree of resentment that appears to have been left to run un-checked over the fact that "their" project (see paragraph 22) had been removed from their control at the last minute, and their inability to get on and deal with the world as it was, rather than how they would have liked it to be, caused difficulties for Project partners and the PCU, where it was exhibited by an apparent unwillingness to readily accept GEF's primacy in the project and the role of the CTA as the person with overall responsibility for its technical delivery, while in fact this may have been confused with a concern over letting go of the technical lead of components that it viewed the PCU as being unfamiliar with (see paragraph 23).
- iii) The penchant of the organisation's leadership for promotion of WI at the expense of a common partnership brand⁷⁶ caused significant dissonance in the early stages and continues to be viewed as a problem by many, e.g. one interviewee noted that "*WI appear to have forgotten what partnership is about*"^{77,78}.

The under-resourcing, and WI's initial moves to run things themselves rather than work closely with fellow partners, has a lasting legacy only in respect of the Training Kit. Their initial plans to repeat the material produced under the previously implemented *Wetlands Poverty Reduction Programme* (possibly as a cost-saving strategy) did not find favour with other partners, but they could not be shifted from their firm belief in the need for a ToT programme and production of the material to enable this to work, despite a number of other options being tabled at the meeting in Almen in September 2007. As a result, the idea of the Flyway Training Kit was cemented, even though its relevance and cost-effectiveness remain questionable (see paragraphs 135-136 and 105 respectively)⁷⁹.

87. Having dealt with the negatives, it is important to balance the picture because WI ultimately managed to turn things around. Throughout, they have been responsible for managing all the co-financing and dealing with a large number of sub-contracts⁸⁰, the efficiency of which the TE cannot assess, but the results of which

⁷⁵ **WI comment:** *While indeed this was the first GEF project in which WI has played such a central role and that without WI's drive and determination would have possibly failed, WI has being involved in other GEF projects or other project of similar size.*

⁷⁶ **WI comment:** *In relation to the brand WI showed much less ownership, there was (and is) even doubt within its ranks that the brand is needed for the concept to be successful.*

⁷⁷ **PSC Chair comment:** *The remark under iii) is quite strong and citing only one person with such a strong view may be not very well balanced. WI has always built on partnerships in its long history.* **TE response:** Many interviewees made the same point – this was perhaps the most concise (and printable) quote.

⁷⁸ **WI comment:** *Partnership is a core value in the way WI works.* **TE response:** The TE is aware of this. He is simply reporting on the views garnered. WI can reflect on them or discard them.

⁷⁹ **WI comment:** *All these statements represent unbalanced information because the people that are main players from the side of WI have not been interviewed or otherwise consulted on this. This makes these statements inappropriate.* **TE response:** Again the TE strongly disagrees. Just because WI disagrees with the statements made does not in itself make the text inappropriate, since such a view is to denigrate the validity of views held by other partners. If WI feels them to be unbalanced, that is noted. However, in the view of the TE, given the strong assertions made here and in footnotes 76 and 77, the TE, with every respect, gently advises WI to check whether their espoused aims at partnership are actually being met in reality.

⁸⁰ **WI comment:** *The number of contracts linked to the implementation of the project was certainly high. This was largely due to the difficulty of AEWA to mobilise resources: AEWA's contribution was delivered in 13 separate contracts each of which required a*

are plain to see through a successful project. WI's technical skills should also not be overlooked since although all elements of the Project have been team efforts, most players recognise that without WI's conceptual vision and technical lead, the CSN Tool and the Flyway Training Kit would not have come to such a successful fruition and in a period shortened by six months through financial imperatives. Furthermore, once the issue of under-resourcing was rectified in the September following the January 2008 PSC meeting, and new blood was injected into the project team concomitant to its needs in the form of a dedicated Project Coordinator, the management of the Project came up to full speed, eventually with the two contractors' Project Coordinators working with the down-sized PCU (and occasionally supplemented with the new PSC Chair) acting as a core management group. These changes, together with the PCU stepping back from day-to-day management (which significantly reduced the institutional tensions) and a more hands-on approach from the PSC, led to an increase in effective management and decision-making. At the time of the TE's visit to the PSC meeting in South Africa in March 2010, it was abundantly clear that relations between the Project's partners were very good, there was an excellent team spirit, sense of camaraderie, and a clear feeling of shared vision and unified purpose. Subsequently, all four parties went on to sign an MOC in June 2010 to turn the Project partnership into a programmatic one.

BirdLife International

88. BLI's input appears to have been effective and efficient throughout, competently delivering their inputs to the Project largely on time and to the required technical standards. BLI were proportionately less affected by GEF's cuts to the Project budget, and in the re-allocation of monies to fund the PCU, but their greater size, their greater experience of implementing GEF projects⁸¹, and their greater ability to call on their network of national partners meant that the increased need for in-kind co-financing to get the job done were easier to absorb and less disruptive for the Project as a result. The TE feels that perhaps BLI sat on the fence a little too easily in the early part of the Project when feelings were running high elsewhere, content to deal with the technical issues that they were tasked with, rather than get involved in the more difficult aspects of the Project's management (with which it has to be said they had little, if any, responsibility for). Nonetheless, their much greater experience of GEF, together with their knowledge of the rapidity and difficulty of this learning period, could have been brought to bear to greater effect⁸².

#8

Lesson learned: Experience counts.

Demonstration Projects

89. The 11 demonstration projects were implemented by independent project management teams drawn from a variety of sources under direct responsibility of WI or BLI, see Table 8. BLI made use of their partnership network of national NGOs for all six of the projects for which they were responsible, while WI implemented their projects through a variety of means. Implementation varied in terms of effectiveness and efficiency, largely as a result of institutional and individual capacity both amongst the management teams but also amongst the partner (often government) agencies, hence generic lessons are impossible to draw. Only one project failed outright (Tanzania), more through an unreasonable degree of stubbornness in the face of rapidly changing external factors than through any degree of ineptness. Capacity in Yemen was low and the Regional Office of BLI stepped in to provide significant support to complete the project. At the other end of the scale, Estonia and Lithuania both produced excellent results, as did Nigeria, albeit that they were

detailed budget and separate accounting and reporting. WI alone can list 19 donor's contracts (inc. UNOPS, AWEA (13!), Ramsar, SNH, LNV, DK, Sweden) and 52 subcontracts.

⁸¹ BLI has implemented four GEF projects as well as WOW – two full-sized projects (“*African NGO Government partnerships for sustainable biodiversity action*” and “*Mainstreaming Conservation of Migratory Soaring Birds into Key Productive Sectors along the Rift Valley/Red Sea Flyway*”) and two medium-sized projects (“*Community-based Conservation in Bamenda Highlands*” (Cameroon) and “*Sustainable Conservation of Globally Important Caribbean Bird Habitats: Strengthening a Regional Network for a Shared Resource*”).

⁸² **BLI comment:** *Whilst fully respecting the opinion of the TE and accepting that we have greater experience of GEF projects, BirdLife consider that this comment is perhaps inaccurate. Neither BirdLife nor the PSC shied away from confronting difficult decisions, whilst on day-to-day management BirdLife respected the roles of each partner, but was willing to challenge in the interests of ensuring the most efficient delivery of the project's objectives. However, it remains our opinion that the partners each had specific roles in the project, and we were correct not to encroach on areas that were clearly the responsibility of others.*

all implemented through different mechanisms and on different continents – the common factors seeming to be strong political support and high levels of local motivation and commitment.

TABLE 8: INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR IMPLEMENTING THE DEMONSTRATION PROJECTS

Institutional arrangement	Wetlands International	BirdLife International
National NGO		Hungary Nigeria South Africa Tanzania Turkey Yemen
National Government Agency	Estonia	
Government/Int. NGO	Niger	
University	Lithuania	
Custom-hired managers	Mauritania Senegal/Gambia	

Adaptive Management

90. The Project’s adaptive management has been excellent, as it has had to be in order to overcome the number of problems that it has faced. Even during the difficult early period when the PSC was clearly not functioning properly, it managed to recognise the need to have the logframe updated, and then later to reform itself, adopt a new Chair, and deal with the issues at hand. Once operating as an effective decision-making body, adaptive management flowed smoothly, the PSC being fed with a wealth of data from the various Project component teams through highly-detailed yet accessible reports produced by the PCU. As a result, the PSC was able to take informed decisions, particularly concerning the critically restricted finances, at both a strategic level – shorten the timeframe of the Project, reduce the size of the PSC, bridge and return policy on funding (see paragraph 100), increase fund-raising activities – and at a more tactical level – allocating priorities for the available finances while cutting back or abandoning others, reducing the scope of the mid-term evaluation to concentrate on governance and organisational issues. It also involved itself in technical adaptation, keeping a close eye on the progress of the various technical components and directing issues based on issues drawn to its attention (often outside of the rigidity of formal meetings) by the PCU, e.g. the original plan had been to produce a first draft of the Flyway Training Kit and then to send it to the Sub-regional Boards to regionalise it (incorporate examples and case studies specifically relevant to each of the regions) and translate it as a single task. However, it was recognised that this would have meant ending up with four completely separate (although similar) training kits which could have led to a myriad of problems long-term. Therefore, the decision was made to get the Sub-regional Boards to provide the materials they wanted including and to then incorporate as much of this material as possible into a final English-language version which would then be translated separately once funding could be found. Technical adaptation was also apparent in many of the demonstration projects, e.g. Lithuania (complete re-design), Hungary (change of fish-pond management regime) and Mauritania (need to help complete a basic ecotourism strategy prior to concentrating on bird eco-tourism).

#9	Lesson learned: Sound application of adaptive management can achieve results in spite of considerable challenges.
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91. The PSC also moved initially to act on the five recommendations provided in the Mid-term Evaluation. At the time, the funding crisis was so acute (and not helped by the institutional issues) that the Project was seriously examining exit strategies that made the best use of available resources while recognising that the Project would fail and be wound-up well ahead of schedule. With increased resource mobilisation in early 2009 and a thaw in relations amongst the Project’s partners, this “*nightmare scenario*” receded and most of the MTE’s recommendations no longer proved relevant. Finally, one other issue is noteworthy here. As discussed in more depth in paragraph 118, although the logframe has acted as the governing framework for the Project’s implementation, its indicators have not played any part in any of the adaptive management that the Project has practiced, not least because the indicators do not lend themselves to anything other than describing the start and finish states of the Project.

Technical Management

92. The technical management of the Project has largely been of the highest standard. The expertise deployed has been outstanding and the products they have produced have also been excellent, even if their relevance is a little suspect (see paragraph 128 *et seq.*). The Project was generally carried out as a series of interlocking technical contracts and sub-contracts using project teams to ensure the necessary degree of interaction and communication. This appears to have worked best in the case of developing the CSN tool, but the situation was less smooth with the Flyway Training Kit. Apart from the problems incurred through WI's insistence over using a ToT model, there were difficulties in assembling a team in one place and the hiring process for a Wetlands Capacity Development Officer (WCDO) failed. As a result, WI used their existing WCDO who was based in Canada⁸³ to fulfil this role, even though there were concerns over whether this was cost-effective, what the added value of the role was, and whether it could be supervised adequately. In retrospect, it remains unclear as to whether the solution was cost-effective⁸⁴, but the role clearly gave ownership of the training component to the regions and led to the establishment of the Regional Training Boards. Furthermore, the timing of contracts for the Regional Capacity Development Officers also left something to be desired since they were recruited before the Flyway Training Kit was available. They would have been much more effective at fund-raising if they had been able to show potential donors what the kit was and if they could have had some examples of where such ToT had been successful⁸⁵. Nonetheless, as is evident from the end products, it is worth repeating, that the technical management of the Project has largely been of the highest standard.

The Project suffered a traumatic early period with significant institutional tensions and inadequately functioning oversight. However, through excellent adaptive management, which was also applied to overcome an acute shortage of finance, it solved these problems and ended with a smoothly functioning implementation team. Administrative and technical management have been of the highest order. Only because the early problems cannot be overlooked has the implementation approach not been assessed more highly, hence the implementation approach has been evaluated as **Satisfactory**.

UNEP supervision and backstopping

93. UNEP-DGEF supervision was accomplished by standard procedures. The Task Manager role was fulfilled by two persons during the lifetime of the Project thus:

Ms. Esther Mwangi	– 4 th April 2006 to 16 th February 2009
Dr. Edoardo Zandri	– 16 th February 2009 ^{86,87} to December 2010

⁸³ **WI comment:** *Factually incorrect: The CDO was based in the NL at the time of his assignment to this project and relocated to Canada later because of family reasons. Considering the fact that he worked largely with external consultants the regional centres and training boards, his location has no bearing on the project. The CDO was not the only person who has relocated to other countries during the project and continue to successfully deliver the project tasks.* **TE response:** Apologies, but the correction itself is incorrect and the text stands. It was stated in a letter from WI CEO to the PCU dated 10/9/07 that at the time WI initiated the recruitment of a CDO in December 2006, WI's acting Capacity Development Coordinator for the WOW project was relocating to join his family in Canada – which he did officially as regards the project on 13/4/07 through an e-mail. The aforesaid letter which outlines “the way Wetlands International has decided to implement the Training and Awareness Component of the WoW project” states that “In early June ... WI decided to re-assign the task of coordinating the development of Component 2 of the WOW project to Tunde Ojei, for part of his time, working from this new base” i.e. Canada.

⁸⁴ **WI comment:** *If the evaluation of cost effectiveness of this decision is part of the remit of the TE, it should have properly assessed, if this is not included in the TOR this comment is unnecessary. Needs to be said the WI remained within the budget for this activity.* **TE response:** This entire comment is wide of the mark. The point is that in a project as cash-strapped as this, cost-effectiveness is vital to all aspects of all activities. Certain members of the Project team raised with the TE the issue of whether having a CDO in Canada was cost effective (as they had with WI at the time). The TE has reported that as being a valid concern, and also makes the point that it is impossible to assess, but that he did a good job. The issues raised by this comment are irrelevant, particularly that re the budget, since no-one, least of all the TE have implied that WI was over budget – the concerns are those relating to savings to be used for other activities.

⁸⁵ **WI comment:** *Needs to be noted though, that they also played an important role in managing the regional input into the development of the training kit. According to Annex 8-I: Implementation arrangements including monitoring and evaluation plan “They will be responsible for mediating the development the sub-regional Training and Awareness Raising Programmes, acting as a focal point for the Exchange Programme, integrating demonstration projects into appropriate activities and coordinating the mobilising of resources for the implementation of the Training and Awareness Raising Programme.”, i.e. fundraising was only one element of their tasks and they had to be in place for many others.*

⁸⁶ **UNEP comment:** *16th February is the date Dr. Zandri moved to UNEP, but the transfer of Task Manager roles for WOW happened later.*

⁸⁷ **PCU comment:** *Formal handover of roles taken on 16th March 2009 as per official letter sent to PSC.*

Key aspects of supervision were made through the Task Manager's involvement in the PSC meetings and through the annual PIRs. The TE finds that the PIRs are a little on the generous side in their rating of activities, and that the Task Manager's perceptions of risk were generally lower than that of the PCU (see also paragraph 115). However, the TE is also aware that such reporting requires some psychological balance to be applied so as not to stultify the creativeness and motivation of the project team which out-and-out realism may impede. Furthermore, too harsh a rating may trigger management responses that are inappropriate in certain circumstances. No special supervisory visits were made to the Project. Generally, the PCU reports working well with the Task Manager and appreciated the proactive approach to requesting the necessary documentation for project reporting.

94. Interviews with the PSC suggest generally positive inputs throughout. Indeed, it is clear to the TE that the importance GEF now places on M&E of projects was only appreciated by the WOW Project because of the Task Manager's interventions and insistence that adequate resources be directed to this task. Hence, the M&E consultancy in October 2007, and the two independent evaluations came about only through this source. However, it is also apparent that during the early stages of the Project when institutional tensions were rising, that a more proactive approach from the UNEP Task Manager acting as a neutral arbiter could have addressed the problems in a more timely fashion and perhaps have helped in resolving some of the conflicts. Certainly a more experienced incumbent, or perhaps a stronger personality, could have helped act as a counterweight to the bias apparent in the original Chair of the PSC and reinforced the message that the WOW Project was a UNEP-GEF led initiative for whom the UNOPS-PCU was the lead agent and not WI. It is clear from the detailed minutes of the PSC meetings that this message, delivered once, was never properly acted upon. Had UNEP involved themselves more deeply in, say the first year, the misconceptions that WI's leadership seemed to be acting under, *vis a vis* their role as senior lead contractor as opposed to GEF implementing agency, could have been rectified more effectively to the benefit of all concerned. In due course, the problems were addressed, and with the Task Manager's help, and thereafter the Project became easier to manage.

UNEP have provided the necessary level of backstopping and supervision, but no more. Stronger inputs made earlier in the Project, or perhaps adopting the role of a neutral arbiter or providing some form of conciliation service, would likely have eased some of the institutional tensions. UNEP's supervision and backstopping role has therefore been evaluated as **Marginally Satisfactory**.

FINANCIAL ASSESSMENT

95. Financing contributions are from GEF (US\$ 6,000,000) with cash and in-kind co-financing from UNEP-AEWA (US\$ 1,056,351), the German Government (BfN) (€ 1,000,000), Wetlands International (US\$ 686,158), ONCFS (US\$ 353,755), BirdLife International (US\$ 70,000), Swiss Federal Office of Environment, Forest and Landscape (BUWAL⁸⁸) (US\$ 44,623), Swedish Environmental Protection Agency (US\$ 30,090), UNEP-WCMC (US\$ 27,619), Ramsar Convention (US\$ 23,540), Danish Ministry of Environment and Energy (US\$ 12,000), Nagao Foundation (Japan) (US\$ 10,000) – total US\$ 2,314,136. In addition, a total of US\$ 2,718,958 of cash and in-kind co-financing was provided to the demonstration site projects, thus:

- Estonia: Ministry of Environment (US\$ 125,055); Total: US\$ 125,055.
- Hungary: Agropoint Ltd. (US\$ 707,096); Bihar Foundation (US\$ 56,029); MME/BirdLife Hungary (US\$ 32,787); Total: US\$ 795,912.
- Lithuania: Silute Municipality (US\$ 170,000); Direction of the Nemunas River Delta Regional Park (US\$ 80,000); Institute of Ecology Vilnius University (US\$ 44,000); Migratory Birds of the Western Palearctic⁸⁹ (US\$ 20,000); UK Wildlife Habitat Trust (US\$ 15,000); Total: US\$ 329,000.
- Mauritania: MAVA Foundation (US\$ 142,500); Parc National Banc d'Arguin (US\$ 64,000); WI Dakar (US\$ 10,000); GTZ (US\$ 7,885); Total: US\$ 214,385.
- Niger: WWF-Niger (US\$ 65,780); Ministry of Environment (US\$ 54,020); Total: US\$ 119,800.

⁸⁸ Bundesamt für Umwelt, Wald und Landschaft

⁸⁹ French NGO.

- Nigeria: Nigerian Conservation Foundation (US\$ 65,000); Dagona Community (US\$ 45,000); Komadugu Yobe Basin Wetlands Development Initiative (KYB-WDI) (US\$ 13,000); Exxon Mobil (US\$ 12,539); Flyway Small Grant (US\$ 10,000); Royal Society Protection of Birds (UK) (US\$ 6,000); Total: US\$ 151,539.
- Senegal/Gambia: Park Authority Gambia (US\$ 130,675); WI Dakar (US\$ 69,027); Park Authority Senegal (US\$ 25,400); Total: US\$ 225,102.
- South Africa: Ekangala Grasslands Trust (US\$ 200,000); BirdLife SA (US\$ 85,000); Darwin Initiative (US\$ 82,345); Spanish Development Cooperation Agency (AECID⁹⁰) (US\$ 51,288); Nature And Biodiversity Conservation Union (BirdLife partner Germany) (NABU⁹¹) (US\$ 30,000); SA Crane Working Group (US\$ 15,950); Total: US\$ 464,583.
- Turkey: Burdur Municipality (US\$ 81,818); Other: > 10 sources (US\$ 11,750); Total: US\$ 93,568.
- Yemen: UNDP (US\$ 100,000); Yemen Environmental Protection Agency (US\$ 60,000); Yemen Society for Protection of Wildlife (US\$ 25,000); BirdLife Middle East (US\$ 5,014); Total: US\$ 190,014.

Therefore, the overall co-financing contribution was US\$ 5,033,094 – a total of US\$ 374,717 (7%) less than what was originally committed to.

96. Total disbursement of funds, as projected in October 2010 to the end of the Project in December 2010 will amount to US\$ 12,337,553 (see Table 9). If Project spending can be taken as a crude measure of the progress of implementation, then the Project has achieved the progress originally envisaged, since this sum represents a very creditable 101.3% of the budget projected in the original Project Document. However, this figure hides some discrepancies.

- The GEF funding was the only one to be paid entirely in dollars, hence the conversion equivalent is obviously 100%.
- The BfN money was paid in Euros, and given the weakness of the dollar over the lifetime of the Project, its converted equivalent shows a 17.1% increase on the budget, even though the actual money paid to the Project by the German Government was exactly the same as in the original contract.
- The money from AEWA came in a variety of currencies but even so, it still shows a deficit of almost US\$ 310,000 over that pledged, i.e. almost one-quarter⁹². This lack of funding, perhaps one of, if not the, biggest problems that the Project faced over its lifetime, appears to have arisen from the belief that a significant proportion of AEWA core funds could be used as co-funding when in fact they could not, and in trying to make up the difference from contributions from Parties, it hit the effects of the global recession which made the climate for fund-raising infinitely harder, and as a result contributions were not forthcoming.
- The figures do not include a large amount of in-kind co-financing contributed by Wetlands International and BirdLife International that has been calculated internally but not attributed by the Project, but is known to run to several hundreds of thousands of dollars for each partner.
- The money from “Others”, i.e. the other 53 donors, came in a large variety of currencies with only a small dollar contribution, and again over the lifetime of the Project showed a small but significant 7.5% increase on budget. However, this too hides the fact that some donors who committed money failed to honour those commitments, e.g. French Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development’s⁹³ promised US\$ 104,000; while other organisations donated more, e.g. WI US\$

⁹⁰ La Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo

⁹¹ Naturschutzbund Deutschland

⁹² **PSC Chair comment:** *The issue of the AEWA co-funding is a difficult one. Indeed the AEWA Secretariat was formally responsible and that is mentioned at many places in this document. However, at one place it should be said that The Netherlands Government is to be mentioned as well in not being able to materialise its promises of equal co-funding as Germany did. Only in a later stage, after much lobbying a relative small amount of € 70,000 was provided. **TE response:** A broken promise of co-funding by The Netherlands’ Government was referred to in paragraph 7, but the TE is unsure whether this is the same as that referred to here by the PSC Chair.*

⁹³ Ministre de l’Écologie et du Développement Durable

TABLE 9: TOTAL DISBURSEMENT OF FUNDS BY OUTPUT TO 31ST DECEMBER 2010* (US\$) AGAINST FULL PROJECT BUDGET AS PER PROJECT DOCUMENT

	GEF			BfN			AEWA			Others			Total		
	Budget	Actual	%	Budget	Actual	%	Budget	Actual	%	Budget	Actual	%	Budget	Actual	%
Outcome 1.1	223,601	577,105	258.1	619,184	988,131	159.6	540,478	537,788	99.5	193,033	479,405	248.4	1,576,295	2,582,428	163.8
Outcome 1.2	68,479	78,789	115.1	73,290	2,320	3.2	144,712	22,766	15.7	305,309	437,116	143.2	591,790	540,990	91.4
Outcome 1.3	168,093	191,594	114.0	155,339	95,540	61.5	107,753	77,817	72.2	173,045	57,931	33.5	604,230	422,882	70.0
Outcome 1.4	30,670	39,343	128.3	0	0	0.0	60,393	0	0.0	44,536	35,596	79.9	135,599	74,939	55.3
Outcome 2.1	87,826	297,962	339.3	0	0	0.0	39,373	47,818	121.4	41,987	68,430	163.0	169,186	414,210	244.8
Outcome 2.2	432,580	280,887	64.9	174,449	67,712	38.8	95,608	65,623	68.6	230,532	133,747	58.0	933,169	547,969	58.7
Outcome 3.1 site	2,500,113	2,428,113	97.1	0	0	0.0	0	0	0.0	2,502,180	2,718,959	108.7	5,002,293	5,147,072	102.9
Outcome 3.1 support	496,942	92,247	18.6			0.0	20,450	0	0.0	64,961	2,792	4.3	582,353	95,039	16.3
Outcome 4.1	21,393	78,711	367.9	0	68,883	0.0	127,573	299,539	234.8	9,965	20,434	205.1	158,931	467,568	294.2
Outcome 4.2	27,309	0	0.0	91,494	81,871	89.5	93,839	5,000	5.3	55,128	22,335	40.5	267,770	109,206	40.8
Outcome 4.3	88,364	0	0.0	0	0	0.0	135,723	0	0.0	78,861	0	0.0	302,948	0	0.0
Project management	1,854,630	1,935,250	104.3	0	0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0	0	0.0	1,854,630	1,935,250	104.3
Total	6,000,000	6,000,000	100.0	1,113,755	1,304,458	117.1	1,365,902	1,056,351	77.3	3,699,537	3,976,744	107.5	12,179,193	12,337,553	101.3

* As projected in October 2010. SOURCE: PCU and WI. NOTE: it is outside the scope of the TE to verify independently the financial figures contained in any of the tables and figures presented here through an audit.

TABLE 11: TOTAL DISBURSEMENT OF ALL FUNDS (US\$) BY COMPONENT BY YEAR AGAINST BUDGET AS PER PROJECT DOCUMENT

	2005			2006			2007			2008			2009			2010			Total		
	Budget	Actual	%	Budget	Actual	%	Budget	Actual	%	Budget	Actual	%	Budget	Actual	%	Budget	Actual	%	Budget	Actual	%
Component 1	14,089	15,292	108.5	528,141	105,467	20.0	762,540	1,248,326	163.7	590,931	792,357	134.1	598,602	658,862	110.1	413,612	800,937	193.6	2,907,914	3,621,240	124.5
Component 2	1,204	0	0.0	484,171	0	0.0	424,432	306,266	72.2	189,962	420,267	221.2	2,586	102,572	3,966.4	0	133,073	-	1,102,355	962,179	87.3
Component 3	0	0	-	1,637,855	0	0.0	1,330,405	1,569,318	118.0	1,086,571	1,632,323	150.2	673,747	1,099,632	163.2	273,717	845,800	309.0	5,002,293	5,147,072	102.9
Component 4	0	0	-	1,927,121	0	0.0	1,643,856	1,785,242	108.6	1,305,325	1,816,263	139.1	894,365	1,239,623	138.6	543,629	977,757	179.9	6,314,295	5,818,884	92.2
Proj Managt.	0	0	-	349,500	202,619	58.0	380,290	539,545	141.9	385,244	334,327	86.8	362,439	488,355	134.7	377,157	370,403	98.2	1,854,630	1,935,250	104.3
Total	15,292	15,292	100.0	3,288,933	308,086	9.4	3,211,118	3,879,378	120.8	2,471,461	3,363,214	136.1	1,857,992	2,489,412	134.0	1,334,397	2,282,170	171.0	12,179,193	12,337,553	101.3

SOURCE: PCU and WI. NOTE: it is outside the scope of the TE to verify independently the financial figures contained in any of the tables and figures presented here through an audit.

25,852, the Nagao Foundation (Japan) which was not an originally-identified source of co-finance donated US\$ 10,000, and the Ramsar Convention donated an additional US\$ 2,540.

- At the demonstration sites, (included under “others”) where financing was site-specific, there were also huge changes between the amounts pledged and that received, with some organisations dropping out, some new ones donating, and some that originally pledged money either increasing or decreasing their contributions. This was directly attributable to the prolonged period between Project’s original design and its implementation (see paragraph 7 *et seq.*) and inevitably there were winners and losers – Table 10 summarises these without providing details of the various donors involved. It is particularly noteworthy that those countries seeming to benefit from the delay and whose co-funding increased as a result were all those with well-developed economies, while those that lost out were all developing, poor African countries. This may be coincidental, but the TE believes it actually highlights the difficulties that poor countries have in raising co-financing and the importance of making use of it when it is available – something a long project development cycle does not facilitate. The key winner from this was Lithuania, whose project was wholly re-designed and an almost completely new set of co-funding identified, most notably US\$ 170,000 from the Silute Municipality. The biggest losers were the transboundary project in Senegal/Gambia where funding from all four original donors was cut (the two park authorities in Senegal and Gambia, WIA, and WAAME who had to pull out of their US\$50,000 pledge); and Nigeria where funding from Flyway Small Grant was US\$ 57,500 less than originally planned, KYB-WDI US\$ 30,000 less, and AP Leventis Foundation who had to pull out entirely from their US\$ 20,000 pledge.

#14	Lesson learned: Countries with developing or weak economies appear to be the most vulnerable to delays between receipt of co-finance pledges and the start of project implementation.
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TABLE 10: CHANGES IN CO-FINANCING OF DEMONSTRATION SITE PROJECTS BETWEEN AMOUNTS ACTUALLY RECEIVED AND THOSE PLEDGED IN THE PROJECT DOCUMENT


Winners		Losers	
Lithuania	US\$ 285,000	Niger	US\$ -30,200
South Africa	US\$ 81,288	Mauritania	US\$ -45,615
Hungary	US\$ 25,262	Tanzania	US\$ -50,000
Estonia	US\$ 25,055	Nigeria	US\$ -96,461
Turkey	US\$ 18,569	Senegal/Gambia	US\$ -174,898
Yemen	US\$ 5,014		

97. Table 9 also shows that funding was re-distributed among the various Outcomes to ensure that the key outputs were achieved. The CSN tool proved significantly more complex and time-consuming to produce than at first envisaged and ultimately cost 63.8% more than budgeted. Within this, GEF funding ran at 258% of budget, BfN funding at almost 160% of budget, and “other” funding at 248% of budget. Similarly, the Flyway Training Kit was produced with an even higher overspend – a total of 245% of budget, made up using over three times the GEF contribution than originally planned with other larger-than-expected contributions from other sources. The biggest overspend at 294% of budget was Outcome 4.1, that related to communications, but in this case it is apparent that the original budget contained provision simply for the salary of the part-time Communications Officer – it did not include additional costs related to that employment nor, inexcusably, costs for printing, design and layout, hosting of a website, or distribution costs of materials. So although the actual spend looks large in relation to budget, it would have been much higher had the Project not adapted and carried out as much of the work themselves using in-house skills. The demonstration site projects ran to budget. Inevitably, therefore, there were cuts in other parts of the Project, most notably Outcome 4.3 which was abandoned altogether; significant reductions in the management support provided to the demonstration sites – but without obvious detriment to them; while a number of others, perhaps most notably the roll-out of the training-of-trainers programmes, had their activity budgets contracted by between half and a quarter.

98. Table 11 gives the figures for the disbursement of all funds by Component against budget in annual periods. This shows that a) some work started on the Project in 2005 ahead of the recognised start of the Project. This was to ensure that the conditions for the BfN funding (contracted separately through WI) were


met; and b) that there was the usual latent start up in disbursement since much of the first six months of the Project (July to December 2006) was spent drafting and agreeing contracts with the lead NGOs and other contractors followed by time early in 2007 undertaking missions to get the demonstration projects re-designed and initiated. No time was allowed for this within the Project Document and the budgets therein did not reflect the reality of this need. The main period of work on activities was undertaken in 2008 and 2009 and was done more quickly than anticipated in order to still finish within the Project's deadline. The actual spending in these years reflects this, typically running at levels well above budget. Figure 1 illustrates these data but cumulatively against the total budget for each Component, and shows the picture clearly with a slow start and steady progress thereafter.

FIGURE 1: CUMULATIVE DISBURSEMENT OF ALL FUNDS (US\$) BY COMPONENT BY YEAR AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL BUDGET IN PROJECT DOCUMENT



SOURCE: PCU and WI.

FIGURE 2: CUMULATIVE DISBURSEMENT OF FUNDS (US\$) BY DONOR BY YEAR AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL BUDGET IN PROJECT DOCUMENT



SOURCE: PCU and WI.

99. Perhaps of more significance, Figure 2 shows the cumulative actual spend as a percentage of the original budget by year for each of the four main donors – GEF, BfN, AEWA, and others. Three of these show a similar pattern to that in Figure 1, that is a slow start with steady progress thereafter. That for AEWA, however, shows crucially that not only did AEWA not produce its promised total of co-financing, but that most of what it did produce arrived in 2010, so late in the Project that it had a much reduced effectiveness. By the end of 2009, only a fraction over a third of the promised funding (US\$ 1.3 million) had materialised and been spent, and this shortfall resulted in some major impacts for the Project – first that its length should be curtailed from five years to four (although as the money began to arrive in 2010 this was extended again to 4.5 years); and second that the staffing of the PCU should be reduced⁹⁴. The increase in AEWA funds in 2010 was a direct result of the PCU and WI writing proposals for AWEA for the Projects.

100. Throughout, the PCU and WI have shown excellent financial planning and management skills in dealing with such a complex Project both in terms of the array of activities and stakeholders involved, the large number of donors and accounts (e.g. the AEWA funding eventually arrived through 12 different accounts, all of which had to be reported separately), but also in balancing the maintenance of those activities in the light of the added complications induced by critical cash shortages. At all times, the PSC has been kept abreast of the situation, and thereby able to make or endorse the decisions necessary to ensure the Project’s progress. In particular, the Project cleverly adopted a bridge and return policy so that GEF and BfN funds were used to cover activities originally identified as being for co-funding, thereby allowing the Project to continue uninterrupted while giving time for fund-raising activities to attempt to make up the shortfall, and then later using the late-coming co-funding to “pay back” the GEF and BfN components to allow them to complete those activities for which it had been allocated. This policy, endorsed by the UNEP Task Manager and appropriate UNEP Financial Officer, worked extremely well. Reporting has been outstanding and allowed the necessary budget revisions to be made on a sound basis. Similarly, the link between the PCU, UNOPS and UNEP has been strikingly efficient in ensuring that budget replenishments have been timely and not subject to bureaucratic delays.

⁹⁴ **AEWA comment:** *Although I agree that AEWA came late with the major funds, I believe the financial problems the project was facing is caused by several issues.....increased management costs UNOPS, loss of the purchase power of the US \$, also lack of additional co-financing by WI ...*

Financial planning and management has been extremely effective throughout showing much creativity to deal with a chronic cash-flow crisis induced by a significant shortage of pledged co-financing from AEWA. Accounting and reporting has been thorough and of the highest order, enabling sound decision-making to be made, hence financial planning has been evaluated as **Highly Satisfactory**.

101. The Project has not been formally audited itself, but has been part of UNOPS's global audits from which no feedback was ever received so no significant problems were deemed to have been identified. However, the TE is critical of one aspect relating to UNOPS's financing. UNOPS received an 8% administration fee to implement the Project in keeping with standard practice, i.e. US\$ 444,444. However, the Project accounting shows a line of "*additional charges*" amounting to US\$ 69,130 which apparently have been levied to recover Headquarter's costs and which have been spread across all UNOPS's projects. However, in an otherwise totally transparent project, there is no obvious basis or explanation available of how these charges have been arrived at or how they have contributed to the implementation of the WOW Project, either directly or indirectly through, say, increased efficiency. Apparently they include contributions to consultancy reports to Headquarters that neither the PCU nor anyone else involved in the Project have ever seen; and security issues for Iraq because the Flyway includes Iraq even though the Project undertook no activities there. For a Project fighting off the very real danger of closure because of financial shortfalls, US\$ 69,130 represents a very significant amount, and given UNOPS has already received its standard fixed 8% fee, such extra charges are decidedly questionable. The TE has never come across such an issue in 13 evaluations for UNDP.

102. One other issue concerns the way that the design of the financing arrangements caused particular problems. In most cases, activities were designed to be funded according to a certain ratio of donors, in particular GEF:BfN:AEWA, which in theory is fine assuming the money is present. Of course, as the above has made clear, not all the money was present which in itself would be a major issue for any project, but when coupled with this ratio made things, in the words of the PCU, "*a disaster*" since the lack of money could not be isolated and kept within a single output or component, but instead it permeated through every aspect of the Project thereby threatening the entire project.

#13	Lesson learned: Using a fixed ratio of financing contributions for each aspect of a project should be avoided in future designs.
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Cost-effectiveness

103. The UNEP Evaluation Office's criteria of "*efficiency*" really applies solely to cost-effectiveness (see TOR in Annex I) hence the rather ambiguous term "*efficiency*", which could apply to efficiency in terms of time, energy-use or even carbon footprint, has been replaced in this evaluation with the more precise term "*cost-effectiveness*".

104. Overall, the Project has been extremely cost-effective since it has produced almost all of its planned deliverables on a "*shoe-string*" budget reported by one UNEP staff member, interviewed in the MTE, as "*ridiculously low for the level of staff involved*". The original planned budget for the Project was originally nearly US\$ 30 million but this was gradually reduced during the convoluted design process to that of US\$ 12 million but, as the TE has been extremely critical of (see paragraph 16), crucially without its intended deliverables being adequately re-designed to fit these increased limitations. While this has had a major detrimental impact on the delivery of the overall integrity of the Project at its Flyway scale, it has not stopped it successfully producing its key deliverables (the CSN tool, Flyway Training Kit, and ten of its 11 planned demonstration projects); and it is hard to see how it could have achieved these at any lower cost, particularly given that the complexity of the tasks facing it (especially the CSN tool) was substantively larger and more difficult to resolve than believed during the design phase. Throughout, and in many aspects, it is clear that the technical and management teams have invested time and effort well beyond that for which they were remunerated and in several cases well beyond their job descriptions. Four examples are particularly noteworthy, although omission of others is not to underplay their considerable contributions:

- i) although initially contracted to work on the Flyway Training Kit prior to becoming the Chair of the PSC, once he became Chair he continued to work extensively on the Kit in a voluntary capacity;

- ii) the website was designed (repeatedly) by the part-time WOW Communications Officer to a very high standard to minimise external web-design costs ;
- iii) the Operations Manager used his considerable design skills to layout many of the WOW publications in-house to save on external printing house costs; and
- iv) members of the core management team spent considerable efforts in writing funding applications in a (largely successful) attempt to make up some of the missing AEWA funds.

Indeed these, and the contributions made by so many others, show that in spite of the immense problems faced by this Project (and shortage of funds was just one), it was deemed by those involved to be just too important for its failure to be contemplated and through sheer determination and incredible levels of commitment they have been proved correct.

#18 Lesson learned: Failure is apparently not an option for a project in which NGOs play a leading role.

105. That said, the TE takes issue with the longer-term view of some of the decisions made by the Project in regards to cost-effectiveness, where it seems their was considerable rigidity of thought in sticking with the original Project concept despite things having moved on since its origin in 1999-2000. The key example of this is undoubtedly the Flyway Training Kit where it was clear from the outset that there was little or no money available for its implementation and that considerable fund-raising would be necessary – in a Project that already knew that promised funds were not forthcoming and in a world beginning to show the first signs of global recession. Furthermore, the ToT model is inherently expensive to set up and maintain; and the sheer size and weight of the Flyway Training Kit finally produced makes it hugely expensive to print and distribute. With significant voices from within the Project pointing out the huge leaps forward that have been made since 2000 in electronic media options, both online and offline, as well as other paper-based models that could have been adopted, all of which would have saved significant money for a cash-strapped project in the short-term, and a financially-challenged post-Project environment in the long-term, the Project chose instead to plough on regardless with its cost-ineffective original idea⁹⁵ (see also paragraphs 135-136).

106. Without a doubt, the Project has fulfilled the concept of incremental cost since without it there would have been neither the framework nor the funds available for a flyway-scale approach to have been undertaken, and although it has not managed to fulfil everything it set out to do, it has achieved a great deal and captured a lot of experience that will be of use to follow-on projects. Given that it was completely innovative, it had nothing on which to build and few lessons to take on board. Nonetheless, it has used existing scientific and technical information to break new ground in providing tools for conservation, and what is more, replicable tools (see paragraph 145 *et seq.*). Although it is still really too early to tell whether the outputs will achieve their intended impacts (see paragraphs 30-31 and Table 5) there is a very strong probability that they will do so provided that follow-up finance can be found for their use, and the agreement by the partners to continue the WOW Project as a WOW Programme significantly enhances that likelihood. Technically and scientifically, the CSN tool and Flyway Training Kit are state-of-the-art.

⁹⁵ **WI comment:** *The total cost of development of the FTK (including consultancies for writing, lay out and printing amounted, but excluding the preparatory works with regional and sub-regional workshops) came to \$127K; printing costs represent about 33%. Distribution costs are estimated in \$12K. Thus assuming a fully electronic material is similarly well received and used as a printed material (which is arguable) the difference in costs would have been in the order of \$50K (cf. #101). Also, AEWA has agreed to develop a contract with an on-line retailer to sell copies of the FTK and use the funds raised to cover the delivery of the FTKs. Furthermore, the Training Kit can be downloaded from the project website. The FTK is open for use by local training institutes and there are letters from training institutes and practical examples to show that it has been taken up by them thus fulfilling the objectives. This process has also supported the development of flyway training capacity development in the target sub-regions. The lay out took into considerations the possibility of photocopying the FTK and did not used the largely black project house-style but developed a new layout but similar to the original. Please note that the implementation of the ToT was excluded from the project delivery since its beginning, while happened, largely within the available budget and through additional funds raised by WI. Therefore the project delivered more than expected.* **TE response:** Clearly WI and the TE (and from the views expressed to the TE by project partners, those partners) hold different views on the value of money and the concept of cost-effectiveness. That WI can dismiss the saving of c. US\$ 50K (actually US\$ 53.7K according to the calculations used above) in so cavalier a way is breathtaking, particularly in the light of so many other activities being impeded by a shortage of funds. Furthermore, there is clearly convoluted logic in providing the FTK as a free download from the Project website and trying to sell it through an online retailer, apart from the fact that downloading files amounting to 21MB will require excellent broadband facilities which are absent from much of the AEWA region.

107. The management costs and structure of the Project have been top-heavy, and project management costs have accounted for almost one-third of the GEF funding (see Table 9). This has undoubtedly been due to the complex management structure applied to the Project with a PCU, and then management teams in the two lead contractors, plus Regional Centres and then project management teams at all the demonstration sites. However, it is hard to see how this could have been streamlined substantially. Originally, the PCU was not part of the design, and had WI not run into financial problems during the PDF-B, it is certain that it would not have been part of the management structure. Without the PCU, the Project would certainly have been cheaper to implement (since the PCU's functions would have been undertaken by a WI person or persons, thereby negating the need for both PCU and WI management functions), but it would be wholly conjecture to attempt to assess whether the original design with WI implementing the Project and BLI as the principal contractor would have worked better or worse and been more or less efficient. What does appear to be clear is that only when WI and BLI committed sufficient resources to the Project's management, and more importantly, when a dedicated coordinator for each organisation became part of a core team with the PCU in managing the Project did things really start to function effectively and efficiently. In future, complex multi-partner projects, whether implemented by one of the partners or through an external vehicle such as UNOPS, would certainly do better if they had a dedicated core management team comprising a representative of each partner working together from the outset.

#7	Lesson learned: Complex multi-partner projects require representation of the main partners in the primary management structure.
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108. The Regional Centres clearly played an important role in the coordination of activities for the CSN tool and the Flyway Training Kit. However, the TE can perceive little added value in their role with the demonstration projects. The BLI Africa Partnership Secretariat in Nairobi (the Regional Centre for Eastern and Southern Africa) provided nothing in terms of management for the projects in South Africa and Tanzania, and hence BLI managed all of the demonstration projects for which they were responsible (Hungary, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, Turkey, and Yemen) through their designated Project Coordinator in headquarters, with the exception of Yemen which was implemented rather than managed through their Middle East Division (one of the Regional Centres)⁹⁶. In each case, the PCU was also in direct contact with the demonstration site project manager. The projects in Estonia and Lithuania fell under WI's purview, but not really under any of the Regional Centres. WI staff visited both projects at start-up and commented on their revised logframes and reports. No further visits were deemed necessary since they were run smoothly and successfully. WI appears to have played almost no role in these except towards the end when the new Project Coordinator came on board. In West Africa, WI was responsible for three projects (Mauritania, Niger, Senegal/Gambia) and these were all managed through the WIA programme in Senegal (the Regional Centre for Western and Central Africa), and this provided the focal point for PCU contact. This seems an additional and redundant level of management, particularly when those charged with the role in Dakar were already so over-committed with other work that they could not actually provide the efficient level of service each demonstration project required – particularly in the case of Mauritania^{97,98}. While the TE recognises the desirability that NGOs place upon decentralisation and the benefits that this brings in some cases, it is clear from the WOW Project that the demonstration projects did not require regionalised management structures to perform effectively, and unless precise benefits can be demonstrably shown to accrue from this approach, it should be avoided in future to minimise costs.

⁹⁶ **BLI comment:** *the “designated project coordinator” was designated (as “Senior Technical Officer – Demonstration Projects”) to support the demonstration projects, and performed this function throughout the project as intended. The additional responsibility as “designated project coordinator” arose in 2008 in response to the issues raised elsewhere in this report. It is thus incorrect to indicate that the designated project coordinator took on the additional task of managing the demonstration projects: the reverse was the case. Moreover, although the BirdLife Africa Secretariat did not directly manage the demonstration projects they performed an important role in supporting the partners institutionally, and mainstreaming the project into the wider BirdLife Africa Partnership work programme.*

⁹⁷ There may be some personality issues involved here, nonetheless of all the demonstration projects visited or interviewed by the TE, the Project Manager in Mauritania was clearly the most isolated with the least amount of support to hand in-country, and this should have been recognised by WIA but competing demands and pressures meant that it was not.

⁹⁸ **WI comment:** *Factually inaccurate. The WIA devoted significant time to rescue the project and support the project manager: as a result the project delivered as much as possible given the PM shortcomings and the difficult socio-political situation. **TE response:** Once again, the idea that only WI's views are factually correct is to the fore. The TE begs respectfully to differ – a range of interviews in Mauritania (not just with the PM) as well as in Niger suggest that the level of service provided by WIA was inefficient, which is why it is reported thus. Personally, the TE wishes it was otherwise since he has friends in WIA.*

109. One other issue that should be examined more closely by GEF is that relating to in-kind co-financing. While in the case of the Project partners, in-kind financing was effective, this is largely down to the drive and commitment of the staff who work for such organisations in ensuring that all of the demands placed upon them are met. However, this is not the case when the same model is applied to government officers and others whose jobs are simply that – jobs rather than strong vocations. “In-kind” contributions are supposed to be undertakings by Governments and other agencies to commit paid staff full- or part-time to project activities and for their regular posts to be temporarily filled by other personnel – that cost being born as the contribution. However, this rarely seems to occur. Instead of working the hours allocated on the project *in lieu* of other work for which the in-kind contribution is assessed, all too frequently civil servants (and government agencies are the main culprits of this) are asked to undertake project activities as additions to their regular jobs for the same pay, leading to stress, resentment, poor work, and inadequate time being committed to the job at hand, and resulting in the project suffering through poor delivery, or simply other partners of the project team having to cover for this work and bearing the resultant (unaccounted for) cost. The TE has seen this in many GEF projects, and WOW is no exception where the prime, but not sole, example was in Niger where the project’s National Coordinator was so busy and away travelling so often that much of his work actually was undertaken by the Project Coordinator – unpaid and unaccounted for in the project finances.

Overall, the efficiency (cost-effectiveness) of the Project has been extremely (and artificially and unsustainably) high, hence is evaluated as **Highly Satisfactory**.

#12	Lesson learned: “In-kind” co-finance is rarely effective and should not be attributed equal value to cash financing.
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MONITORING AND EVALUATION

Outstanding progress monitoring through reporting has been fatally undermined by the lack of an M&E Plan, no budget allocation for M&E, and generally poor impact monitoring at the demonstration sites, hence the overall rating for monitoring and evaluation has been evaluated as **Marginally Unsatisfactory**.

M&E Design

110. The Project design did not contain any monitoring and evaluation (M&E) plan nor any budget allocation for M&E. It did include statements about progress monitoring being undertaken in accordance with UNEP’s internal requirements, and of including an external mid-term and terminal evaluation. However, it must be noted that the original design was undertaken during the period 2000-2003 and significantly revised in 2005 – both periods prior to GEF introducing its improved M&E policy in 2006. Indicators were included for the objective and outcome levels but not for the components, but in many cases these were not only not SMART⁹⁹ but also not really results oriented, being too vague and general.

111. Once implementation had started, the PCU recognised these limitations at an early stage and the issue was raised in the first PSC meeting. Significant work was undertaken by the PCU to strengthen the logframe, but even after this they felt improvements could be made. As a result, and with PSC approval, a consultancy was let in October 2007 to revise and update the M&E framework. This was undertaken through an interactive workshop with a representative of each project partner where the wording of the main logframe was revised; and a separate review of each of the 11 demonstration project logframes for later discussion/approval with local partners. The revised logical frameworks were endorsed by the PSC at its meeting in January 2008. The review also recommended that funding should be made available for the two independent reviews and the task of M&E be allocated to someone’s TOR. In light of the review and the revised logframe, a simple Task Assignment Matrix was produced by the PCU allocating certain tasks to partner organisations related to the measurement of indicators and outputs, but its timescale appears to have been largely limited to a six-month horizon, and as the PCU admit, partner organisations did not apply it effectively meaning that the tasks fell to an already over-worked PCU.

⁹⁹ Specific; Measurable; Achievable and attributable; Relevant and realistic; Time-bound, timely, trackable and targeted.

Despite this good work, no M&E plan was ever put in place for the Project as a whole, nor for any of the demonstration projects, which has reduced the effectiveness of M&E throughout. Therefore, monitoring and evaluation design has been evaluated as **Unsatisfactory**.

M&E Implementation

112. Monitoring and evaluation of Project activities have been undertaken in varying detail at three levels:

- i. Progress monitoring
- ii. Internal activity monitoring
- iii. Impact monitoring

113. Progress monitoring has been very good and has been made through consolidated progress reports, also referred to as Semi-annual Reports (SAR), to the PSC, UNEP, and 34 of the donors. UNEP and the PCU agreed at the outset that given the scale of the Project, quarterly reporting was too onerous and semi-annual reports would be sufficient. Similarly, given the extensive reporting requirements of the Project, the PCU adopted a standard format for all progress reports, a decision the TE believes to have been eminently sensible. The quality of these reports is of the highest order – they are comprehensive, well-structured and accessible, highly detailed and informative, and contain excellent concise executive summaries complete with graphical indications of progress. The reports are well-written and provide information, under different areas of project management, on key issues and, in the TE’s experience unusually, proposed solutions. All components, regional centres, and demonstration projects are covered with quantitative estimates of tasks completed (although the TE could not verify the accuracy of this data), and financial details of budget and disbursements provided. For each sub-activity in components 1,2, and 4, and for each demonstration project as a whole, details of the party responsible, quantitative and text measures of progress, and issues or explanations are provided; while similarly detailed and formatted reports from each of the 11 demonstration projects are attached as appendices. Financial information is analysed by budget line and by donor. UNOPS automatically generates its own financial reports through its adoption of the ATLAS system, and these were provided to the PCU on request. Unfortunately (for this Project), UNEP never adopted the ATLAS system but uses IMIS instead, meaning that the PCU had to “translate” the information received in order for it to be in the format consistent with the Project Document for the donors and intelligible to UNEP’s system. Progress is also given against indicators and forthcoming six-monthly workplans and updates to the overall project workplan are provided, along with an inventory of outputs and services provided in the preceding period. There is throughout the Project team a tendency to “talk-up” its achievements (and possibly progress) which is understandable if not always desirable. However, the TE finds that largely the SARs are credible and pragmatic with only the occasional slip, e.g. in SAR#4, the MTE is described as “*comprehensive*” when in fact it was in fact undertaken as “*light*”, even if it did cover some issues in-depth. The SARs were presented in detail at the first two PSC meetings but it was found that this did not work particularly well and they were too detailed to get full PSC engagement. Subsequently, they have been submitted to the PSC prior to meetings and endorsed within the meeting.

114. It is clear from the foregoing that the demonstration projects were also required to provide the PCU with reports to the same format every six months. The quality, timeliness and, as interviews with project managers indicate, the ability to undertake this task varied greatly amongst the projects. Through the extended elapsed period of the TE, there was clear evidence that the PCU and the project partners (WI and BLI) assisted the demonstration project teams with their reporting in a supportive and nurturing way through comments for improvements, requests for additional information, and through ensuring high standards were reached. Three of the West African projects (Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal/Gambia) sent their SARs through the WIA office. Payments were not disbursed until the PCU had signed off on the appropriate report. The vast majority of the project managers interviewed by the TE praised the PCU and the partners in their assistance with this task. In some cases, e.g. South Africa, progress reporting is more stringent with formal, quarterly, fixed format reports being prepared for BirdLife South Africa Council members. In addition, the Regional Centres also provided periodic reports, in the early part of the Project these went to the PCU, but once GEF funds for these Centres had been exhausted, they continued to report directly to WI to whom they were sub-contracted although where BirdLife regional structures were involved, these reports were agreed “internally” with BLI headquarters prior to submission.

115. The major findings and observations of all these reports are given in an annual report covering the period July to June, the Project Implementation Report (PIR), which is submitted to UNEP-GEF for review and official comments, followed by final submission to GEF. During the TE, the fourth of these was sent covering 2009/2010. The PIRs are generally informative, although in those for 2008 and 2009 the TE believes the ratings to be a little higher than justified (e.g. in 2008/9 a Satisfactory rating for Activity 2.2.4 when funding has been mobilised to implement ToT sessions for only two of the four sub-regions¹⁰⁰), while those for activities dropped from the Project due to lack of funding have become suddenly omitted from the PIR altogether (e.g. Activity 1.4.2 previously rated Unsatisfactory¹⁰¹). Also, under M&E, the 2007 PIR identifies the weaknesses inherent in there being no plan, but in 2008 finds everything satisfactory when there is still no M&E Plan in place, just an updated and improved logframe¹⁰². Project risk assessment was updated annually as part of the PIR by the PCU and the UNEP Task Manager. In general, the PCU categorises risk slightly higher than does the Task Manager, perhaps because they were at the sharper end, though it may also reflect on the more reactive approach of the Task Manager (see paragraph 94). The identification and rating of risks was realistic and the issue of lack of co-financing rated as Substantial in 2007 and 2009, and High (the riskiest category) in 2008. This triggered a change in the Project's strategy by the PSC in December 2008 with a shortening of the implementation period and abandonment or curtailment of certain more minor activities to ensure delivery of core components.

116. A Mid-term Evaluation (MTE) reported in September 2008. Because of the critical shortage of funding, all parties agreed that this should be a "light" evaluation, concentrating on governance and organizational issues, and operational aspects such as project management, and to make suggestions for corrective actions. Because the MTE was constrained by funding, it was unable to make field visits¹⁰³ but sought to overcome this constraint with an on-line survey aimed at participants rather than beneficiaries. The evaluation's findings were fed back into the project management processes making an effective contribution to the Project's re-organisation current at that time.

117. Internal activity monitoring has generally been good, at least in the intention if not always in the execution, since the PCU's initial hands-on approach caused considerable resentment amongst project partners and subsequently had to be changed. Thus, in the early part of the Project the PCU took an active approach in supervising the technical teams involved in the CSN tool and the Flyway Training Kit, setting milestones, agreeing delivery schedules, and monitoring technical quality. However, this approach, particularly that of monitoring technical quality, met with a lot of resistance, led to accusations of micro-management, and effectively back-fired so profoundly that the system broke down in August 2007 when meetings between the PCU and the technical teams ceased altogether. In retrospect, the contract between UNOPS and WI effectively stated that WI had the right to implement the contract as they saw fit, but nonetheless the overall responsibility for delivery of the GEF-funded segment of the Project lay squarely with the PCU as UNOPS' representatives (see paragraph 18). After the second PSC meeting in January 2008, the PCU disconnected completely from the technical teams and addressed only macro-management issues through periodic meetings with the contractors' now-designated focal points to discuss impending issues for feedback into the technical teams' approaches. Work plans were devised and guided by the technical teams themselves and updated by each, using computerised planning tools to track daily progress. They also set their own milestones, but sometimes these were deemed unacceptable to the overall scheme of the Project by the PCU and were altered accordingly, e.g. once the Project had been shortened by financial considerations, the launch of the CSN tool was proposed as October 2010, but since this left no time for its

¹⁰⁰ **UNEP comment:** *For factual clarity we should either specify that the target was to be achieved later, in December year 2010, not in FY09. In this instance the S rating takes into account several factors indicating reasonable progress towards that target, including that (a) at the time of the PIR there was still 1,5 year to go to raise the funds for the other 2 ToTs, and that (b) there are no funds in the project to implement the ToTs, hence even the implementation of the two ToTs (through additional fund-raising by the partners) was to be highly commended, and last but not least (c) the progress towards target for the end of the project was on track, in spite of external constraints. Hence an S rating was deemed fully appropriate.*

¹⁰¹ **UNEP comment:** *For factual clarity: the revised logframe and its application throughout (including PIR) was agreed by the PSC to which UNEP is part, at PSC meeting in 2008.*

¹⁰² **UNEP comment:** *there was no guidance from UNEP to the project team as to the need for an M&E plan, no examples provided, etc. Hence the revised logframe combined with a simple matrix of tasks for M&E execution that was provided by the PCU to partners (i.e. specifying who does what in terms of delivering data for the indicators) and other simple standard UNEP requirements was regarded by UNEP as all that was required or indeed possible in the context of this project, and this is reflected in the PIR rating as well.*

¹⁰³ **BLI comment:** *the MT evaluator did, however, make personal visits to the main project partners.*

promotion, this was altered to June 2010. With the down-sizing of the PCU, a core group of the two contractors' focal points (Project Coordinators) and the Operations Manager met monthly, occasionally supplemented with the new PSC Chair, to monitor activities. As the Project wound down through 2010, these meetings became bi-monthly. Independent financial audits were undertaken of all the demonstration projects, either specifically as part of their TOR, or as part of global annual audits of WI and BLI. The Project as a whole has also featured on occasion in UNOPS regional annual audit when it has been selected for inclusion on a random basis.

118. Although the difficulties encountered have been profound, the coordination and feedback of the Project has been excellent throughout, but it is interesting to note that the logframe's indicators have not played any part in the considerable adaptive management that the Project has practiced. In most cases, the indicators are designed in such a way that they have only a role in defining the start and finish states of the Project and hence in providing only an indication of its overall progress rather than being able to provide guidance to the project's overall management. Furthermore, for several, the Project can exert only marginal influence, e.g. "D2 – the number of sites designated using Ramsar Criteria 5 and 6"; or "D3 – the number of countries ratifying AEWA"; while in other cases the indicators are disconnected from the Project, e.g. C1.2 – has been changed from "number of registered CSN users" to "number of unique visitors" since no registration process is required to use the CSN tool. Overall, the adaptive management of the Project has been influenced by, and responded to, its financial shortcomings to a much larger extent than its indicators with the emphasis on pruning activities without impinging on the overall integrity of the deliverables (see also paragraph 91).

119. The demonstration sites exhibited varying degrees of monitoring of their activities. Of the sites visited:

- South Africa displayed the most structured approach with annual work plans being broken down into monthly work plans which were checked by the Project Manager through a physical meeting at the end of each month with the Operations Manager. Sadly, this was undermined by the fact that the Operations Manager was not entirely truthful with what had been achieved, and the Project Manager admits that he was managing his staff more than he was managing the activities. In 2009, two years into the project, the problems became apparent and a new operations team was put in place, this time working solely through monthly work plans which were SMART-based. Monthly visits by the Project Manger now include visual checks on the progress.
- Niger used mostly short-term (< 21 day) contracts which did not require periodic monitoring. A workshop was conducted at the end of every contract which the Project Coordinator attended to verify the work had been completed satisfactorily. All contracts were paid half in advance and half on completion and only one problem was encountered where a job was not completed.
- Hungary worked from the budget table and since most work was sub-contracted there was no need for work plans. Contracts were let on a pay-on-completion basis (e.g. construction of four watchtowers) with two exceptions – a contract to monitor the birds which was let through, and reported to, MME (BirdLife Hungary); and the contract for the Feasibility Study on new working methods which was paid 30% upfront and 70% on completion. The Project Manger reviewed weekly drafts of this to ensure progress. All payments were made by MME on receipt of approval notes from the Project Manager.
- Mauritania had no staff, only a Project Manager, so he set his own timetable for activities according to his own priorities and what was possible according to responses from PNBA who were very slow; e.g. the initial approach to identify the best bird sites for ecotourism was made in May 2009 and no response was forthcoming until January 2010. Monitoring such activities over which the Project had no control and which were so slow is clearly impossible. Of the main activity, that of training the group of 18 eco-guides, this was done according to a modular-based curriculum with a set timetable for formal classes, language lessons, and field activities. No monitoring of this was necessary since the Project Manager was the course leader.

120. Impact monitoring by the Project has been limited, although it is fair to say that until the two main outputs were delivered in 2010 there could be no impact. The indicators in the logframe for Components 1, 2 and 4 have been measured at appropriate times and the results reported on, but it is hard to see how these

could have been acted on to guide adaptive management which has, by necessity, been more reactive to financial imperatives. Baseline measurements of the Immediate Objectives did not take place until May 2008, but this reflects the response to the M&E consultancy let in October 2007 and whose recommendations were endorsed in January 2008 which included strengthening of the Immediate Objective. Of slight concern is that one table in the SARs reports on “*Project Impact*” but concerns itself with such things as the “*number of NGO staff involved with this project*”, “*number of beneficiaries involved with this project*” and “*number of people trained under this project*” – none of which is actually a measurement of an impact, e.g. 1,391 people may have been trained by the Project, but how many are actually using that training towards the Project’s stated objectives? While in the TE’s experience of other projects, monitoring of impacts is generally the hardest monitoring concept for project teams to understand, it is surprising to find such a lack of perceptiveness within an otherwise formidable and capable PCU.

121. For demonstration sites, the Protected Areas Management Tracking Tool (PAMETT) was performed for ten of the 11 projects; the project in Tanzania being the only one that did not involve a protected area. The baseline measurement was undertaken in 2007 and a final measurement was completed in 2010. Although GEF requires three PAMETT measurements to be undertaken – baseline, mid-term, and final – the demonstration projects were so short, usually a little over two years, as to make the mid-term measurement effectively irrelevant and, given the paucity of resources available to the Project overall, it was agreed with the UNEP Task Manager to limit this to just two measures so as to be able to assess the overall status and management effectiveness of the project, but it is obvious that they could not be used to guide adaptive management of the demonstration projects. The PCU briefed all site teams on PAMETT aims and provided guidelines for its implementation to enable project teams to prepare PAMETT’s for their sites, in consultation with local stakeholders and protected area managers. The PCU prepared an issue paper with an analysis of the preliminary results for discussion with all the teams at the WOW team meeting held in Wagengen in January 2008. The M&E consultancy recommended that the regional Training Board members fill out capacity assessment scorecards annually, but in the event, and mostly because the role of the Boards decreased within the Project, this was carried out only twice.

122. Apart from PAMETT scores, impact monitoring was absent from many sites. The absence of an overall Project M&E Plan was reflected at most sites. Of the four demonstration projects visited, no impact monitoring was undertaken.

- In South Africa, a socio-economic survey was conducted in 2008 with a repeat due in November 2010 to provide an indication of project success but nothing was undertaken to feedback into management and decision-making of the Project itself.
- In Niger, there was no impact monitoring of awareness activities, with only personal expressions of interest being noted, and although a training needs report was carried out, it did not include any baseline measurements. Satisfaction levels were measured on training courses but these were subjective only and the Project Manager was content to rely on consultants’ methodologies which were clearly inadequate.
- In Mauritania, it is apparent that the baseline data needed for some of the indicators was simply not available (e.g. no statistics on visitors are kept by the Park, and there are no visitor satisfaction questionnaires), while the focus on training the guides meant that little else was measurable. Even with those, no formal measurements of the effectiveness of various training modules taught over the 18-month period were ever conducted, although informal monitoring through teacher-pupil contact was maintained allowing slower students to be paired with quicker ones to provide help to the former. An operative M&E Plan would have provided a framework for the demonstration project teams to have understood, designed, and incorporated adequate impact measurements into their activities and identified other shortcomings at the outset and allowed rectification.
- In Hungary, impact monitoring of sorts was conducted intensively through weekly bird counts on the various fishponds. Since the main project activity was a change in the management of some ponds to benefit the birds, this was getting close to reasonable impact monitoring. Unfortunately, there was no attempt to undertake a systematic assessment with control ponds, or if there was, no evidence was produced showing such analyses were carried out, let alone used to influence the Project in any way.

123. The latter raises another issue prevalent in biodiversity projects (and especially those concerned with birds), in that impact monitoring, if it does occur, almost exclusively focuses on bird counting, the rationale being that if numbers are climbing then the project is having a beneficial impact. While superficially this may be the case, of course it does not take account of natural variations in breeding and survival nor of factors such as the project maybe simply attracting birds from nearby, but somewhat less attractive, sites. Measurements of habitat created (e.g. in Lithuania), people attracted (e.g. Estonia) or changes in people's behaviour or standard of living may prove to be better indicators of impacts directly attributable to a project's interventions. The latter of these three examples is extremely well demonstrated by the team working in the Hadeija-Nguru Wetlands in Nigeria who appear to have gone to great lengths to undertake socio-economic surveys before and after to gauge project success and to talk to villagers more informally between times to assess the Project's effects on fish catch and agricultural improvements, and to guide new ideas, additional to the original project design, concerning the use of the cut (and initially waste) *Typha* for other economic uses.

M&E implementation has been mixed, with excellent progress monitoring and generally good internal activity monitoring badly let down by poor or absent impact monitoring, hence the implementation of monitoring and evaluation has been evaluated as Marginally Satisfactory.

Budgeting and Funding for M&E

124. No specific budget was ever allocated to M&E within either the WOW Project overall or any of its constituent demonstration projects. The monitoring activities outlined above all came from within the PCU budget, including those for the two external evaluations. The critical shortage of project funds meant that priority was always given to "doing" things rather than to "measuring" things and this has undoubtedly limited the effectiveness and benefits of M&E. Shortage of funds also meant that the MTE was let as a "light" evaluation rather than a full evaluation and although it was incisive and carried out to a high standard, a more in-depth evaluation would have undoubtedly led to more than the five recommendations provided. Interestingly enough, the fourth of these recommends reducing the terminal evaluation from a three-person mission to a one-person mission on the basis that:

"it is unlikely that implementation will advance between the mid-term and final evaluations to an extent that would justify a full-fledged final evaluation team"

so that:

"A significant portion of these funds [c]ould be better spent in supporting the consolidation and documentation of ongoing WOW initiatives".

While the first of these quotes proved untrue with implementation well advanced, the TE has indeed been undertaken by a one-person mission.

The lack of an allocated budget for M&E within the project has to be viewed as unsatisfactory. However, given that the Project has been under-budgeted from its approval, and given that funds have been found to enable basic M&E to take place, the budgeting and funding for monitoring and evaluation has been evaluated only as Marginally Unsatisfactory.

STRATEGIC ISSUES

125. As can be seen from the foregoing part of the evaluation, the TE believes that this is generally a good project, if ambitious and complex, which ultimately has been well implemented after a particularly rocky start. The aim of this section is to concentrate on those key and often difficult cross-cutting issues. It is important that the reader keeps in mind that this section is not intended to show this Project in a poor light, rather to learn lessons.

RELEVANCE

Flyway Approach

126. The relevance of the Project is probably the single most contentious issue within the evaluation. On the one hand its outcomes are consistent with the focal areas and operational programme strategies of the

GEF and make significant contributions to the Ramsar Convention and the AEWA. In particular, the data generated by the surveys undertaken in previously poorly-documented areas as part of the data gap-filling exercise necessitated in the production of the Critical Site Network tool have strengthened the scientific base for conservation of sites in these areas while, for some species, confirming or boosting the priorities attached to sites in other areas. Similarly, the fixing of site boundaries also necessitated by the CSN tool has provided much needed clarity in site definition, both for future counts under a variety of monitoring programmes as well as for site designation and on-the-ground conservation measures. On the other hand, opinions are divided over how relevant the design of the Project's components is to the wider applicability of the outputs.

127. The Project has ably demonstrated that the apparent antipathy within GEFSec to the idea of flyway-scale projects (see paragraph 8) was misplaced and that projects, however complex and difficult they may be to implement, are needed that respond to the challenges posed in trying to conserve migratory systems; that they have to address the holistic ecological scale and not just the smaller political scale. This Project, and the UNEP-GEF Siberian Crane Wetland Project, along with the current UNDP-GEF Migratory Soaring Birds Project, have shown that the flyway-scale approach is relevant whether focussed on a single-species, multiple-species, or sites and as such deserves a continued place within the GEF portfolio to the same extent that large marine ecosystems do (see also paragraph 146). The approach is still new, there is much to be learnt, and as the following paragraphs point out, this Project has not necessarily got it completely right. But all innovation carries risk, and with risk sometimes comes imperfection, partial, or total failure. While this Project is categorically not in the latter bracket, it still shows there is much to learn.

Critical Site Network

128. In many ways, this is the flagship output of the Project – a web-based central information portal providing access to comprehensive current knowledge on migratory waterbirds aimed at supporting the identification and conservation of the network of sites used by waterbirds to complete their annual migrations along the African-Eurasian Flyways. The Project's website¹⁰⁴ claims the CSN tool aims to “*foster international cooperation among a wide range of government and non-government organisations towards flyway level conservation of migratory waterbirds*” and summarises its functions as allowing “*conservation managers and policy makers at the local, national and international level to:*

- *Identify the key sites used by a specific population of waterbirds along their entire migration route;*
- *Understand the importance of a site for a specific population, and the ecological role of that site in the context of the whole flyway;*
- *Verify the conservation status of a specific site;*
- *Illustrate the boundaries of a specific site;*
- *Show how population numbers are changing over time at a specific site;*
- *Show the importance of a site from a flyway-scale perspective; [and]*
- *Provide practical information on the ecological requirements of waterbirds to help site management”.*

129. These functions, and the way in which the CSN tool has been designed from the outset, suggest that it appears heavily conceptualised towards use by NGOs and relevant mainly to them rather than to government agencies, and indeed there is a clear dichotomy of views within the PSC and the Project's wider management team around this issue. Key proponents of the CSN tool within the Project argue that it is not aimed at NGO use only but that it is to be used within the framework of the flyway. Individual members of the AEWA, i.e. governments, work to commonly agreed priorities and derive these from commonly agreed, shared, and authoritative data with each stakeholder taking up their own part of the overall responsibility for site and species conservation. To do this, each stakeholder requires access to international (flyway), national, and site-based data and the CSN tool is designed to meet that need. While NGOs play a big role in implementing conservation priorities, the mandate is set by member countries and again, for this, they require accurate data. While this argument has some validity, it remains hard to believe that government officials of AEWA member states, particularly those from countries with limited capacities, will actually begin using this tool to set their own independent priorities within AEWA rather than continue to lean on advice provided by the

¹⁰⁴ <http://wow.wetlands.org/informationflyway/oldcsnpage/tabid/143/language/en-US/Default.aspx>

AEWA and Ramsar secretariats or trusted NGOs, all of whom already have ready access to the databases that the CSN tool relies on and the means to interpret those data that the CSN does not supply¹⁰⁵.

130. The other viewpoint expressed by several senior persons interviewed, and which the TE admits he leans towards, is that the CSN tool is “supply driven rather than demand driven”¹⁰⁶, i.e. the NGOs already have the data held in various places and are seeking means to make its use more attractive, rather than looking at what stakeholders’ requirements are and tailoring the supply of those data to better meet those needs. One senior member of the Project’s team indicated that “I can’t see me using the CSN tool in my conservation work” while others voiced “significant doubts as to whether government policy people will use it and find it effective”; that it is “too clever for many government people to be able to use it”, and that it “doesn’t seem to justify its cost”. Given that most threats to biodiversity come mainly from ill-conceived or -practiced resource use, one of the most important target groups for the supply of data via the CSN tool should be officials of all levels in government line ministries dealing with the policy, planning, and operations of resource use, e.g. water, agriculture, minerals and mining. Yet it is noticeable that no reference to such uses or target stakeholders is made in the summary quoted above (paragraph 128); indeed most of the functions in that summary deal with largely scientific issues which by and large are already known or, given the tool’s reliance on existing data bases, can be derived without the need for the tool¹⁰⁷.

131. To be fair, proponents of the CSN tool say this sort of use has not been overlooked, rather it is seen as being the next step or two down the line once the technical and teething issues of the tool have been resolved and it has gained legitimacy and proved its worth elsewhere in the conservation community. Furthermore, one of its main aims is to influence developed countries who spend millions of euros/pounds/dollars on conservation of birds in their own countries but whose overseas development agencies either inadvertently develop or operate projects that adversely affect the same bird populations’ overseas or target too little at sites critical to those populations elsewhere along the flyway, i.e. the tool aims to assist the redistribution of conservation funds to better target effective conservation actions. The TE concedes, that as with the identification and designation of other sites such as WWF’s Global 200 or BirdLife’s IBAs and Endemic Bird Areas, the definition and identification of Critical Sites will raise their profile and lead to increased vigilance amongst the major donors/financiers of development projects, and as one interviewee claimed, “open awareness for cooperation through transboundary and inter-Ministerial actions, therefore adding value to policies”.


132. Results from the questionnaire (Annex VII) tend to support the dichotomy of views expressed above. Only 53.5% of the 43 respondents who described themselves as being from a national government ministry/agency indicated that they thought the CSN tool would be “useful” or “extremely useful” for their organisation’s work (this being higher at 62.8% for their own work), although interestingly, 23% of these were from Western and Central Africa and 15% from Southern and Eastern Africa – significantly higher proportions than the overall distribution of respondents (Q.2). This compares with 72.5% and 67.5% of 40 respondents from international NGOs/MEAs respectively that thought the CSN tool would be “useful” or “extremely useful” for their organisation’s or their own work. Evidence supporting the supply versus demand theory comes from the greater use so far made of the tool by international NGOs/MEAs. While the proportion of respondents who had visited the site (Q.5) was relatively similar across types (average 68.7%, n = 166), the proportion that had actually used it for professional purposes (Q.6) is 42.5% (n = 40) for international NGOs/MEAs compared to 30.2% (n = 43) for national government ministries/agencies and 29.4% (n = 34) for national/local NGO. This is further supported by the heavy bias towards Western Europe in the geographical distribution of visits made to the CSN tool since its launch, see Figure 3.

¹⁰⁵ **WI comment:** It is important to remember that the CSN tool makes available information at a level of detail (flyway) which none of the separate databases is able to provide. Therefore also the NGOs will need to rely upon this tool to get this kind of information. Failing to understand this important fact, clearly explained in the specific material so far produced (leaflets and PPTs) results in a failure to understand the importance of the CSN Tool.

¹⁰⁶ **WI comment:** This statement does not seem to take into consideration the need identified in the Resolution 4.10 AEWAs International Implementation Tasks For 2009-2016 http://www.unep-awea.org/meetings/en/mop/mop4_docs/final_res_doc/res4_10_iit_2009_2016_final.doc which reaffirms “the particular importance of [...] the need to identify functional networks of key sites through an understanding of the migratory flyways of populations covered by the Agreement”. Demand driven-ness shown by interest from other flyways. **TE response:** WI’s view is noted. The quotes come from the WOW partnership who the TE would suggest are also aware of the AEWAs Resolution 4.10.

¹⁰⁷ See WI’s comment under footnote #105.

FIGURE3: VISITS TO THE CSN TOOL BY COUNTRY BETWEEN 14TH JUNE AND 14TH OCTOBER 2010.



133. Finally, Site Managers are highlighted as one of the key target users of the CSN tool, for example the flyer published at the tool’s launch states:

“The CSN Tool can help site managers maximise the contribution of individual sites to the conservation of global biodiversity, pinpoint the international importance of a site, identify populations for which a site is important in an international context and understand its ecological requirements. The CSN Tool caters to the specific needs of site managers¹⁰⁸, while also providing detailed information on the ecology of 294 waterbird species distilled from more than 2000 references.”

If this is the case, then there appears that there is much work to do in facilitating or persuading them to use it. Only four out of 288 respondents (1.4%) to the questionnaire were site managers. While this maybe due to most site managers residing and working in remote locations, if so it does point out the irrelevance of an internet tool being aimed at a target audience with limited internet facilities and puts into question the PSC’s decision not to produce a CD-ROM-based “snapshot” version. Furthermore, most of the site managers that the TE interviewed were more or less of a similar opinion to the one who stated that:

“the CSN tool is irrelevant to site management since [managers] are already aware of what the site needs are for a species and why a site is important. Local people know most about [their] sites”.

Frankly, this is somewhat disturbing since in failing to take advantage of the opportunities for communicating the wider flyway-scale messages to stakeholders and a wider public, it suggests that the benefits of the flyway approach taken by the Project were not actually fully understood by, or at least communicated to, everyone involved¹⁰⁹.

#15 **Lesson learned:** In flyway-scale projects, the benefits of the approach need to be understood and be able to be communicated by all concerned.

¹⁰⁸ **PSC Chair comment:** *The CSN Tool has indeed never been meant to be of practical use on just the site level but in the first instance and much more important to show the relative importance of a particular site in the whole of the flyway.* **TE response:** This comment does not sit comfortably with the text within the Project’s flyer.

¹⁰⁹ **WI comment:** *Needs to be noted that the survey was carried out before the CSN Tool was available (as it will be soon) in 4 languages (English, French, Arabic and Russian).* **TE response:** Agreed, however the availability of the tool in four languages (or even in one) is not a pre-requisite for the messages to be adequately communicated to all of the site managers (and other people) involved in the Project.

134. These questions over the relevance of the CSN tool are clearly connected to weaknesses in its original design. While the conceptual arguments of its proponents summarised in paragraphs 129 is perfectly logical, it also reflects a weak root cause analysis. Paragraph 31 of the Project Document states that:

“... migratory waterbirds are still threatened by activities that degrade and remove wetland sites along their flyways and therefore threaten their survival. The specific root causes are generally due to unsustainable development pressures on natural resources, weak coordination and cooperation between government agencies and NGOs, insufficient technical capacity to manage sites locally and within the flyway context, low awareness amongst a wide variety of stakeholder groups (from decision-makers to site-based practitioners to community leaders) and poor access to resources to inform and assist conservation activity.”

To a large degree, this over-inflates the role of NGOs (perhaps unsurprising coming from an NGO) in the sense that while “*unsustainable development pressures on natural resources*” is undoubtedly the key root cause of threats to migratory waterbirds, “*weak coordination and cooperation between government agencies and NGOs*” is not really the second most important of these – and while insufficient technical capacity, low awareness and poor access to resources may all be important factors, the key question remains that if one was to ask the decision-makers (who are responsible for the unsustainable development pressures) what would be the most useful way to spend US\$ 3.5 million in helping them improve their decision-making to aid conservation of wetlands, neither the TE nor many of the Project team believe it would be the CSN tool with its introspective view towards the MEAs and the ecology of species, but rather an outward looking, practically-based tool to assist long-term economic planning in key line ministries. As the German Government, a key donor indicates (see paragraph 41), the CSN cannot be used as a planning tool and does not add value for Europe – so why has so much been paid for a tool that has no additional value to the German Government?¹¹⁰ And if not Europe, then what about Africa? To ensure balance, the TE also points out that this Project started its design life in 1999 at a time when root cause analysis and barrier removal was still at an unsophisticated level within GEF, and hence it is wrong to judge it against the standards being used today. It also went through a long and involved review process mainly focussed on finance on which the MTE commented that:

“It is surprising that a project of WOW’s magnitude and global relevance could have been approved without sufficient funds ...”

to which could equally well be added “or attention to relevance”.

Flyway Training Kit

135. The training kit has been described by various Project team members as a “*masterpiece*” and a “*tour de force*” and undoubtedly its production is a great achievement (see paragraph 49). That it fulfils admirably a means for “*Establishing a basis for strengthening decision-making and technical capacity for wetland and migratory waterbird conservation*” [Component 2] is beyond question, so it may seem a little perverse to be questioning its relevance. Yet, again amongst senior project team members, there is a contrary viewpoint that the kit has been developed with a “*top-down supply approach rather than a bottom-up needs approach*”¹¹¹ and that “[we are] *not sure it’s what’s needed*”¹¹². This alternative view suggests that the kit

¹¹⁰ **BfN/BMU comment:** See footnote #34.

¹¹¹ **PSC Chair comment:** *Here I really have a problem with the remark cited about the process. The FTK was completely developed via a bottom/up process and not top/down. Through a whole series of workshops people throughout the flyway could tell and suggest what information they would like to have to work on the flyway approach. After that Tim Dodman and I were given a document with tenths of Key words which should be addressed or on which information should be provided in the FTK. It was an absolute bottom/up process of which we received the end/results and used that to start writing and collecting illustrations. In no way it was a top/down process. Its relevance is high and certainly of a printed version. I fully respect the long term experience of Tim Dodman in Africa who with many examples illustrated the absolute need that local and regional managers do need something printed in spite of an increased and better access to internet (the reason why the FTK contains so many references to websites!). The FTK has already received very positive reactions from other parts of the world and through that it has been shown as a product people were waiting for. **TE response:** The PSC Chair’s comments are noted and as one of the chief authors of the FTK, they must be given high credence. However, they are totally at odds with numerous (not one or two) members of the Project team interviewed, as reported in the paragraph.*

¹¹² **WI comment:** *This does not seem to be the view of the TBs or of the training Institutes that have formally endorsed and / or used the FTK since its launch. **TE response:** The TE notes this point of view. However, the evidence appears shaky. The number of members of the Training Boards has declined throughout the Project. There were at least 38 different institutions represented at the Almen workshop (Sept 2007), and at least 26 members completed the baseline capacity scorecard (July 2008). Only 13 of these were still interested or could be bothered enough to fill in the repeat scorecard (October 2010) (see indicator I1 in Annex IV). The TE*

represents a tome on flyway management and that it is not dynamic and easy to reach out to all the people concerned with the flyway; it is in fact a “*single tool approach to a problem [capacity development] needing a multiple-tool approach, e.g. policy advocacy and influence ... i.e. we need a more sophisticated tool box than just training*”. Although all elements relevant to flyway conservation are covered and can be extracted to customise training, it also means that it may not be the most cost-effective solution since for most of the time the majority of the kit will not be used. The issue is significant and it is apparent that the ToT model on which the Flyway Training Kit is based, did not receive universal backing within the Project team, not least because it is inherently expensive to set up and maintain. Several people commented that given that it was clear from the outset that there was little or no money available for its implementation and that considerable fund-raising would be necessary, other models would have been preferable. They also indicated that experience shows that often the ToT model is flawed since the people who attend the ToT courses are “sent” rather than volunteers; there are often high attrition rates for a range of reasons meaning a steady replacement of trainers is necessary, and there is often little money available for implementation. There is no reason to believe that this will be any different with the Flyway Training Kit. Printing and distribution costs are also excessively high – the Flyway Training Kit weighs in at 2.6 kg per volume making it prohibitively expensive to ship without assistance; many kits were sent through diplomatic channels. Then there is the question of the number of copies produced – 1,500 copies were printed in English and yet 700 of these are still with the PCU and will not be distributed within the lifetime of the Project¹¹³. The TE is not the only one to question whether there are really 1,500 trainers in the region, each of whom requires an English language version, and remembering that French, Russian and Arabic versions are also in various stages of production.

136. There appears to be an unspoken view within certain parts of the Project, and more vociferously opposed by another faction, that a project has to produce “stuff” to show that it has made progress; that it is able to show through its “stuff” that it has been in existence and made a difference; and that the Flyway Training Kit has partially fallen within this view. While not detracting from the magnificence of the achievement of the Flyway Training Kit, the TE leans strongly in support of the view that other means of capacity-building and awareness-raising may have been preferable. Going back to two of the root causes expressed in the Project Document (“*unsustainable development pressures on natural resources*” and “*low awareness amongst a wide variety of stakeholder groups (from decision-makers to site-based practitioners to community leaders)*”), does the encyclopaedic form of the Flyway Training Kit really represent the most effective way of reaching decision-makers? Will line ministries really pay for staff to attend long courses given by the trained trainers, or would a series of small, highly targeted leaflets to be delivered by the INGO’s/MEA’s regional and national networks be more effective (and less expensive)? And what of innovative methods – interactive CDs with increased accessibility to smaller topics (and cheaper to produce and distribute)? Online training courses in tight topics with a certificate to print out at the end? Training topics linked to the CSN tool itself or even on the various uses of the CSN tool? Evidence suggesting that electronic media may have been a better route than expensive generalised printed materials comes obliquely from the CSN questionnaire (Q.4) where 35.5% of 166 respondents said that they had heard of the CSN tool from websites compared to only 3.0% from brochures. Clearly, there was a fixed vision at the outset of the Project and delivery of this vision in the face of numerous arguments for alternative approaches was seen as the only possibility for achieving success. The TE only hopes that the Flyway Training Kit does not become a white elephant, since there will now be only a finite period for raising the necessary funds to implement it before it becomes out-of-date.

#20	Lesson learned: Producing “stuff” is not inherently good.
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would expect that a project producing something really relevant to the training institutes across the regions might expect a somewhat higher than 50% (at best, 33% or less at worst) retention rate among those initially interested. Again, WI appears to be happy to base its views upon those who agree with it, rather than trying to explore the reasons behind those who may not or do not.

¹¹³ **PCU comment:** *Actually, the remaining 700 will remain at the UNEP/AEWA Secretariat who has agreed to act as a clearing house post-project. A plan is in place for the distribution of the remaining kits and they will be sent out – albeit at a much slower pace – as funds for their distribution are mobilised post-project. Of the 700 FTKs sitting within the archive room at the UNEP/AEWA Secretariat, 200 copies have been specifically reserved for the UNEP/AEWA Secretariat.*

Demonstration Projects

137. In comparison with the other two main components, there is more or less unanimous agreement that the demonstration projects are the least relevant to the flyway concept. Paradoxically, they are demand-driven, responding to real national or local needs, for example in producing management plans, solving management problems, and providing education and awareness-raising. Unfortunately, as a group rather than as individual projects, they lack any cohesiveness around the flyway concept that they are trying to demonstrate within; and as individual projects rather than as a group, they largely lack any innovative value in what they are trying to demonstrate, the exception being Hungary, since there is already a significant body of documented experience from projects worldwide on issues such as eco-tourism, education, and participatory management planning. That is not to say that each in its own way has not made a significant contribution to site-based or even regional-level wetland conservation needs, e.g. Senegal/Gambia is the first trans-boundary Ramsar site to be designated in Africa; Niger is the first community-based management plan to be approved in that country. The lack of relevance here can again be traced back to weaknesses in the Project's design, and more particularly to the fact that its original idea of a site-based flyway-scale project was changed to one of producing two major tools and then having to incorporate the site-based ideas (which had by then been designed and approved) as being "*showcases for best practice across the project area to catalyse other activity*". Unfortunately, much of this intention was lost when funding cuts in the Project meant that the exchange programme between sites (through which a flyway link may have conceivably been established) had to be abandoned. Other reasons, lost in the mists of time, may also have been relevant – no-one seems to be able to recall why or how the sites were selected in the first place – but what is clear is that there should have been some link between them to enable them to demonstrate the importance of coordination and operational collaboration between critical sites in achieving integrated conservation within a flyway-scale framework rather than in being simply a group of disparate projects geographically linked through being within the same overall flyway. While making a link through a species may have been obvious, the Siberian Crane Wetland Project effectively precluded that since GEF did not want two similar projects at the same time. However, a link demonstrating just one or two key activities (e.g. transboundary management planning, or increased education) at several sites linked through being on the same flyway of several species' populations would have made more sense in demonstrating the need for concerted action at the flyway scale, or a link could have been made between the projects and the Flyway Training Kit or the CSN tool. Either way, such opportunities were unfortunately missed.

The Project has produced two excellent flyway-scale tools but the relevance of these remains questionable, and has implemented ten demonstration projects that have made significant contributions to site-based and regional-level wetland conservation needs, but which have not acted in concert to demonstrate a flyway-scale approach, hence relevance is evaluated as **Marginally Satisfactory**.

#1 **Lesson learned:** Flyway-scale projects should demonstrate management of flyway-scale priorities.

SUSTAINABILITY

138. While the terminal evaluation of a project is supposed to examine the sustainability of a project's elements, with WOW there is an additional angle that adds significantly to the likelihood of these elements being sustained. As most of the actors acknowledge, perhaps the greatest accomplishment of the Project is not any of its components *per se* but the empowerment of the WOW Partnership itself. This empowerment does not appear in the logframe, nor is it among the indicators, and hence it is easy to overlook. However, its importance engenders itself most strongly not only in the increased likelihood of sustaining the gains already made, but in building upon them – something quite rare for a project. The main four partners (WI, BLI, AWEA, and Ramsar) have negotiated a five-page (plus annexes) Memorandum of Cooperation (MOC) which was signed and came into effect on 14th June 2010 with the express intent to:

"... consolidate and progress a programmatic partnership among like-minded international NGOs and Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) for flyway-scale conservation of migratory waterbirds and the wise-use of wetlands."

and

“Building from the aims and achievements of the WOW project, specifically to work towards achieving the following collaborative goals:

- i. Improving access to good flyway-scale information based on sound science*
- ii. Strengthening capacity in understanding and applying flyway conservation concepts*
- iii. Promoting effective communication and creating awareness*
- iv. Stimulating and maintaining effective management of flyway networks of sites for migratory species*
- v. Promoting conservation and flyway-scale approaches across the critical network of sites.”*

#19

Lesson learned: The positive spin-offs that GEF projects can generate should not be underestimated by managers and evaluators.

139. Evaluation of the sustainability of this Project is not straightforward because of the disparate nature of the components and the number of organisations involved. In particular, attempting to lump the 11 demonstration projects together to get a single rating and then lump this with a combined rating for the CSN tool and the Flyway Training Kit would, in the view of the TE, lead to a meaningless rating. Therefore, rating of the elements of sustainability has been limited to the CSN tool and Flyway Training Kit together, since there are distinct similarities between them in terms of the elements (financial, socio-political, institutional, and environmental), while the disparate demonstration projects (from each other as well as from Components 1 and 2) are evaluated individually in tabular form for completeness (Table 12 below). Rating criteria are defined in Table 2.

140. The CSN tool has been designed to require very little in the way of maintenance since it automatically updates as and when the underlying databases are updated. Separate agreement is being negotiated among the WOW partners to allocate the costs of running, and occasionally maintaining, the server on which the portal is lodged, leaving only larger-scale maintenance such as re-defining site relationships, allocating new records to the correct flyway, and taxonomic changes needing staff time and therefore finance. Similarly, the Flyway Training Kit requires no immediate maintenance and hence generates no requirement for finance. Undoubtedly at some point in the future, this state-of-the-art-publication will require updating, but perhaps in a decade’s time continued innovation in IT may render this less expensive than such an update would now. However, the Project has struggled for financial resources throughout its lifetime, particularly in raising the necessary co-finance, and as a result it has been the shortened by six months. The inability of the Project to raise sufficient funds to implement significant designed activities, most notably the mobilisation of resources to enable implementation of the Flyway Training Kit, but also others such as the production of a field guide to wetland birds in Russian, translation of MEA texts, and a CD-ROM version of the CSN tool, is particularly worrisome and suggests that significant risks remain associated with this element. However, although the MOC does not guarantee success in raising further finance, it does provide a formal framework for funding proposals, and the visible reality of a programmatic partnership is very likely to assist in leveraging further funds for flyway scale activities, particularly given that such a partnership can now point to a successful track record of delivery. Additionally, one of the unsung benefits arising from the Project has been the ability of one action to assist with the implementation of several instruments of AEWa and Ramsar, and this effectiveness sends a powerful signal to donors. This is deemed to partially mitigate the risks, therefore financial sustainability is adjudged to be **Marginally Likely**.

141. Socio-politically, the two components enjoy considerable support, not least because of their promotion for the aims of the two MEAs, AEWa and Ramsar, and the widespread membership they have. Member states have backed a number of political statements recognising the need to strengthen conservation at the flyway level¹¹⁴, and the WOW Project, together with the complementary species-based Siberian Crane Wetlands Project, have clearly demonstrated the validity and viability of a flyway-scale approach to projects.

¹¹⁴ e.g. the Edinburgh Declaration on Global Flyways (2004); the adoption of the first AEWa Strategic Plan in 2008; Resolution X.22 from COP 10 of the Ramsar Convention (2008) on the need for international cooperation for the conservation of waterbird flyways; and Resolution 9.2 from COP 9 of the Convention of Migratory Species (2008) outlining the conservation activities needed in global flyways and establishing a Working Group on Global Flyways.

The CSN tool and Flyway Training Kit have both been extremely well received at international meetings where they have been promoted and feedback to the Project team has been positive throughout, although results of the questionnaire on the CSN tool undertaken as part of the TE suggest a slightly more ambiguous response, e.g. 57.8% of 166 respondents rated the tool as being useful or extremely useful to their organisation's work (Q.8, [Annex VII](#)). The participatory nature of the Flyway Training Kit, and the regionalisation of the examples used, reflect the design principle that the Kit should be as relevant as possible to audiences throughout the Flyway. The TE believes this has been successfully achieved and hence will ensure that its widespread adoption by training institutes throughout the various regions. The socio-political sustainability is evaluated as **Likely**.

142. The institutional sustainability of the Project's components is extremely strong since, as indicated above, the four main partners of the Project have signed a MOC to convert the Project into a broad partnership programme aimed at continuing the recognisable branding, shared communications, and collaboration that the Project has developed, rather than dropping the concept or just applying for funding for a continuation project. It is clear that the partnership is not without its continuing tensions; the imperative of WI for self-promotion is still clearly evident in the extended deliberations and iterations of the MOC itself, but it has not derailed the process. Lessons have been learned regarding the governance of the partnership and a steering committee comprising two members of each partner organization with the chair revolving annually has been agreed. The continuation of this demonstrably effective partnership among the key institutions working on bird conservation at the flyway level can only bode well for the project's impacts. The institutionalisation of key activities critical to the continued well-being of the Project's two main components has been cleverly recognised and developed, i.e. the use of the volunteer surveyors involved in existing successfully operating flyway-scale surveys, the IBA and IWC, to provide the underlying data on which to base the CSN tool, and the integration of other regional institutions into the design process of the Flyway Training Kit to tie in their intended use for its delivery. The institutional sustainability of the Project is evaluated as **Likely**.

143. The environmental sustainability of the two components is effectively not applicable since neither is specifically site-related. In general, both the CSN tool and the Flyway Training Kit should lead to improved conservation status for sites throughout the region through a more targeted and coordinated approach to site designations, and to raised capacity to manage conservation at many levels. However, these two components will not directly diminish the environmental threats to any site, nor provide any immediate benefits. The environmental sustainability of the Project is evaluated as **not applicable**.

Since UNEP-GEF deems each risk dimension of sustainability critical, the overall rating for sustainability cannot be higher than the rating of the dimension with lowest rating, and as such the overall sustainability is ranked as Moderately Likely.

Demonstration Projects

144. The demonstration projects have been assessed independently from Components 1 and 2, and from each other, since there are no links between them in terms of sustainability; hence the results have not been used in the overall rating of sustainability for the Project, given above. However, of the ten demonstration projects assessed (Tanzania has been excluded because it failed to deliver any products), sustainability is assessed as Likely for three; Moderately Likely for three; Moderately Unlikely for two; and Highly Unlikely for two – a reasonably good result – see Table 12. Notably, only one project outside of Europe is receives a likely/moderately likely rating, that of the Hadeija-Nguru Wetlands in Nigeria. In addition to the elements of sustainability required by UNEP-GEF, that of economic sustainability has been added to the evaluation of the demonstration projects since this is frequently highly relevant to a site-based project because if an activity provides sound economic returns to one or more stakeholders, that activity is more likely to be maintained as a behaviour than if there is no economic gain or if losses are involved. It is deemed separate from financial since that tends to involve access to outside funding, while economic sustainability reflects internal benefits accruing directly from the activity/behaviour itself.

TABLE 12: EVALUATION OF SUSTAINABILITY OF DEMONSTRATION PROJECTS

ESTONIA: HAAPSALU NOARROOTSI BAYS		
Financial	Likely	No overt information available to the TE, but close State involvement and the development of an integrated management plan covering three sites suggests sustainable finance would be in place to implement the activities contained therein.
Socio-political	Likely	Significant political support resulted in Estonia joining AEWa and nominating the site under Ramsar. Possibility of the site becoming a UNESCO World Heritage site under consideration.
Institutional	Likely	Strong – project was implemented through Environmental Board of Estonia, the State environmental agency, who continue to be involved with the management of the site.
Environmental	Likely	Significant habitat restored and populations of target species using site appear to be increasing. Site has received considerable extra protection.
Economic	Likely	Again, no overt information available to the TE, but increasing numbers of visitors suggests knock-on economic benefits both to those managing the sites themselves, and to associated tourism-based businesses nearby.
Overall	Likely	
HUNGARY: BIHARUGRA FISH PONDS		
Financial	Likely	The key project achievement (new fish-farming method) is continuing to be funded by the private company (Agropoint Ltd.) partnering the Project.
Socio-political	Likely	There is indirect support from the Körös-Maros National Park within which the fish ponds lie.
Institutional	Likely	Agropoint Ltd. has committed to continue to implement biodiversity-friendly fish-farming beyond the closure of the Project.
Environmental	Likely	Site is protected with the Körös-Maros National Park and the new fish-farming method appears to be increasing numbers of target species.
Economic	Moderately Likely	The economics of Agropoint Ltd. operating the fish ponds remains unclear despite assertions it is now profitable, and since the move to biodiversity-friendly fish-farming has not as yet proven to be wholly economically viable, there must still be doubt over how long this situation can be maintained, particularly if habitat support subsidies are cut.
Overall	Moderately Likely	
LITHUANIA: NEMUNAS RIVER DELTA		
Financial	Likely	Very strong. Project levered catalytic finance of US\$ 5.5 million from national and EU funds for large-scale habitat restoration works.
Socio-political	Likely	No overt information available to the TE, but the involvement of new national and EU funding plus cross-border cooperation with Russia suggests strong political support from the State. Presence of over 40,000 visitors since May 2008 and receipt of the EDEN award suggests strong social support.
Institutional	Likely	Appears strong since the Project was implemented by Vilnius University but with strong involvement of the Direction of the Nemunas River Delta Regional Park.
Environmental	Likely	Small-scale habitat restoration resulted in return of globally threatened species and increased numbers of others. Follow-up large-scale restoration is likely only to increase this trend.
Economic	Moderately Likely	Again, no overt information available to the TE, but increasing numbers of visitors suggests knock-on economic benefits both to those managing the sites themselves, and to associated tourism-based businesses nearby.
Overall	Likely	

MAURITANIA: PARC NATIONAL BANC D'ARGUIN		
Financial	Likely	No constraints within this element since activities not dependent on further finance, but see "economic".
Socio-political	Moderately Unlikely	Guides need some sort of accreditation from PNBA to provide competitive edge with tourists but this is complicated by inter-ministerial politics and another project. Coup d'état midway through project implementation has had no effect on government support for outcomes.
Institutional	Likely	FIBA still operative in the National Park and able to provide support to guides, and perhaps help with the formation of an Association for them. New Director of PNBA particularly supportive of project's aims within greater strategy for national park.
Environmental	Likely	Not really applicable, though presence of trained guides may help in general protection duties and through promotion of environmentally-sound behaviour from tourists.
Economic	Moderately Unlikely	International tourism in Mauritania severely curtailed by terrorist activity in 2008/9, though strong national market segment seemingly unaffected. Although the former is being promoted again by a national strategy, this will take time. Furthermore, not all Imraguen villages are equally attractive to tourists making livelihood by guiding alone difficult for many of the new trainees.
Overall	Moderately Unlikely	
NIGER: NAMGA-KOKOROU WETLANDS		
Financial	Moderately Unlikely	Although donor meetings have been held to find funds to finance the management plan, nothing concrete has been achieved at the time of the evaluation.
Socio-political	Likely	Strong support from local communities, Governorate and Ministry of Environment throughout. This appears unchanged by coup d'état in February 2010; in fact support may be strengthened since new Government is prioritising rural development and local capacity-building.
Institutional	Moderately Likely	Strong and moderately competent support from local department of Ministry of Environment. Local communities well-organised.
Environmental	Moderately Unlikely	Too early to assess since implementation of plan not yet commenced. Given degraded state of environment, any attempt to intervene and rectify problems is likely to be positive, but poverty, intense human pressure on site, history of drought (possibly exacerbated by climate change) militate against plan being successful.
Economic	Moderately Unlikely	Communities are too poor for change to occur unaided. However, if changes prove effective, economic benefits are likely to ensue embedding the management plan in local economic behaviour.
Overall	Moderately Unlikely	
NIGERIA: HADEIJA-NGURU WETLANDS		
Financial	Likely	Not really necessary because economic benefits of activities provide self-sustaining motivation for communities to carry out work for themselves. However, project has put a sustainability plan in place which includes a local tax to enable continuation of <i>Typha</i> clearance. Money from USAID available to start up <i>Typha</i> briquette manufacturing project.
Socio-political	Likely	Communities well organised and have continuing support of Nigerian Conservation Foundation. Economic benefits create strong local political support. Nearby communities interested in replicating activities for their benefit.
Institutional	Likely	No overt information available to the TE, but strong contacts with research organisations and tertiary education studies.
Environmental	Likely	<i>Typha</i> clearance has increased productivity of fishery, raised water levels benefiting local agriculture, and appears to be increasing numbers of target species.
Economic	Likely	Outstanding improvements in economic conditions for locals taking part means that value of activities and wetlands are now widely recognised.
Overall	Likely	

SENEGAL-GAMBIA: SALOUM-NIUMI COMPLEX		
Financial	Moderately Likely	No finance immediately identified outside of the annual budget for Saloum (Senegal). Niumi does not have a separate budget from that of the Parks Department in Gambia but some funding available from that. Fund-raising is actively occurring through another proposed project covering the critical activities identified in the joint management plan.
Socio-political	Likely	Strong political support for trans-boundary approach and recognition of importance of wetland complex.
Institutional	Likely	Good. Implementation of trans-boundary management plan and new joint monitoring activities firmly embedded in existing national park authorities. Joint management body agreed, to be staffed from two countries' agencies.
Environmental	Likely	Excellent. Recognition of need to manage the wetland complex as a single ecological entity promotes its well-being and reduces risks posed by uncoordinated management.
Economic	Moderately Likely	Work on introducing small-scale income-generating activities and increased awareness of sustainable natural resource use may provide links between economic good of local people with continued need for its conservation.
Overall	Moderately Likely	
SOUTH AFRICA: WAKKERSTROOM WETLAND		
Financial	Likely	Continued support from BirdLife South Africa for project activities seems likely for the immediate future.
Socio-political	Moderately Likely	There is good support from the local community through the Tourist Association and schools and farms. However, buy-in from the local administration remains poor, although in part this may be because they are in financial administration.
Institutional	Moderately Likely	Generally the institutional side of this project is weak, and while it has political support it appears to have no institutional base outside of BirdLife South Africa. However, the Wakkerstroom Wetland Centre is owned and operated by BLSA and other aspects of the project are either economic-based or run with local support hence an institutional framework is largely irrelevant.
Environmental	Moderately Likely	All activities have a positive environmental effect and target species are increasing. There is external pressure in the form of dams and mining applications but effective and organised opposition has won notable legal battles recently to protect site.
Economic	Likely	Slow but sound progress has been made in this element, and although small in scale, most of the project's activities are soundly grounded economically.
Overall	Moderately Likely	
TANZANIA: DAR ES SALAAM WETLANDS		
Evaluation of sustainability not applicable because project failed.		

TURKEY: BURDUR GÖLÜ		
Financial	Highly Unlikely	Nothing apparent from either government sources or international NGOs. Strong voluntary ethos established locally by project.
Socio-political	Moderately Likely	State level endorsement of Ramsar management plan through National Wetlands Committee. Strong support from local communities and local administration, especially schools and education department.
Institutional	Moderately Unlikely	Weak with local authorities willing to undertake activities but requiring continued leadership. Continued commitment (albeit largely voluntary) of Doğa Derneği needs to focus on institutionalising gains, e.g. in formally including environmental education into local schools' curricula.
Environmental	Moderately Unlikely	Too early to identify since awareness-raising type projects take considerable time for on-site benefits to accrue. Rating given reflects considerable uncertainties and assumptions that increased awareness will translate into hard benefits, meantime external pressure remain.
Economic	Highly Unlikely	No economic benefits immediately apparent to local people since project is effectively stand-alone education/awareness-raising.
Overall	Highly Unlikely	
YEMEN: ADEN WETLAND		
Financial	Moderately Likely	UNDP's Sustainable Natural Resources Management Programme has taken on implementation of some of the activities required under the Aden Wetland Management Plan developed by WOW. Thus, some funding has been leveraged but beyond this there appear to be no commitments, although fund-raising efforts continue through the WOW-ME Regional Centre.
Socio-political	Highly Unlikely	Mixed, since the management plan received endorsement from the Aden Governorate and the Government's Environmental Protection Agency, yet the stated aim of having the plan included into Aden's Economic Masterplan has drawn a complete blank and economic development continues rapidly close to the site.
Institutional	Moderately Unlikely	Equivocal – as indicated, the plan has been endorsed by two State institutions but it is not institutionalised by the higher tier plan, nor has any State or City funding been allocated to its implementation.
Environmental	Moderately Unlikely	Project has managed to maintain the environmental values of the site and to raise awareness of these, but threat from development is ever present.
Economic	Highly Unlikely	Economic returns from the wetland are insignificant in the face of those to be made from its commercial development as part of the continuing expansion of Aden's port.
Overall	Highly Unlikely	

CATALYTIC ROLE AND REPLICATION

145. This Project's greatest innovation is that it is the first GEF project to be designed at a scale that recognises the importance of the flyway approach when dealing with migratory birds. In terms of geographic area, it is probably the biggest GEF project ever attempted, covering 113 countries on three continents – Africa, Asia, and Europe. Its other major innovation is the development of an internet-based tool that a) enables all existing data on a migratory waterbird species or on a wetland site to be brought together in one place to enable its relevance to be understood within the flyway context, whether that be, say, in identifying sites that should be prioritised for protection, or for identifying the priority management needs of a single site to best benefit the flyway. Nothing of this type or with this degree of insight has been attempted before. While the TE has been somewhat critical of the tool under other evaluation criteria (e.g. paragraph 129 *et seq.*), there is absolutely no doubt that it has the power to revolutionise national priority setting when it comes to designating sites, either under international frameworks or under national protected area systems, and as such will increase the effectiveness of the deployment of limited national conservation resources. At the time of the evaluation, although formally launched, the tool was still in the late stages of its consultative version so it is much too early to say to what extent it has contributed to changing institutional behaviours. However, it clearly will, and the newly-developed concept of a Critical Network Site will come to enter the lexicon of conservation terms in the same way as "Ramsar Site" or "Natura 2000". Given the

Project's partnership, the tool, and the concept, will be championed not only by two influential international NGOs but probably more importantly by the two MEAs, Ramsar and AEWA, through their national governmental members.

146. Can the flyway approach be replicated elsewhere? The TE believes the answer to this is a resounding "yes". The UNEP-GEF Siberian Crane Wetland Project and the UNDP-GEF Migratory Soaring Birds Project have both shown that the flyway-scale approach is relevant at a single-species level¹¹⁵, a multiple-species issue-based level, or as here, a site-focussed level. The TE and all the technical members of the PSC and the project partners interviewed believe very strongly that, complex as they are to design effectively, flyway-scale projects are an extremely important addition to the GEF repertoire and resources should continue to be made available for them to act at the appropriate ecological scale rather than focussing too heavily on nationally-oriented approaches. Furthermore, there appears to be great interest from organisations working in other areas of the world to replicate this approach and obvious candidates would be the East Asian-Australasian Flyway and any of the three Americas flyways (West Atlantic, Mississippi or Pacific). The lessons learned from WOW, and particularly those technical ones relating to the development and production of the CSN tool, would enable this to be undertaken more cost-effectively, although it will remain manually intensive and therefore expensive. Nonetheless, the precedent has been set, its usefulness established, and most of the technical challenges overcome – all that would be required is a source of finance.

147. The Flyway Training Kit could be replicated with very little effort or cost – in fact in principle it could simply be reprinted and used in other regions, with the only drawback that the regional focus implicit amongst the examples used throughout would be missing. However, the work required to change most of these to examples from other flyways would be relatively small and moderately easy to achieve, and assuming finance is available, the project partners would be conducive to help.

148. The underlying idea of the demonstration projects is that they are demonstrations of good practice and therefore designed to be both catalytic in terms of inspiring to others and to be replicated by collating "how-to" knowledge. That the financial difficulties of the Project meant that the aspect of sharing this knowledge was significantly scaled down, the fact remains that the projects remain for use by others (including other projects) as and when they can be made use of. While the quality of the work done was variable between sites, much of it was very good and broke new ground. Any or all of this could be replicated in other countries. What is also good to be able to report is that within a given country, the work done at a demonstration site is already being replicated. Perhaps the best example of this is the catalytic financing obtained by the demonstration project in Lithuania where US\$ 5.5 million was leveraged from national and EU funds to up-scale habitat restoration works piloted by the original project. In other countries, replication was

- promoted as part of the project itself, e.g. Hungary where workshops and a book promoted replication of biodiversity-friendly fish-farming to other private sector companies operating fishponds elsewhere in the country and across the border in Romania;
- fostered as part of the project's longer-term strategy, e.g. in Nigeria where the success of the project catalysed interest from nearby communities and this was addressed factored into a sustainability and replication plan; or
- adopted by the national authorities as a result of the project's success, e.g. in Niger, the success of the participatory management plan in generating local ownership and a self-help mentality has meant that it is already being replicated at another Ramsar site in the country and is finding support with the new Government through integration of the approach into its rural development strategy.

The Project has displayed high levels of innovation and ability for replication, with catalytic financing leveraged by one demonstration project, hence catalytic role and replication is evaluated as **Highly Satisfactory**.

¹¹⁵ **BLI comment:** *The UNDP-GEF Migratory Soaring Birds project is too early in its implementation to say that it has "shown that the flyway-scale approach is relevant". Moreover, the Migratory Soaring Birds project is not a single-species level project – rather, it is a mainstreaming project based around one broad ecological grouping. But the TE is correct in identifying that the project does utilise a flyway-scale approach and explicitly recognises the value of this.*

COUNTRY DRIVEN-NESS AND COORDINATION

149. The assessment of country ownership is inherently difficult for projects involving a large number of countries. In the case of WOW, countries were not involved directly in the conceptual design since this was at a supra-national level and the prime movers were WI and AEWA. Indeed it is through AEWA with its system of country membership that implicit country support has been derived throughout. The Parties of AEWA reconfirmed this implicit support at the fourth MOP in Madagascar in September 2008 when they passed Resolution 4.10 whose third clause states:

“Strongly urges Contracting Parties and specialised international organisations to specifically support the activities/projects linked to the Wings Over Wetlands Project (WOW) / African-Eurasian Flyways GEF project in order to allow successful implementation of the project; and Determines that these activities/projects shall be considered the highest priority for funding over the period 2009-2012”.

Similarly, the Parties of Ramsar made an explicit acknowledgement of support for the Project in the preamble to Resolution X.22 passed at the tenth COP in Korea in November 2008, which states:

“WELCOMING the multi-partner Wings Over Wetlands GEF project in Africa and western Eurasia, in particular its demonstration projects, its capacity-building activities, and its innovative Critical Site Network Tool for disseminating key data and information on wetlands and waterbirds to support conservation actions by site managers, stakeholders, and other decision-makers”.

150. Even amongst the demonstration sites, country driven-ness is hard to identify since most of the approaches to sites to take part were made originally through national or international NGOs, e.g. FIBA in Mauritania, MME in Hungary, Doğa Derneği in Turkey, BirdLife South Africa, Nigerian Conservation Foundation, Wildlife Conservation Society of Tanzania which have subsequently been major partners in implementation. Only in Estonia, Niger, and to a lesser degree in Lithuania, has government been a driving force with central government involved directly in project implementation. While governments signed off through their GEF focal points and seem happy enough to have a GEF project funding activities on their territory, and while all the projects respond to national priorities within their country's policy and legislative frameworks, there has been a notable lack of direct involvement. While protected area authorities have been involved in activities or support for activities in Senegal/Gambia, Mauritania, Lithuania and Estonia, they took no part in Hungary despite the site lying fully within the Körös-Maros National Park. Ownership of end products has also been similarly low-key amongst the countries excluding Estonia, Lithuania, and Niger. In Mauritania, political issues involving another project with French bi-lateral funding are preventing immediate support necessary to establish the trained eco-guides to operate successfully; in Yemen there is no cabinet support for mainstreaming the management plan into the Aden Master Plan; in South Africa there remains inadequate understanding and support for the Wakkerstroom wetlands in a planning context; and in Hungary, Nigeria, and Turkey the government played no formal role in the project at all. However, while government driven-ness has been a positive factor in the success of the projects in Estonia, Lithuania, and Niger, the converse is not necessarily a problem since lack of government involvement can be offset by other factors such as private sector involvement as in Hungary, or rendered irrelevant by local level commitment and enthusiasm as in Nigeria; both projects achieving notable successes.

Country driven-ness and coordination is largely irrelevant to a project driven at a supra-national level through the MEAs. Government involvement in demonstration projects has varied from high (Estonia) to absent (e.g. Hungary, Nigeria, Turkey) but although where driven-ness has been overt this has helped the success of projects, its absence has not necessarily meant failure, hence country driven-ness and coordination is evaluated as **Marginally Satisfactory**.

RECOMMENDATIONS

151. Only one recommendation falls out of the text for implementation before, or as soon as possible after, the Project's end, although the reader is directed to paragraph 40 *et seq.* where another issue that impinges directly on the credibility of the CSN tool needs to be addressed but is outside the remit of the TE:

- Remedy the bugs and errors in the consultative version of the CSN tool as soon as possible so as to a) avoid a loss of momentum inevitable when the Project ends; and b) avoid reducing the size of the target audience who will assess the tool's usefulness to them on their initial one or two visits.

LESSONS LEARNED

152. Lessons learned have been arranged under project-related headings, and cross-referenced back to the paragraph where they appear. Further discussion and key points for future projects have been added in this section. It is important to point out that the WOW Project, together with the Siberian Crane Wetland Project, produced an excellent publication entitled "*The Experience of UNEP GEF and Partners in Flyway Conservation*"¹¹⁶ which discusses the lessons learned at many levels arising from the experience of the two projects. Two of the lessons learned discussed in this section (# 4 and 5) are also treated in that publication, which the reader is encouraged to view.

DESIGN

#1 **Flyway-scale projects should demonstrate management of flyway-scale priorities.** Although many good things have come out from the demonstration projects, connectivity to demonstrate flyway-scale conservation management is not one of them, and this lack of technical or ecological connections between the demonstration projects has significantly reduced their value in a flyway level context. This is in part due to the history of the project's design (originally it was to have been "*Enhancing Conservation of the Critical Network of Wetlands Required by Migratory Waterbirds of the African-European Flyway*", i.e. a site-centred project) and part because the original call for proposals within the project was based on national and not flyway priorities. In addition, it appears that GEF required a more broad-based flyway approach than say a species based one like the Siberian Crane Wetland Project. Nonetheless, the resulting diversity of issues in, and approaches to, the demonstration projects have meant that there is little that can be learned collectively from them and no flyway-scale conservation management insights demonstrated. In the case of WOW, this has been exacerbated by the lack of funds which has significantly curtailed the inter-site study visits foreseen.

See paragraph 137

Key points for future projects:

- If demonstration sites are included as a component of a flyway-scale project, the activities undertaken should attempt to reflect flyway-scale priorities rather than national or local ones. This can be done by addressing key issues by topic, e.g. as the UNDP GEF "Migratory Soaring Birds" project has done, or by linking issues and sites through one or more species, perhaps similar to but less focussed than the Siberian Crane Wetland Project.*
- Links between sites should be made wherever possible through some sort of twinning or similar process through a species common to the sites or through different approaches to common problems. Such links would be particularly useful from an education/awareness-raising viewpoint.*

#2 **The current requirements of GEF funding have perversely formed an obstacle to the logical development of a broad-based (as opposed to species-specific) flyway-scale project.** Within the WOW Project, the logical approach to activities would have been to have developed the CSN tool and then to have used it to identify a number of critical sites in which demonstration projects could have been implemented (and perhaps even training using the new training kit undertaken). Unfortunately, GEF requirements negate this approach since all countries involved in a project have to sign off on the project document at the outset through their respective focal points, which in turn requires details to be elaborated of the aims and activities proposed on each sovereign territory from the outset. This has undoubtedly resulted in a weaker project with missed opportunities, but the solution is not easy to identify. Perhaps GEF could consider phased projects with national governments signing in-principle commitments to be involved if they are selected on scientific grounds at a later stage, so that regional tools are developed in the first phase and demonstrations of their use made in the second phase. The

See paragraph 12

¹¹⁶ UNEP GEF Portfolio Outlook and Evolution: Biodiversity Issue Paper BD/001.

TE recognises that even this “solution” may cause problems for countries in planning their “quota” of GEF projects. It is not within the TE’s expertise to develop a fully operable solution here, rather to draw attention to the issue that GEF’s current mechanism for funding projects, designed originally to meet the requirements of country-specific projects, may need to be reviewed for some flyway-scale projects if they are to become fully effective.

Key points for future projects:

- a) *For flyway-scale projects developing regional tools and support to multilateral environmental agreements, the GEF should consider being flexible over their requirements for approving funding to take account of project logic, thereby increasing effectiveness and relevance of proposed interventions.*

#3 To be effective, demonstration projects must be relevant at the conceptual scale and include a component to “market” the demonstration. The design of most of the demonstration projects effectively assumes that by simply undertaking the project, that in itself will be sufficient to elicit interest and catalyse replication. Such an assumption falls foul of the mousetrap fallacy¹¹⁷, critically in the areas of awareness (if nobody knows you have built a mousetrap, no one will know that there is a path worth beating) and relevance (if people do not have a mouse problem, they do not need a mousetrap). While it is rare to design a demonstration project that is irrelevant to a local (or national) situation, it appears that the WOW project almost fell foul of this in intending to carry out cross-demonstration-project-visits irrespective of their use. Only lack of funding prevented this from occurring. Furthermore, when examined at the flyway-scale, the relevance of the demonstration projects becomes questionable when the concept of what is being demonstrated is considered – a management plan for an estuary in Lithuania has little in common with a management plan for an inland wetland in Niger. The methods for management planning and the diversity of their development to fit local situations is already well known, so are educational awareness techniques that are being demonstrated in Turkey, South Africa, and intended for Tanzania; so what is actually being demonstrated relevant to flyway conservation? Not marketing a demonstration is a much more common flaw and is found in many of the demonstrations (even at a national level), e.g. the Estonian project documents states that “*This project will show how to address the effects of this [political transition], providing a demonstration that will be valuable across this sub-region of AEWA and indeed in any other site in the AEWA area that is confronted by similar issues*” but makes no provision for its communication. In contrast, in Hungary the project has been at pains to convey its messages, holding two technical workshops for fish-farmers and producing a technical publication to promote the adoption of new fish-farming methods by others.

See paragraph 55

Key points for future projects:

- a) *Inclusion of demonstration projects within, or as the major component of, a GEF project should consider and be precise about (i) the scale the demonstration is acting at; (ii) what exactly is being demonstrated; and (iii) how it is intended to market the demonstration to its target audience. Furthermore, in considering (ii), full cognisance should be taken of existing knowledge and what makes the particular demonstration necessary.*

¹¹⁷ “If a man can write a better book, preach a better sermon, or make a better mousetrap, than his neighbour, though he build his house in the woods, the world will make a beaten path to his door” – usually ascribed to Ralph Waldo Emerson it is actually a misquotation of his statement: “If a man has good corn or wood, or boards, or pigs, to sell, or can make better chairs or knives, crucibles or church organs, than anybody else, you will find a broad hard-beaten road to his house, though it be in the woods”.

GOVERNANCE

#4 All projects require an inception period; complex projects require one even more. A number of projects evaluated by the TE¹¹⁸ have demonstrated substantively the benefits of taking time at the outset to make a thorough re-assessment of the situation, even where significant delays have already been incurred in start-up. Having an inception period during which the project team can calmly study the situation, learn lessons from other projects, collect the experience from as many sources as possible, and then start planning the implementation process, has been proven to pay dividends. This is particularly the case where the design history has been long and/or fragmented as with the WOW Project. This period should also be used to re-visit carefully the current legal, policy and institutional conditions and to study the experience accumulated within the country(ies) of activities similar to those that the Project intends to implement. Time should be taken to define and refine the activities from what is commonly a fairly general description in the Project Document, and if necessary to change the indicators to make them more quantitative, and ensure that each can be measured accurately, based wherever possible on a sound scientific approach to provide good feedback through a precise monitoring programme. Such an inception period should be standard procedure, and yet was not undertaken by WOW. Where a project is complex and involves partners with widely differing prior levels of experience of GEF project execution, where management styles and institutional cultures are known to be different (or at least have the potential to be different), and/or where different visions and expectations are likely, an inception period ending with an inception workshop during which a common approach and understanding can be worked out becomes an essential. Had these been instigated at the start of the WOW Project instead of the headlong rush to begin after years of design and delay, most of the issues that caused such immense problems during its implementation could have been avoided.

See paragraph 23

Key points for future projects:

- a) *Do not rush into implementation as soon as possible; ensure there is time to conduct a considered inception period and workshop.*
- b) *Examine precisely what lies behind the often overly-diplomatic and generic language of the Project Document to ascertain exactly what is required during implementation*
- c) *Develop a common approach and understanding between project partners, particularly where there are (likely to be) differences in culture, management style, and experience.*
- d) *Conduct a thorough reality check of the enabling environment (the legal, policy and institutional conditions) at the outset.*
- e) *Revise logframes and M&E systems particularly where the design history has been long and/or fragmented. Such revision should include defining meaningful SMART¹¹⁹ indicators, re-assessing baselines, and updating (or developing) a fully-costed M&E Plan.*
- f) *Raise and resolve the questions that need clarification during the inception workshop.*

#5 In a partnership-executed project, it is important that the chair of the Project Steering Committee is independent from the organisations involved to avoid intimations of bias. The PSC should be a neutral forum in which consensus can be built where expectations and agendas differ. It is clear that significant tensions existed between partners at the outset of WOW and that the PSC under its original chairman failed to deal with these to the satisfaction of all parties. While these tensions have largely subsided, differences of opinion and approach still remain that could have continued to cause the project problems. That they have not is apparently largely due to the unifying efforts of the respected and independent new chairman and to his closer engagement with the project partners and the introduction of a core management team and increased engagement by members of the PSC.

See paragraph 80

¹¹⁸ UNDP-GEF projects “Biodiversity Protection in the North Vidzeme Biosphere Reserve” (Latvia); “Conservation of Tugai Forest and Strengthening Protected Areas System in the Amu Darya Delta of Karakalpakstan”; and “Strengthening Sustainability of the National Protected Area System by Focusing on Strictly Protected Areas” (both Uzbekistan).

¹¹⁹ Specific. Measurable. Achievable and Attributable. Relevant and Realistic. Time-bound, Timely, Trackable, and Targeted.

Key points for future projects:

- a) *The Chair of the PSC should be a figure commanding respect across all executing agencies.*
- b) *The chair of the PSC should be endorsed equally by all executing agencies rather than being championed by one and simply acceptable to the others.*
- c) *The Chair of the PSC should be independent of any other role associated with any of the executing agencies.*

#6 In a complex project involving numerous countries and many partners, an executive decision-making body is a necessity.

And

#7 Complex multi-partner projects require representation of the main partners in the primary management structure. Most large projects find that it is impractical and too costly to have steering committee meetings more than once a year, and yet this remains too infrequent to provide an adequate level of oversight, particularly in in complex and innovative projects in particular, like WOW, where there are significant recurrent advisory and adaptive management needs. Greater engagement is required to provide adequate levels of guidance to management and rapid decision-making when unseen (if not unexpected) problems arise. While modern technology allows for easier communications (e.g. Skype, e-mail), the number of people serving on a steering committee of a complex project is often too great to be properly responsive. Although the idea of an executive committee was turned down by the PSC, the WOW Project still adopted a *de facto* core management group comprising the PCU, the project coordinator from each of the two main contractors, and occasionally the Chair of the PSC, and further supported by greater engagement of the rest of the PSC. Such an executive committee or primary management structure, with representation from all main partners (and preferably agreed by the steering committee) was a sound innovation which has proven its worth in the WOW Project and should be considered worthy of replication in other similar projects in future. A parallel peer review mechanism to provide technical guidance and assess the quality of project deliverables may also be appropriate, perhaps something similar to, but more engaged than, the Regional Training Boards pioneered by WOW.

80 and 107

See paragraphs

Key points for future projects:

- a) *For large and multi-agency executed projects, an executive committee should be elected from the steering committee members to provide responsive support to management in dealing with and resolving problems arising during implementation.*
- b) *Its scope and perhaps terms of reference should be agreed by the steering committee so that conflicts over roles do not arise and the steering committee's primacy in overall project governance is not impinged.*

MANAGEMENT

#8 Experience counts. Implementation of the WOW project involved a number of stakeholders with varying levels of experience in managing projects, and in particular with managing GEF projects with their demanding reporting requirements. While a number of factors were at play during the lifetime of the Project, experience was clearly key in managing complex tasks involving numerous actors in several countries and in difficult financial circumstances and in delivering products and activities on time and within budget. This factor is has been seen time and time again in projects across many countries by the TE. Within WOW, by common consent, inexperienced members struggled throughout. At the demonstration sites, this was also apparent with direct inputs being made to inexperienced managers at critical stages of the projects in Hungary, South Africa, Tanzania and Yemen to achieve good results, where such inputs were accepted. In other cases, experienced managers struggled where support was through inexperienced supervision, in some cases relatively successfully, e.g. Niger (where additional capacity was available through WWF), and in others less so, e.g. Mauritania (where the project manager was effectively on his own).

See paragraph 88

Key points for future projects:

- a) *Ensure that key management roles within projects are staffed by experienced, capable individuals through rigorous selection procedures. To repeat two recommendations the TE*

made on a UNDP-GEF project¹²⁰ in 2007, GEF should consider adding a professional capacity assessment of the proposed executing agency(ies) to the design of all Projects to ensure proficient implementation of the Project on the ground, and close attention should be paid by project design teams to other projects in, or forthcoming to, the portfolio of the proposed executing agency to ensure that there is adequate spare capacity to undertake the proposed project.

- b) Ensure that roles and responsibilities of key staff and partner organisations are clearly defined from the beginning of the project covering coordination, administration, and technical delivery.
- c) Along with the resources generally provided for building the capacity of stakeholders within projects, include within the project design specific resources and activities to build the capacity of implementing bodies in management aspects so as to increase the pool of experience required for managing GEF and other donor-funded projects in the long-term.
- d) Partner organisations should be made aware during the design stage of the extent of resources (both human and financial) necessary to manage a (large) GEF project.
- e) It was suggested at some the demonstration projects that splitting the administration and technical management roles would be helpful, particularly regarding reporting, but the TE cannot see how this would work in reality and therefore recommends that all managers of sub-components of a GEF project have adequate capacity to deal with the management and administrative needs as well as the technical knowledge required. Undoubtedly if funds allow, managers should be provided with administrative support.

#9 Sound application of adaptive management can achieve results in spite of considerable challenges. One of the features of the main WOW Project itself, and of the demonstration site projects, has been the excellence of the adaptive management displayed in overcoming a host of serious challenges ranging from lack of expected co-financing and major differences in agendas between project partners to difference of vision between stakeholders at a local level and significantly changed local contexts between the time of design and implementation. Flexibility in approach, willingness to compromise, and innovativeness have all been demonstrated in bringing the project and its components to completion. The importance of this is clearly evident when comparing say the demonstration projects in Lithuania (which required a complete re-design of its objectives to take account of major changes in the enabling environment) and Hungary (where the major stakeholder needed to be cajoled into changing its original mind-set) with that of Tanzania (where despite rapidly changing external circumstances the original project concept was stuck to stubbornly in spite of contrary advice and which as a result completely failed – notably the only complete failure of any part of the entire project).

See paragraph 90

Key points for future projects:

- a) GEF Implementing Agencies should stress the importance of adaptive management to project management and governance bodies from the outset and provide a supportive environment in which flexibility of approach and innovativeness can be fostered.

FINANCE

#10 Budgeting has to be based on reality, not optimism. Of all of the problems to beset the WOW Project, the shortage of finance was both the most acute and most chronic. Much of this stemmed from optimism during the design – optimism that cuts in the budget enforced by GEF did not necessarily mean reductions in the scale and scope of project activities; optimism that changes in management would not necessarily have cost implications; optimism that co-finance could still be found in spite of signs to the contrary; optimism that “*enthusiasm and commitment*” would see the Project through. Only the latter proved correct – but it still ended up costing large amounts of unattributed in-kind financing from the two lead contractors. At no point after the initial design did anyone take a holistic view of the Project during the review stages to match the revised budget with the activities.

See paragraph 17

¹²⁰ “Conservation of Biodiversity through Integrated Collaborative Management in the Rekawa, Usangoda and Kalametiya Coastal Ecosystems, Sri Lanka”

Key points for future projects:

- a) *All project activities, even the most insignificant, cost money. Budget them accordingly.*
- b) *If the review process involves cutting the budget, ensure there is a corresponding cut in the scope, scale, or number of activities.*

#11 One size does not fit all. The proportion of money spent on management and coordination of a highly complex, multi-scale, multi-country project has to be bigger than on a simpler single country one. This lesson speaks for itself, really. All projects require management and donors like to keep the proportion of funds spent on management to a minimum. This proportion is often fixed to a certain percentage of a project's overall budget. However, projects with similar-sized budgets can often be very different beasts and the complexity of a project needs to be taken account of in determining the amount of management needs.

See paragraph 17

Key points for future projects:

- a) *The 10% cap on management fees should continue to be used as a guide since cost-effectiveness suggests that organisations are much more efficient when spending their own money than when spending someone else's. Furthermore, different organisations have different systems and requirements leading to different cost structures, while many use such management funds to help defray core costs or those for other activities, something not intended by GEF for funding under its strict incremental cost requirements. However, it should be a guide not a rule – the complexity of a project should be taken into consideration when determining its management needs and costs – simple rules do not always apply.*

#12 “In-kind” co-finance is rarely effective and should not be attributed equal value to cash financing. “In-kind” contributions are supposed to be undertakings by Governments and other agencies to commit paid staff full- or part-time to project activities and for their regular posts to be temporarily filled by other personnel – that cost being born as the contribution. In so many projects, this rarely seems to occur – and WOW is no exception where the prime but not sole example is Niger – and no “financial” accounting or auditing of this type of contribution ever seems to be made. Instead of working the hours allocated on the project in lieu of other work for which the in-kind contribution is assessed, all too frequently civil servants (and government agencies are the main culprits of this) are asked to undertake project activities as additions to their regular jobs for the same pay, leading to stress, resentment, poor work, and inadequate time being committed to the job at hand, and resulting in the project suffering through poor delivery, or simply other partners of the project team having to cover for this work and bearing the resultant (unaccounted for) cost.

See paragraph 109

Key points for future projects:

- a) *GEF should work to phase-out the acceptance of “in-kind” financing for projects.*
- b) *If “in-kind” financing remains, a much more rigorous means of accounting for it should be introduced including verifiable paper records comparable with that required for cash.*
- c) *If “in-kind” financing remains, because a project's management does not have complete control over the extent, timing, or quality of its implementation, it should be given a reduced ratio of “worth” when assessing contributions required to meet the co-financing ratio for GEF funding.*

#13 Using a fixed ratio of financing contributions for each aspect of a project should be avoided in future designs. Because of the complexity of the financing arrangements, WOW used a simple ratio system of allocating donor funds to all activities. This did not work. Such a system poses a severe risk to a project's integrity should any one of the sources fail to deliver, since in such a case, e.g. WOW, the lack of money cannot be isolated to a single activity or output, but instead permeates through every aspect thereby threatening the integrity of the whole.

See paragraph 102

Key points for future projects:

- a) *Where possible, co-funding of GEF projects should be allocated to discrete work components whether these be activities or whole outputs or even outcomes; it should not be allocated as a fixed proportion across the entire project, in order to reduce risk.*

- See paragraph 96
- #14 **Countries with developing or weak economies appear to be the most vulnerable to delays between receipt of co-finance pledges and the start of project implementation.** This is a surprising quantifiable result from this TE. It would appear that countries with weaker economies have more difficulty in attracting co-financing for projects, possibly because they lack the internal sources of finance available to richer countries (e.g. local government funds, private sector) and hence it is important to make use of it when it is available – something a long project development cycle does not facilitate. It is possible that the effect seen in WOW is actually coincidental, and more work using figures from other projects would be interesting.

COMMUNICATION

- See paragraph 133
- #15 **In flyway-scale projects, the benefits of the approach need to be understood and be able to be communicated by all concerned.** The TE found a disturbing viewpoint voiced by a number of persons involved in the WOW demonstration projects that site manager's see no need to be involved in a flyway-level approach since as long as they ensure sound management of the site with which they are involved, the flyway will be alright, i.e. if we look after the pennies, the pounds will look after themselves. While in purely site management terms this viewpoint may have some veracity, it a) fails to stress to other stakeholders (owners, economic users, government planners) the importance of the site to a wider system in which countless other persons are involved in conserving, that say a site providing refuge for non-migratory species does not, and b) fails to take advantage of the awareness-raising and education opportunities available for communicating the importance of the flyway system.

Key points for future projects:

- a) *Future flyway-scale projects should ensure through adequate inception procedures that all project personnel understand, and can communicate to others, the key messages central to the project and its context.*

- See paragraph 70
- #16 **In multi-partner projects, an agreed basic communication strategy developed as part of the project design would save much time during, and facilitate efficient delivery of, the project.** Most projects require a communications strategy, and most projects develop this during their lifetime (often not early enough). However, where project proposals involve more than one partner in the proposed implementation process, a basic communications strategy could be agreed during the design phase and submitted as an annex to the proposal, in much the same way that implementation arrangements are sketched out in the text. This would save a lot of time and trouble during the implementation period itself of the sort that was evident in the WOW Project, and facilitate all involved in the partnership in agreeing a common vision and approach.

Key points for future projects:

- a) *For multi-partner projects, develop a basic communications strategy as part of the project design process and include it as an annex in the proposal.*

- See paragraph 70
- #17 **In multi-partner projects, it is important that the Project is developed with its own identity (brand) to ensure that it has its own unique visibility that is more than the sum of its component partners.** Creation of a visual identity is important in getting people to recognise and identify with an idea, a project, or an area of land and cannot be over-stated since this is often at the centre of gaining the respect of governments, communities, landowners and local stakeholders on whose goodwill much of a project's success may lay. This needs to be re-stated at every opportunity to reinforce the brand with the messages it carries and should not be diluted by the use of partners' individual identities which may already be associated by the recipients with other messages.

Key points for future projects:

- a) *Multi-partner projects should agree an identity for the project (and/or partnership) at the beginning and stick to it throughout to reinforce the messages associated with it.*

OTHER

#18 Failure is apparently not an option for a project in which NGOs play a leading role. The implementation of the WOW project may not have gone smoothly having been troubled by significant tensions between project partners, non-appearance of promised co-funding, inexperience in project management requirements by several of the partners, and initially poor performance of the PSC. In most projects that the TE has evaluated, a combination of just two of these elements would have been enough to cause the project to have failed. While it appears that there was indeed a time when the WOW project teetered on the brink, it has ultimately succeeded through the sheer determination and incredible levels of commitment that have been displayed by many of the people involved to whom the project was just too important for failure to be contemplated.

See paragraph 104

Key points for future projects:

- a) *This is an important lesson because, while GEF has been wary about developing NGO-executed projects in the past, the difficulties that may be inherent in such projects are more than compensated for through the levels of commitment to achieve a project's goals that NGOs can inspire. The development of large-scale NGO-executed projects should become a significant part of the GEF portfolio, particularly if the lessons learned from the WOW and the Siberian Crane Wetland Project can be absorbed and acted upon.*
- b) *NGOs should recognise that commitment costs money and should budget projects realistically (see Lesson # 10).*

#19 The positive spin-offs that GEF projects can generate should not be under-estimated by managers and evaluators. The WOW project has generated a number of benefits outside of the logframe that cannot be captured easily within the logframe indicators. Chief amongst these are the development of the WOW Partnership itself, described by one PSC member as the “*most important outcome ... even more than [the development of] the tools*”, and the mobilisation and empowerment of the local people and organisations within many of the demonstration projects. This was evident at all four projects visited where the guides trained in Mauritania indicated that even if they ended up not being able to guide they had learnt French which gave them a voice in representing their communities on a larger stage; in Hungary where the management of Agropoint Ltd. had undergone a significant change in attitude and were now acting as ambassadors for integrated conservation; in Niger where for the first time in the country, a management plan produced largely by the local communities had been adopted into regional planning policy; and in South Africa where support through business development courses have boosted confidence and led people to take charge of their own lives. None of these were the direct intention of the intervention, but all have benefited the actors enormously whether they be organisations such as the WOW Partnership, or individuals whose capacity and self-esteem have risen as a direct result of the Project's interventions, empowering them not only to work towards conservation objectives but to take more control of all aspects of their lives.

See paragraph 138

Key points for future projects:

- a) *Although there is no formal tool or “space” for reporting on project benefits additional to and outside of the intended project products, nevertheless managers and evaluators should make reference to these under whatever headings they feel are appropriate when they are significant.*
- b) *In the WOW Project, the additional benefits that have accrued have undeniably arisen from the fact that demonstration projects and the main partnership concept have come from a bottom-up approach. Designers should note that while such a process is often beset with problems and may take a long time to finalise, such difficulties can be more than outweighed by the additional benefits that can accrue and which thereby can considerably strengthen the sustainability of project outcomes and impacts.*

#20 Producing “stuff” is not inherently good. Projects like to produce stuff; the sheer physicality of something tangible seems to inure the idea that it must be having some positive result because it has been produced. Posters, calendars, brochures, books – authors like to see their name in print, photographers love to see their pictures reproduced; it is basic human nature. But it is not always “good”, there are often alternative ways, more efficacious in achieving results, more effective in terms of cost. WOW has been no exception to this rule – brochures have been produced that have had no discernible effect in advertising the CSN tool while the website has been excellent; the Flyway Training Kit, beautiful as it is, may be the wrong model to achieve the desired result; beautiful information booklets about the Project are unlikely to have been money well-spent. Success occurs when the outcome a project desires is reached. The means of achieving this is the art of good management. Producing stuff is not always the best or most successful means.

See paragraph 136

Key points for future projects:

- a) *Projects should evaluate carefully whether the traditional production of materials is actually the most appropriate or most cost-effective method of achieving their intended aims.*

ADDITIONAL LESSONS

During the TE, the evaluator came across a number of other, largely technical, lessons learned, mainly from presentations. The TE makes no claim that these are from his own work, they are simply included here to ensure that they are captured for posterity.

Technical Lessons Learned from the CSN Tool

- Linking data sources is a technically manageable task
- Maintenance also manageable, but cannot be fully automated when site definition or taxonomy changes:
 - site relationships have to be updated;
 - flyway allocations to be judged for new records;
 - taxonomic changes to be reconciled in all data sources.
- Quality of outputs and progress on implementation depends heavily on input from national IWC and IBA coordinators (checking site boundaries, providing site information, reviewing results), AEW & Ramsar focal points Their contribution was not adequately costed;
- Progress on gap filling and monitoring training surveys has been significantly limited by available funding;
- Securing co-funding and reporting separately on individual contracts have used up significant staff time from project partners that could be allocated to project implementation;
- Uncertainty of co-funding created difficulty for work planning, subcontracting and project implementation

Technical Lessons Learned from the Flyway Training Kit

- (too?) Long a development process
- Importance of regional ownership
- Regionalisation risked to split the product
- Very different needs (e.g. hard and electronic)
- Regional CDO recruitment timing

ANNEX I : TERMINAL EVALUATION TERMS OF REFERENCE

Terminal Independent Evaluation of the UNEP GEF project

UNEP/GEF African-Eurasian Flyways Project: "Enhancing Conservation of the Critical Network of Sites required by Migratory Waterbirds on the African/Eurasian Flyways"

Project Number: GFL-2328-2712-4907

1. PROJECT BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW

Project rationale

Migratory waterbirds and the network of critical sites that they depend on during their life cycles constitute a globally significant biodiversity resource. Within the project area, which comprises the entire African/West Eurasian region, there are over 900 designated Wetlands of International Importance (Ramsar Sites), covering more than 64 million hectares; this is more than half the area currently covered by designated sites globally. Of these sites more than 753 have been identified as being of significance for waterbirds, with potentially many more also fulfilling these criteria but not being designated on this basis. In addition, 2,083 sites in Europe and 586 sites in Africa have been identified as 'shadow' Ramsar Sites under the BirdLife International Important Bird Area (IBA) Programme. There are also thousands more that play important roles in waterbird migrations but do not meet the criteria for designation under the Ramsar Convention. These sites and others across the African-Eurasian region support many important migratory species including 507 populations of 235 species recognised under the African Eurasian Waterbird Agreement (AEWA).

Whilst migratory waterbird species depend on these sites for the completion of their annual cycle, the sites are also essential resources for other animal and plant species. They provide refuge and resources for many species that are both uniquely adapted to living within them or which depend on them for parts of their life cycle. They are also very valuable systems to people. Typically they are highly productive, generating a wealth of products; millions of people are dependent on them for food, building materials and other products. In addition the environmental characteristics of these ecosystems will often deliver services such as flood protection and fresh water.

The overall project outcome will be the enhanced conservation of migratory waterbirds and their critical sites in the African-Eurasian flyways. Activities will be strategic and catalytic in nature addressing the flyway-scale causes of site degradation and related species decline. The network of sites of critical importance to migratory waterbirds will be identified and existing data / information resources improved and linked to create a tool for flyway planning and management. Sub-regional Training and Awareness Raising Programmes will be developed in four sub-regions to provide the basis for individual and institutional capacity development. Best practice management will be catalysed through a number of demonstration projects showcasing approaches and techniques of how to implement an array of wetland management activities in different environmental and social contexts. Communications will be improved to enhance coordination and cooperation in the flyways between and within governments and NGOs.

The project objectives were stated as:

Development Objective: Conservation of globally significant migratory waterbirds and wetlands enhanced in the African – Eurasian flyways

Immediate Objective: Strengthened strategic capacity to plan and manage the conservation of migratory waterbirds and the critical sites along their flyways

Relevance to GEF Programmes

The project document identifies the following GEF Biodiversity Strategic Priorities to be addressed:

- ***I. catalysing sustainability of protected areas*** - A wide range of site-based project initiatives continue to support measures to enhance the long-term sustainability of protected areas at strategic sites located in 12 countries and covering over 17,000 km². Progress on this target is being monitored through the application of the Protected Areas Management Effectiveness Tracking Tool. This effort is supported by capacity building activities at the local, national and regional level;
- ***IV. Generation and dissemination of best practices for addressing current and emerging biodiversity issues*** - The project is supporting an improved communication network across the AEWA region (118 countries in Africa and Eurasia). The dissemination of best practice and analysis of lessons learned from the demonstration projects will also contribute significantly to this objective;
- ***Supporting joint workplans between the CBD and UNEP-AEWA, Convention, UNEP-CMS*** - The project is supporting and/or corroborating the realization of most key implementation priorities of AEWA (and CMS). The workplan of the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands is also being supported through collaborative efforts at national and regional level. Close collaboration is maintained with the above organizations through their participation in the project Steering Committee.

UNEP Programming context

UNEP's role in the GEF is detailed in the "Action Plan on Complementarity between the Activities Undertaken by UNEP under the GEF and its Programme of Work (1999)". This project addresses the Action Plan strategic objective: "...promoting multi-country cooperation directed to achieving global environmental benefits" by establishing international cooperation mechanisms and building capacity for the conservation of a network of globally important wetlands in Africa and Eurasia that are required for the survival of migratory waterbirds including a number of globally endangered species. The project also links to the strategic objective "...relating national and regional priorities to global environmental objectives" by building capacity for flyway conservation at national and sub-regional levels and by directing resources towards project activities that will achieve global benefits (such as conservation of internationally important wetlands and threatened waterbird species).

Executing Arrangements

The project's goal is at the flyway level, however, the project activities that will be executed to achieve this will take place at three scales; flyway, sub-regional and site (demonstration activities). The flyway scale refers to the African-Eurasian Flyway area defined in the AEWA.

The sub-regional scale refers to activities being implemented in defined areas within the flyway area which have lower capacity to conserve migratory waterbirds and wetlands; these are Western (and Central) Africa, Eastern (and Southern) Africa, the Middle East States and Central Asia / the Caucasus States. (Central and Southern Africa are bracketed to indicate that they will be able to benefit from activities but their physical implementation will take place or be planned to take place in Western and Eastern Africa). Arrangements to coordinate, execute and guide activities will be organized accordingly but overall management and coordination will take place at the flyway scale.

The GEF project will be implemented by UNEP (referred to as the project "Implementing Agency"). It will be managed and administered by United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS - referred to as the project "Executing Agency").

A series of contracted organizations and consultants will carry out a range of technical activities within each component. Of these, Wetlands International will be the "Senior Lead Contractor" sharing the majority of these tasks with BirdLife International the "Lead Contractor".

Project Steering Committee: The Project Steering Committee (PSC) will consist of representatives of the main project organizations involved in technical and administrative delivery of the project (Wetlands International, BirdLife International, AEWa, the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands, UNOPS and UNEP). Representatives of selected government agencies such as the German Government will also participate.

The PSC's role will be twofold: a) firstly to guide and oversee the project's technical progress and performance, and b) secondly to coordinate the roles of the organizations they represent and ensure that strategic decision-making therein is made with due consideration of the project's activities and objectives.

Project Coordination Unit: The overall project will be technically coordinated by a small Project Coordination Unit (PCU)¹²¹ recently re-located from the offices of Wetlands International in Wageningen, The Netherlands to the UNEP/AEWa Secretariat in Bonn, Germany. A Chief Technical Advisor and a Junior Operations Manager were originally employed by UNOPS at the onset of the project to run the PCU. Since February 2009, the PCU was downsized to one junior staff member. The PCU will report to the PSC, the UNEP Project Task Manager in UNEP and Portfolio Manager in UNOPS.

Additional staff employed at the flyway scale will not be employed by UNOPS but through a series of contracts with the Lead Contractors. These will specifically include a Capacity Development Officer and two Waterbird Officers (one in each lead Contractor).

Regional Centres: The WOW project is implemented through four Regional Centres located across the African-Eurasian region, which bridge regional activities with field-based work. Each Regional Centre has an established network to encourage multi-country activities within a flyway context. The WOW Regional Centre for Western and Central Africa is located at the Wetlands International Africa Office in Dakar, Senegal, while the Eastern and Southern African region is being covered by the BirdLife Africa Partnership Secretariat in Nairobi, Kenya. The Middle East WOW Regional Centre is being hosted by BirdLife Middle East Division in Amman, Jordan and the Central Asia and Caucasus States are being serviced jointly through the Wetlands International Russia Programme in Moscow and the Association for the Conservation of Biodiversity in Almaty, Kazakhstan.

Sub-Regional Training Boards: Sub-Regional Training Boards will guide and oversee the activities in each of the focal sub-regions relating to the development of the Flyway Training Programme. Funding is earmarked for two years after which it is expected that resource mobilisation for the implementation of the programmes will cover future costs. The Board will be no more than 12 members and its composition will be established through a process of consultation by the sub-regional capacity development officer, but will include representatives from sub-regional governments. These agencies will be requested to commit themselves to development of the programmes and helping to establish and sustain its implementation. The Chair of each Board will be drawn from a sub-regional government agency active in the delivery of wetland and water-bird related training activities. The Chair will also take part in the overall Project Steering Committee, acting as a link between the two Committees. In this way strong participation of government stakeholders in the project will be further reinforced. The role of the Sub-Regional Steering Committees will be to provide advice and guidance on technical activities in the region and to provide linkage with the activities of their respective organisations in the sub-region.

Project Activities

The project is divided into four components¹²² that each have several outcomes and that together form the foundations of a strategic and catalytic approach to flyway conservation. They are presented separately here, but will in reality be executed in an integrated manner with strong linkages between each that will be facilitated by the structures outlined in the Project Implementation Arrangements. Each component is based on a strategy that has been developed based on extensive stakeholder consultation throughout the region during the PDF-B phase.

¹²¹ In February 2009 the Project Coordination Unit was downsized to one junior staff member when the CTA took on a new role at UNEP/DGEF. As per November 2009, the PSC agreed to revise the TORs of the junior staff member to reflect the roles and responsibilities needed to bring the project to a successful closure.

¹²² New Logical Framework structure officially endorsed by the WOW Steering Committee in January 2008

Component 1: Conservation activities strengthened through the development and use of a comprehensive, flyway scale, critical site network planning and management tool. (Critical Site Network Tool)

- Outcome 1.1. The network of critical sites is available as a tool for use by practitioners to underpin planning and management of and catalyse site level activity in, flyway conservation.
- Outcome 1.2. Primary data resources that underpin flyway conservation, planning and management activities enhanced to include all critically important sites in the AEWA region.
- Outcome 1.3. Flyway data gathering and monitoring capacity strengthened to support the updating and maintenance of primary data resources that underpin conservation of the network of critical sites.
- Outcome 1.4. Species and critical site knowledge base supports management and planning decision-making in flyway conservation.

Component 2: Establishing a basis for strengthening decision-making and technical capacity for wetland and migratory waterbird conservation (Flyway Training Programme)

- Outcome 2.1. Transferable model Training and Awareness Raising Programme framework produced for developing wetland and waterbird conservation capacity.
- Outcome 2.2. Wetland and waterbird conservation Training and Awareness Raising Programmes produced ready for implementation in four sub-regions.

Component 3: Improved conservation status at sites critical for waterbirds, and knowledge is generated on how to enhance conservation across the African-Eurasian flyways. (11 demonstration projects in 12 countries)

- Outcome 3.1. Demonstrations of best practice management of migratory waterbirds and wetlands available across the flyway.
- Outcome 3.2 Mechanisms for governments and NGOs to communicate between themselves and with each other strengthened.
- Outcome 3.3. Mechanisms of exchange between and within sub-regions for improved flyway-level migratory waterbird and wetland management established.
- Outcome 3.4: Wise-use of migratory waterbirds and wetlands is better understood and implemented by governments in focal sub-regions.

Component 4: Catalyzing the exchange of information for wetlands and migratory waterbird conservation (Communication and Exchange Component)

Budget

The total allocation of GEF funds (pdf-B included) to UNEP was US\$6,350,000. The project also had a total co-financing commitment from a number of partners (pdf-B included) of US\$6,632,229. The budget can be broken down as follows:

GEF: Project US\$ 6.000.000
PDF US\$ 350.000
Sub-total GEF US\$ 6.350.000

Co-financing

FSP Project

Local Government US\$ 695.080
MEA Organizations US\$ 1.514.079
Bilateral US\$ 1.622.664
NGOs US\$ 1.265.406
Others US\$ 1.098.000
Sub-total for FSP US\$ 6.195.229

PDF

Wetlands International US\$ 150.0003
BirdLife International US\$ 55.0004
Demonstration project NGOs US\$ 21.000

AEWA US\$ 21.000
Ramsar Convention US\$ 21.000
UNEP-CMS US\$ 25.000
Netherlands Government US\$ 65.000
European Community US\$ 40.000
Swiss government US\$ 18.000
Demonstration project governments US\$ 21.000
Sub-total for PDF US\$ 437.000
Sub-total co-financing US\$ 6.632.229

Total Project Value US\$ 12.982.229

TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE EVALUATION

1. Objective and Scope of the Evaluation

The objective of this terminal evaluation is to examine the extent and magnitude of any project impacts to date and determine the likelihood of future impacts. The evaluation will also assess project performance and the implementation of planned project activities and planned outputs against actual results. In addition, the evaluation will review the recommendations of the Mid Term Evaluation (MTE) and the extent to which corrective measures were adopted thereafter to fine-tune project management, relationships and implementation processes.

Specifically, it will focus on the following main questions:

- i) assess the relevance of the project design vis-à-vis the practical conditions encountered during project execution (bearing in mind mitigation measures put in place throughout implementation and the need for adaptive management on some issues and activities);
- ii) assess the appropriateness of the execution means vis-à-vis the project objectives, this should encompass the strengths and weaknesses of the project's management structure, operational mechanisms, and the various partnership arrangements of the project including the management by the main executing agency (including the appropriateness of the execution arrangement in UNOPS);
- iii) review the original strategic aims of the project against available results, while assessing the quality and relevance of all project outputs to date including their use by member countries;
- iv) assess the continued relevance of the expected results, outcomes and objectives to the participating countries;
- v) review the project indicators if these are used appropriately for project monitoring purposes, particularly review the application of the Logical Framework;
- vi) Identify possible replication mechanisms, potentially involving more countries;
- vii) assess the actual management (staff) costs of the PCU, Senior Lead and Lead Contractors over the course of the project, against agreed costs with the GEF during project design so as to gauge the cost-effectiveness of this initiative and management arrangements;
- viii) assess levels of co-financing leveraged during project implementation by relevant stakeholders and partners. The evaluation should take into account any significant changes in the economic situation during project implementation and how this may have affected co-financing;
- ix) assess efforts during project implementation and mechanisms in place to ensure stakeholder ownership, replicability and sustainability of the benefits post-project. In light of efforts taken to create a collaborative programmatic framework agreement for continued cooperation on flyway issues in the African-Eurasian region, the evaluation shall provide recommendations on future flyway-level work and approaches. It should review / consider the UNEP-GEF Biodiversity Issue Paper and provide advice on guiding future actions, while reinforcing the justification for some of the work the project partnerships hopes to carry forward in the future.

2. Methods

This terminal evaluation will be conducted as an in-depth evaluation using a participatory mixed-methods approach, during which the UNEP/DGEF Task Manager, key representatives of the executing agencies and other relevant staff are kept informed and consulted throughout the evaluation. The consultant will liaise with the UNEP Evaluation Office and the UNEP/DGEF Task Manager on any logistic and/or methodological issues to properly conduct the review in as independent a way as possible, given the circumstances and resources offered. The draft report will be delivered to the Evaluation Office and then circulated to UNEP/DGEF Task Manager, key representatives of the executing agencies. Any comments or responses to the draft report will be sent to the UNEP Evaluation Office for collation and the consultant will be advised of any necessary or suggested revisions.

The terminal evaluation of the WOW project will be implemented in the following five phases:

- i) Phase I (approximately 5 working days) will consist of a desk review / preparatory reading of project documents. Most of this information is public domain and can be accessed directly from the project . The consultant will also be provided with a dossier of reports that are not public domain. This phase of the TE could commence as early as February 2010 so as to allow the consultant to get acquainted with the project. The documents to be reviewed include, but are not limited to:
 - (a) The project documents, outputs, consolidated project progress reports, progress reports from both the Senior Lead and Lead contractors, financial reports to UNEP (via UNOPS), and GEF annual Project Implementation Review reports;
 - (b) Final Mid-Term Evaluation (MTE) report and management responses to the MTE;
 - (c) Minutes from the Steering Committee meetings;
 - (d) Review of project-related outputs (primarily the Critical Site Network Tool and Flyway Training Kit) when they become available produced by the project's technical teams;
 - (e) Relevant material published on the WOW website;
 - (f) Final MTE report and management responses and SC direction;
 - (g) Minutes from partners' discussions on a post-project collaborative agreement on the continuation of flyway-scale activities in the African-Eurasian region;
 - (h) Annual newsletters and any impacts realised during project presentations at key international meetings.
- ii) Phase II (approximately 4 working days) will consist of a desk study of all 11 demonstration projects based on an assessment of the original Terms of Reference, actual implementation of activities, progress reports and realised outcomes. Where needed, the consultant may liaise with each project team by e-mail or by telephone. Furthermore, it is expected that several demonstration project managers will attend the final Steering Committee and the consultant will in some instances be able to conduct one-on-one interviews;
- iii) Phase III (approximately 12 working days for all four projects) will be an in-depth review of **four** out of the **eleven** demonstration projects. It is envisaged that the consultant will spend two days in the field at the respective demo site to liaise with relevant project teams. An additional day will be allotted for the production of a detailed assessment report. The consultant is free to select any four demonstration projects to evaluate in detail. However, the Project Coordination Unit recommends that the consultant evaluates the following projects: Estonia, Hungary, South Africa and Niger. These demonstration projects balance geographic considerations, differences in local capacity and institutional oversight issues. The shortlist has been discussed with the respective focal points from the Senior Lead and Lead contractors and was approved by the project Steering Committee in November 2009. This phase of the TE is expected to commence in March 2010 starting with South Africa. A schedule for the four assessments will be drafted in consultation with the evaluator and the local demonstration team;
- iv) Phase IV (approximately 10 working days) will be an in-depth evaluation of regional activities (covering project components 1, 2 & 4) using a participatory approach. The consultant will employ a number of methods including a structured questionnaire and focus group discussions to involve as

many stakeholders as possible. The consultant will first liaise with the UNEP Evaluation Office, the UNEP/DGEF Task Manager and the project's technical staff in the PCU UNOPS. This phase of the TE should be based on the following:

- (a) Consultation with project staff from primary project partners, especially Wetlands International, BirdLife International, UNEP/AEWA Secretariat, Ramsar Convention Bureau and the German Government;
 - (b) Consultation with project Steering Committee members at the last meeting in South Africa (scheduled for March 2010);
 - (c) Telephone interviews with other stakeholders (including NGOs and institutions involved in the implementation of technical activities, as well as regional centres) and the Secretariats of international conventions (i.e. Ramsar) which are participating in the project. As appropriate, these interviews could be combined with an email questionnaire;
 - (d) The Consultant shall determine whether to seek additional information and opinions from representatives of donor agencies, external specialists and other organisations by e-mail or through telephone communication.
- v) Phase V (approximately 2 working days) will consolidated information from the entire evaluation process into a final TE report.

Key Evaluation principles

In attempting to evaluate any outcomes and impacts that the project may have achieved, evaluators should remember that the project's performance should be assessed by considering the difference between the answers to two simple questions "*what happened?*" and "*what would have happened anyway?*". These questions imply that there should be consideration of the baseline conditions and trends in relation to the intended project outcomes and impacts. In addition it implies that there should be plausible evidence to **attribute** such outcomes and impacts **to the actions of the project**.

Sometimes, adequate information on baseline conditions and trends is lacking. In such cases this should be clearly highlighted by the evaluator, along with any simplifying assumptions that were taken to enable the evaluator to make informed judgements about project performance.

3. Project Evaluation Parameters and Ratings

The success of project implementation will be rated on a scale from 'highly unsatisfactory' to 'highly satisfactory'. In particular the evaluation shall **assess and rate** the project with respect to the eleven categories defined below¹²³.

It should be noted that many of the evaluation parameters are interrelated. For example, the 'achievement of objectives and planned results' is closely linked to the issue of 'sustainability'. Sustainability is understood as the probability of continued long-term project-derived outcomes and impacts and is, in turn, linked to the issues of 'catalytic effects / replication' and, often, 'country ownership' and 'stakeholder participation'.

A. Attainment of objectives and planned results:

The evaluation should assess the extent to which the project's major relevant objectives were effectively and efficiently achieved or are expected to be achieved and their relevance.

- *Effectiveness*: Evaluate the **overall likelihood of impact achievement**, taking into account the "achievement indicators", the achievement of outcomes and the progress made towards impacts. UNEP's Evaluation Office advocates the use of the **Review of Outcomes to Impacts (ROtI)** method (described in Annex 7) to establish this rating.
- *Relevance*: In retrospect, were the project's outcomes consistent with the focal areas/operational program strategies? Ascertain the nature and significance of the contribution of the project outcomes to relevant conventions and the wider portfolio of the GEF.

¹²³ However, the views and comments expressed by the evaluator need not be restricted to these items.

- *Efficiency*: Cost-effectiveness assesses the achievement of the environmental and developmental objectives as well as the project's outputs in relation to the inputs, costs, and implementing time. It also examines the project's compliance with the application of the incremental cost concept. The review will assess: Was the project cost effective? Was the project the least cost option? Was the project implementation delayed and if it was, then did that affect cost-effectiveness? Assess the cost-effectiveness of the activities of the project funded by GEF and whether these activities are likely to achieve the goals and objectives within the planned time and budget. Assess the contribution of cash and in-kind co-financing, and any additional resources leveraged by the project, to the project's achievements and to what extent the project leveraged additional resources; Assess the extent the project build on earlier initiatives; did it make effective use of available scientific and / or technical information? Wherever possible, the evaluator should also compare the cost-time vs. outcomes relationship of the project with that of other similar projects. Assess and compare the management (staff) costs of the PCU, Senior Lead and Lead Contractors over the course of the project, against any prior agreements with the GEF during project design. This should be used to gauge the cost-effectiveness of the project's management arrangements. It should answer the questions a) whether the project could have been executed for less, and up to the same standards, under a different arrangement b) whether there has been any comparative advantage with the current management set-up, and c) what management set-up is recommended for future GEF flyway-scale initiatives.

In particular the TE will:

- Evaluate the immediate impact of the project on the countries selected;
- As far as possible, also assess the potential longer-term impacts of the project's interventions.
- Evaluate the relevance and applicability of the UNEP/GEF Issue Paper on the lessons learned from flyway-scale initiatives. The assessment of outcomes, impact and sustainability (see below) should also consider the collaborative framework agreement that is being formulated by project partners for the continuation of flyway-scale activities in the African-Eurasian region.

B. Sustainability:

Sustainability is understood as the probability of continued long-term project-derived outcomes and impacts after the GEF project funding ends. The evaluation will identify and assess the key conditions or factors that are likely to contribute or undermine the persistence of benefits after the project ends. Some of these factors might be outcomes of the project, e.g. stronger institutional capacities or better informed decision-making. Other factors will include contextual circumstances or developments that are not outcomes of the project but that are relevant to the sustainability of outcomes. The evaluation should ascertain to what extent follow-up work has been initiated and how project outcomes will be sustained and enhanced over time. Application of the ROtI method described in Annex 7 will also assist in the evaluation of sustainability.

Five aspects of sustainability should be addressed: financial, socio-political, institutional frameworks and governance, environmental (if applicable). The following questions provide guidance on the assessment of these aspects:

- *Financial resources*. Are there any financial risks that may jeopardize sustenance of project outcomes and onward progress towards impact? What is the likelihood that financial and economic resources will not be available once the GEF assistance ends (resources can be from multiple sources, such as the public and private sectors, income generating activities, and trends that may indicate that it is likely that in future there will be adequate financial resources for sustaining project's outcomes)? To what extent are the outcomes and eventual impact of the project dependent on continued financial support?
- *Socio-political*: Are there any social or political risks that may jeopardize sustenance of project outcomes and onward progress towards impacts? What is the risk that the level of stakeholder ownership will be insufficient to allow for the project outcomes to be sustained? Do the various key stakeholders see that it is in their interest that the project benefits continue to flow? Is there sufficient public / stakeholder awareness in support of the long term objectives of the project?

- *Institutional framework and governance.* To what extent is the sustenance of the outcomes and onward progress towards impacts dependent on issues relating to institutional frameworks and governance? What is the likelihood that institutional and technical achievements, legal frameworks, policies and governance structures and processes will allow for, the project outcomes/benefits to be sustained? While responding to these questions consider if the required systems for accountability and transparency and the required technical know-how are in place.
- *Environmental.* Are there any environmental risks that can undermine the future flow of project environmental benefits? The TE should assess whether certain activities in the project area will pose a threat to the sustainability of the project outcomes. For example; construction of dam in a protected area could inundate a sizable area and thereby neutralize the biodiversity-related gains made by the project; or, a newly established pulp mill might jeopardise the viability of nearby protected forest areas by increasing logging pressures; or a vector control intervention may be made less effective by changes in climate and consequent alterations to the incidence and distribution of malarial mosquitoes. Would these risks apply in other contexts where the project may be replicated?

C. Catalytic Role and Replication

The catalytic role of the GEF is embodied in its approach of supporting the creation an enabling environment, investing in activities which are innovative and show how new approaches and market changes can work, and supporting activities that upscale new approaches to a national (or regional) level to sustainably achieve global environmental benefits. The evaluation should assess whether the project, and in particular the training tools developed, have potential to be replicated, either in terms of expansion, extension or replication in other countries and/or regions and whether any steps have been taken by the project to do so and the relevance and feasibility of these steps.

In general this catalytic approach can be separated into are three broad categories of GEF activities: (1) “**foundational**” and enabling activities, focusing on policy, regulatory frameworks, and national priority setting and relevant capacity (2) **demonstration** activities, which focus on demonstration, capacity development, innovation, and market barrier removal; and **investment** activities, full-size projects with high rates of cofunding, catalyzing investments or implementing a new strategic approach at the national level.

The three categories approach combines all the elements that have been shown to catalyze results in international cooperation. Evaluations in the bilateral and multilateral aid community have shown time and again that activities at the micro level of skills transfer—piloting new technologies and demonstrating new approaches—will fail if these activities are not supported at the institutional or market level as well. Evaluations have also consistently shown that institutional capacity development or market interventions on a larger scale will fail if governmental laws, regulatory frameworks, and policies are not in place to support and sustain these improvements. And they show that demonstration, innovation and market barrier removal do not work if there is no follow up through investment or scaling up of financial means.

(3)

In this context the evaluation should assess

catalytic role played by this project by consideration of the following questions:

- **INCENTIVES:** To what extent have the project activities provided incentives (socio-economic / market based) to contribute to catalyzing changes in stakeholder behaviours?
- **INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE:** To what extent have the project activities contributed to changing institutional behaviors?
- **POLICY CHANGE:** To what extent have project activities contributed to policy changes (and implementation of policy)?
- **CATALYTIC FINANCING:** To what extent did the project contribute to sustained follow-on financing from Government and / or other donors? (this is different from co-financing)
- **PROJECT CHAMPIONS:** To what extent have changes (listed above) been catalyzed by particular individuals or institutions (without which the project would not have achieved results)?

(Note: the ROtI analysis should contribute useful information to address these questions)

the

Replication approach, in the context of GEF projects, is defined as lessons and experiences coming out of the project that are replicated or scaled up in the design and implementation of other projects. Replication can have two aspects, replication proper (lessons and experiences are replicated in

different geographic area) or scaling up (lessons and experiences are replicated within the same geographic area but funded by other sources).

Is the project suitable for replication? If so, has the project approach been replicated? If no effects are identified, the evaluation will describe the strategy / approach adopted by the project to promote replication effects.

D. Stakeholder participation / public awareness:

This consists of three related and often overlapping processes: information dissemination, consultation, and “stakeholder” participation. Stakeholders are the individuals, groups, institutions, or other bodies that have an interest or stake in the outcome of the GEF- financed project. The term also applies to those potentially adversely affected by a project. The evaluation will specifically:

- Assess the mechanisms put in place by the project for identification and engagement of stakeholders in each participating country and establish, in consultation with the stakeholders, whether this mechanism was successful, and identify its strengths and weaknesses.
- Assess the degree and effectiveness of collaboration/interactions between the various project partners and institutions during the course of implementation of the project.
- Assess the degree and effectiveness of any various public awareness activities that were undertaken during the course of implementation of the project. Have all publications funded with GEF support been technically and scientifically vetted before publication and accredited to UNEP and GEF?

E. Country ownership / driven-ness:

This is the relevance of the project to national development and environmental agendas, recipient country commitment, and regional and international agreements. The evaluation will:

- Assess the level of country ownership. Specifically, the evaluator should assess whether the project was effective in providing and communicating information on migratory waterbirds and their critical sites that catalyzed action in participating countries to improve decisions relating to the conservation of the waterbirds and planning and management of flyways in each country.
- Assess the level of country commitment to the generation and use of research related to migratory waterbirds and their critical sites during and after the project, including in regional and international fora.

F. Achievement of outputs and activities:

Delivered outputs: Assessment of the project’s success in producing each of the programmed outputs, both in quantity and quality as well as usefulness and timeliness. Especially the TE will;

- Assess if the project has delivered on all aspects of the workplan (bearing in mind adaptive management and mitigation measures)?
- Assess the usefulness and technical capabilities of the Critical Site Network Tool and determine the extent to which its development was a) executed in a participatory and consultative manner b) driven by the needs of end users c) scientifically sound, and d) user friendly;
- Assess the Flyway Training Kit as a capacity building resource and suggest any possible improvements for their future implementation;
- Determine the extent to which scientific and technical information and knowledge have been incorporated within, and have influenced the execution of the communications component of the project.

G. Preparation and Readiness

Were the project’s objectives and components clear, practicable and feasible within its timeframe? Were the capacities of executing institution and counterparts properly considered when the project was designed? Were lessons from other relevant projects properly incorporated in the project design? Were the partnership arrangements properly identified and the roles and responsibilities negotiated prior to project implementation? Were counterpart resources (funding, staff, and facilities), enabling legislation, and adequate project management arrangements in place?

H. Assessment monitoring and evaluation systems.

The evaluation shall include an assessment of the quality, application and effectiveness of project monitoring and evaluation plans and tools, including an assessment of risk management based on the assumptions and risks identified in the project document. The Terminal Evaluation will assess whether the project met the minimum requirements for 'project design of M&E' and 'the application of the Project M&E plan' (see minimum requirements 1&2 in Annex 4). GEF projects must budget adequately for execution of the M&E plan, and provide adequate resources during implementation of the M&E plan. Project managers are also expected to use the information generated by the M&E system during project implementation to adapt and improve the project.

I. Implementation approach:

This includes an analysis of the project's management framework, adaptation to changing conditions (adaptive management), partnerships in implementation arrangements, changes in project design, and overall project management. The review will assess the efficiency of project organisation and management with respect to its size and composition, organisational structure, personnel management and policy, the qualifications of local staff and consultants. The evaluation will:

- Ascertain to what extent the project implementation mechanisms outlined in the project document have been closely followed. In particular, assess the role of the various committees established and whether the project document was clear and realistic to enable effective and efficient implementation, whether the project was executed according to the plan and how well the management was able to adapt to changes during the life of the project to enable the implementation of the project.
- Assess the extent to which the project responded the mid term review / evaluation (if any).
- Evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency and adaptability of project management and the supervision of project activities / project execution arrangements at all levels (1) policy decisions: Steering Group; (2) day to day project management in each of the country executing agencies.
- Identify administrative, operational and/or technical problems and constraints that influenced the effective implementation of the project.
- Assess whether the logical framework was used during implementation as a management tool and whether feedback from M&E activities more broadly was used for adaptive management.
- The evaluator will examine risk assessments included in the annual Project Implementation Review (PIR). Any major variances between the PIR risk assessment and the consultant's assessment of the risks (Annex 6) the project encountered will be presented and discussed.

J. M&E during project implementation

- *M&E design.* Projects should have sound M&E plans to monitor results and track progress towards achieving project objectives. An M&E plan should include a baseline (including data, methodology, etc.), SMART indicators (see Annex 4) and data analysis systems, and evaluation studies at specific times to assess results. The time frame for various M&E activities and standards for outputs should have been specified.

The evaluator should use the following questions to help assess the M&E design aspects:

SMART-ness of Indicators

- Are there specific indicators in the log frame for each of the project objectives and outcomes?
- Are the indicators relevant to the objectives and outcomes?
- Are the indicators for the objectives and outcomes sufficient?
- Are the indicators quantifiable?

Adequacy of Baseline Information

- Is there baseline information?
- Has the methodology for the baseline data collection been explained?
- Is desired level of achievement for indicators based on a reasoned estimate of baseline?

Arrangements for Monitoring of Implementation

- Has a budget been allocated for M&E activities?
- Have the responsibility centers for M&E activities been clearly defined?
- Has the time frame for M&E activities been specified?

Arrangements for Evaluation

- Have specific targets been specified for project outputs?
- Has the desired level of achievement been specified for all Indicators of Objectives and Outcomes?
- *M&E plan implementation.* A Terminal Evaluation should verify that:
 - an M&E system was in place and facilitated timely tracking of results and progress towards projects objectives throughout the project implementation period (perhaps through use of a logframe or similar);
 - annual project reports and Progress Implementation Review (PIR) reports were complete, accurate and with well justified ratings;
 - that the information provided by the M&E system was used during the project to improve project performance and to adapt to changing needs;
 - and that projects had an M&E system in place with proper training for parties responsible for M&E activities.
 - Has the project completed the GEF Biodiversity Tracking Tools in accordance with requirements? (i.e. (i) at project inception, (ii) at mid term.
- *Budgeting and Funding for M&E activities.* The terminal evaluation should determine whether support for M&E was budgeted adequately and was funded in a timely fashion during implementation.

The review will consider the effectiveness of the M&E system (in defining performance indicators and collecting and analysing monitoring data on project progress) and follow-up on primary stakeholders' reactions to project activities. Is the project using 'results-based' management approaches?

- The review shall include an assessment of the quality, application and effectiveness of project monitoring and evaluation plans and tools, including an assessment of risk management based on the assumptions and risks identified in the project document. The review shall comment on how the monitoring mechanisms have been employed throughout the project's lifetime, whether this allowed for tracking of progress towards project objectives and how the project responded to the challenges identified through these mechanisms. The tools used might include a baseline, clear and practical indicators and data analysis systems, or studies to assess results that were planned and carried out at specific times in the project.

K. Financial Planning

Evaluation of financial planning requires assessment of the quality and effectiveness of financial planning and control of financial resources throughout the project's lifetime. Evaluation includes actual project costs by activities compared to budget (variances), financial management (including disbursement issues), and co- financing. The review should assess whether the use of project funds is commensurate with the attainment of physical progress, efficacy and the timeliness of procurement and disbursement activities. The review should also assess the executing agency's use of GEF funds specifically for project activities as opposed to work conducted with their regular budgetary support.

The evaluation should:

- Assess the strength and utility of financial controls, including reporting, and planning to allow the project management to make informed decisions regarding the budget and allow for a proper and timely flow of funds for the payment of satisfactory project deliverables.
- Present the major findings from the financial audit if one has been conducted.

- Identify and verify the sources of co- financing as well as leveraged and associated financing (in co-operation with the IA and EA).
- Assess whether the project has applied appropriate standards of due diligence in the management of funds and financial audits.
- The evaluation should also include a breakdown of final actual costs and co-financing for the project prepared in consultation with the relevant UNEP Fund Management Officer of the project (table attached in Annex 2 Co-financing and leveraged resources).

L. **UNEP Supervision and Backstopping**

The purpose of supervision is to work with the executing agency in identifying and dealing with problems which arise during implementation of the project itself. Such problems may be related to project management but may also involve technical/substantive issues in which UNEP has a major contribution to make. The evaluator should assess the effectiveness of supervision and administrative and financial support provided by UNEP/DGEF including:

- the adequacy of project supervision plans, inputs and processes;
- the emphasis given to outcome monitoring (results-based project management);
- the realism / candor of project reporting and rating (i.e. are PIR ratings an accurate reflection of the project realities and risks);
- the quality of documentation of project supervision activities; and
- financial, administrative and other fiduciary aspects of project implementation supervision.

In summary, accountability and implementation support through technical assistance and problem solving are the main elements of project supervision (Annex 5).

M. **Complementarity with UNEP Medium Term Strategy and Programme of Work**

UNEP aims to undertake GEF funded projects that are aligned with its strategy. Whilst it is recognised that UNEP GEF projects designed prior to the production of the UNEP Medium Term Strategy (MTS)¹²⁴ / Programme of Work (POW) 2010/11 would not necessarily be aligned with the Expected Accomplishments articulated in those documents, complementarity may exist nevertheless. For this reason, the complementarity of GEF projects with UNEP's MTS / POW will not be formally rated, however, the evaluation should present a brief narrative to cover the following issues:

- *Linkage to UNEP's Expected Accomplishments.* The UNEP Medium Term Strategy specifies desired results in six thematic focal areas. The desired results are termed Expected Accomplishments. Using the completed ROtI analysis, the evaluation should comment on whether the project makes a tangible contribution to any of the Expected Accomplishments specified in the UNEP MTS. The magnitude and extent any contributions, and the causal linkages should be fully described.
- *Project contributions that are in-line with the Bali Strategic Plan (BSP)*¹²⁵. The outcomes and achievements of the project should be briefly discussed in relation to the objectives of the UNEP BSP.
- *South-South Cooperation* is regarded as the exchange of resources, technology, and knowledge between developing countries. Briefly describe any aspects of the project that could be considered as examples of South-South Cooperation.

The **ratings for the parameters A - K will be presented in the form of a table**. Each of the eleven categories should be rated separately with **brief justifications** based on the findings of the main analysis. An overall rating for the project should also be given. The following rating system is to be applied:

HS = Highly Satisfactory
 S = Satisfactory
 MS = Moderately Satisfactory

¹²⁴ <http://www.unep.org/PDF/FinalMTSGCSS-X-8.pdf>

¹²⁵ <http://www.unep.org/GC/GC23/documents/GC23-6-add-1.pdf>

- MU = Moderately Unsatisfactory
 U = Unsatisfactory
 HU = Highly Unsatisfactory

4. Evaluation Report Format and Review Procedures

The report should be brief, to the point and easy to understand. It must explain; the purpose of the evaluation, exactly what was evaluated and the methods used. The report must highlight any methodological limitations, identify key concerns and present evidence-based findings, consequent conclusions, recommendations and lessons. The report should be presented in a way that makes the information accessible and comprehensible and include an executive summary that encapsulates the essence of the information contained in the report to facilitate dissemination and distillation of lessons.

The evaluation will rate the overall implementation success of the project and provide individual ratings of the eleven implementation aspects as described in Section 1 of this TOR. *The ratings will be presented in the format of a table with brief justifications based on the findings of the main analysis.*

Evidence, findings, conclusions and recommendations should be presented in a complete and balanced manner. Any dissident views in response to evaluation findings will be appended in an annex. The evaluation report shall be written in English, be of no more than 50 pages (excluding annexes), use numbered paragraphs and include:

- i) An **executive summary** (no more than 3 pages) providing a brief overview of the main conclusions and recommendations of the evaluation;
- ii) **Introduction and background** giving a brief overview of the evaluated project, for example, the objective and status of activities; The GEF Monitoring and Evaluation Policy, 2006, requires that a TE report will provide summary information on when the evaluation took place; places visited; who was involved; the key questions; and, the methodology.
- iii) **Scope, objective and methods** presenting the evaluation's purpose, the evaluation criteria used and questions to be addressed;
- iv) **Project Performance and Impact** providing *factual evidence* relevant to the questions asked by the evaluator and interpretations of such evidence. This is the main substantive section of the report. The evaluator should provide a commentary and analysis on all eleven evaluation aspects (A – K above).
- v) **Conclusions and rating** of project implementation success giving the evaluator's concluding assessments and ratings of the project against given evaluation criteria and standards of performance. The conclusions should provide answers to questions about whether the project is considered good or bad, and whether the results are considered positive or negative. The ratings should be provided with a brief narrative comment in a table (see Annex 1);
- vi) **Lessons (to be) learned** presenting general conclusions from the standpoint of the design and implementation of the project, based on good practices and successes or problems and mistakes. Lessons should have the potential for wider application and use. All lessons should 'stand alone' and should:
 - Briefly describe the context from which they are derived
 - State or imply some prescriptive action;
 - Specify the contexts in which they may be applied (if possible, who when and where)
- vii) **Recommendations** suggesting *actionable* proposals for improvement of the current project. In general, Terminal Evaluations are likely to have very few (perhaps two or three) actionable recommendations.

Prior to each recommendation, the issue(s) or problem(s) to be addressed by the recommendation should be clearly stated.

A high quality recommendation is an actionable proposal that is:

1. Feasible to implement within the timeframe and resources available

2. Commensurate with the available capacities of project team and partners
3. Specific in terms of who would do what and when
4. Contains results-based language (i.e. a measurable performance target)
5. Includes a trade-off analysis, when its implementation may require utilizing significant resources that would otherwise be used for other project purposes.

viii) **Annexes** may include additional material deemed relevant by the evaluator but must include:

1. The Evaluation Terms of Reference,
2. A list of interviewees, and evaluation timeline
3. A list of documents reviewed / consulted
4. Summary co-finance information and a statement of project expenditure by activity
5. Details of the project's 'impact pathways' and the 'ROTI' analysis
6. The expertise of the evaluation team. (brief CV).

TE reports will also include any formal response / comments from the project management team and/or the country focal point regarding the evaluation findings or conclusions as an annex to the report, however, such will be appended to the report by UNEP Evaluation Office.

Examples of UNEP GEF Terminal Evaluation Reports are available at www.unep.org/eou

Review of the Draft Evaluation Report

Draft reports submitted to UNEP Evaluation Office are shared with the corresponding Programme or Project Officer and his or her supervisor for initial review and consultation. The DGEF staff and senior Executing Agency staff are allowed to comment on the draft evaluation report. They may provide feedback on any errors of fact and may highlight the significance of such errors in any conclusions. Where, possible, a consultation is held between the evaluator, Evaluation Office Staff, the Task Manager and key members of the project execution team. The consultation seeks feedback on the proposed recommendations and lessons. UNEP Evaluation Office collates all review comments and provides them to the evaluator(s) for their consideration in preparing the final version of the report.

5. Submission of Final Terminal Evaluation Reports.

The final report shall be submitted in electronic form in MS Word format and should be sent to the following persons:

Segbedzi Norgbey, Chief,
 UNEP Evaluation Office
 P.O. Box 30552-00100
 Nairobi, Kenya
 Tel.: (254-20) 7623387
 Fax: (254-20) 7623158
 Email: segbedzi.norgbey@unep.org

With a copy to:

Maryam Niamir-Fuller, Director
 UNEP/Division of GEF Coordination
 P.O. Box 30552-00100
 Nairobi, Kenya
 Tel: + 254-20-7624686
 Fax: + 254-20-623158/4042
 Email: Maryam.Niamir-Fuller@unep.org

Edoardo Zandri

UNEP/GEF Task Manager, Biodiversity & Natural Resources
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)
Division of GEF Coordination (DGEF)
PO Box 30552
Nairobi, Kenya
Tel: +254 20 7624380
Fax: +254 20 7624041/2
Email: Edoardo.Zandri@unep.org

Mr. Bahaa Al-Asad
Head of Programme
UNOPS AFO KEOC
Nairobi, Kenya
Tel: +254 (0) 20 762 1153
Email: BahaaA@unops.org

The final evaluation report will be published on the Evaluation Office website www.unep.org/eou and may be printed in hard copy. Subsequently, the report will be sent to the GEF Office of Evaluation for their review, appraisal and inclusion on the GEF website.

6. Resources and Schedule of the Evaluation

This terminal evaluation will be undertaken by an international evaluator contracted by the UNEP Evaluation Office. The TE will be conducted in five phases spread over a ten-month period.

- Phase I (approximately 10 working days) will consist of a desk review / preparatory reading of relevant project documentation and attendance at the Steering Committee meeting in South Africa starting March 8th 2010;
- Phase II (approximately 4 working days) will consist of a desk study of all 11 demonstration projects;
- Phase III (approximately 12 working days) will be an in-depth review (field visit) of four out of the eleven demonstration projects; South Africa, Hungary, Estonia and Niger. Possible timing of these missions could be:
 - 1) South Africa: week of 15 March (immediately following the SC / team meeting)
 - 2) Estonia: last week in March
 - 3) Hungary: mid-April
 - 4) Niger: late April
- Phase IV (approximately 10 working days) will be an in-depth evaluation of regional activities (covering project components 1, 2 & 4) using a participatory approach;
- Phase V (approximately 2 working days) will pull together information from the entire evaluation process into a final consolidated TE report.

The contract for the evaluator will begin on 20th of February 2010 and end on December 10th 2010 (33 days spread over 10 months (12 days of travel to Estonia, Hungary, South Africa and Niger, and 21 days desk study). The evaluator will submit:

- a) An inception report covering evaluation phases I and II (31st May 2010)
- b) A brief lessons learned document covering the demonstration site visits (31st May 2010)
- c) A consolidated Terminal Evaluation report covering all evaluation phases

Note the final evaluation report is scheduled for delivery much later than the initial field visits to allow time for the project to complete implementation and produce the final outputs (such as the Critical Site Network tool). The demonstration site visits are scheduled earlier as some of the project operations at the sites will be completed earlier in 2010.

The evaluator will submit a draft consolidated evaluation report on 22nd November 2010 to UNEP's Evaluation Office, which, in turn will circulate the report to the UNEP/DGEF Task Manager, and key representatives of the executing agencies. Any comments or responses to the draft report will be sent to the Evaluation Office for collation and the consultant will be advised of any necessary revisions. Comments to the final draft report will be sent to the consultant by 6th December 2010 after which, the consultant will submit the final report no later than 10th December 2010.

The evaluator will after an initial telephone briefing with the staff of the UNEP Evaluation Office and UNEP/GEF Task Manager conduct initial desk review and then travel to South Africa for the final project steering committee meeting at the beginning of the evaluation. Furthermore, the evaluator is expected to travel to the demonstration sites in Estonia, Hungary, South Africa and Niger and meet with representatives of the project executing agencies and the intended users of project's outputs.

In accordance with the evaluation policies of UNEP and the GEF, all GEF projects are evaluated by independently contracted evaluators. The evaluator should have the following qualifications:

The evaluator should not have been associated with the design and implementation of the project in a paid capacity. The evaluator will work under the overall supervision of the Chief, Evaluation Office, UNEP. The evaluator should be an international expert in biodiversity management and conservation with a sound understanding of migratory waterbirds and their flyways. The consultant should have the following minimum qualifications: (i) experience in international biodiversity, wetlands and migratory waterbird issues; (ii) experience with management and implementation of research projects and in particular with research targeted at policy-influence and decision-making; (iii) experience with project evaluation. Knowledge of UNEP programmes and GEF activities is desirable. Fluency in oral and written English is a must.

7. Schedule Of Payment

The consultant shall select one of the following two contract options:

Lump-Sum Option

The evaluator will receive an initial payment of 30% of the total amount due upon signature of the contract. A further 30% will be paid upon submission of the draft report. A final payment of 40% will be made upon satisfactory completion of work. The fee is payable under the individual Special Service Agreement (SSA) of the evaluator and **is inclusive** of all expenses such as travel, accommodation and incidental expenses.

Fee-only Option

The evaluator will receive an initial payment of 40% of the total amount due upon signature of the contract. Final payment of 60% will be made upon satisfactory completion of work. The fee is payable under the individual SSAs of the evaluator and is **NOT** inclusive of all expenses such as travel, accommodation and incidental expenses. Ticket and DSA will be paid separately.

In case, the evaluator cannot provide the products in accordance with the TORs, the timeframe agreed, or his products are substandard, the payment to the evaluator could be withheld, until such a time the products are modified to meet UNEP's standard. In case the evaluator fails to submit a satisfactory final product to UNEP, the product prepared by the evaluator may not constitute the evaluation report.

Annex 1. OVERALL RATINGS TABLE

Criterion	Evaluator's Summary Comments	Evaluator's Rating
A. Attainment of project objectives and results (overall rating) Sub criteria (below)		
A. 1. Effectiveness - overall likelihood of impact achievement (ROtI rating)		
A. 2. Relevance		
A. 3. Efficiency		
B. Sustainability of Project outcomes (overall rating) Sub criteria (below)		
B. 1. Financial		
B. 2. Socio Political		
B. 3. Institutional framework and governance		
B. 4. Environmental		
C. Catalytic Role		
D. Stakeholders involvement		
E. Country ownership / drivenness		
F. Achievement of outputs and activities		
G. Preparation and readiness		
H. Implementation approach		
I. Financial planning		
J. Monitoring and Evaluation (overall rating) Sub criteria (below)		
E. 1. M&E Design		
E. 2. M&E Plan Implementation (use for adaptive management)		
E. 3. Budgeting and Funding for M&E activities		
K. UNEP Supervision and backstopping		

RATING OF PROJECT OBJECTIVES AND RESULTS

Highly Satisfactory (HS): The project had no shortcomings in the achievement of its objectives, in terms of relevance, effectiveness or efficiency.

Satisfactory (S): The project had minor shortcomings in the achievement of its objectives, in terms of relevance, effectiveness or efficiency.

Moderately Satisfactory (MS): The project had moderate shortcomings in the achievement of its objectives, in terms of relevance, effectiveness or efficiency.

Moderately Unsatisfactory (MU): The project had significant shortcomings in the achievement of its objectives, in terms of relevance, effectiveness or efficiency.

Unsatisfactory (U) The project had major shortcomings in the achievement of its objectives, in terms of relevance, effectiveness or efficiency.

Highly Unsatisfactory (HU): The project had severe shortcomings in the achievement of its objectives, in terms of relevance, effectiveness or efficiency.

Please note: Relevance and effectiveness will be considered as critical criteria. The overall rating of the project for achievement of objectives and results **may not be higher** than the lowest rating on either of these two criteria. Thus, to have an overall satisfactory rating for outcomes a project must have at least satisfactory ratings on both relevance and effectiveness.

RATINGS ON SUSTAINABILITY

- A. Sustainability will be understood as the probability of continued long-term outcomes and impacts after the GEF project funding ends. The Terminal evaluation will identify and assess the key conditions or factors that are likely to contribute or undermine the persistence of benefits after the project ends. Some of these factors might be outcomes of the project, i.e. stronger institutional capacities, legal frameworks, socio-economic incentives /or public awareness. Other factors will include contextual circumstances or developments that are not outcomes of the project but that are relevant to the sustainability of outcomes..

Rating system for sustainability sub-criteria

On each of the dimensions of sustainability of the project outcomes will be rated as follows.

Likely (L): There are no risks affecting this dimension of sustainability.

Moderately Likely (ML). There are moderate risks that affect this dimension of sustainability.

Moderately Unlikely (MU): There are significant risks that affect this dimension of sustainability

Unlikely (U): There are severe risks that affect this dimension of sustainability.

According to the GEF Office of Evaluation, all the risk dimensions of sustainability are deemed critical. Therefore, overall rating for sustainability will not be higher than the rating of the dimension with lowest ratings. For example, if a project has an Unlikely rating in any of the dimensions then its overall rating cannot be higher than Unlikely, regardless of whether higher ratings in other dimensions of sustainability produce a higher average.

RATINGS OF PROJECT M&E

Monitoring is a continuing function that uses systematic collection of data on specified indicators to provide management and the main stakeholders of an ongoing project with indications of the extent of progress and achievement of objectives and progress in the use of allocated funds. Evaluation is the systematic and objective assessment of an on-going or completed project, its design, implementation and results. Project evaluation may involve the definition of appropriate standards, the examination of performance against those standards, and an assessment of actual and expected results.

The Project monitoring and evaluation system will be rated on ‘M&E Design’, ‘M&E Plan Implementation’ and ‘Budgeting and Funding for M&E activities’ as follows:

Highly Satisfactory (HS): There were no shortcomings in the project M&E system.

Satisfactory(S): There were minor shortcomings in the project M&E system.

Moderately Satisfactory (MS): There were moderate shortcomings in the project M&E system.

Moderately Unsatisfactory (MU): There were significant shortcomings in the project M&E system.

Unsatisfactory (U): There were major shortcomings in the project M&E system.

Highly Unsatisfactory (HU): The Project had no M&E system.

“M&E plan implementation” will be considered a critical parameter for the overall assessment of the M&E system. The overall rating for the M&E systems will not be higher than the rating on “M&E plan implementation.”

All other ratings will be on the GEF six point scale.

GEF Performance Description
HS = Highly Satisfactory
S = Satisfactory
MS = Moderately Satisfactory
MU = Moderately Unsatisfactory
U = Unsatisfactory
HU = Highly Unsatisfactory

Annex 2. Co-financing and Leveraged Resources

Co-financing (basic data to be supplied to the consultant for verification)

Co financing (Type/Source)	IA own Financing (mill US\$)		Government (mill US\$)		Other* (mill US\$)		Total (mill US\$)		Total Disbursement (mill US\$)	
	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual
- Grants										
- Loans/Concessional (compared to market rate)										
- Credits										
- Equity investments										
- In-kind support										
- Other (*)										
-										
--										
Totals										

* Other is referred to contributions mobilized for the project from other multilateral agencies, bilateral development cooperation agencies, NGOs, the private sector and beneficiaries.

Leveraged Resources

Leveraged resources are additional resources—beyond those committed to the project itself at the time of approval—that are mobilized later as a direct result of the project. Leveraged resources can be financial or in-kind and they may be from other donors, NGO's, foundations, governments, communities or the private sector. Please briefly describe the resources the project has leveraged since inception and indicate how these resources are contributing to the project's ultimate objective.

Table showing final actual project expenditure by activity to be supplied by the UNEP Fund management Officer. (insert here)

Annex 3. Review of the Draft Report

Draft reports submitted to the UNEP Evaluation Office are shared with the corresponding Programme or Project Officer and his or her supervisor for initial review and consultation. The DGEF staff and senior Executing Agency staff provide comments on the draft evaluation report. They may provide feedback on any errors of fact and may highlight the significance of such errors in any conclusions. The consultation also seeks agreement on the findings and recommendations. UNEP Evaluation Office collates the review comments and provides them to the evaluators for their consideration in preparing the final version of the report. General comments on the draft report with respect to compliance with these TOR are shared with the reviewer.

Quality Assessment of the Evaluation Report

All UNEP Evaluation reports are subject to quality assessments by the Evaluation Office. These are used as a tool for providing structured feedback to the evaluator.

The quality of the draft evaluation report is assessed and rated against the following criteria:

GEF Report Quality Criteria	UNEP EO Assessment	Rating
A. Did the report present an assessment of relevant outcomes and achievement of project objectives in the context of the focal area program indicators if applicable?		
B. Was the report consistent and the evidence complete and convincing and were the ratings substantiated when used?		
C. Did the report present a sound assessment of sustainability of outcomes?		
D. Were the lessons and recommendations supported by the evidence presented?		
E. Did the report include the actual project costs (total and per activity) and actual co-financing used?		
F. Did the report include an assessment of the quality of the project M&E system and its use for project management?		
UNEP additional Report Quality Criteria	UNEP EO Assessment	Rating
G. Quality of the lessons: Were lessons readily applicable in other contexts? Did they suggest prescriptive action?		
H. Quality of the recommendations: Did recommendations specify the actions necessary to correct existing conditions or improve operations ('who?' 'what?' 'where?' 'when?'). Can they be implemented? Did the recommendations specify a goal and an associated performance indicator?		
I. Was the report well written? (clear English language and grammar)		
J. Did the report structure follow EOU guidelines, were all requested Annexes included?		
K. Were all evaluation aspects specified in the TORs adequately addressed?		
L. Was the report delivered in a timely manner		

$$\text{Quality} = (2*(0.3*(A + B) + 0.1*(C+D+E+F)) + 0.3*(G + H) + 0.1*(I+J+K+L))/3$$

The Totals are rounded and converted to the scale of HS to HU

Rating system for quality of terminal evaluation reports

A number rating 1-6 is used for each criterion: Highly Satisfactory = 6, Satisfactory = 5, Moderately Satisfactory = 4, Moderately Unsatisfactory = 3, Unsatisfactory = 2, Highly Unsatisfactory = 1, and unable to assess = 0.

Annex 4: Minimum requirements for M&E

Minimum Requirement 1: Project Design of M&E¹²⁶

All projects must include a concrete and fully budgeted monitoring and evaluation plan by the time of Work Program entry (full-sized projects) or CEO approval (medium-sized projects). This plan must contain at a minimum:

- SMART (see below) indicators for project implementation, or, if no indicators are identified, an alternative plan for monitoring that will deliver reliable and valid information to management
- SMART indicators for results (outcomes and, if applicable, impacts), and, where appropriate, corporate-level indicators
- A project baseline, with:
 - a description of the problem to address
 - indicator data
 - or, if major baseline indicators are not identified, an alternative plan for addressing this within one year of implementation
- An M&E Plan with identification of reviews and evaluations which will be undertaken, such as mid-term reviews or evaluations of activities
- An organizational setup and budgets for monitoring and evaluation.

Minimum Requirement 2: Application of Project M&E

- Project monitoring and supervision will include implementation of the M&E plan, comprising:
- Use of SMART indicators for implementation (or provision of a reasonable explanation if not used)
- Use of SMART indicators for results (or provision of a reasonable explanation if not used)
- Fully established baseline for the project and data compiled to review progress
- Evaluations are undertaken as planned
- Operational organizational setup for M&E and budgets spent as planned.

SMART INDICATORS GEF projects and programs should monitor using relevant performance indicators. The monitoring system should be “SMART”:

1. **Specific:** The system captures the essence of the desired result by clearly and directly relating to achieving an objective, and only that objective.
2. **Measurable:** The monitoring system and its indicators are unambiguously specified so that all parties agree on what the system covers and there are practical ways to measure the indicators and results.
3. **Achievable and Attributable:** The system identifies what changes are anticipated as a result of the intervention and whether the result(s) are realistic. Attribution requires that changes in the targeted developmental issue can be linked to the intervention.
4. **Relevant and Realistic:** The system establishes levels of performance that are likely to be achieved in a practical manner, and that reflect the expectations of stakeholders.
5. **Time-bound, Timely, Trackable, and Targeted:** The system allows progress to be tracked in a cost-effective manner at desired frequency for a set period, with clear

¹²⁶ <http://gefweb.org/MonitoringandEvaluation/MEPoliciesProcedures/MEPTools/meptstandards.html>

identification of the particular stakeholder group to be impacted by the project or program.

M&E during Project implementation

- *M&E design.* Projects should have sound M&E plans to monitor results and track progress towards achieving Project objectives. An M&E plan should include a baseline (including data, methodology, etc.), SMART indicators (see Annex 4) and data analysis systems, and evaluation studies at specific times to assess results. The time frame for various M&E activities and standards for outputs should have been specified.

The Consultant(s) should use the following questions to help assess the M&E design aspects:

SMART-ness of Indicators

- Are there specific indicators in the log frame for each of the Project objectives and outcomes?
- Are the indicators relevant to the objectives and outcomes?
- Are the indicators for the objectives and outcomes sufficient?
- Are the indicators quantifiable?

Adequacy of Baseline Information

- Is there baseline information?
- Has the methodology for the baseline data collection been explained?
- Is desired level of achievement for indicators based on a reasoned estimate of baseline?

Arrangements for Monitoring of Implementation

- Has a budget been allocated for M&E activities?
- Have the responsibility centers for M&E activities been clearly defined?
- Has the time frame for M&E activities been specified?

Arrangements for Evaluation

- Have specific targets been specified for Project outputs?
- Has the desired level of achievement been specified for all Indicators of Objectives and Outcomes?
- *M&E plan implementation.* A Terminal Evaluation should verify that:
 - an M&E system was in place and facilitated timely tracking of results and progress towards Projects objectives throughout the Project implementation period (perhaps through use of a logframe or similar);
 - annual Project reports and Progress Implementation Review (PIR) reports were complete, accurate and with well justified ratings;
 - that the information provided by the M&E system was used during the Project to improve Project performance and to adapt to changing needs;
 - and that Projects had an M&E system in place with proper training for parties responsible for M&E activities.
- *Budgeting and Funding for M&E activities.* The terminal evaluation should determine whether support for M&E was budgeted adequately and was funded in a timely fashion during implementation.

Annex 5: Expectations regarding the role of DGEF Task Managers in GEF Project Supervision and a list of Documentation relevant for the evaluation of Project Supervision (provided to Evaluator by DGEF)

Project start up phase

- Pink File preparation and signature (including detailed project supervision plan)
- Co-financing arrangements
- Bank account opened and/or information provided
- Initial cash advance
- Supervision of recruitment of project staff
- Office set up (office space, procurement of equipment, host agreements)
- Establishment of project steering committee and any other advisory/governing structures

Inception mission and workshop

- Preparation
- Review of institutional arrangements and project implementation responsibilities
- Workshop including providing training (important to discuss at inception how project will be evaluated at exit)
- First Steering Committee meeting
- Revised project implementation, M&E or supervision plan as necessary

Project implementation

- Project financial and substantive reporting (includes audited statements, inventories of non-expendable equipment)
- Active monitoring of progress in achieving outcomes
- Liaising with co-implementing agency if applicable
- Steering committee meeting preparation and attendance
- Field visits as relevant/required
- Risk monitoring (social and environmental safeguards)
- Preparation and coordination of MTR (or support to MTE)
- Adaptive management to respond to risk and problems (includes follow up to MTR/MTE recommendations, and risk mitigation plan if applicable)
- Revisions
- Other technical assistance (e.g., output review, support to communications efforts)
- Database maintenance
- Knowledge management

Project completion

- Review/clearance of outputs
- Clearance of terminal report and review of audited financial statement
- Completion revision
- Request for disposal of equipment
- Support to Evaluation Office for terminal evaluation (review of draft evaluation TOR, project information, comments to draft TE, completion of management response / implementation plan, follow up on recommendations [if any])
- Knowledge management

Documents to inform evaluation of project supervision

- Project supervision plan, with associated budget
- Correspondence related to project
- Supervision mission reports
- Steering Committee meeting documents, including agendas, meeting minutes, and any summary reports
- Project progress reports, including financial reports submitted
- Cash advance requests documenting disbursements

- Annual Project Implementation Reports (PIRs)
- Mid-term evaluation and associated action plans, (if any)
- Management memos related to project
- Other documentation of supervision feedback on project outputs and processes (e.g. comments on draft progress reports, etc.)

Possible additional documents;

Has a project extension occurred?

- Extension documentation

Has a formal revision of project activities or objectives occurred? (Beyond modifications to project plans based on normal adaptive management procedures)

- Project revision documentation

Has a formal budget revision occurred?

- Budget revision documentation

ANNEX 6: Risk Factor Table

Evaluators will use this table to summarize risks identified in the **Project Document** and reflect also **any new risks** identified or experienced in the course of the evaluation in regard to project implementation. The Notes column should be used to provide additional details concerning manifestation of the risk **as relevant**.

INTERNAL RISK Project management										
Risk Factor	Indicator of Low Risk	Indicator of Medium Risk	Indicator of High Risk	Low	Medium	Substantial	High	Not Applicable	To be determined	NOTES
Management structure	Stable with roles and responsibilities clearly defined and understood	Individuals understand their own role but are unsure of responsibilities of others	Unclear responsibilities or overlapping functions which lead to management problems							
Governance structure	Steering Committee and/or other project bodies meet periodically and provide effective direction/inputs	Body(ies) meets periodically but guidance/input provided to project is inadequate	Members lack commitment (seldom meet) and therefore the Committee/body does not fulfil its function							
Internal communications	Fluid and cordial	Communication process deficient although relationships between team members are	Lack of adequate communication between team members leading to							

		good	deterioration of relationships and resentment / factions							
Work flow	Project progressing according to work plan	Some changes in project work plan but without major effect on overall implementation	Major delays or changes in work plan or method of implementation							
Co-financing	Co-financing is secured and payments are received on time	Is secured but payments are slow and bureaucratic	A substantial part of pledged co-financing may not materialize							
Budget	Activities are progressing within planned budget	Minor budget reallocation needed	Reallocation between budget lines exceeding 30% of original budget							
Financial management	Funds are correctly managed and transparently accounted for	Financial reporting slow or deficient	Serious financial reporting problems or indication of mismanagement of funds							
Reporting	Substantive reports are presented in a timely manner and are complete and accurate with a good analysis of project progress and implementation issues	Reports are complete and accurate but often delayed or lack critical analysis of progress and implementation issues	Serious concerns about quality and timeliness of project reporting							
Stakeholder involvement	Stakeholder analysis done and positive feedback from critical stakeholders and partners	Consultation and participation process seems strong but misses some groups or relevant partners	Symptoms of conflict with critical stakeholders or evidence of apathy and lack of interest from partners or other stakeholders							
External communications	Evidence that stakeholders,	Communications efforts	Project existence is							

	practitioners and/or the general public understand project and are regularly updated on progress	are taking place but not yet evidence that message is successfully transmitted	not known beyond implementation partners or misunderstandings concerning objectives and activities evident							
Short term/long term balance	Project is meeting short term needs and results within a long term perspective, particularly sustainability and replicability	Project is interested in the short term with little understanding of or interest in the long term	Longer term issues are deliberately ignored or neglected							
Science and technological issues	Project based on sound science and well established technologies	Project testing approaches, methods or technologies but based on sound analysis of options and risks	Many scientific and /or technological uncertainties							
Political influences	Project decisions and choices are not particularly politically driven	Signs that some project decisions are politically motivated	Project is subject to a variety of political influences that may jeopardize project objectives							
Other, please specify. Add rows as necessary										

EXTERNAL RISK

Risk Factor	Indicator of Low Risk	Indicator of Medium Risk	Indicator of High Risk	Low	Medium	Substantial	Not	To be	NOTES
Political stability	Political context is stable and safe	Political context is unstable but predictable and not a threat to project implementation	Very disruptive and volatile						

Environmental conditions	Project area is not affected by severe weather events or major environmental stress factors	Project area is subject to more or less predictable disasters or changes	Project area has very harsh environmental conditions						
Social, cultural and economic factors	There are no evident social, cultural and/or economic issues that may affect project performance and results	Social or economic issues or changes pose challenges to project implementation but mitigation strategies have been developed	Project is highly sensitive to economic fluctuations, to social issues or cultural barriers						
Capacity issues	Sound technical and managerial capacity of institutions and other project partners	Weaknesses exist but have been identified and actions is taken to build the necessary capacity	Capacity is very low at all levels and partners require constant support and technical assistance						
Others, please specify									

Annex 7 – Introduction to Theory of Change / impact pathways, the ROTi Method and the ROTi Results Scoresheet


Terminal evaluations of projects are conducted at, or shortly after, project completion. At this stage it is normally possible to assess the achievement of the project’s outputs. However, the possibilities for evaluation of the project’s outcomes are often more limited and the feasibility of assessing project **impacts** at this time is usually severely constrained. Full impacts often accrue only after considerable time-lags, and it is common for there to be a lack of long-term baseline and monitoring information to aid their evaluation. Consequently, substantial resources are often needed to support the extensive primary field data collection required for assessing impact and there are concomitant practical difficulties because project resources are seldom available to support the assessment of such impacts when they have accrued – often several years after completion of activities and closure of the project.

Despite these difficulties, it is possible to enhance the scope and depth of information available from Terminal Evaluations on the achievement of results **through rigorous review of project progress along the pathways from outcome to impact**. Such reviews identify the sequence of conditions and factors deemed necessary for project outcomes to yield impact and assess the current status of and future prospects for results. In evaluation literature these relationships can be variously described as ‘Theories of Change’, Impact ‘Pathways’, ‘Results Chains’, ‘Intervention logic’, and ‘Causal Pathways’ (to name only some!).

Theory of Change (TOC) / impact pathways


Figure 1 shows a generic impact pathway which links the standard elements of project logical frameworks in a graphical representation of causal linkages. When specified with more detail, for example including the key users of outputs, the processes (the arrows) that lead to outcomes and with details of performance indicators, analysis of impact pathways can be invaluable as a tool for both project planning and evaluation.

Figure 1. A generic results chain, which can also be termed an ‘Impact Pathway’ or Theory of Change.



The pathways summarise casual relationships and help identify or clarify the assumptions in the intervention logic of the project. For example, in the Figure 2 below the eventual impact depends upon the behaviour of the farmers in using the new agricultural techniques they have learnt from the training. The project design for the intervention might be based on the upper pathway assuming that the farmers can now meet their needs from more efficient management of a given area therefore reducing the need for an expansion of cultivated area and ultimately reducing pressure on nearby forest habitat, whereas the evidence gathered in the evaluation may in some locations follow the lower of the two pathways; the improved faming methods offer the possibility for increased profits and create an incentive for farmers to cultivate more land resulting in clearance or degradation of the nearby forest habitat.

Figure 2. An impact pathway / TOC for a training intervention intended to aid forest conservation.



The GEF Evaluation Office has recently developed an approach that builds on the concepts of theory of change / causal chains / impact pathways. The method is known as Review of Outcomes to Impacts (ROtI)¹²⁷ and has three distinct stages:

- a. Identifying the project’s intended impacts
- b. Review of the project’s logical framework
- c. Analysis and modeling of the project’s outcomes-impact pathways

The **identification of the projects intended impacts** should be possible from the ‘objectives’ statements specified in the official project document. The next stage is to **review the project’s logical framework** to assess whether the design of the project is consistent with, and appropriate for, the delivery of the intended impact. The method requires verification of the causal logic between the different hierarchical levels of the logical framework moving ‘backwards’ from impacts through outcomes to the outputs; the activities level is not formally considered in the ROtI method¹²⁸. The aim of this stage is to develop and understanding of the causal logic of the project intervention and to identify the key ‘impact pathways’. In reality such process are often complex; they often involve

¹²⁷ GEF Evaluation Office (2009). ROtI: Review of Outcomes to Impacts Practitioners Handbook. http://www.gefweb.org/uploadedFiles/Evaluation_Office/OPS4/Roti%20Practitioners%20Handbook%2015%20June%202009.pdf

¹²⁸ Evaluation of the efficiency and effectiveness in the use of resources to generate outputs is already a major focus within UNEP Terminal Evaluations.

multiple actors and decision-processes are subject to time-lags, meaning that project impact often accrue long after the completion of project activities.


The third stage involves analysis of the ‘impact pathways’ that link project outcomes to impacts. The pathways are analysed in terms of the ‘assumptions’ and ‘impact drivers’ that underpin the processes involved in the transformation of outcomes to impacts via **intermediate states** (see Figure 3). Project outcomes are the direct intended results stemming from the outputs, and they are likely to occur either towards the end of the project or in the short term following project completion. **Intermediate states** are the transitional conditions between the project’s immediate outcomes and the intended impact. They are necessary conditions for the achievement of the intended impacts and there may be more than one intermediate state between the immediate project outcome and the eventual impact.

Impact drivers are defined as the significant factors that if present are expected to contribute to the realization of the intended impacts and **can be influenced** by the project / project partners & stakeholders. **Assumptions** are the significant factors that if present are expected to contribute to the realization of the intended impacts but are largely **beyond the control of the project** / project partners & stakeholders. The impact drivers and assumptions are ordinarily considered in Terminal Evaluations when assessing the sustainability of the project.

Since project logical frameworks do not often provide comprehensive information on the processes by which project outputs yield outcomes and eventually lead, via ‘intermediate states’ to impacts, the impact pathways need to be carefully examined and the following questions addressed:


- Are there other causal pathways that would stem from the use of project outputs by other potential user groups?
- Is (each) impact pathway complete? Are there any missing intermediate states between project outcomes and impacts?
- Have the key impact drivers and assumptions been identified for each ‘step’ in the impact pathway.

Figure 3. A schematic ‘impact pathway’ showing intermediate states, assumptions and impact drivers (adapted from GEF EO 2009).



The process of identifying the impact pathways and specifying the impact drivers and assumptions can be done as a desk exercise by the evaluator or, preferably, as a group exercise, led by the evaluator with a cross-section of project stakeholders as part of an evaluation field mission or both. Ideally, the evaluator would have done a desk-based assessment of the project’s theory of change and then use this understanding to facilitate a group exercise. The group exercise is best done through collective discussions to develop a visual model of the impact pathways using a card exercise. The component elements (outputs, outcomes, impact drivers, assumptions intended impacts etc.) of the impact pathways are written on individual cards and arranged and discussed as a group activity. Figure 4 below shows the suggested sequence of the group discussions needed to develop the TOC for the project.

Figure 4. Suggested sequencing of group discussions (from GEF EO 2009)



Once the theory of change model for the project is complete the evaluator can assess the design of the project intervention and collate evidence that will inform judgments on the extent and effectiveness of implementation, through the evaluation process. Performance judgments are made always noting that project contexts can change and that adaptive management is required during project implementation.

The ROI method requires ratings for outcomes achieved by the project and the progress made towards the ‘intermediate states’ at the time of the evaluation. According to the GEF guidance on the method; *“The rating system is intended to recognize project preparation and conceptualization that considers its own assumptions, and that seeks to remove barriers to future scaling up and out. Projects that are a part of a long-term process need not at all be “penalized” for not achieving impacts in the lifetime of the project: the system recognizes projects’ forward thinking to eventual impacts, even if those impacts are eventually achieved by other partners and stakeholders, albeit with achievements based on present day, present project building blocks.”* For example, a project receiving an “AA” rating appears likely to deliver impacts, while for a project receiving a “DD” this would seem unlikely, due to low achievement in outcomes and the limited likelihood of achieving the intermediate states needed for eventual impact (see Table 1).

Table 1. Rating scale for outcomes and progress towards ‘intermediate states’

Outcome Rating	Rating on progress toward Intermediate States
D: The project’s intended outcomes were not delivered	D: No measures taken to move towards intermediate states.
C: The project’s intended outcomes were delivered, but were not designed to feed into a continuing process after project funding	C: The measures designed to move towards intermediate states have started, but have not produced results.
B: The project’s intended outcomes were delivered, and were designed to feed into a continuing process, but with no prior allocation of responsibilities after project funding	B: The measures designed to move towards intermediate states have started and have produced results, which give no indication that they can progress towards the intended long term impact.
A: The project’s intended outcomes were delivered, and were designed to feed into a continuing process, with specific allocation of responsibilities after project funding.	A: The measures designed to move towards intermediate states have started and have produced results, which clearly indicate that they can progress towards the intended long term impact.

Thus a project will end up with a two letter rating e.g. AB, CD, BB etc. In addition the rating is given a ‘+’ notation if there is evidence of impacts accruing within the life of the project. The possible rating permutations are then translated onto the usual six point rating scale used in all UNEP project evaluations in the following way.

Table 2. Shows how the ratings for ‘achievement of outcomes’ and ‘progress towards intermediate states translate to ratings for the ‘Overall likelihood of impact achievement’ on a six point scale.

Highly Likely	Likely	Moderately Likely	Moderately Unlikely	Unlikely	Highly Unlikely
AA AB BA CA BB+ CB+ DA+ DB+	BB CB DA DB AC+ BC+	AC BC CC+ DC+	CC DC AD+ BD+	AD BD CD+ DD+	CD DD

In addition, projects that achieve documented changes in environmental status during the project’s lifetime receive a positive impact rating, indicated by a “+”. The overall likelihood of achieving impacts is shown in Table 11 below (a + score above moves the double letter rating up one space in the 6-point scale).

The ROtI method provides a basis for comparisons across projects through application of a rating system that can indicate the expected impact. However it should be noted that whilst this will provide a relative scoring for all projects assessed, it does not imply that the results from projects can necessarily be aggregated. Nevertheless, since the approach yields greater clarity in the ‘results metrics’ for a project, opportunities where aggregation of project results might be possible can more readily be identified.

Results rating of project entitled:							
		Rating (D – A)		Rating (D – A)		Rating (+)	Overall
Outputs	Outcomes		Intermediary		Impact (GEBs)		
1.	1.		1.		1.		
2.	2.		2.		2.		
3.	3.		3.		3.		
	Rating justification:		Rating justification:		Rating justification:		

Scoring Guidelines

The achievement of **Outputs** is largely assumed. Outputs are such concrete things as training courses held, numbers of persons trained, studies conducted, networks established, websites developed, and many others. Outputs reflect where and for what project funds were used. These were not rated: projects generally succeed in spending their funding.

Outcomes:

Outcomes, on the other hand, are the first level of intended results stemming from the outputs. Not so much the number of persons trained; but how many persons who then demonstrated that they had gained the intended knowledge or skills. Not a study conducted; but one that could change the evolution or development of the project. Not so much a network of NGOs established; but that the network showed potential for functioning as intended. A sound outcome might be genuinely improved strategic planning in SLM stemming from workshops, training courses, and networking.

Examples

Funds were spent, outputs were produced, but nothing in terms of outcomes was achieved. People attended training courses but there is no evidence of increased capacity. A website was developed, but no one used it. (Score – D)

Outcomes achieved but are dead ends; no forward linkages to intermediary stages in the future. People attended training courses, increased their capacities, but all left for other jobs shortly after; or were not given opportunities to apply their new skills. A website was developed and was used, but achieved little or nothing of what was intended because intended end users had no access to computers. People had meetings that led nowhere. Outcomes hypothesized or achieved, but either insignificant and/or *no evident linkages forward* to intermediary stages leading towards impacts. (Score – C)

Outcomes plus implicit linkages forward. Outcomes achieved and have *implicit forward linkages* to intermediary stages and impacts. Collaboration as evidenced by meetings and decisions made among a loose network is documented that should lead to better planning. Improved capacity is in place and should lead to desired intermediate outcomes. Providing implicit linkages to intermediary stages is probably the most common case when outcomes have been achieved. (Score - B)

Outcomes plus explicit linkages forward. Outcomes have *definite and explicit forward linkages* to intermediary stages and impacts. An alternative energy project may result in solar panels installed that reduced reliance on local wood fuels, with the outcome quantified in terms of reduced C emissions. Explicit forward linkages are easy to recognize in being concrete, but are relatively uncommon. (Score A)

Intermediary stages:

The **intermediate stage** indicates achievements that lead to Global Environmental Benefits, especially if the potential for scaling up is established.

“Outcomes” scored C or D. If the outcomes above scored C or D, there is no need to continue forward to score intermediate stages given that achievement of such is then not possible.

In spite of outcomes and implicit linkages, and follow-up actions, the project dead-ends. Although outcomes achieved have *implicit forward linkages* to intermediary stages and impacts, the project dead-ends. Outcomes turn out to be insufficient to move the project towards intermediate stages and to the eventual achievement of GEBs. Collaboration as evidenced by meetings and among participants in a network never progresses further. The implicit linkage based on follow-up never materializes. Although outcomes involve, for example, further participation and discussion, such actions do not take the project forward towards intended intermediate impacts. People have fun getting together and talking more, but nothing, based on the implicit forwards linkages, actually eventuates. **(Score = D)**

The measures designed to move towards intermediate states have started, but have not produced result, barriers and/or unmet assumptions may still exist. In spite of sound outputs and in spite of explicit forward linkages, there is limited possibility of intermediary stage achievement due to barriers not removed or unmet assumptions. This may be the fate of several policy related, capacity building, and networking projects: people work together, but fail to develop a way forward towards concrete results, or fail to successfully address inherent barriers. The project may increase ground cover and or carbon stocks, may reduce grazing or GHG emissions; and may have project level recommendations regarding scaling up; but barrier removal or the addressing of fatal assumptions means that scaling up remains limited and unlikely to be achieved at larger scales. Barriers can be policy and institutional limitations; (mis-) assumptions may have to do with markets or public – private sector relationships. **(Score = C)**

Barriers and assumptions are successfully addressed. Intermediary stage(s) planned or conceived have feasible direct and explicit forward linkages to impact achievement; barriers and assumptions are successfully addressed. The project achieves measurable intermediate impacts, and works to scale up and out, but falls well short of scaling up to global levels such that achievement of GEBs still lies in doubt. **(Score = B)**

Scaling up and out over time is possible. Measurable intermediary stage impacts achieved, scaling up to global levels and the achievement of GEBs appears to be well in reach over time. **(Score = A)**

Impact: Actual changes in environmental status

“Intermediary stages” scored B to A.

Measurable impacts achieved at a globally significant level within the project life-span. .
(Score = ‘+’)

ANNEX II : ITINERARY OF ACTIVITIES OF THE TERMINAL EVALUATION MISSION

Date		Activities
Mon	1 st March	am: Meeting (Skype) with ex-CTA/UNEP Task Manager and PSC member (Dr. Edoardo Zadri) and Operations Manager (Mr. Camillo Ponziani).
Tue	2 nd March	All day: Document review.
Wed	3 rd March	All day: Document review.
Thu	4 th March	All day: Document review.
Fri	5 th March	All day: Document review.
Sun	7 th March	pm: Travel to Johannesburg, South Africa
Mon	8 th March	am: Evaluator arrives Johannesburg. pm: 1. Travel to Waakerstroom demonstration site. 2. Meeting with Chair of PSC (Mr. Gerard Boere).
Tue	9 th March	am: 1. Plenary presentations at PSC meeting. 2. Meeting with Secretary-General AEWA and PSC member (Dr. Bert Lenten). pm: 1. Meeting with Director of Science, BirdLife International and PSC member (Dr. Leon Bennun). 2. Plenary presentations at PSC meeting. 3. Meeting with Head of Programme and Strategy for Biodiversity and Ecological Networks, Wetlands International and PSC member (Dr. Ward Hagemeyer).
Wed	10 th March	am: 1. Meeting with Project Manager Nigeria demonstration site (Mr. Mohammed Garba Boyi). 2. Meeting with Project Manager Lithuania demonstration site (Dr. Saulius Svazas). 3. Meeting with Director BirdLife International Middle East Region (Dr. Ibrahim Khader). 4. Meeting with Head of Operations UNOPS Kenya Operations Centre and PSC member (Mr. Bahaa Al-Asad) and Project Officer UNOPS Kenya Operations Centre (Ms. Kerstine Kageni). pm: 1. Meeting with Task Manager UNEP-WCMC Informatics Programme (Dr. Andrew Cottam). 2. Meeting with Project Manager Turkey demonstration site (Ms. Lale Aktay). 3. Meeting with WOW Project Coordinator for Wetlands International (Dr. Umberto Gallo-Orsi).
Thu	11 th March	am: 1.PSC meeting Plenary Field visit to Luneberg . pm: 1. Meeting with WOW Project Coordinator for BirdLife International (Dr. Jonathan Barnard).
Fri	12 th March	pm: Document review.
Sat	13 th March	Free day
Sun	14 th March	Free day
Mon	15 th March	All day: Meeting with Wakerstroom Centre Manager (Mr. Andre Steenkamp) and Wakerstroom Operations Manager (Ms. Kristi Garland) (South Africa demonstration site managers).
Tue	16 th March	am: 1. Meeting with Wakerstroom Operations Manager (Ms. Kristi Garland). 2. Meeting with Head of Igugulethu Vegetable Garden (Ms. Ida Makhubu). 3. Site visit to Igugulethu Vegetable Garden. pm: 1. Meeting with Wakerstroom Operations Manager (Ms. Kristi Garland). 2. Meeting with wood carver (Mr. Muzi Makhubu) and visit to his workshop. 3. Meeting with Head of Vbunye Cooperative Beading Project (Ms. Thabisile Madonsena).
Wed	17 th March	am: 1.Travel to Johannesburg. pm: 1. Travel to Johannesburg. 2. Meeting with Community-based Conservation Division Manager, Birdlife South Africa and Project Manager for Wakerstroom demonstration site (Mr. Daniel Marnewick). 3. Evaluator departs Johannesburg.
Thu	18 th March	am: Evaluator arrives UK and travel to home.
Mon	12 th April	All day: Travel to Dakar, Senegal .
Tue	13 th April	am: 1. Evaluator arrives Dakar.

Date		Activities
		pm: 1. Visit to Mauritanian Embassy for visa. 2. Meeting with Capacity Building Manager, Wetlands International West Africa Programme (Mr. Abdoulaye Ndiaye). 3. Meeting with Regional Director Wetlands International West Africa Programme (Mr. Ibrahima Thiam). 4. Meeting with Project Associate and WOW West Africa Coordinator for demonstration projects (Mr. Gabin Agblonon).
Wed	14 th April	am: 1. Travel to Nouakchott, Mauritania . pm: 1. Travel to Parc National du Banc d'Arguin (WOW demonstration site).
Thu	15 th April	am: 1. Visit to site. 2. Meeting with Demonstration Site Project Coordinator (Mr. Mahmood Chihaoui). 3. Meeting with group of eco-guides trained by project (Mr. Mohamed Ould Abdsalame, Mr. Bah Bilal, Mr. Daomda Boukhari, Mr. Cherif Chabaane, Ms. Moun Ely, Ms. Soukiene Ely, Mr. Mohamed Ould Habib, Mr. Bedi Ould Hamdinou, Ms. Aicha Hamma, Mr. Jkhya Mi Hassen, Mr. Hamadi Lemerabott, Mr. Ahmed Ould Medou, Mr. Aboubekrine Olissmane, Mr. Mohamed Beyatt-el-Ahmed Salem, Mr. Ahmed Salem Siyam). pm: 1. Meeting with eco-guides continued. 2. Visit to site.
Fri	16 th April	am: 1. Visit to site. 2. Meeting with Demonstration Site Project Coordinator (Mr. Mahmood Chihaoui). 3. Meeting with Director for Park Operations South, Parc National du Banc d'Arguin (Mr. Abou Gueye). pm: 1. Meeting with French Teacher to eco-guides (Mr. Ahmed Ould Meslem). Travel to Iwik (main tourist site with Banc d'Arguin National Park).
Sat	17 th April	Free day inc. travel to Nouakchott.
Sun	18 th April	am: 1. Meeting with Coordinator of Fondation International du Banc d'Arguin Programme Coordinator (Mr. Antonio Araugo). pm: 1. Meeting with Director General Parc National du Banc d'Arguin (Mr. Mahamadou Youssouf Diagana). 2. Meeting with Coordinator of Fondation International du Banc d'Arguin Programme Coordinator (Mr. Antonio Araugo). 3. Overnight travel to Niamey, Niger .
Mon	19 th April	am: 1. Arrive in Niamey. 2. Sleep. pm: 1. Initial meeting with Head of WWF West Africa Freshwater Programme and Project Coordinator for WOW demonstration site (Mr. Abba Mahmoudou). 2. Logistics meeting with Project Associate and WOW West Africa Coordinator for demonstration projects (Mr. Gabin Agblonon).
Tue	20 th April	am: 1. Meeting with Director of Division of Wildlife and Hunting, Ministry of Environment and Control of Desertification and National Coordinator of WOW demonstration project (Mr. Issa Malam Abdou). 2. Meeting with Head of WWF West Africa Freshwater Programme and Project Coordinator for WOW demonstration site (Mr. Abba Mahmoudou). pm: 1. Travel to Kokorou (demonstration site).
Wed	21 st April	am: 1. Visit to site and discussion on main management issues. 2. Meeting with Tribal Chief of Kokorou Canton (Chief Boukari Soumaila). 3. Meeting with Representatives of Environment Committees from four communities (Mr. Issa Oumaron Mr. Hamidon Ousseimi, Mr. Soumaika Kadicha, Ms. Boureima Ouma, Mr. Amadou Souley, Mr. Halidon Djibo, Mr. Boukari Tahiron (all Kokorou); Mr. Wankaye Zeinabon, Ms. Madondon Moumonmi (Diblo); Ms. Alhabane Salon, Mr. Yaye Hamidon (Namga); and Mr. Moussa Larabou, Mr. Abdoulaye Moussa (Zoribi)). pm: 1. Meeting with Mayor of Kokorou Commune (Mr. Gake Dourhamale). 2. Travel to Terra. 3. Meeting with Director of Environment and Control of Desertification – Terra Department (Mr. Issoufou Oumarou Magagi). 4. Meeting with Prefect of Terra Department (Mr. Ibrahim Tidjani Katiella).
Thu	22 nd April	am: 1. Travel to Niamey. 2. Meeting with Head of WWF West Africa Freshwater Programme and Project Coordinator for WOW demonstration site (Mr. Abba Mahmoudou). pm: 1. Document Review. 2. Meeting with Project Associate and WOW West Africa Coordinator for demonstration projects (Mr. Gabin Agblonon).

Date		Activities
Fri	23 rd April	Free day.
Sat	24 th April	Free day.
Sun	25 th April	Free day. Overnight evaluator departs Niamey.
Mon	26 th April	am: Evaluator arrives UK and travel to home.
Thu	20 th May	All day: Travel to Budapest, Hungary .
Fri	21 st May	am: 1. Meeting with Managing Director of Magyar Madartani es Termeszettvedelmi Egyesulet (MME – BirdLife Hungary) (Mr. Gergo Halmos). pm: 1. Travel to Fuzesabony (mid-way point) with Conservation Director of MME (Dr. Andras Kovacs). 2. Travel to Biharugra with former Project Manager (Mr. Gabor Simay). 3. Meeting with Secretary of Bihar Public Foundation (Mr. Robert Vanyi).
Sat	22 nd May	All day: Visit site and discuss project issues. Informal meeting with Coordinator of bird monitoring programme (Mr. Gabor Horvath) and Director of Nagy Kocsag (mr. Janos Togye).
Sun	23 rd May	am: 1. Meeting with former Project Manager (Mr. Gabor Simay). pm: Free
Mon	24 th May	Free day.
Tue	25 th May	am: Free pm: Travel to Budapest via Debrecen
Wed	26 th May	All day: Travel to UK and home.
Thu	3 rd June	pm: Skype meeting with WOW Project Coordinator for BirdLife International (Dr. Jonathan Barnard).
Wed	9 th June	am: Skype meeting with Scientific Officer for Federal Ministry for Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety (BMU) and PSC member (Ms. Andrea Pauly).
Thu	10 th June	am: Skype meeting with WOW Operations Manager (Mr. Camillo Ponziani).
Fri	18 th June	am: Skype meeting with WOW Communications Officer and AEWA Information Officer (Mr. Florian Keil).
Mon	21 st June	am: Skype meeting with Deputy Secretary-General of Ramsar Secretariat and PSC member (Prof. Nick Davidson).
Mon	28 th June	am: Skype meeting with Communication, Education and Public Awareness Officer, Ramsar Secretariat (Ms. Sandra Hails).
Thu	8th July	pm: Skype meeting with Head of Programme and Strategy - Wetlands & Water Resources, Wetlands International (Mr. Chris Baker).
	August	Numerous skype conversations with WOW Operations Manager (Mr. Camillo Ponziani).
Fri	3 rd September	am: Skype meeting ex-CTA/UNEP Task Manager and PSC member (Dr. Edoardo Zadri)

ANNEX III : PERSONS INTERVIEWED

Alphabetic order.

UNEP / GEF

Andrew Cottam	Task Manager UNEP-WCMC Informatics Programme
Edoardo Zadri	Task Manager, UNEP (formerly Chief technical Adviser to the project)

Project Coordination Unit

Camillo Ponziani	Operations Manager
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Wetlands International¹²⁹

Abdoulaye Ndiaye	Capacity Building Manager, Wetlands International West Africa Programme
Chris Baker	Head of Programme and Strategy - Wetlands & Water Resources
Gabin Agblonon	Project Associate and WOW West Africa Coordinator for demonstration projects
Ibrahima Thiam	Regional Director Wetlands International West Africa Programme
Umberto Gallo-Orsi	WOW Project Coordinator for Wetlands International.
Ward Hagemeyer	Head of Programme and Strategy for Biodiversity and Ecological Networks

BirdLife International

Ibrahim Khader	Director, Middle East Region
Jonathan Barnard	Senior Programme Manager, (WOW Project Coordinator for BirdLife International (2008-2010))
Leon Bennun	Director of Science, Policy and Information

AEWA Secretariat

Bert Lenten	Secretary-General
Florian Keil	WOW Communications Officer and AEWA Information Officer

Ramsar Secretariat

Nick Davidson	Deputy Secretary-General
Sandra Hails	Communication, Education and Public Awareness Officer

UNOPS

Bahaa Al-Asad	Head of Operations, Kenya Operations Centre
Kerstine Kageni	Project Officer, UNOPS Kenya Operations Centre

Government of Federal Republic of Germany

Andrea Pauly	Scientific Officer for German Federal Ministry for Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety (BMU) ¹³⁰
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¹²⁹ **WI comment:** It is important to note that the TE has not interviewed two key persons in WI : Szabolcs Nagy, who has lead the CSN Development and Tunde Ojei, who lead the framework of the FTK.

Independent Expert

Gerard Boere	Chair, Project Steering Committee
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Demonstration Site Personnel

Abba Mahmoudou	Head of WWF West Africa Freshwater Programme and Project Coordinator demonstration site, Niger
Ahmed Ould Meslem	French Teacher to eco-guides, Mauritania
Andre Steenkamp	Wakerstroom Centre Manager and demonstration site manager, South Africa
Daniel Marnewick	Community-based Conservation Division Manager, BirdLife South Africa and Project Manager for demonstration site, South Africa
Gabor Simay	Project Manager, demonstration site, Hungary
Kristi Garland	Wakerstroom Operations Manager and demonstration site manager, South Africa
Lale Aktay	Project Manager, demonstration site, Turkey
Mahmood Chihaoui	Demonstration Site Project Coordinator
Mohammed Garba Boyi	Project Manager, demonstration site, Nigeria
Saulius Svazas	Project Manager, demonstration site, Lithuania

Other Persons Associated with Demonstration Sites

Abou Gueye	Director for Park Operations South, Parc National du Banc d'Arguin, Mauritania
Andras Kovacs	Conservation Director of Magyar Madartani es Termeszettvedelmi Egyesulet (MME – BirdLife Hungary)
Antonio Araugo	Coordinator of Fondation International du Banc d'Arguin Programme Coordinator, Mauritania
Gabor Horvath	Coordinator of bird monitoring programme and PSC member, Hungary
Gergo Halmos	Managing Director of Magyar Madartani es Termeszettvedelmi Egyesulet (MME – BirdLife Hungary) and PSC member, Hungary
Ibrahim Tidjani Katiella	Prefect of Terra Department, Niger
Issa Malam Abdou	Director of Division of Wildlife and Hunting, Ministry of Environment and Control of Desertification and National Coordinator of WOW demonstration project, Niger
Issoufou Oumarou Magagi	Director of Environment and Control of Desertification – Terra Department, Niger
Janos Togye	Director of Nagy Kocsag and PSC member, Hungary
Mahamadou Youssouf Diagana	Director General Parc National du Banc d'Arguin, Mauritania
Robert Vanyi	Secretary of Bihar Public Foundation and PSC member, Hungary

Project Beneficiaries

Aboubekrine Olissmane	Eco-guide, Parc National Banc d'Arguin, Mauritania
Abdoulaye Moussa	Environment Committee member for Zoribi, Niger

¹³⁰ Formerly the German Federal Agency for Nature Conservation (BfN).

Ahmed Ould Medou	Eco-guide, Parc National Banc d'Arguin, Mauritania
Ahmed Salem Siyam	Eco-guide, Parc National Banc d'Arguin, Mauritania
Aicha Hamma	Eco-guide, Parc National Banc d'Arguin, Mauritania
Alhabane Salon	Environment Committee member for Namga, Niger
Amadou Souley	Environment Committee member for Kokorou, Niger
Bah Bilal	Eco-guide, Parc National Banc d'Arguin, Mauritania
Bedi Ould Hamdinou	Eco-guide, Parc National Banc d'Arguin, Mauritania
Boukari Soumaila	Tribal Chief of Kokorou Canton
Boukari Tahiron	Environment Committee member for Kokorou, Niger
Boureima Ouma	Environment Committee member for Kokorou, Niger
Cherif Chabaane	Eco-guide, Parc National Banc d'Arguin, Mauritania
Daomda Boukhari	Eco-guide, Parc National Banc d'Arguin, Mauritania
Gake Dourhamale	Mayor of Kokorou Commune, Niger
Halidon Djibo	Environment Committee member for Kokorou, Niger
Hamadi Lemerabott	Eco-guide, Parc National Banc d'Arguin, Mauritania
Hamidon Ousseimi	Environment Committee member for Kokorou, Niger
Ida Makhubu	Head of Igugulethu Vegetable Garden, Wakerstroom, South Africa.
Issa Oumaron	Environment Committee member for Kokorou, Niger
Jkhya Mi Hassen	Eco-guide, Parc National Banc d'Arguin, Mauritania
Madondon Moumonmi	Environment Committee member for Diblo, Niger
Mohamed Beyatt-el-Ahmed Salem	Eco-guide, Parc National Banc d'Arguin, Mauritania
Mohamed Ould Abdsalame	Eco-guide, Parc National Banc d'Arguin, Mauritania
Mohamed Ould Habib	Eco-guide, Parc National Banc d'Arguin, Mauritania
Moun Ely	Eco-guide, Parc National Banc d'Arguin, Mauritania
Moussa Larabou	Environment Committee member for Zoribi, Niger
Muzi Makhubu	Wood carver, Wakerstroom, South Africa.
Soukiene Ely	Eco-guide, Parc National Banc d'Arguin, Mauritania
Soumaika Kadicha	Environment Committee member for Kokorou, Niger
Thabisile Madonsena	Head of Vbunye Cooperative Beading Project, Wakerstroom, South Africa.
Wankaye Zeinabon	Environment Committee member for Diblo, Niger
Yaye Hamidon	Environment Committee member for Namga, Niger

ANNEX IV: SUMMARY EVALUATION OF PROJECT ACHIEVEMENTS BY OBJECTIVES AND COMPONENTS

The initial Project logframe was revised in October 2007 with the new version being endorsed officially by the WOW Steering Committee in January 2008. The present evaluation matrix uses this revised logframe.

KEY:

GREEN = Indicators show achievement successful at the end of the Project.

YELLOW = Indicators show achievement nearly successful at the end of the Project.

RED = Indicators not achieved at the end of Project.

HATCHED COLOUR = estimate; situation still not complete at time of terminal evaluation.

Aim	#	Performance Indicator	Baseline	End of Project Target	Delivery Status at Terminal Evaluation ¹³¹	Comments	HS	S	MS	MU	U	HU
Development Objective: Conservation of globally significant migratory waterbirds and wetlands enhanced in the African – Eurasian flyways	D1	Overall extinction risk of AEWA waterbirds, as measured by the red list index for AEWA region (in line with AEWA SAP, 2009-17).	AEWA/BLI Red List index value (pre-2005) was: 0.93932	No increase in overall extinction risk. RLI value remains stable at approx. the same value: 0.94 ¹³²	End of Project assessment being made for 15 th December 2010 but indications are that the expected value will show a small decrease to around 0.93.	This indicator appears to be at too high a level, i.e. too remote, since it is almost wholly independent of the WOW Project activities.						
	D2	The numbers of sites designated using Ramsar Convention criteria 5, 6 (specific criteria based on waterbirds) as Internationally Important wetlands under the Ramsar Convention in the 119 countries of the AEWA region.	Number of Ramsar Sites fulfilling criteria 5 and 6 in AEWA region as of July 1 st , 2006 (from Ramsar Database) is 198.	An increase of 10%, with respect to the start of the project, i.e. 20 new Ramsar sites designated by project end (target 218).	As of 14 th October a total of 589 sites had been designated as Ramsar sites using Ramsar Convention criteria 5 and 6 – an increase of 391 over the baseline or an increase of 197%.	Apparently the huge increase has arisen from the Ramsar Secretariat processing and clearing a huge backlog of applications rather than from actions arising from the WOW Project's activities.						

¹³¹ Taken largely from the delivery reported in the PIR 2009.

¹³² The Red List assessment process occurs on a four-yearly cycle, so the 2004 RLI for AEWA species can be used as the baseline figure for the WOW project, the 2008 RLI can be used as the mid-term figure and the 2012 RLI could be used as the end of project indicator. However there will not be a Red List assessment between 2008 and the end of the WOW project (December 2010), so from that perspective it won't be possible to assess whether or not the project had met its target with this indicator until 2 years after the project's end. The project technical team is looking into alternative ways of undertaking this assessment in 2010 for the project's purpose.

Aim	#	Performance Indicator	Baseline	End of Project Target	Delivery Status at Terminal Evaluation ¹³¹	Comments	HS	S	MS	MU	U	HU
	D3	The number of countries ratifying AEWA (in line with AEWA SAP, 2009 – 17).	The number of countries ratifying the AEWA stood at 53 at project outset (source: AEWA Website).	85 by 2010	As of 14 th October 2010, 64 countries have become Contracting Parties to AEWA (+ 11 with respect to baseline – an increase of 21%)	Although a pertinent indicator of awareness about AEWA, few of the WOW Project's activities appeared relevant to bringing this about.						
Immediate Objective: Strengthened strategic capacity to plan and manage the conservation of migratory waterbirds and the critical sites along their flyways.	I1	Aggregate score of WOW Capacity Scorecard	Baseline survey completed May 2008. Baseline aggregate score from 26 respondents from the four regional training boards members = 345 (average = 13.27)	380 (10% increase in aggregate score)	Average score is (176/13) 13.54 (a 2% rise). Target re-set as 10% increase on baseline average = 14.60	Survey re-issued in September 2010 to those training board members/countries within the region that were still active and/or willing to contribute to this process ¹³³ . Only 13 replies received (50% fewer) and by default the aggregate would be lower than the baseline. The TE has therefore used average scores (retro-fitted) to offset the differences in sample size. The final respondents came mostly from Africa where initial capacity was substantively lower, so it is possible that a full response may have achieved the target. Unfortunately the data does not allow a direct matched pairs analysis.						

¹³³ An underestimation of the expected utility of the Training Boards (TBs) is largely due to the timing of Component 2 and of timing of when the Regional Capacity Development Officers (CDOs) were brought on board. The CDOs first established the TBs but then the FTK was not ready before their contracts expired. So when the TBs were established and should have been most active, there was no CDO on board to act as a Secretariat.

Aim	#	Performance Indicator	Baseline	End of Project Target	Delivery Status at Terminal Evaluation ¹³¹	Comments	HS	S	MS	MU	U	HU
	I2	The level of satisfaction with the WOW products across the AEWA network practitioners (members of WOW team database).	Aggregate score of baseline survey measuring satisfaction of WOW products (namely: CSN tool, Training Programme and website) is 428 (June 2008 – source MTE report & PCU)	471 (10% increase in aggregate score)	TE survey shows 53.5% (n=43) of national government ministries/agencies thought CSN useful or extremely useful to their organisation's work, while this was 57% for respondents from all categories (n=166), and 72.5% (n=40) for int. NGOs/MEAs. Exit survey of participants at ToT courses in Jordan and Cameroon showed 80% of participants felt the training was "relevant" and "very useful".	End survey not undertaken because it is argued that CSN survey done as part of this TE negated need and that "Sending out another survey at this point would be counter-productive and not reach the end-users". TE disagrees but too late to obtain results for this evaluation.						
Component 1: Conservation activities strengthened through the development and use of a comprehensive, flyway scale, critical <u>site network planning and management tool</u> .	C1.1	Critical site network tool makes required information available in an appropriate format for planning and management.	Information is scattered and incomplete.	AEWA Technical Committee, Ramsar STRP and 8 site managers endorse the tool.	Not yet available. No site managers yet asked. TE believes that if this is done, such site managers should not include the demonstration sites to ensure some degree of independence. PSC members (except AEWA) have endorsed CSN tool.	Ramsar STRP to consider endorsement of CSN tool at meeting in Jo'burg 30 Nov-2 Dec 2010. AEWA Technical Committee unable to endorse it until functions specifically requested (hover feature, AEWA species list in a country and site) have been added. CSN Tool will be circulated on the TC workspace at the end of November when features have been added.						

Aim	#	Performance Indicator	Baseline	End of Project Target	Delivery Status at Terminal Evaluation ¹³¹	Comments	HS	S	MS	MU	U	HU
	C1.2	Number of registered CSN users	0	At least 100	No registration function added. As of 14 th October 2010, there had been 2,950 unique visits from 116 countries / territories.	Decision taken to avoid registration function so as not to hinder dissemination of the CSN tool.						
	C1.3	Evidence that registered CSN users are <i>repeatedly</i> using the tool.	N/A	At least 50 registered users have accessed the tool at least twice.	Results from the Google Analytics tool attached to the online portal show heavy (perhaps habitual) usage in some countries – see Fig. 3 in text.	See C1.2 above re registration function.						
Component 2: Establishing a basis for <u>strengthening decision-making and technical capacity</u> for wetland and migratory waterbird conservation	C2.1	Availability and quality of multi-modular, multi-target group regional training programmes	Understanding of needs but no specific training programmes	All four regional training programmes approved by the four concerned Regional Training Boards.	Four Regional Training Boards have endorsed Flyway Training Kit.							
	C2.2	The usefulness of the training programme.	Understanding of needs but no specific training programmes	Implementation of modules of the training programme in at least two sub-regions.	Two training institutes (RSCN Jordan & Garoua, Cameroon) have provided written confirmation that they will adopt the Flyway Training Kit as part of their training curriculum							

Aim	#	Performance Indicator	Baseline	End of Project Target	Delivery Status at Terminal Evaluation ¹³¹	Comments	HS	S	MS	MU	U	HU
Component 3: <u>Improved conservation status at sites critical for waterbirds, and knowledge is generated on how to enhance conservation across the African-Eurasian flyways.</u>	C3.1	The effectiveness of Protected Areas management at the 11 WOW Demonstration sites (total area approx. 17,332 km ²), is improved by an average of 20%.	Protected areas supported by the project do not have a PAMETT score at project start. PAMETT is applicable at 9 out of 11 demo sites. Average score of 2008 baseline PAMETT for 10 sites = 49.5.	All 9 sites have a PAMETT repeated at project end. Average PAMETT score: 62	PAMETT's submitted by 10 of 11 demonstration projects. Mean score = 57.2, a 15.5% rise.	Confusion within the logframe here. Baseline PAMETT's were completed in 2008 at start-up of most demonstration projects. <i>"Realistic end-of-project target"</i> set at 55 (under Mid-term target column not reproduced here) based on only half project left (2 years) so half of 20% target increase deemed realistic. But then end of Project target set at 62 (based on full 20% increase over 4 year period). TE has adopted lower target as more realistic and relevant (to time elapsed).						
	C3.2	Reaction from a review panel on the 'lessons learnt product'.	N/A	Positive response from 80% of reviewers	PSC decided (Oct. 2010) formally to forego a long final publication, opting for a four-page designed brochure highlighting lessons learned within the entire project and not just the demo sites. It is intended that the review panel will comprise all the members of the Steering Committee and additional individuals from core implementing partners. Provided that this group is happy with the end product it will be used and disseminated widely.	This activity will be completed in-house in December 2010. Therefore, it is not possible to assess response until it as been prepared. The TE draws the attention of the PSC to the fact that while they are free to endorse this product to enable its dissemination, if they are looking to properly fulfil this indicator, then an independent review panel will need to be constituted – the PSC's endorsement is not sufficient since it is not independent.	?	?	?	?	?	?

Aim	#	Performance Indicator	Baseline	End of Project Target	Delivery Status at Terminal Evaluation ¹³¹	Comments	HS	S	MS	MU	U	HU
Component 4: Catalyzing the exchange of information for wetlands and migratory waterbird conservation	C4.1	The number and geographical diversity of stakeholders accessing the website.	Baseline is zero as no WOW website available at project start	At least 10,000 visitors from at least 160 countries.	As of 14 th October 2010, there had been a total of 14,197 unique visitors from 164 countries / territories.							
	C4.2	No. of documents downloaded from the website	Baseline is zero as no WOW website available at project start	At least 50 documents downloaded, monthly	As of 14 th October 2010, 101 documents have been made available on the WOW website. Downloads of just eight of these amount to 3,803	Since the WOW website was launched in April 2008, 50 downloads per month amounts to 1650 downloads by the end of the Project, therefore target easily met.						

ANNEX V: SUMMARY EVALUATION OF DEMONSTRATION PROJECT ACHIEVEMENTS BY IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVES

Many of the Projects' logframes were revised from those included in the Project Document. The present evaluation matrix uses these revised logframes.

KEY:

GREEN = Indicators show achievement successful at the end of the Project.

YELLOW = Indicators show achievement nearly successful at the end of the Project.

RED = Indicators not achieved at the end of Project.

HATCHED COLOUR = estimate; situation still not complete at time of terminal evaluation.

Source	Indicators of Immediate Objective	Findings	HS	S	MS	MU	U	HU
Estonia: Haapsalu-Noarootsi Bays – Strengthen conservation management capacity								
Project final report	An adopted management plan under implementation (note: plan will include monitoring framework and indicators)	As of 30 th June 2009, all parts of the project area are covered by a management plan for the period 2009-2013. The plans for the two component parts – Osmussaar Landscape Reserve and the Nõva-Osmussaar Special Protected Area – were approved on 13 th April and 20 th July 2010 respectively.						
	Financial capacity to implement the plan	After reorganization, the Environmental Board has more staff and technical capacity for management of the site. Estonia is ratified the AEWA and became a full member on 1 st November 2008. The site is currently being established as a Ramsar site.						
Hungary: Biharugra Fishponds – Demonstrate harmonization of conservation and local economic interests								
Site visit	Agropoint Ltd. continues to operate fishpond system	Although it remains unclear as to whether Agropoint Ltd.'s operations at the fishponds are consistently profitable as a result of the Project's interventions, they were certainly still actively operating the fishponds at the time of the site visit, using the technique of organic manuring agreed in the feasibility study completed by the project.						
	Tourism grows in the project area and its surroundings during the project's lifetime	Tourism numbers show a significant increase over baseline levels. Although no independent corroboration can be made by the TE, certainly the new accommodation at the Bihari Madarvarta (Birdwatcher's Retreat) built by the Körös-Maros National Park was being used by a number of visitors during the site visit and several bird-watching groups were present around the fishponds.						
	Status of IBA qualifying bird species is maintained or improves	Monitoring figures indicate a general increase in numbers. Certain key species (e.g. Ferruginous Duck, Pygmy Cormorant, Whiskered tern) were present in high numbers during the site visit in the peak breeding season.						

Source	Indicators of Immediate Objective	Findings	HS	S	MS	MU	U	HU
	The local community will benefit from the nature-friendly fish farming, eco-tourism and nature conservation.	It is dubious as to the extent of this although external factors are at play. Prior to project start-up, the Körös-Maros National Park built a new accommodation and education complex at the Bihari Madarvarta (Birdwatcher's Retreat) about 1,500m from the Biharugra fishponds. This negated many of the opportunities available to the project associated with ecotourism through the renovation of the MME building – and rather than duplicate resources, the project chose sensibly to use the money for other things including bird-watching towers, new information boards, and a film. None of these, however, address this indicator. Undoubtedly, a fuller review and re-draft of the logframe would have been beneficial. Notwithstanding that, the project has contributed indirectly to the local economy, since simply by maintaining the fishponds as active economic units through increasing their profitability by the introduction of new management methods, the local economy continues to benefit from the jobs maintained there. New boards and the film (already shown on regional television) will increase the awareness of people about the ponds and attract more visitors. To a small extent this may bring benefits to the local economy, if only by maintaining the jobs of the 2-3 people working at the Bihari Madarvarta.						
Lithuania: Nemunas River Delta – improve the conservation status and sustainable use of the Nemunas River delta								
Interview with Project Manager and Project final report	An increase in the number of waterbirds in the demonstration site	Several degraded floodplains have been restored (cleared of shrubs and sown with grasses) in two sites of the Rupkalviai Ornithological Reserve (c. 30 ha) during July-August 2008 and fruitful cooperation with local stakeholders and authorities established. The numbers of staging waders (Lapwing, Dunlin, Ruff) counted per day in the restored areas has increased from 0 to 700 in September 2008, while numbers of staging geese (Greylag and White-fronted Geese) has risen from 0 to 1,600 in September-October 2008. In March-April 2009 the number of staging swans, geese and ducks (Whooper Swan, White-fronted Goose, Barnacle Goose, Pintail, Wigeon) in restored sites increased from 0 to up to 7,000; while a new lekking site of the globally threatened Great Snipe was recorded close to the restored area in spring 2009. Breeding Corncrake, and other rare species of waterbirds (Ruff, Black-tailed Godwit, Spotted Crake) were found in the restored wetland area.						
	Improved monitoring and conservation of migratory waterbirds and their key habitats	A new monitoring and research scheme of migratory waterbirds establish and the results applied successfully for wise management of key staging habitats of waterbirds, and included into the State Monitoring Programme. Buildings have been reconstructed for a new Bird Observatory and a new information centre on migratory waterbirds is functional						
	Improved environmental education of local communities	The environmental education of local communities has been improved through a special training seminar and informative booklets/project special publications.						
	Increased income from local ecotourism	The new facility for eco-tourists established. Public events “Bird Day” and “Bird Rally” arranged in collaboration with BirdLife Lithuania had more than 3,000 participants in 2007-2008 and of project activities were widely covered in national media. Newly established eco-tourism facilities used by more than 60,000 visitors by 2010. In 2009, the Nemunas River Delta Regional Park received the European Destination of Excellence (EDEN) Award from the European Commission ¹³⁴ . However, the TE has not found any evidence of “increased income” from this.						

¹³⁴ Launched by the European Commission in 2006, the EDEN award recognizes places where tourism is managed and supports growth in a socially, culturally and environmentally sustainable way.

Source	Indicators of Immediate Objective	Findings	HS	S	MS	MU	U	HU
	Improved cross-border cooperation in conservation of the Nemunas River delta	International collaboration on waterbirds over the whole transboundary Nemunas River delta area has been established and now the major part of this cross-border complex is a protected territory with new State Nature Reserves "Diuny" and "Zapovedny" (total area – about 30,000 ha) established in the Russian part of the delta in January 2010. A transboundary Ramsar site for this wetland complex shared by Lithuania and Russia is planned.						
Mauritania: Parc National du Banc d'Arguin – increase in equitable biodiversity-friendly tourism								
Site visit and Project final report	Increase in park revenues from tourism	This has proved impossible to achieve because of significant external factors, notably a coup d'état in August 2008 and more recently a number of Al Qaeda terrorist attacks on European visitors in other parts of the country, all of which has brought about a major reduction in tourist numbers and revenues to the country as a whole. The indicator is also rendered irrelevant by the fact that there are no reliable statistics relating to visitor numbers/revenue to the Park. However, the rating reflects the fact that the WOW Project has also worked outside of its remit with FIBA to address structural barriers to tourism, most notably by elaborating a bird eco-tourism strategy as part of a wider eco-tourism strategy incorporated within the Park Management Plan for 2010-2014, funded by GTZ, and the elaboration of a bird eco-tourism communication strategy.						
	Community members engaged in providing services to visitors	A total of 18 people (2 park staff and 16 Imraguen villagers) have undergone 18 months' training in French as well as a number of modules including ecology, ornithology, geography, history and Imraguen society, GPS and cartography, administration (law) of the Park, communication skills, and eco-guiding for tourists. Assessment of the guides' skills suggests they fall into three groups – those that make efforts to observe on their own and who display good competence in identification of species and communication of this; those that make little effort to observe on their own and whose identification of species is poor or restricted but whose communication skills are adequate; and those whose French skills remain poor and for who communication remains difficult. Only two of the guides (based at Iwik, the main tourist hub of the Park) are optimistic that there will be enough visitors for them to make a living as guides.						
Niger: Namga-Kokorou – demonstrate community-owned sustainable use planning process								
Site visit and Project final report	Management plan endorsed by local councils	Management plan produced to international standards through a highly participatory approach. Covers a five-year period with annual action plans. Process was led by project team and consultants who also trained seven local mobilisers (animators) to lead the process locally, one within each of the seven local communities within Kokorou commune. Environment committees, elected by each of the communities, worked on identifying threats to wetland complex and identifying solutions and selecting activities necessary to remediate them. Members met display a good understanding of local environmental issues. Consultants worked up committees' ideas and re-presented them to joint meetings of the committees. This is the first time in Niger that communities have been motivated and involved in doing such work for themselves and this is understood to be the first management plan written at the commune level. The management plan has been endorsed and adopted by a meeting in April 2010 chaired by the Secretary General to the Governor of Tillaberi Province and including a representative from the Ministry of Environment, the Director General of Environment and the Prefect of Terra Department which apparently gives it some form of legal status; certainly it will be integrated into the Department Development Plan.						

Source	Indicators of Immediate Objective	Findings	HS	S	MS	MU	U	HU
	Signs of replication efforts locally and nation-wide	Seemingly good. Process is being replicated at a Ramsar site at Gaya in Moyen Niger Province in a project started in 2009. Wetland development is considered very important by the new Government which is supporting these activities through full integration into its rural development strategy. In 2010, funding was received from UNDP to develop management plans for two more Ramsar sites within the country and the current model will provide the basis for these.						
	Evidence that donors/government willing to support the implementation of the management plan	This remains to be seen. A donor round table meeting was held on 8 th March 2010 attended by Wetlands International, WWF, government and academic agencies, and a number of national NGOs to look at funding various activities within the management plan, but with no concrete results. A second meeting is planned. However, there is general agreement amongst actors and stakeholders that all interventions in the area will now take cognisance of the management plan, thereby avoiding duplication (or even conflict) of activities.						
Nigeria: Hadejia-Nguru Wetlands – demonstrate wetland restoration through community participation								
Interview with Project Manager and Project final report	An increase of 10% score in relevant sections of the PAMETT	PAMETT's were performed at the start and end of the Project and show a rise from 43 to 51 – an 18% increase.						
	An increase of 10% in average household income within communities in which Typha clearance was carried out.	In Dabar Magini, annual income from fishing has since doubled from an estimated 1 million naira at the start of the Project to over 2 million naira at the end of the Project.						
	A 15% increase in average fish catch among communities where Typha clearance was undertaken	Increases in fish catch have risen from 2-10kg/day to 30-50kg/day in Bambori; from 1-5 kg/day to 10-20kg/day in Dabar Magini; from 5-20kg/day to 30-60kg/day in Kasaga Baba; and from 1-10kg/day to 10-20kg/day in Matafari.						
	A 10% increase in the amount of farmland reclaimed as a result of restored water flow as a result of Typha clearance.	In Bambori, the project has led to an estimated reclamation of c. 20% of lost farmland. The estimated value of agriculture in Bambori has risen from 10 million naira prior to the project to 15 million naira in October 2009.						
Senegal/Gambia: Saloum-Niumi complex – demonstrate trans-boundary cooperation and community participation								
Project final report	Saloum-Niumi Complex legally established as a trans-boundary reserve and Ramsar / AEWA site	The Saloum-Niumi complex has been formally designated as a transboundary Ramsar site, and a transboundary management plan has been elaborated for the whole complex. The final technical review of this plan with all relevant stakeholders and technical partners took place on 17-18 th May 2010 where some revisions and other changes were suggested. A small technical committee was established thereafter (comprising officials from both countries) which met several times thereafter. As of 1 st October 2010 the final transboundary management plan has been endorsed by the Senegalese technical committee, and has now been submitted to the Gambia for their observations and endorsement, at which time the document will be considered to be formally adopted.						
	A 10% increase of PAMETT scores by the end of the demonstration project	The PAMETT's undertaken in October 2007 provided scores of 70 (Senegal) and 28 (Gambia) – average = 49. A PAMETT undertaken jointly as a single site in April 2010 resulted in a score of 47 – a 4% decrease.						

Source	Indicators of Immediate Objective	Findings	HS	S	MS	MU	U	HU
South Africa: Wakkerstroom Wetland – demonstrate multi-faceted tourism development and income generation								
Site visit and Project final report	Evidence of direct economic benefits flowing to all sections of the local community with an increasing trend during project implementation	This indicator is very weak because it does not specify that the “ <i>direct economic benefits</i> ” should be linked to the wetland. Nonetheless, the Project has established six community projects including a community vegetable garden, wood crafts, beading, bird guiding reed fencing, and wire crafts, although no evidence of the latter two was made available to the TE. Given the garden involves 17 direct beneficiaries, the wood-carving one, the bead project three, and bird-guiding three (total 24), the Project’s claims for the incoming-generating activities (IGAs) to be supporting 36 direct beneficiaries and 197 indirect beneficiaries remains unclear to the TE. The quality, scale and sustainability of the other four IGAs witnessed varies greatly – the Iguglethu vegetable garden appears to be the most successful involving a 17-woman cooperative cultivating a 4 ha plot provided by the municipality to supply high quality local produce produced by permaculture methods to the tourist hotels. The wood carving business employs just the one man (although he is looking for a suitable apprentice to train) producing good quality carvings mainly of birds for the tourist trade and for local tourist-based companies. The local bird guides appear to have been trained to a high level of competence and a ready market exists for their services. The Ubunye beading project is not so good, having suffered from a high level of internal conflict, poor rate of delivery, and people withdrawing from the group. It is good to see that since the TE’s visit that the beading project has now been accommodated in a workshop which should help it to overcome most of its earlier problems. Of particular note is the support provided to the IGAs through the business development course run by the project in the form of tools for long-term sustainability, e.g. how to develop and execute business plans, how to set-up and use savings accounts, how to market goods and services, and to integrate them into the main tourist trades within the town through the Wakkerstroom Tourism Association. The Project has developed a resource/environmental education centre at the BirdLife South Africa centre on the outskirts of Wakkerstroom, which is open to all learners and community members. This includes a classroom, accommodation, interpretive materials, trails and hides. The project continues to train three community members in environmental education to assist in providing environmental education to local schools and centre visitors.						
	A 10% improvement in the biodiversity (numbers of waterbirds, species diversity) of the Wakkerstroom Wetland by project end	This indicator is not measurable since the baseline monitoring was too infrequent and disorganised to provide significant monitoring data. However, the Project has initiated a monthly programme of bird monitoring, using the Indwe Eco-Club members. These survey data are now fed into national monitoring programmes. The latest count as part of World Migratory Bird Day in May 2010 counted 83 different species and a total of 1,280 birds. In addition, a new wetland management plan has been developed and is awaiting approval from the local municipality, along with a TOR for the recently-formed Wakkerstroom Wetland Reserve Management Committee. The Project has also partnered the Crane Working Group in a management project aimed at increasing crane numbers in the area, through education, farmer outreach, and monitoring by delivering crane awareness activities to farm schools in their local language.						
Tanzania: Dar es Salaam Wetlands – change attitude to waterbirds of key stakeholders and resource-users								
Project final report and BLI	Increased understanding of wetlands conservation and migratory waterbird issues among visitors of the information centre	This represents the only element of clear-cut failure within this large and complex project. See paragraph ?? for details.						

Source	Indicators of Immediate Objective	Findings	HS	S	MS	MU	U	HU
Turkey: Burdur Gölü – raise awareness among key local stakeholders on the socio-economic and ecological importance of Lake Burdur								
Interview with Project Manager and Project final report	Evidence of endorsement by local authorities of the principles and participatory process towards the development of a Ramsar Management Plan	Ramsar management plan endorsed by National Wetlands Committee in November 2008 and being implemented by a Local Wetlands Commission overseen by the Regional Governor.						
	Evidence of an increased understanding of the importance of conserving Lake Burdur among residents surrounding the lake	A general survey conducted at the onset of the project and then again in 2010 (to teachers and school children participating in the education programme) show roughly a 45% increase in understanding about the importance of the lake. Other stakeholders such as the families of the school children participating in the education programme, university students and government officials also show an improvement of knowledge of approximately 25%. Residents surrounding the lake are increasingly adopting modern irrigation systems such as drip irrigation.						
	An active and self-sustained network of 40 volunteers and 15 teachers is in place, regularly undertaking management activities	There is an active and self-sustaining network of more than 60 volunteers and 47 teachers across Burdur who are now able to deliver environmental education in the absence of the project.						
Yemen: Aden Wetlands – Demonstrate sustainable approaches to resource use and planning								
Project final report and BLI	Policies and practices of sectoral agencies and stakeholders reflect recognition of the need to conserve the biodiversity values of the Aden wetlands	The site Management Plan has been prepared in both Arabic and English languages, and has been endorsed by the Aden Governorate and the Government's Environmental Protection Agency, but neither of these reflect recognition by the sectoral agencies and the total lack of progress despite the Project's best efforts in getting the management plan included within the Aden Development Masterplan suggest a continuing inability or unwillingness to recognise the natural values of the wetland in the face of possible economic gains associated with developing them. Certainly the key Outcome "An integrated management plan for the Aden wetlands finalized (including by-laws and regulations) and under <i>implementation</i> by the Yemeni government" has not been achieved since it is not under implementation.						

ANNEX VI : LIST OF PROJECT STEERING COMMITTEE MEMBERS

	Representative	Institution
1	Andrea Pauly	Scientific Officer for German Federal Ministry for Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety (BMU)
2	Bahaa Al-Asad*	Head of Operations, Kenya Operations Centre
3	Bert Lenten	Secretary-General AEWA
4	Gerard Boere	Chair, Project Steering Committee
5	Leon Bennun	Director of Science, BirdLife International
6	Nick Davidson	Deputy Secretary-General of Ramsar Secretariat
7	Ward Hagemeyer	Head of Programme and Strategy for Biodiversity and Ecological Networks, Wetlands International
8	Eduardo Zandri§	Task Manager, UNEP (formerly Chief technical Adviser to the project)
9	Steven de Bie	Shell Ltd. Executive

* replaced Julie Klassen

§ replaced Esther Mwangi

ANNEX VII: SUMMARY OF RESPONSES MADE TO CSN QUESTIONNAIRE

Total responses for Q.s 1-2 = 288																			
1. Have you been involved with the WOW Project?																			
Yes	89	30.9																	
No	199	69.1																	
2. What region are you from?																			
Western Europe	110	38.2																	
Eastern Europe	38	13.2																	
North Africa	13	4.5																	
Southern and Eastern Africa	33	11.5																	
Western and Central Africa	24	8.3																	
Middle East	20	6.9																	
Caucasus and Central Asia	13	4.5																	
Other (outside of WOW area)	37	12.8																	
3. What description best describes you (please choose the nearest one only)?																			
A) National government ministry/agency	74	25.7	43																
B) Local government agency	6	2.1			1														
C) International NGO/Multi-lateral Environmental Agreement	54	18.8				40													
D) National/local NGO	70	24.3					34												
E) Site manager	4	1.4						3											
F) Trainer/teacher	5	1.7								5									
G) Academic/researcher	53	18.4											27						
H) Interested individual	22	7.6														13			
Total responses made to Q.s 4-10																			166
Sub-set of responses as per question 3 (n= 166)																			
		A		B		C		D		E		F		G		H		Total	
4.	Where have you heard of the CSN tool?	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
	Wow project website	12	27.9	1	100.0	11	27.5	12	35.3	0	0.0	1	20.0	12	44.4	2	15.4	51	30.7
	Project partner website	2	4.7	0	0.0	4	10.0	1	2.9	1	33.3	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	8	4.8
	Brochure	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	2.9	0	0.0	0	0.0	3	11.1	1	7.7	5	3.0
	International meeting	11	25.6	0	0.0	8	20.0	5	14.7	0	0.0	0	0.0	10	37.0	1	7.7	35	21.1
	Word of mouth	7	16.3	0	0.0	6	15.0	4	11.8	0	0.0	1	20.0	0	0.0	4	30.8	22	13.3

			A		B		C		D		E		F		G		H		Total	
			#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Don't know what CSN tool is			6	14.0	0	0.0	4	10.0	3	8.8	1	33.3	2	40.0	0	0.0	3	23.1	19	11.4
Other			5	11.6	0	0.0	7	17.5	8	23.5	1	33.3	1	20.0	2	7.4	2	15.4	26	15.7
5. Have you visited the CSN tool site?																				
Yes			30	69.8	1	100.0	31	77.5	23	67.6	1	33.3	3	60.0	18	66.7	7	53.8	114	68.7
No			13	30.2	0	0.0	9	22.5	11	32.4	2	66.6	2	40.0	9	33.3	6	46.2	52	31.3
6. Have you used the CSN tool for work/professional purposes?																				
Yes			13	30.2	0	0.0	17	42.5	10	29.4	1	33.3	1	20.0	6	22.2	2	15.4	50	30.1
No			30	69.8	1	100.0	23	57.5	24	70.6	2	66.6	4	80.0	21	77.8	11	84.6	116	69.9
7. How do you rate the usefulness of the tool for your own work?																				
Extremely useful			7	16.3	1	100.0	11	27.5	5	14.7		0.0	3	60.0	4	14.8	3	23.1	34	20.5
Useful			20	46.5	0	0.0	16	40.0	8	23.5		0.0	1	20.0	13	48.1	3	23.1	61	36.7
Moderately useful			6	14.0	0	0.0	8	20.0	16	47.1	2	66.6	1	20.0	8	29.6	3	23.1	44	26.5
Not very useful			6	14.0	0	0.0	3	7.5	1	2.9		0.0	0	0.0	1	3.7	1	7.7	12	7.2
Not at all useful			4	9.3	0	0.0	2	5.0	4	11.8	1	33.3	0	0.0	1	3.7	3	23.1	15	9.0
8. How do you rate the usefulness of the CSN tool for your organization's work?																				
Extremely useful			6	14.0	1	100.0	14	35.0	5	14.7		0.0	3	60.0	5	18.5	3	23.1	37	22.3
Useful			17	39.5	0	0.0	15	37.5	11	32.4	2	66.6	1	20.0	10	37.0	3	23.1	59	35.5
Moderately useful			11	25.6	0	0.0	8	20.0	11	32.4		0.0	1	20.0	5	18.5	3	23.1	39	23.5
Not very useful			6	14.0	0	0.0	1	2.5	4	11.8		0.0	0	0.0	6	22.2	1	7.7	18	10.8
Not at all useful			3	7.0	0	0.0	2	5.0	3	8.8	1	33.3	0	0.0	1	3.7	3	23.1	13	7.8
9. How do you rate the CSN tool in terms of accessibility (i.e. how easy is it to use and understand)?																				
Very high			3	7.0	1	100.0	2	5.0	5	14.7	0	0.0	2	40.0	3	11.1	2	15.4	18	10.8
High			21	48.8	0	0.0	20	50.0	14	41.2	0	0.0	0	0.0	12	44.4	3	23.1	70	42.2
Moderate			12	27.9	0	0.0	15	37.5	9	26.5	2	66.6	3	60.0	9	33.3	6	46.2	56	33.7
Low			4	9.3	0	0.0	1	2.5	4	11.8	0	0.0	0	0.0	2	7.4	0	0.0	11	6.6
Very low			3	7.0	0	0.0	2	5.0	2	5.9	1	33.3	0	0.0	1	3.7	2	15.4	11	6.6
10. How frequently do you think you will use the CSN tool?																				
Often (weekly)			1	2.3	1	100.0	2	5.0			0	0.0	1	20.0	3	11.1	0	0.0	8	4.8
Frequently (monthly)			13	30.2	0	0.0	14	35.0			1	33.3	1	20.0	3	11.1	4	30.8	36	21.7
Occasionally (quarterly)			19	44.2	0	0.0	10	25.0			1	33.3	2	40.0	12	44.4	5	38.5	49	29.5
Infrequently (half-yearly)			2	4.7	0	0.0	7	17.5			0	0.0	0	0.0	5	18.5	1	7.7	15	9.0
Rarely (annually)			8	18.6	0	0.0	7	17.5			1	33.3	1	20.0	4	14.8	3	23.1	24	14.5

ANNEX VIII: PHOTOGRAPHS FROM DEMONSTRATION SITES

HUNGARY

	
<p>One of the four observation towers built by Project.</p>	<p>Detail of tower showing excellent standard of construction. Photo shows aluminium cap on main support. Note rubber washers to exclude water ingress.</p>
	
<p>Four of the education boards produced by the Project, on a wall of the National Park's birdwatching accommodation centre.</p>	<p>Manure pile at one of the fish ponds with one of the tern platforms in the background.</p>
	
<p>Platform for breeding terns built by Project atop an old concrete structure.</p>	

MAURITANIA



Group of eco-guides trained by Project. Project Manager is back right; WI's WOW West Africa Coordinator second from left centre row.



One of the two birdwatching hides erected by the Project at key bird sites with National Park.

NIGER



Sand dunes encroaching on Kokorou village.



Over-grazing and over-cutting of trees within Namga-Kokorou wetland.



Evaluation meeting with Namga-Kokorou Community Ecological Committee.



Effects of continuing drought around Kokorou village.

SOUTH AFRICA



Inside of BLSA shop with beads and bird carvings from IGA activities on display.



Artificial wetland at Wakkerstroom Centre used for educational purposes to illustrate water cycle.




WOW birdwatching hide at Wakkerstroom wetland.



Inside of BLSA/WOW education centre at Wakkerstroom.

ANNEX IX : PROCESS OF SPECIES SELECTION FOR THE CSN TOOL



Overview of the process

The backbone of the WOW project's species list is formed by the 235 species listed on AEWA.

In addition to the 235 AEWA-listed species, 124 species from *World Population Estimates #4* (WPE4) were also considered for inclusion. Of these, 14 were discounted because they had ranges which, according to BirdLife range maps, lay entirely outside the WOW area, although some may occasionally occur as vagrants within the WOW area (Swan Goose, Cotton Pygmy Goose, Spot-billed Duck, Eaton's Pintail, Surf Scoter, Imperial Shag, Gough Moorhen, Least Sandpiper, Small Pratincole, Kerguelen Tern, Yellow Bittern, Pheasant-tailed Jacana, Oriental Pratincole, Brown-headed Gull (although could be in once the map is updated)).

Of the remaining 110 WPE4 species 3 were excluded as having only feral populations in the WOW area (Canada Goose, Mandarin Duck, Ruddy Duck). A further 12 WPE species were excluded because they are not ecologically associated with wetlands (Southern Bald Ibis, Madagascar Crested-Ibis, Eurasian Thick-knee, Spotted Thick-knee, Black-headed Lapwing, St. Helena Plover, Cream-coloured Courser, Temminck's Courser, Somali Courser, Double-banded Courser, Bronze-winged Courser, Three-banded Courser)

The value of any gap analysis was likely to be much reduced for species with only a small proportion of their global range inside the WOW area. Therefore a geographic cut-off was set so that if <10% of the species global range lay inside the WOW area then that species was excluded unless it was AEWA listed, in which case it was included, but assigned priority 2 (see below); 27 species were so excluded. In addition, there are 2 species for which there are currently no IBAs, but which do occur in numbers that could potentially trigger IBAs. These are Grey Pratincole (which has not been surveyed adequately) and Madagascar Sacred Ibis (a recent taxonomic split) and so these 2 species remain priority 1.

A further 8 species have been excluded for taxonomic reasons (e.g. species lumped together) and 1 (Aloatra Grebe) that was declared extinct in 2010. The final list therefore contains 294 species, of which 42 are priority 2.

The 42 species assigned priority 2 are because the WOW site-based approach is likely to be less helpful for their conservation, because:

- they are one of the 31 species for which we have no IBAs (because they are non-congregatory, insufficiently congregatory etc.) and which are not likely to be able to trigger IBAs; or
- they are one of the 7 species of essentially 'pelagic' waterbirds (European Shag, Bridled Tern, Sooty Tern, Black Noddy, Brown Noddy, Lesser Noddy, Ivory Gull); or
- they are one of the 4 AEWA listed species with <10% of their range in WOW (Great Knot, Herring Gull, Kelp Gull, Royal Tern).

ANNEX X: SUMMARY OF WORK UNDERTAKEN IN PRODUCING THE CSN TOOL

Outcome 1.1: The network of critical sites is available as a tool for use by practitioners to underpin planning and management of and catalyse site level activity in flyway conservation

Activity 1.1.1: Establishment of inter-operability between the main data-sources

1. The World Conservation Monitoring Centre (UNEP-WCMC) was identified in the Project Document to provide the technical lead on the implementation of this component. Two key datasets required standardisation, namely species taxonomy (which differed between organisations because of constant evolution in taxonomy) and site locations. Quality standards for both were developed and mapped. For taxonomy, it was agreed to follow the nomenclature of BLI with the exception of two AEWA species (which are not considered as full species by BLI), and a WOW Project species list was agreed. Species were split into two priorities for gap analysis, the methodology for which was developed and agreed. For sites, a review of the existing International Waterfowl Census (IWC) database for the Western Palaearctic¹³⁵ and Africa regions showed that 3,338 sites had no central coordinates, 3,072 sites had no site codes, and some sites had inaccurate central coordinates and/or duplicate records. Thus, more than 27,000 site records had to be checked individually to enable accurate linkage of Important Bird Areas (IBAs) and IWC sites, which proved considerably more challenging than originally foreseen. Standards were agreed amongst partners for mapping and the interoperability of GIS data. The existing technical capacity for the databases' interoperability was also assessed by UNEP-WCMC and the results used in the creation of the CSN portal concept. Digitization standards were agreed to take account of the EU Commission's INSPIRE¹³⁶ initiative guidelines.

2. Working groups agreed methods for linking sites' and species' databases. An interim database was set up for the gap analysis, refined, and the architecture developed and tested for the IBA database using standardised IBA data provided to UNEP-WCMC for inclusion in the test portal. Species data could be linked, but there was a delay in linking site data until revision of the central coordinates of the IWC sites was completed. The IBA database was populated and improved by linking the number of individuals occurring at IBAs with the relevant flyway population, and then included in the test portal.

3. Data quality rules were implemented during a web-enabled version of the IWC database to test their inter-operability. This involved a number of steps: i) IBA boundaries were digitised facilitating the process of matching them with IWC coordinates and work was required beyond the specifications within the original Project Document because 518 IBAs (c. 20% of all relevant IBAs) had no boundaries defined; ii) population data on WOW species was collated for IBAs within the AEWA region and the intricate process of cleaning and integrating IBA and IWC data undertaken; iii) WOW species' IBAs were assigned by BLI to individual flyways (on the basis of polygons produced by WI); iv) WOW species' population data (from IBAs) was combined by BLI with WI's *Waterbird Population Estimates N^o. 4* (WPE4) flyway population totals to calculate the percentage population held in the IBA network during different seasons; v) IBA population, WI flyway, and species/country distribution information from the World Bird Database (WBDB) were combined using standards to identify priority populations by season for individual countries; vi) IBA, IWC, and Ramsar site information were combined with the layer on wetlands and mapped to enable gaps in the network to be analysed at Western and Central Africa, Central Asia and Caucasus, and Middle East regional workshops. At these workshops, IBA population, WI flyway, and species/country distribution information from the WBDB were combined using standards to identify priority populations by season for individual countries. Names for flyway shape files were replaced with codes to facilitate storage and linkage of data behind the CSN Tool, and reduce the chance of errors. As a result of testing, it was found that linking species, populations, and flyway polygons had to be revised and a new coding system for populations needed

¹³⁵ Europe, Central Asia, Middle East and North Africa

¹³⁶ The INSPIRE Directive came into force in May 2007 and established an infrastructure for 34 spatial data themes, specified through technical implementing rules, needed for environmental applications, based on the infrastructures for spatial information established and operated by the 27 EU Member States.

development in collaboration with BLI. Attribute tables for all 753 flyway polygons were populated with key data and standardised to allow linkage with other data in the CSN tool. All the underlying datasets and the critical network are now fully interoperable, and the CSN tool is able to query underlying data and the critical site network without issue.

Activity 1.1 2: Collection of spatial site reference data as a basis for database linkage in the site network

4. All site information within the IWC and IBA databases was fully digitized, and it is expected that a full set of site descriptions will be available by the end of the project in December 2010. This process proved to be far more difficult than anticipated. The boundary and coordinate information for more than 25,000 sites in the IWC dataset all had to be checked manually. Much of this task was delegated to the regional centres of the WOW project, and respective Flyway Officers assisted with the digitization process using a simple Google Earth based mapping tool supported by clear instructions. In spite of best efforts and considerable goodwill, only a few countries were able to provide a full set of IWC site boundary shape files. As a result, it was decided to use a hybrid of central coordinates, which were validated for all IWC sites in 125 territories through IWC country coordinators and other experts, and use the corresponding IBA boundaries, for which a larger proportion had already been digitized. UNEP-WCMC produced national maps with IBA, IWC, and Ramsar sites as well as location of major wetlands for all countries from the four priority sub-regions. Available IBA data was checked and verified to minimise errors in the CSN tool and to identify and agree the best process for presenting data for sites in areas of flyway overlap. Some new boundary information was sourced by BLI, and well over 80% of the IBAs in the AEWA region have now been fully digitized. Range maps were completed for all species contained within the AEWA Annexes except for 15 added to AEWA Annex 2 at a late stage in the Project. The WI WPE4 table, which is linked to the CSN tool, was updated by BirdLife to reflect the updated set of flyway polygons.

5. All completed spatial information on IBA, IWC, and Ramsar sites as well as on protected areas, species ranges and flyways was made available by Project partners to the wider technical team and then given wider accessibility through the test version of the CSN portal. BLI collated the set of 753 flyway polygons created by WI, including those amended after inputs during the review process, and these were standardised in format and coded for ease of linkage in the web-portal. Flyways for all 294 species (see [Annex IX](#)) were digitised. Allocation of sites to populations was made using the hybrid method above. All available IWC and Ramsar sites as well as protected areas were spatially linked with the IBA boundaries in the CSN test portal which was designed to have the capacity to automatically reflect changes in the underlying databases. Linkage was delayed because gathering the missing IWC coordinates, and their subsequent validation, took WI much longer than originally expected, in part because of the voluntary structure of the IWC mechanism. The CSN Tool was launched in The Hague on 14th June 2010 in a side meeting of the AEWA 15th Anniversary Symposium, still on the dummy website but now using a real-time link to the underlying datasets. It is anticipated that testing and tweaking will continue for the remainder of the Project and an interactive system for reporting bugs and problems has been included. The decision on the final domain for the site is still to be made.

Activity 1.1 3: Creation of the basis of the site network by linking the main data resources

6. A spatial overlay between IBA boundaries and IWC centroids identified a first set of overlapping sites, but where the boundaries of IBA or IWC sites were not readily available, a proximity analysis was carried out to identify potential overlaps. These were checked manually and IWC sites were allocated to IBAs when an overlap was positively identified. The IWC count data of separate IWC sites within the same IBA were aggregated so that for each IBA site a single annual count dataset was available. The methods and necessary Access software procedures to analyse and process the combined dataset were developed collaboratively. Because of the delayed IWC coordinates, the identification of poorly-covered populations in the gap analysis was based on the IBA data only, but this was deemed adequate because the IBAs included the most important sites for each population. The identification of spatial gaps (poorly-covered areas) was undertaken at the regional workshops using country and regional maps produced by UNEP-WCMC of all IBA, IWC, and Ramsar sites. For each biogeographic population, as identified by AEWA, a shape file was designed starting from existing published material and following an extensive consultation process. The shape files were then linked to the species tables, and each count data at each site was allocated to each flyway through a spatial overlay. For those species hosting two or more populations, software was developed to identify the

separate populations by seasonal occurrence, as and where this was relevant and the data were available; otherwise the highest threshold was selected for applying the Critical Site criteria. For identification of the critical site network, it was agreed that both IWC data and information from gap-filling surveys and other sources would be described in a similar form to the IBA data and stored in the WBDB, including for non-IBA sites which met the CSN criteria. This removed the need to analyse the IBA and IWC databases together and allowed the team to focus efforts on the sites which meet the CSN criteria. Candidate CSN sites were identified using a database developed by WI containing both IBA and IWC data with duplicate records removed. Country files were created and sent for consultation to the national IBA and IWC coordinators. Using feedback from this, the IWC data were further analysed and refined and software developed by WI to apply fully the Ramsar Convention's guidelines on defining "regularity" of a site supporting internationally significant numbers. As designed, the CSN portal is able to reflect changes in the underlying databases automatically so long as they are entered using the interoperability standards.

Activity 1.1 4: Development of a web-based portal to integrate the data from the main data sources, to display the network of critical sites to users via the Internet and to link into data on ecological requirements of species, site use and management advice

7. Basic conceptual plans for the for a CSN web based-portal were initiated in October 2006 at the first planning workshop held in Cambridge. A second technical meeting was held there in April 2007, and plans were refined collaboratively with other partners at technical meetings e.g. presented to, and discussed with, participants at the Eastern and Southern Africa gap-filling and monitoring workshop held in Kenya in November 2007, and the WOW demonstration projects during a team meeting in Wageningen in January 2008, to garner feedback from potential user groups. A hosting server was procured and installed on the UNEP-WCMC network for development purposes. The first trial version of the portal was made available by UNEP-WCMC in December 2007 using a dummy website (<http://dev.unep-wcmc.org/csn/default.html#state=home>) pulling data from mirrors, i.e. copies of data made at a fixed time and uploaded solely for dummy use. In the finished version, data will be pulled live in real time from the databases which will be updated on a regular basis. The Ramsar Site Information Service Database was already linked live to the portal since all issues of interoperability had been resolved. In January 2008 at a third meeting in Cambridge, the data custodians (i.e. WI for the IWC and Ramsar Sites Information Service; BLI for the WRDB; and UNEP-WCMC for the World Database of Protected Areas) agreed on the main functionalities as the databases' interoperability was improving. In addition to the original Project plans, the portal also contained links to the World Database on Protected Areas. The methods for tagging CSN sites in the WBDB, and for providing for non-IBA CSN site information stored in the WBDB were developed. The process for coding and storing WI flyway polygons devised and applied to allow portal-linking. Programming continued on the basis of monthly consultation between the parties to add functionality, e.g. an online Threshold Look-up Tool to aid selection of Critical Sites; and improvements, e.g. replacing the original mapping engine to improve reliability make the site load faster. In September 2008 the second demonstration version of the CSN portal was ready and presented at the AEWA MOP 4 in Madagascar. This new layout of the portal had markedly improved navigability and provided a more user-friendly interface.

8. The work on the portal was then halted for almost one full year as the database interoperability and the acquisition of new spatial information took all the attention of the CSN team. In the second half of 2009 a new web developer from UNEP-WCMC became involved in the project and the layout improved significantly. Further consultations were held with stakeholders in North and West Africa at a December 2009 WetCap¹³⁷ project meeting in Morocco and also with a narrow group of demonstration site managers in March 2010 in South Africa aiming at promoting the tool and identifying functions most useful to site managers. The the final look and feel of the portal, its functionalities, help functions, and languages, incorporating inputs from all the meetings and consultation, was agreed in March 2010 in Cambridge. Importantly, it was decided that surplus funds under this component (which had been earmarked for, but proved insufficient to produce, a fully-functional CD-ROM version of the CSN tool) would be allocated to

¹³⁷ *Strengthening waterbird and wetland conservation capacities in North Africa* – a three year project started in March 2009 under the auspices of AEWA, focused on capacity building activities in Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt and Mauritania, funded by the Spanish development cooperation agency Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo (AECID), coordinated by Sociedad Española de Ornitología (BirdLife partner in Spain), with technical support from BirdLife International, Wetlands International, and local partner organisations.

enhancing the suite of functionalities of the portal not originally envisioned within the project document and to support its translation into French, Arabic, and Russian. All databases are able produce the desired outputs within the live CSN Tool online portal environment. Further testing, troubleshooting and tweaking of the database are expected to continue for the remainder of the project and will be concluded in December 2010.

Activity 1.1 5: Compile the network of critical sites using Ramsar and IBA criteria

9. Specific CSN Criteria were developed, derived from the relevant Ramsar and IBA criteria, to address the Project's particular focus (i.e. identifying networks of sites critical for populations during those stages of their annual cycles when site-based conservation is effective). The criteria were developed by the CSN team and discussed with the members of the AEWA Technical Committee. Two criteria were defined for identifying sites that make up the Critical Site Network:

CSN criterion 1: The site is known or thought to hold significant numbers of a population of a globally threatened waterbird species on a regular or predictable basis¹³⁸.

CSN criterion 2: The site is known or thought to hold $\geq 1\%$ of a flyway or other distinct population of a waterbird species on a regular or predictable basis¹³⁹.

At first the criteria were applied to the datasets separately i.e. to a) the IBA data and b) the data for IWC sites which do not overlap with an IBA to identify which sites to concentrate on, and then in a combined way to determine overlaps, e.g. in many cases two or more IWC sites fell within a single IBA site and so could be amalgamated. The result was a first draft list of about 15,000 sites from which duplicate records had to be removed manually, and flyway overlap records had to be allocated to the appropriate flyway. A further manual verification exercise had to be conducted on approximately 3,600 sites covered by two or more flyways. This cleaned draft list was circulated to all national IBA and IWC coordinators for consultation and cross-checking. Which yielded a small number of inputs, and another semi-automatic check was carried out through the development of software. The final list of 3,020 sites was uploaded onto the World Bird Database for online use through the CSN portal.

10. The results of the application of the CSN criteria were sent out in January 2010 for consultation to relevant experts (Specialist Groups, regional, national IWC coordinators, IBA officers, AEWA and Ramsar Focal Points), for priority setting with each national contact receiving a national list, and specialist groups the relevant species' site list. Unfortunately, the time for this activity was shortened to less than a month to allow more time on other work which was grossly underestimated, which resulted in a low response. Some additional one-to-one consultation will be required throughout the remainder of the Project to check data. Following this consultation, analysis was carried out on the number of qualifying species and aggregated proportion of populations (to identify priority sites), frequency of threats to the sites in the network and gaps

¹³⁸ i.e. species classified globally as Critically Endangered, Endangered or Vulnerable; where "significant numbers" is defined as the regular presence of a Critically Endangered or an Endangered species, irrespective of its abundance, or of 10 pairs or 30 individuals of a Vulnerable species; where "regular" excludes vagrancy, marginal occurrences and ancient or historical records; and "predictable" is intended to cover instances where conditions are suitable, and hence the species is present, only at more extended intervals, (e.g. at temporary wetlands in areas of erratic rainfall).

¹³⁹ i.e. species that are vulnerable, at the population level, to site-based threats by virtue of their congregating behaviour when breeding, wintering and/or on passage. The delimitation of "flyway or other distinct populations" and the associated 1% threshold figures follow Waterbird Population Estimates 4th edition (WPE4). In cases where the 1% threshold exceeds 20,000 individuals, or for species with large populations for which no accurate estimates exist, the 1% threshold for the population is set at 20,000 individuals, in accordance with Ramsar Criterion 5. The words "regular" and "predictable" are defined in the same way as under criterion 1, but with the following qualification – a wetland "regularly" supports a population of a given size if: a) the requisite number of birds is known to have occurred in two-thirds of the seasons for which adequate data are available, the total number of seasons being not less than three; or b) the mean of the maxima of those seasons in which the site is internationally important, taken over at least five years, amounts to the required level (means based on three or four years may be quoted in provisional assessments only). In some instances, however, for species occurring in very remote areas, or where there are particular constraints on national capacity to undertake surveys, areas may be considered suitable on the basis of fewer counts. For some countries or sites where there is very little information, single counts (e.g. gap filling surveys) can help to establish the relative importance of the site for a species. If, at any time, a site supports parts of more than one population of the same species, efforts should be made to distinguish between the relevant populations by investigating their origins and destinations, and/or the seasonal pattern of occurrence for each population using the site. If it is not possible to separate them, the 1% threshold relating to the largest population is used to identify critical sites.

in protection of site has taken place. This information was presented for the first time along with the launch of the CSN tool at The Hague on 14th June 2010. For illustrative purposes, it was determined that Iran, Russia and South Africa had the most critical sites and more than 30% of all critical sites were unprotected. Furthermore, a number of “mega sites” were identified:

- a) Gizilgach State Reserve, Azerbaijan (supporting 52 populations - protected)
- b) Lower Saxony Wadden Sea National Park, Germany (supporting 50 populations - protected)
- c) Syvash Bay, Ukraine (supporting 49 populations - protected)
- d) Wadden Sea, Netherlands (supporting 48 populations - protected)
- e) Dvuob'ye, Russia (supporting 47 populations – only partially protected, less than a third)
- f) Lower Ob, Russia (supporting 47 populations – only partially protected less than a third of the site)

Detailed analysis will continue for the remainder of the Project and will also form the basis of a CSN tool publication anticipated in December 2010.

Activity 1.1 6: Publication of the network of critical sites on CD ROM, in printed format (as a static document), and launch of the dynamic and interactive version on the internet

11. This activity suffered from a shortage of funding. The PSC kept it on the work plan pending attempts to fill this gap, and it was included in a WI proposal to the Ministry of Environment of Abu Dhabi, but this proved unsuccessful. After careful consideration of the requirements and inputs for a CD-ROM and a printed version of a *Directory of the Critical Network of Sites*, the CSN Technical team decided in March 2010 to abandon them altogether as not a cost-effective use of funds. Internet capacity within Africa and across the AEWA region is improving rapidly and the vast majority of potential users (e.g. government staff in the main urban centres) have relatively good access. The book would have been very heavy with descriptions for each of the 3,020 sites meaning only a very limited number of copies could be produced with the available funds. Even in electronic format, e.g. a CD inventory, available funds would have permitted the production of only a few hundreds copies. As a trade-off, the limited resources available for this activity are being allocated to lowering the bandwidth necessary to operate the CSN portal; improving functionalities; ensuring most of the CSN tool’s translation into French, Arabic and Russian; and adding features not originally planned, e.g. hovering the cursor on a specific point on a map will show the 1% Ramsar threshold, a “print” feature on the portal menu allowing end-users to print the network of sites of interest and by country thereby offsetting the need for a printed Directory, and at the request of AEWA, another feature showing flyways for AEWA species in a particular country will also be added. This will be completed by the end of the Project and will improve penetration among target users. One requirement of the AEWA Action Plan is a report on the networks of sites used by each population, including reviews of the protection status of each site as well as of the management measures taken in each case (to be known as the Site Network Report). The information generated by this activity will allow AEWA to finally meet this priority.

12. The CSN Tool was launched formally in The Hague on 14th June 2010 in a side meeting of the AEWA 15th Anniversary Symposium. A Google Analytics Tool was installed on 17th June after a surge in interest saw the server crash to monitor the usage of the site. In its first month, the site attracted 656 unique visitors, and by 14th October 2010 when this report was written, 2950 unique visitors from 116 countries had visited the site.

Activity 1.1 7: Raise awareness amongst practitioners, and train them in the use of the network of critical sites

13. The CSN concept has been presented as part of WOW Project presentations by all project partners as a central component of the WOW Project to a wide range of internal and external audiences at numerous meetings throughout the Project’s lifetime, in national and international contexts, e.g. at the internal BirdLife Flyways Workshop in March 2007 which involved partners from nine WOW countries; at the Kenya Wildlife Service conference in Kenya in April 2007 with over 500 participants from Africa; to the Dutch government on several occasions, most notably to the Ministry of Agriculture in October 2007; at the Waterbird Society meeting in Barcelona in October 2007, at the partnership meeting for the East Asian Australasian Flyway in China in November 2007; at the Wetlands International Membership Meeting in

China in November 2007; and at the Ramsar STRP meeting in Korea in November. A single A0-sized poster was produced for display at international meetings. A one-page A4-size colour leaflet on the CSN tool was produced by WI and published with German funding in early 2008 for distribution by WI, the PCU, AEWA Information Officer, and BLI at various project meetings and a number of external events covering a wide geographic area. The CSN tool also featured on the WOW website where a test version was made available at the earliest opportunity, and it featured heavily in the widely-distributed WOW newsletters. A second A4 leaflet on the CSN tool was produced in-house by the PCU, WI, BirdLife International and Ramsar Secretariat in early 2010. In the Project Document, it was envisioned that the CSN tool would be delivered at the very end of the Project but launch of the portal a full six months ahead of the revised Project end, has meant that targeted promotion has been possible.

Activity 1.1 8: Promote the network of critical sites as a conservation tool

14. The WOW Communication Strategy, which included the plan for publicising all of the Project's main outputs including the CSN tool, was finalised in April 2008 and endorsed by the Steering Committee. The CSN tool has been publicised in some way at each event, talk or meeting that Project staff have attended throughout the entire project. Major events and meetings were selected carefully to reach the most relevant target groups focussing particularly on external audiences, i.e. those not directly involved in the IBA or IWC data collection nor directly involved in the WOW Project. Presentations, reaching several hundred people each and raising significant interest were made at:

- AEWA Technical Committee – Bonn, Germany, March 2008;
- CBD COP side event – Bonn, Germany, May 2008;
- Ramsar European Regional Meeting – Stockholm, Sweden, May 2008;
- AEWA MOP 4 – Antananarivo, Madagascar, September 2008;
- CMS COP 9 – Rome, Italy December 2008;
- Europe's Green Infrastructure – DG Environment, Brussels, March 2009;
- WI/IUCN SSC Duck Specialist Group Meeting – Arles, France, March 2009;
- AEWA Technical Committee – Zagreb, Croatia, April 2009;
- Adriatic Flyaway Conference – Ulcinij, Montenegro, April 2009;
- Conference on Flyways on the 30th anniversary of the PA network – Latium, Italy, May 2009;
- Nordic Baltic Wetland Seminar – Turku, Finland, August 2009;
- WI/IUCN SSC Goose Specialist Group Meeting – Höllviken, Sweden, October 2009;
- West African coastal wetlands conservation plan workshop – Dakar, Senegal, October 2009;
- Steering Committee Meeting of the WetCap Project – Bonn, Germany, November 2009;
- WetCap Critical Site Network Workshop – Kénitra, Morocco, December 2009;
- Meeting of the Coordination Council for Waterbird Monitoring in the Black Sea Region – Kiev, Ukraine, March 2010;
- European Bird Census Council – Caceres, Spain, March 2010;
- CBD SBSTTA14 – Nairobi, Kenya May 2010
- AEWA 15th Anniversary Symposium – The Hague, Netherlands, June 2010.

The meeting in Morocco (December 2009) was the first example of exporting the CSN tool concept to a new project as a direct spin-off of from WOW, which fills a partial gap in the WOW Project by focusing on North African countries, promoting the CSN tool and building capacity using the WOW Training Kit.

15. The parties of AEWA reconfirmed their support to the CSN tool in resolution 4.10 of the AEWA International Implementation Task 2009-2016 and determined that the task related to the WOW Project, including the CSN tool, should be given the highest priority. A user manual for the CSN Tool will be developed under the EU funded AEWA project (co-financing) by the end of the year.

Activity 1.1 9: Production of a publication to raise awareness of key issues in the flyway using the network as the basis

16. It is expected that work on the final publication for the CSN tool will commence in November 2010 once all the functions have been added. Initially the PSC dropped this activity because of a shortage of funds, but since it can be largely completed in-house, it is anticipated that it will be produced and distributed by the end of the Project.

Outcome 1.2: Primary data resources that underpin flyway conservation, planning and management activities enhanced to include all critically important sites in the AEWA region

Activity 1.2.1: Identify gaps in spatial coverage and mobilise existing information

17. Gaps were identified for both sites and species. The geographic coverage of existing sites (IBAs, IWC sites and Ramsar sites) was mapped for countries represented at the four sub-regional gap-filling and monitoring workshops planned and facilitated by the joint WI, BLI and WCMC technical teams in collaboration with the Regional Waterbird Officers, and held successfully thus: for Eastern and Southern Africa in Naivasha, Kenya, on 17-21 November 2007; for Central and Western Africa in Accra, Ghana, on 10-15 December 2007; for Caucasus and Central Asia in Tbilisi, Georgia, on 13-16 March 2008; and for the Middle East in Amman, Jordan on 14-18 April 2008. The maps, which included a wetland layer, were sent to the national delegates to identify gaps in the current site national networks that were a priority for surveys. Workshop participants then discussed these, prioritising the most important sites to be surveyed within the sub-region, and finally at the regional level. Using the IBA database to test it, methodology was developed to calculate, for each population, the percentage of the total flyway population supported at different IBAs in each of the breeding and non-breeding seasons in each of the four sub-regions to focus participants' attention on species with particular gaps. The Regional Waterbird Officers and other workshop participants were asked to provide additional information on known sites not presented on the maps, but that might be important for the poorly-covered populations. Priority species for further surveys were identified. The results of the gap analysis were presented in a consolidated gap identification report by WI in September 2008.

Activity 1.2 2: Fill the information gaps in the data sources

18. Improving IWC/IBA coordination at the sub-regional level was discussed at various meetings. Dedicated working sessions were held at each of the four sub-regional gap-filling and monitoring workshops focussing on analysing the current level of coordination between IBA/IWC at the national level. Obstacles to better coordination were highlighted by participants and each country present produced a national action plan for improving coordination between IBA and IWC. The RWOs followed up with the IWC and IBA national coordinators to develop a plan to best fill these gaps, whether through expanding existing monitoring or through special surveys. Priority sites for gap-filling surveys were identified for each sub-region – Eastern and Southern Africa 106 sites; Western and Central Africa 106; Caucasus and Central Asia 41; and Middle East 42. Given the shortage of funding, the PSC decided that the Project should neither provide additional funds to, or focus fund-raising efforts on, additional gap-filling efforts but use only existing earmarked funds until they were exhausted. As a result, the Regional Waterbird Officers continuing to implement a gap-filling strategy but the priority shifted away from filling gaps of unexplored areas with anticipated significant concentrations of migratory birds could exist, to building the monitoring capacity to survey underexplored sites already included in the CSN to enhance the quality of data already in the tool. This strategy was deemed more effective in ensuring the long-term quality of data on which the portal is based.

19. Surveys were performed in January 2007 to cover approximately 80 of these sites in East and West Africa and Central Asia, mainly using additional co-funding (US\$ 75,000) mobilized by WI and focusing on some of the obvious gaps in coverage emerging from the initial stages of CSN development. Within Africa field censuses were implemented at c. 70 sites in nine countries thus – Angola (2 sites); Congo (1); Cameroon (c. 10); Kenya (c. 5); Eritrea (c. 5); Ethiopia: (c. 25); Sudan (c. 10); Malawi (c. 5); and Nigeria (c. 5). An additional € 12,000 was mobilized by WI for census work in Central Asia in January 2008, coordinated through the WI Moscow office covering the Caspian coast in Russia and Azerbaijan (c. 20 sites between the two countries), Uzbekistan (2 sites) and Armenia (1 site). In 2008 in Africa, surveys were

carried out in Togo (18 sites), Senegal (17 sites), Benin and Niger (16 sites each), Democratic Republic of Congo (14 sites), Guinea (eight sites), Gabon (seven sites), Côte d'Ivoire and Somaliland (five sites each), Kenya (two sites), and Burundi, Madagascar, Rwanda, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, (one site each).

Activity 1.3.1: Harmonizing and strengthening data gathering capacity, thus ensuring better compatibility between and sustainability of monitoring networks

20. The WI and BLI team produced a review paper on waterbird and an analysis of overlap in people/organizations involved in IBA and IWC monitoring in the AEWA region, focussing on harmonising coordination between the two. Participants at the sub-regional gap-identification and monitoring workshops produced national action plans to improve coordination between the two schemes. These, together with the fact that both IBA and IWC monitoring manuals already contained reference to each other, meant no further manuals were deemed necessary. Improved integration will be achieved through better coordination at national and other appropriate levels, and a draft form combining requirements of the two schemes has been suggested by the BirdLife Africa Secretariat.

Activity 1.3.2: Strengthening capacity for data gathering and monitoring

Monitoring manuals were no longer deemed required. Sub-regional surveys to provide training on integrating monitoring activities were implemented in the Lake Chad region by ONCFS (a planned in-kind contribution to the Project with small GEF and WI support) in 2005/06, 2006/07 and 2007/08. ONCFS produced a leaflet with information about these counts. The WI partner, WIWO, also conducted censuses in Oman and, in collaboration with WI, in southern Sudan. In December 2008, the PSC decided that all funds allocated for fieldwork were to be used also for training, hence training courses on waterbird and wetland monitoring were undertaken in December 2009 in a) the Central African Republic (18 people trained) by the WI Africa Office and b) Mozambique by WI and BLI (14 people trained). In January-February 2010, surveys with strong training components were conducted in Central Africa Republic (6 sites), Benin (23 sites), Guinean (13 sites), Guinea Bissau, Senegal, Somalia, Rwanda, Zimbabwe, Iraq (2 trained) and Syria (1 trained). A training course planned for southern Sudan in March 2010 had to be postponed because of security concerns. A further training course was carried out also in Mauritius (14 people trained). In 2009 in Central Asia, the main gap was the Russian Arctic. Since it would have been impossible to cover the entire area, a detailed inventory of the areas surveyed in Russian Arctic during last 15-20 years was carried out. Field surveys were conducted in the Bukhara region of Uzbekistan, as part of the IWC work. This covered a range of artificial wetlands which were known to be important wintering sites for migratory waterbirds and local volunteers (3) were trained. Surveys were also carried out in Kazakhstan (5 sites, 2 trained), Uzbekistan (3 sites, 5 trained) and Turkmenistan (3 sites, 5 trained) in cooperation with the ACBK.

Activity 1.3.3: Provide materials and equipment to facilitate and assist the training and data collection

21. The planned development and printing of a field guide in Russian was dropped from the main work plan by the PSC because of a shortage of AEWA funding. However, a significant amount of optical and other equipment was provided to stakeholders. Six telescopes with tripods and 75 binoculars funded by BfN, were purchased by WI and shipped to the East and West Africa sub-regional WOW centres in Nairobi and Dakar for distribution. Five additional binoculars and other field equipment (e.g. waders, boots, torches) were bought and delivered directly to Nigeria by WI staff on mission. During the four gap-filling and monitoring workshops, second-hand pairs of binoculars were provided by BirdLife from the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds' (UK) scheme to the Regional Centre in East Africa to distribute to participant countries. An additional 30 pieces of optical equipment were purchased by WI for Eastern and Southern, and Western and Central Africa, using BfN funds. Three new scopes, several second hand binoculars and 25 copies of *Birds of Africa South of Sahara* were acquired for East Africa and delivered through the UN Diplomatic Pouch system to avoid loss of material and time while clearing customs. Three telescope eye-pieces and 800 copies of the ONCFS field guide to the waterbirds in West Africa (the books provided as in-kind contribution) were acquired and distributed. However, the planned development and printing of a field guide in Russian was dropped from the main work plan by the PSC because of a shortage of AEWA funding.

Outcome 1.4: Species and critical site knowledge base supports management and planning decision-making in flyway conservation

Activity 1.4.1: Compile existing ecological knowledge

22. A contract was issued by WI to BirdLife International to compile a review of existing knowledge on species' migratory characteristics, site function, and population delimitation. The task turned out to be more time-consuming than expected and extension was agreed. The ecological content of the web portal was agreed in August 2007 and compiled for a small number of species as a test template. A literature review of the ecological requirements (habitat, diet, behaviour, breeding site, and migration patterns) was completed for all 294 species included on the CSN tool. Clear guidance for site managers on habitat management emerged as a gap in available information for most species.

Activity 1.4.2: Facilitate research to cover the gaps in knowledge of the use of sites by migratory waterbirds and of population limitation

23. In the light of the shortage of AEWA funding this activity was dropped from the Project.

ANNEX XI: MEMBERSHIP OF THE REGIONAL TRAINING BOARDS

EASTERN AND SOUTHERN AFRICA

- BirdLife Africa Partnership Secretariat
- College of African Wildlife Management – Mweka, Tanzania
- Kenya Wildlife Service Training Institute – Kenya
- Makerere University - Uganda
- Nile Basin Initiative
- Ramsar Convention Secretariat
- University of Addis Ababa - Ethiopia
- University of Cape Town – South Africa
- Wetlands International East Africa Focal Point

WESTERN AND CENTRAL AFRICA

- Agence Béninoise pour l'Environnement
- BirdLife Africa Partnership Secretariat (West Africa)
- Centre Forestier de Recyclage de Thiès – Senegal
- Gambia River Basin Organization
- GIPS/WAR (Groupe d'Initiatives pour le Progrès Social/WAR) -Senegal
- Global Water Partnership West Africa
- IUCN West Africa Programme
- Wetlands International Africa Programme
- Wildlife College – Garua, Cameroon
- Wildlife Management Office of the Federal Department of Environment, Housing and Urban Development - Nigeria
- WWF Programme for Western Africa – Regional Coordination Office

MIDDLE EAST

- Bahrain Natural History Society
- BirdLife Middle East Partnership Secretariat
- MedWet Secretariat - Greece
- Ministry of Environment – Syria
- National Commission for Wildlife Conservation and Development - Saudi Arabia
- Nature Iraq
- Ramsar Regional Training Centre – Iran
- Royal Society for Conservation of Nature – Jordan
- Yemen Society for the Protection of Wildlife

Observers:

- Abu-Dhabi Development Agency
- Oman Environment Society

CENTRAL ASIA AND CAUCASUS

- AEWAS Secretariat
- Armenian Society for the Protection of Birds
- Association for the Conservation of Biodiversity of Kazakhstan
- Azerbaijan Ornithological Society
- IUCN Programme Office for the Southern Caucasus – Georgia
- Khazar Wetlands Project in Turkmenistan
- Ministry of Environment – Azerbaijan

- Ministry of Environment – Russia
- Ministry of Environment Protection and Nature Resources of Georgia
- UNDP/GEF Uzbekistan project
- Uzbek Society for the Protection of Birds
- Wetlands International Russia Office

ANNEX XII: BRIEF CV OF EVALUATOR

Phillip Edwards is an ecological and environmental consultant with 26 years' experience in both the private and international development sectors whose clients include the world's major development agencies (World Bank, UNDP, UNEP, UNIDO, IFAD, ADB), international conservation organisations (IUCN, Wetlands International), and private companies (British Petroleum). He is a specialist in strategic conservation planning, project/programme planning and evaluation, particularly those involving biodiversity and protected area management, sustainable land management issues, as well as in environmental impact assessment of industrial and development projects. He has wide international experience having visited 82 countries and worked in 40. He obtained a first class honours degree in zoology from the University of Wales and a doctorate in ornithology from the Edward Grey Institute for Field Ornithology, Oxford University. He was elected a Fellow of the Institute of Ecology and Environmental Management (UK) in 1997 in recognition of an outstanding contribution to the practice of ecology and environmental management.

ANNEX XIII: EVALUATION OFFICE'S COMMENTARY AND ASSESSMENT OF THE EVALUATION REPORT

UNEP EOU Assessment of project ratings and performance using the Terminal Evaluation report for the project entitled “Enhancing Conservation of the Critical Network of Sites required by Migratory Waterbirds on the African/Eurasian Flyways - Wings Over Wetlands”
Project Number: IMIS: GFL-2328-2712-4907 & PIMS: GF/6010-06-03

Criterion	Evaluator's Rating	UNEP Evaluation Office Rating	Evaluation Office's Summary Comments
A. Attainment of project objectives and results (overall rating) Sub criteria (below)	S	S	EO Concurs with the evaluators assessment and rating
A. 1. Effectiveness - overall likelihood of impact achievement (ROTI rating)	S BB to C – likely to unlikely	S	EO Concurs with the RoTI analysis presented and the evaluators overall assessment and rating
A. 2. Relevance	MS	MS	EO Concurs with the evaluators assessment and rating
A. 3. Cost-effectiveness	HS	HS	EO Concurs with the evaluators assessment and rating
B. Sustainability of Project outcomes (overall rating) Sub criteria (below)	ML	ML	EO Concurs with the evaluators assessment and rating
B. 1. Financial	ML	ML	EO Concurs with the evaluators assessment and rating
B. 2. Socio-political	L	L	EO Concurs with the evaluators assessment and rating
B. 3. Institutional framework and governance	L	L	EO Concurs with the evaluators assessment and rating
B. 4. Environmental	n/a	n/a	EO Concurs with the evaluators assessment and rating
C. Catalytic Role	HS	HS	EO Concurs with the evaluators assessment and rating
D. Stakeholders involvement	HS	HS	EO Concurs with the evaluators assessment and rating
E. Country ownership / driven-ness	MS	MS	EO Concurs with the evaluators assessment and rating
F. Achievement of outputs and activities	S	S	EO Concurs with the evaluators assessment and rating
G. Preparation and readiness	HU	HU	EO Concurs with the evaluators assessment and rating
H. Implementation approach	S	S	EO Concurs with the evaluators assessment and rating
I. Financial planning	HS	HS	EO Concurs with the evaluators assessment and rating
J. Monitoring and Evaluation (overall rating) Sub criteria (below)	MU	MU	EO Concurs with the evaluators assessment and rating
E. 1. M&E Design	U	U	EO Concurs with the evaluators assessment and rating
E. 2. M&E Plan Implementation (use for adaptive management)	MS	MS	EO Concurs with the evaluators assessment and rating
E. 3. Budgeting and Funding for M&E activities	MU	MU	EO Concurs with the evaluators assessment and rating
K. UNEP Supervision and backstopping	MS	MS	EO Concurs with the evaluators assessment and rating

Checklist of compliance with EOU's normal operating procedures for the evaluation process

Compliance issue	Yes	No	N/A
1. Were the TORs shared with the implementing and executing agencies and agreed by all parties	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2. Was the final selection of the preferred evaluator made by EO?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3. Were the details of the evaluation field missions and the roles of IAs and EAs in the evaluation process agreed prior to the commencement of the evaluation?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4. Was the budget for the evaluation agreed and approved prior to initiation of the contract process?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
5. Did the evaluator sign a contract with UNEP before commencing any work or travel in connection with the evaluation?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
6. Was the terminal evaluation initiated after completion of all project activities?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
7. Was the mid term evaluation initiated on or before the project/programmes's mid point?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
8. Was the draft report sent directly to EO by the evaluator?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
9. Did EOU disseminate the draft report to key stakeholders to solicit formal comments?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
10. Were formal comments sent directly to EO for collation and onward transmission (with EO Guidance) to the evaluator	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
11. Did EO complete an 'Evaluation Commentary' for the draft report that included an assessment of the quality of the report and EO's rating of the project based on the evidence presented in the report?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
12. Did EO disseminate the 'Evaluation commentary' to key stakeholders	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
13. Did the evaluator revise the report appropriately based on the feedback received?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
14. Did EO complete an 'Evaluation Commentary' for the final report that included an assessment of the quality of the report and EO's rating of the project based on the evidence presented in the report?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Comments in relation to any non-compliant issues:

10. In view of the exceptionally high quality of the draft and the need for speedy review comments were sent simultaneously to evaluator and EO at the latter's request.

**UNEP EOU Quality assessment of the "Enhancing Conservation of the Critical Network of Sites required by Migratory Waterbirds on the African/Eurasian Flyways - Wings Over Wetlands"
Project Number: IMIS: GFL-2328-2712-4907 & PIMS: GF/6010-06-03**

Draft Terminal Evaluation Report.

This Terminal Evaluation Report has been assessed:

- 1) Against GEF Evaluation Office's (EO) Criteria and rating system for the assessment of the quality of terminal evaluation reports.
- 2) For compliance with GEF Principles and requirements for Terminal Evaluations - as set out by GEF EO.
- 3) For compliance with the Terms of Reference set by UNEP EO for the evaluation

This assessment by UNEP EO is intended to evaluate the quality of the Terminal Evaluation Report, NOT the performance of the project to which it relates.

1. UNEP EO assessment of the quality of terminal evaluation reports (incorporating GEF Evaluation Office's Criteria and rating system).

The ratings on the quality of the TE reports were assessed for the following criteria:

Report Quality Criteria	UNEP EOU Assessment	Rating
A. Did the report present an assessment of relevant outcomes and achievement of project objectives in the context of the focal area program indicators if applicable?	The report presented a good assessment of performance against objectives, achievement of outcomes, production of outputs etc.	6
B. Was the report consistent and the evidence complete and convincing and were the ratings substantiated when used?	The report was consistent, evidence was very complete and detailed. The ratings were well substantiated. Each sub-project was evaluated but some ratings were missing from the annex 7	6
C. Did the report present a sound assessment of sustainability of outcomes?	The sustainability issues were discussed thoroughly	6
D. Were the lessons and recommendations supported by the evidence presented?	Lessons and recommendations were supported by the evidence some minor edits needed	6
E. Did the report include the actual project costs (total and per activity) and actual co-financing used?	Detailed financial information was presented	6
F. Did the report include an assessment of the quality of the project M&E system and its use for project management?	The M&E assessment was concise and clear.	6
Report Quality Criteria		
G. Quality of the lessons: Were lessons readily applicable in other contexts? Did they suggest prescriptive action?	Lessons were well-formulated.	6
H. Quality of the recommendations: Did recommendations specify the actions necessary to correct existing conditions or improve operations ('who?' 'what?' 'where?' 'when?'). Can they be implemented?	The recommendations were relevant.	6
I. Was the report well written? (clear English language and grammar)	The report was very well written.	6
J. Did the report structure follow EOU guidelines, were all requested Annexes included?	Yes, the structure was good. Annexes were included and very detailed	6
K. Were all evaluation aspects specified in the TORs adequately addressed?	All aspects of the TORs were covered	6
L. Was the report delivered in a timely manner	The report was delivered at the mutually agreed time after some delays due to logistical difficulties arranging field visits	6

Rating system for quality of terminal evaluation reports

A number rating 1-6 is used for each criterion: Highly Satisfactory = 6, Satisfactory = 5, Moderately Satisfactory = 4, Moderately Unsatisfactory = 3, Unsatisfactory = 2, Highly Unsatisfactory = 1, and unable to assess = 0.

The quality of the terminal evaluation report was calculated by applying the following formula:

Content Quality of the TE report = $0.3*(A + B) + 0.1*(C+D+E+F)$

The total is rounded and converted to the scale of HS to HU

Quality of the TE report = 6 = **Highly Satisfactory**

TE report Quality = $0.3*(G + H) + 0.1*(I+J+K+L)$

The total is rounded and converted to the scale of HS to HU

EOU Quality assessment = 6 = **Highly Satisfactory**

Combined GEF EO /UNEP EOU TE quality Rating

$(2* \text{'GEF EO' rating} + \text{EOU rating})/3$

The total is rounded and converted to the scale of HS to HU

Overall quality of the TE report = 6 = **Highly Satisfactory**