



**United Nations Environment Programme**

# **Republic of the Sudan Country Programme Evaluation**

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# Acronyms

CBD	Convention on Biological Diversity
CBNRM	Community Based Natural Resource Management
CEAP	Community Environment Action Plan
CHF	Common Humanitarian Fund
CPE	Country Programme Evaluation
(D)EPI	(UNEP Division for) Environmental Policy Implementation (previous UNEP Sub-programme)
DJAM	Darfur Joint Assessment Mission
DRA	Darfur Reconstruction Agency
DTIE	(UNEP) Division for Technology, Industry and Economics
EO	(UNEP) Evaluation Office
FNC	Forestry National Corporation
GEF	Global Environment Facility
HCENR	Higher Council for Environment and Natural Resources (Sudan)
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IWRM	Integrated Water Resource Management
JEM	Justice and Equality Movement (Sudan)
LJM	Liberation and Justice Movement (Sudan)
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MEFPD	Ministry of Environment and Physical Development
MIWR	Ministry of Irrigation and Water Resources
MWRE	Ministry of Water Resources and Electricity
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
NRM	Natural Resource Management
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Action
PCEA	Post-Conflict Environmental Assessment
PIMS	Project and Management Information System (UNEP)
PoW	(UNEP) Programme of Work
ROA	(UNEP) Regional Office for Africa
SAF	Sudan Armed Forces
SIEP	Sudan Integrated Environment Project
SLA	Sudan Liberation Army
UNAMID	United Nations Assistance Mission in Darfur
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEG	United Nations Evaluation Group
UNCCD	United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNICEF	United Nations Children's and Education Fund
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
WES	Water, Environment & Sanitation



# Executive Summary

## Country Programme Evaluation focus

This independent UNEP Sudan Country Programme Evaluation (CPE) was requested by DFID and commissioned by the UNEP Evaluation Office, Nairobi. It was undertaken from November 2012 to February 2013 and encompasses all UNEP activities in Sudan (excluding South Sudan) over a seven-year period from mid-2005. The CPE provides evidence-based insights on the positioning of UNEP in Sudan, its strategic partnerships, and the performance and results of the portfolio as a whole. Although UNEP's remit is nationwide, there is a particular emphasis on Darfur. The CPE has a balance between retrospective accountability and a more updated assessment of events and trends that will influence UNEP's future programming.

UNEP's strategic focus in Sudan has been on environment policy, environmental mainstreaming, forestry, integrated water resource management, community environment management, and livelihoods. In 2007, following the production of a comprehensive Post-Conflict Environmental Assessment (PCEA, 2007), a country office was established in Khartoum to provide assistance to the Government, civil society and other UN agencies to tackle Sudan's environmental challenges. Subsequently three projects were undertaken from 2007-2009 – the Darfur Integrated Water Resource Management Project, the Darfur Aid and the Environment Project, and the Darfur Timber and Energy Project. From July 2009 to June 2013, an expanded and more integrated single project – the Sudan Integrated Environment Project (SIEP) – builds on the experience of previous years while establishing environmental governance as a key objective.

There are four main themes to the SIEP: (i) Climate change and forestry; (ii) Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM); (iii) Livelihoods, particularly of pastoralists; and (iv) Community-based Natural Resource Management. The programme is supported by demonstration projects intended to showcase solutions to local environmental management issues and at the same time build capacity and encourage partners to take over activities once UNEP funding ends.

Methodologically, the evaluation takes as its starting point a Programme Theory (also called Theory of Change or Intervention Logic) that accommodates some of the wider questions regarding the 'pathways of change' that the programme hopes to achieve. The higher level objectives pertain to a reduction in conflict over natural resources, and the evaluation explores the manner in which the programme can be expected to have an impact in this respect. It looks at both the drivers that determine success and the validity of the assumptions underpinning this. This is important because compared to the larger operational UN agencies UNEP has relatively few resources and must therefore rely to a large extent on advocacy, degrees of influence and replication of ideas by others. In particular, its institutional support and capacity building in government and civil society are intended to instil ownership and sufficient sustainability to enable 'scale-up' by those institutions themselves.

## Key Findings

### *1) Relevance*

The 'storyline' of UNEP in Sudan is essentially one of building on the major impetus provided by the PCEA in 2007. The PCEA highlighting the mutually reinforcing dynamics between conflict and environmental degradation, thus launching the central premise for UNEP's work in Sudan: a strong evidence-based advocacy on environmental issues both within national policy and also with the UN Agencies and other organisations who have been heavily involved with rehabilitation and recovery in the aftermath of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

The three projects of Phase 1 (2007-09) did not add up to a 'strategy' as such since they were a loose configuration of projects selected by a very limited donor base. Their actual impact in the context of one of the most traumatic periods in Darfur's history was circumscribed by resource constraints and security, and therefore was quite localised. UNEP Sudan was, and still is, a project-funded office, entirely dependent on donor funding on three-year project cycles. Nevertheless, a satisfactory degree of continuity and coherence was afforded by building relationships in government through a small number of ministries and departments while retaining the same senior UNEP staff in-situ across the years.

Environmental governance in Sudan is characterised by: (i) poor inter-ministerial coordination and a lack of common vision; (ii) likewise between government and customary institutions; and (iii) legislative and institutional pluralism at state and federal levels. The entry point for UNEP has to some extent been opportunistic: to concentrate on those areas of governance where the greatest impact can be achieved. Hence it has worked on policy dialogue, advocacy, exchange visits, training and providing some basic resources for key government departments, notably in the Ministry of Environment and Physical Development (MEFPD), the Ministry of Water Resources and Electricity (MWRE), the Forestry National Corporation (FNC) and the Higher Council for Environment and Natural Resources (HCNER).

Government stakeholders constantly reminded the evaluation of other areas where UNEP could work – alternative energy, oil, mining, urban water supplies and waste management – but the evaluation judged that, strategically, it was appropriate to limit activities to the four main themes of the SIEP. Indeed, the most significant progress has been made in IWRM where the government has been most responsive to policy change, and to livelihoods (particularly pastoralism) where UNEP has found the most committed and complementary partnerships.

Equally important has been the work on Climate Change where a number of new national and state government policies have emerged, and where the Ministries of Environment, Forestry and Physical Development and Finance are now increasingly coordinating their efforts to conduct assessments in 15 states, although no outcome-level results regarding climate change adaptation can be expected at this stage. Finally, the mainstreaming of environmental concerns – and the leveraging of additional funds – within other international bodies, particularly the UN, is essential at a time when the war in Darfur has caused major population upheaval and pressure on natural resources.

## **2) Results**

**Environmental governance.** UNEP has exceeded most of the planned logframe milestones set for the SIEP in this component. The evaluation recognised UNEP's catalytic role in shaping and promoting policy dialogue, noting that, among other things, exchange visits to east Africa (Kenya and Tanzania) and South Africa were an important impetus. One outcome is the way in which IWRM is becoming embedded in national policy, with the elevated status of the Groundwater and Wadis Department within the MWRE. Another is the on-going development of National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) with the HCENR at both federal and state levels of government; this has been particularly useful in pushing the climate change agenda and should result in Sudan being able to access funding from the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. However, the evaluation was unable to determine whether these advances translate into a more efficient execution of government policy as such. Without a baseline level of efficiency from which to start – and lacking a thorough institutional analysis beyond the impressions given by project participants – we can only note the capacity and financial constraints at state level in particular.

There has been a lack of cohesion between the various elements of the SIEP, in particular an elusive connection between upstream and downstream activities. In pursuit of a more integrated portfolio, the expected forthcoming EU funding of the Wadi El Ku catchment project might address this – and the evaluation was firmly convinced that these area based models have greater potential for multiplying results across several thematic interventions.

**Mainstreaming within the UN system.** UNEP's partnership with FAO on the Darfur Timber and Energy project (completed March 2010) has led to a subsequent joint Strategic Framework for Natural Resource Management in Darfur drafted with FAO, with a focus on livelihoods, soil protection and deforestation. The collaboration with UNICEF in monitoring ground water in IDP camps in Darfur has also been a clear success. And UNEP is currently fostering stronger links with UNFPA on population dynamics and the environment through closer coordination and collaboration with the National Population Council (NPC).

There is a crucial link between UNEP's influence and actual demonstration projects on the ground. Work on physical infrastructures (accounting for about 23% of the total SIEP budget) has made some progress in the last three years. The Dams Rehabilitation/Construction Project is being implemented through UNOPS, who have a direct contract with DFID but have technical assistance and project leadership from UNEP. There have been some construction failures in the work undertaken and UNEP/UNOPS/DFID have recently approved a survey of all failed dams in Darfur so that future implementing agencies can have a better understanding of conditions there.

Within the UN country team, UNEP has had a high level of influence on the *UN and partners Work Plan for Darfur* for both 2011 and 2012, the UN planning document "*Darfur – Beyond Emergency Relief*" and the current *UNDAF*. In 2011 UNEP was able to introduce a pilot environment 'marker' for projects registered in Sudan and vet them against a set of basic environmental good practice principles. The method used here has been picked up elsewhere in the world. However, as with most 'guidelines', the marker is a self-assessment tool, not very comprehensive or thorough, and there is no monitoring of compliance (hence, no sanctions for non-compliance).

The wider concern – expressed by all UN agencies interviewed by the evaluation – is that despite the quality of UNEP's written outputs, the knowledge, momentum and promise of these documents could be lost unless matched by deliverable results on the ground. UNEP has neither the financial nor staff resources to participate fully in the numerous inter-agency technical working groups in Darfur; their influence is therefore 'passive'. UNEP's lack of status in not having an accredited representative in Sudan has become a more pressing issue as its profile rises. The evaluation was frequently informed by both Government and UN that the existing representation is insufficient not only for the kind of sustained advocacy, advice and support built over the last 5 years, but also for the entry-level political engagement that this entails.

**Community-based natural resource management.** UNEP has used the Community Environmental Action Plan (CEAP) model to engage local communities in planning natural resource management initiatives, fund small projects in recipient villages and also to bring together pastoralists and farmers in designing interventions of mutual benefit to both groups. Included in the model is a demonstration of REDD+ work. With the national NGO Darfur Reconstruction Agency (DRA) seven villages were selected for the pilot. Two had fully developed CEAPS by the end of 2011 and one more was under development at the time of evaluation. Looking ahead, the FNC has indicated an interest in developing a further 20 CEAPs in Darfur. Despite this potential multiplier effect, the evaluation found a significant disconnect between the (relatively costly) small-scale outputs of CEAPs and the upstream policy that these are supposed to influence regarding community involvement in local natural resources management. The CEAP model itself entails high transaction costs and intensive capacity building at the service actor (NGO or government partner) and community levels which might be better undertaken by agencies other than UNEP.

**Pastoralism and livelihoods.** The acclaimed research and literature on livelihoods and pastoralism makes this component of UNEP's work one of the most readily recognized. The baseline research publications produced in close collaboration with Tufts University (as well as IIED and SOS Sahel) have been extremely useful in raising the level of debate over land use, natural resources and pastoralist livelihoods in Darfur. The strategy has been to build the capacity of pastoralist leaders, professionals and

other stakeholders to influence decision making; to improve monitoring and analysis of markets and trade in Darfur in order to better understand how conflicts affect livelihoods; and to identify pastoralist-related policy gaps through a comprehensive policy review. The participatory approach has been particularly influential to the thinking and approaches now adopted by the international community and certain sections of the government.

To date, however, the project represents only a cautious beginning in the process of influencing government policy; and, indeed, in shifting the parameters of conflict-related arguments over land usage in Darfur. Some government and UN agencies argued that the academic outputs of the project –the publications and associated seminars - now need a stronger and more simplified dissemination strategy for them to have impact beyond a rather closed group of initiates.

***Cross-cutting issues.*** The evaluation was concerned by UNEP's inefficient administrative and management arrangements in relation to its own management structures. The quadrangular jurisdiction between UNEP HQ in Nairobi, DEPI (PCDMB) in Geneva, UNDP Khartoum and the country office is at best inefficient and, in some cases, directly obstructive to the programme. It has resulted in some long delays in procurement and financial disbursement, and associated reputational damage.

The SIEP project document states that the role of women in natural resource management would be improved, though there were no gender-specific activities in the project design. Gender-sensitivity training was included in, for example, the IWRM component of SIEP. Gender disaggregated data is available for various outputs and capacity building activities assert the need to ensure gender-balanced participation. Nevertheless, there appear to be no concerted efforts to follow this through, with community-based committees and CBOs where women are sorely under-represented.

### ***3) Likelihood of sustainability and impact***

UNEP's intervention logic is that attitudinal change from the top down and from the bottom up reaches a 'critical mass' when it translates into policy change and permanent practice in natural resource management. Tracing a pathway of change from capacity development, consultation and research to tangible changes in policy (and, by extension, improvements in peoples' lives) is a challenge. Unlike the relationships being developed between service actors (within Government and between Government and non-government actors) there is no monitoring information available from UNEP on progress made in enhancing trust relationships between service actors and communities. The war has debilitated the prospects and impetus for even medium-term planning and has also heightened levels of distrust between communities and local government.

With respect to financial resources, UNEP's brokering of new resources from the international community has been notable, though this has taken place within a shrinking pool of potential donors. The financial climate and opportunities for new funding in Sudan will remain limited in the absence of a durable peace agreement in Darfur. In relation to this, raising the ability (and expectations) of communities to seek funds directly rests on an assumption that the private sector will be able to respond to demands for inputs and environmental infrastructure and technology. This is far from realities at present.

Although UNEP has undertaken risk assessment, its actual outreach is (like all actors in Sudan) constrained by security and access. A reduction in local conflict over NRM emanating from the above intervention logic (programme theory) makes two assumptions: first, that non-environmental drivers of recovery and development improve; second, that other non-environmental drivers of conflict do not increase. These are large assumptions, and obviously beyond UNEP's control.

## Conclusions and Recommendations

UNEP has, through an inclusive dialogue process, raised the quality of environmental debate and policy within some key government institutions. It has also become a source of reputable and influential research backed by stakeholder analysis on natural resource management, particularly on livelihoods and pastoralism. The constraints to success are primarily related to staffing and resources, and the fact that expectations have been raised which cannot be satisfied in the current aid climate.

The continuing volatile situation in Darfur (and indeed in many other areas of Sudan, not least the border areas with South Sudan) presents major challenges to the scaling up of a programme that would rely on a degree of stability that has yet to be realised. In addition to the agreed indicators within a project logframe, there should be a regularly updated broader analysis that takes into account risk assessment, conflict analysis and a review of how the 'drivers' of change are impacting upon the core activities of the programme.

### **Recommendation 1**

*A comprehensive programme theory of change should be developed for the next programme cycle, along with indicators and a means of reporting on the drivers and pathways of change. These should include not only those indicators influenced by UNEP, but also exogenous factors that are likely to impact upon the programme.*

There is a disjuncture in UNEP between the desire to engage more fully in fragile states and the institutional architecture available to do so. The dysfunctional management arrangements currently in place between Nairobi, Geneva and Khartoum need to be revised to take into account the requirements of working flexibly and with a degree of decentralized authority commensurate with good practice in such situations.

### **Recommendation 2**

*Administrative arrangements and procedures for a country-level programme should include flexible and appropriate human and financial procurement procedures, including a stronger delegation of authority to the country level and the possibility to fast-track administrative and operational requests when needed.*

UNEP's programme logic suggests that 'influence' and associated outcomes need to be measured more comprehensively. The SIEP logframe does not capture the internal dynamics of how precisely UNEP's influence translates to policy change. The recent UNEP review of environmental governance in Sudan has helped to map out what these governance institutions are and the relationship between them. What is needed now is a more concerted effort to explain (a) how these institutions function internally; (b) how policy decisions are made; (c) how such policy is used at federal and state levels; and (d) the extent to which UNEP attribution/contribution towards policy change can be asserted.

### **Recommendation 3**

*More robust monitoring and evaluation methods should be developed for measuring the contribution UNEP has on institutional development. As well as policy changes, these should include indicators on influence, attitude change, replication, management development and financial commitments.*

No radical changes need to be made to core programme activities, but some resources within these should be redirected. In particular, a more holistic integration of programmes in forestry and water is required. The cumulative benefits that lend themselves to conflict prevention would be better served if resources were concentrated in designated geographical areas. The obvious unit would be the catchment area (such as Wadi El Ku), not least because UNEP has managed to leverage additional interest and funding for these.

**Recommendation 4**

*To avoid project fragmentation, UNEP in its next SIEP phase should promote integrated NRM projects that capitalize on the accumulative benefits of infrastructure (dams, etc.), forestry, policy work (IWRM master plans, CC) and community initiatives (CEAPs) in the same catchment area. The exceptions are those projects that are part of a larger UN humanitarian effort.*

UNEP has yet to engage fully in the 'big debates' over rapidly expanding peri-urban settlements (protracted IDP presence) and the radical shifting patterns of rural population Sudan as a whole. The attendant plethora of 'durable solution' projects emanating from international organizations suggests a more concerted effort by UNEP to advise upon - and monitor - the environmental impact of aid and engage more substantively on population issues.

**Recommendation 5**

*A UNEP Environmental Advisor should be assigned to OCHA with a view to (i) increasing the monitoring of environmental markers ascribed to participating UN agencies, particularly those in which environment is a central component, (ii) developing a realistic and independent monitoring system that can be used by agencies themselves, along with a public reporting system, and (iii) developing global methods and guidelines that can be used similar situations elsewhere in the world.*

A measure of policy commitment and sustainability will be the leveraging of environmental funds from federal and state budgets. UNEP's mantra has been that these are government-owned activities supported by UNEP. Ownership should then be demonstrated and reinforced with government strategy and budget lines assigned to sustaining these activities.

**Recommendation 6**

*Within the next SIEP project cycle, UNEP should incorporate a clear request and commitment from Government of Sudan partners towards co-funding of certain projects. For example (i) IWRM policy reform within the Ministry of Water Resources and Electricity should now be matched with committed funds; (ii) Forestry National Corporation should commit to a designated budget for CEAP expansion.*

Progress in implementing the pilot community environment CEAP model has been slow, an inevitable consequence of working in a highly fragile social environment where building trust takes time. Access and security constraints are compounded by the additional transaction costs of direct field engagement. The management of field projects is not UNEP's key area of competence. Moreover, although the link with higher policy and advocacy is theoretically ascertained, it is only tenuous in practice and would depend on a significant scaling up of CEAPs to reach the desired impact on NRM management 'at scale'.

**Recommendation 7**

*UNEP should no longer be directly responsible for the CEAP process; this is more appropriately implemented by an operational agency that UNEP should seek at the earliest opportunity. UNEP's role should be to advocate community-driven NRM at policy level.*

Despite the high quality of knowledge materials produced by UNEP, these have yet to be effectively communicated beyond the relatively small coterie of UNEP partners. There are no capacity building activities targeted to, for example, media, and private sector businesses or to schools and other educational institutions. An effective advocacy strategy might also take up issues such as land tenure, communal grazing rights and customary laws, and a more direct engagement with pastoralists.

**Recommendation 8**

*UNEP should further develop and implement a dissemination strategy to raise political and public awareness with specified targets and outputs, including the use of media outlets, logos at project sites, public opening ceremonies, etc.*

# I. Introduction

1. In 2012 the UNEP Evaluation Office, upon the request of DFID Sudan, commissioned an independent country programme evaluation (CPE) for the Republic of Sudan (hereafter referred to as Sudan) that encompasses the entirety of UNEP activities for the seven year period from mid-2005 to mid-2012. CPEs are expected to help UNEP in the preparation of future country strategies and provide lessons that can be used in the design of new operations. Although this is the first CPE conducted in Sudan, it will refer back to findings and recommendations contained in the case study review of the UNEP Disasters and Conflicts Sub-programme Evaluation (November 2011) and the DFID global assessment of UNEP's work as part of a multilateral review of its implementing partners (February 2011).
2. The focus of the evaluation is on UNEP activities in Sudan over the last seven years. These include the follow-up to the Post-Conflict Environmental Assessment (PCEA, 2007), the three Darfur projects from 2007-2009, then the Sudan Integrated Environment Project (SIEP, the only on-going project at the time of evaluation). The SIEP was designed to run from April 2009 – March 2012, though it is now extended to December 2013. It included a South Sudan component, but this was separated for practical purposes in 2012. We look solely at the (north) Sudan activities.
3. The rationale for this CPE is to provide evidence-based insights on the positioning of UNEP in Sudan, its strategic partnerships, programme design, and implementation, and to evaluate the performance and results of the portfolio as a whole. The Evaluation considers whether, in the period under consideration, the UNEP strategy and interventions were able, in response to the evolving country context, to address priority environmental governance and management issues in the country and whether the results achieved are likely to have lasting impact on the environment and human well-being. Associated with this is a review of the comparative advantage of UNEP Sudan in a particularly challenging environment, in light of the priorities and strategies of Government and other non-state actors, and good practices in humanitarian/recovery response while working in fragile/conflict states. We present a balance between retrospective accountability (2005 – 2012) and a more updated assessment of events and trends that will influence UNEP's future programming.

## II. Evaluation background

### A. Country context

4. Linkages between conflict and environmental issues are complex in Sudan. The country faces critical environmental challenges, including severe land degradation, deforestation, desertification and the impacts of climate change. However, while these may threaten the prospects of lasting peace and sustainable development there is only limited evidence to support the notion that environmental conditions, resource scarcity and climate change are in themselves direct causes of armed conflict. Much more important drivers of conflict can be found in institutional factors and the politicisation of access to resources as well as agricultural encroachment that obstructs the mobility of herders and livestock. Moreover, conflict undermines governance and hence natural resource management.
5. While some of these access issues (to land, pasture and water) are essentially local, they have increasingly become absorbed into, or at least affected by the wider political struggles of the country.

The vulnerability of people's livelihoods remains deeply embedded in the policies, institutions and processes that influence their access to livelihood capital, and in the power relations between different livelihood groups and livelihood systems. In 2012 Transparency International ranked Sudan 173 out of 174 (second only to Afghanistan, Somalia and North Korea) in terms of corruption<sup>1</sup>. An important message, therefore, is that while many conflicts have serious environmental dimensions, ways out of the livelihoods-conflict cycle in Sudan will require the support of wider systems of good governance that have yet to be established.

6. Population growth, conflicts and displacement and environmental pressures interact with each other. For example: scarce resources can be a contributory cause of conflict between farmers and pastoralists; when nomads and pastoralists lose their livelihoods they are more susceptible to political manipulation and recruitment into militias<sup>2</sup>; and displacement and encampment accelerates the pressure on local resources – an acute displacement emergency very soon evolves into a chronic environmental crisis.

### ***Social and economic overview***

7. The oil boom of the last decade led to an increased consumption of imports over domestic goods. Though some significant investments were made in physical infrastructure, little was done to support other important sectors of the economy - environment, health, water and sanitation, agriculture, industry, education, trade and productive capacity building. For example, the proportion of the population with access to clean water and sanitation is 59.3% and 31.2%, respectively, and varies considerably across states. Meanwhile, substantial resources have been allocated to strengthen the security sector in an increasingly volatile political climate where the Government is threatened by insurgencies both east and west.
8. In 2012, Sudan ranked 169<sup>th</sup> out of 179 states in terms of the Human Development Index, according to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Social conditions vary widely, with 46.5% of the population living under the national poverty level (less than US\$1 a day).<sup>3</sup> Sudan has large endowments of natural resources, but its economic performance continues to be greatly affected by civil war and related governance problems. According to the CBS 2009 baseline household survey, 46.5% of Sudanese are considered poor<sup>4</sup>. With high income inequality and skewed resource allocation in favour of the security sector<sup>5</sup>, growth has not been broad-based enough to make a dent in the incidence of poverty.
9. Sudan's medium-term growth prospects are not bright. The secession of South Sudan resulted in an 80% decline in foreign currency earnings and a 35.6% reduction in budget revenue<sup>6</sup>. Real GDP grew by 2.8% in 2011, down from 5% in 2010. In January 2012, after having failed to reach an agreement with Sudan on a pipeline fee, South Sudan abruptly cut off all oil production, severely affecting the

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<sup>1</sup> Quoted (with tables) by The Guardian online, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2012/dec/05/corruption-index-2012-transparency-international>

<sup>2</sup> H.Young et al (2009), 'Livelihoods, Power and Choice: The Vulnerability of the Northern Rizaygat, Darfur, Sudan'. UNEP/Tufts University.

<sup>3</sup> United Nations (2012), Sudan: UN and Partners Work Plan 2012.

<sup>4</sup> Central Bureau of Statistics, Sudan National Baseline Household Survey 2009: North Sudan – Tabulation Report, CBS/NBHS 2009.

<sup>5</sup> According to the Ministry of Finance some 70% of the national budget is now allocated to security and defence.

<sup>6</sup> The mining sector has been heavily affected by the decline in oil production after the separation of South Sudan. The government has intensified its efforts to expand oil production from an average of 117 900 to 180 000 barrels per day by the end of 2012.

economies of both countries. GDP growth is expected to decline further to 2% in 2012, despite the initial assumption that oil production would resume in the latter quarter of the year.

10. Meanwhile, gold has emerged as a leading export commodity, contributing US\$ 1.5 billion to export revenue in 2011 up from US\$ 0.45 billion in 2010, and revenue from gold is expected to double by 2012. However, there are growing environmental concerns about extraction processes<sup>7</sup>.
11. Foreign investment has raised substantially, much of it in the oil industry - largely by China, Malaysia and India. These countries have also expanded their presence into other sectors. Gulf Arab firms have also shown a growing interest in Sudan, especially in the financial sector and the telecommunications industry, but also in agricultural land<sup>8</sup>. Environmental damage from industry is known to have increased, though empirical evidence is hard to come by<sup>9</sup>. The release of effluent from factories and the disposal of produced water associated with crude oil extraction are issues of particular concern, as industrial wastewater treatment facilities are lacking even in Khartoum<sup>10</sup>.
12. Agriculture is critical to overall economic growth and poverty reduction, particularly in rural areas. It is the base of the country's employment with 45% of youth and 42% of adults directly employed in the sector. The contribution of agriculture to Sudan's GDP increased from 31.2% in 2010 to 34.1% in 2011 and is expected to rise further to 39.4% in 2012. Value added in the sector grew by 9.3% in 2011 and is estimated to grow by 15% in 2012.<sup>11</sup>
13. The distribution of wealth is highly unequal along both social and regional lines and subsistence agriculture remains the predominant form of employment. The Government has appreciated that poverty reduction is both an economic and political imperative. In 2011, it prepared an Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper to address the daunting challenge of poverty and to meet the requirements for accessing debt relief. On a broader level Sudan is unlikely to meet the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) targets 2, 4 and 6 without seriously boosting the capabilities of its health facilities to combat malaria, tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS, which are the main causes of hospital deaths. For our purposes here, the UNEP programme aspires to contribute to MDG1 (eliminating extreme poverty) and MDG7 (environmental sustainability). The Sudan Integrated Environment Project (SIEP) was also conceived as a peace-building initiative.<sup>12</sup>
14. As a result of insecurity in parts of Darfur and along Border States, displacement and loss of livelihoods are expected to continue and malnutrition rates are likely to deteriorate even further in the absence of a permanent political solution. State and NGOs offer only rudimentary medical services that barely meet the population's health needs. There is growing concern that the fiscal adjustment necessary after the secession of South Sudan, which focuses on spending cuts and tax increases, will seriously undermine pro-poor service delivery and the potential for long-term growth. Federal transfers to state governments, the main financing tool for service delivery under decentralisation, accounted for only 3.3% of GDP in 2011.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> African Development Bank (AfDB), African Economic Outlook: Sudan 2012.

<http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/Sudan%20Full%20PDF%20Country%20Note.pdf>

<sup>8</sup> EIU Country Profile Sudan 2009.

<sup>9</sup> A useful analysis is presented by Luke Patey (June 2012), 'Lurking Beneath the Surface: Oil, environmental degradation and armed conflict in Sudan', in *High-Value Natural Resources and Peacebuilding*, ed. P. Lujala and S. A. Rustad. London: Earthscan.

<sup>10</sup> Evaluation of UNIDO Integrated Programme for Sudan, 2010.

<sup>11</sup> Figures from AfDB, *ibid*.

<sup>12</sup> UNEP (2009), Project Document for SIEP.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid*

15. In 2012 inflation continued to soar especially with the surge in livestock and meat exports to compensate for the shortfall in oil revenue and disruption in the supply of livestock due to civil unrest. The Government put in place measures to curb consumer price inflation, including reducing meat prices and curbing currency speculation. The prices of edible oil and some vegetables have fallen, thanks to a favourable agricultural season in the previous year.

### ***Climate change***

16. Climate variability and cyclical trends of wet and dry years have been common for centuries. The desert has been subject to natural oscillation in ecological boundaries which ebb and flow over millennia<sup>14</sup>, and rainfall patterns make Sudan one of the driest and most at risk countries in Africa.<sup>15</sup> Climate change has to be seen in the context of associated dynamics of change. These include, for example: population growth; migration; rapid urbanisation; environmental degradation; restricted access to natural resources, technological and economic changes. To address these issues holistically one would need to look at mitigating the impacts of the conflict including reversing the adoption of “maladaptive” livelihood coping strategies.
17. Sudanese crop production is based on three farming systems: traditional and mechanised rain-fed agriculture – these provide the majority of staple foods (millet and sorghum) - and the irrigated sector (wheat). Some 70% of the population depend on rain-fed agriculture for their livelihoods, employment and income<sup>16</sup>. If the historical rainfall trend continues, the prediction is a further reduction of the yield for the three selected crops, confirming the expectations provided by the literature<sup>17</sup>. The consequence will be a continuing deterioration of both food availability and access to food as a consequence of climate change<sup>18</sup>.
18. The Sudanese state, however, has failed to pay adequate attention to the centrality of climatic change factors in its economic planning. The result is further ecological deterioration that compounds protracted socio-political instability. Over the past few years, and with the support of the Global Environment Facility (GEF), the Government of Sudan has prepared its National Biodiversity Strategic Action Plan. In addition, the Government has prepared its Second National Communication on Climate Change. The Higher Council for Environment and Natural Resources (HCNER) is responsible for preparing Sudan’s NAPA on Climate Change. National and international partners are working to formulate a strategic environmental framework for the management of trans-boundary waters and environmental challenges in the Nile River Basin.

### ***Current political context***

19. The Republic of Sudan faces a host of problems around its periphery, above all in Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile. When South Sudan gained independence, crucial issues such as border

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<sup>14</sup> Brooks, N. (2006) ‘Climate Change, Drought and Pastoralism in the Sahel’ Discussion note for the World Initiative on Sustainable Pastoralism, IUCN.

<sup>15</sup> Sassi, M. (2012). Food prices and climate change in Sudan: A stochastic approach. Paper presented at the Seventy-third International Atlantic Economic Conference. Istanbul: 28-31 March 2012.

<sup>16</sup> IFAD (2009), Country Programme Evaluation, Sudan, Rome 2009.

<sup>17</sup> UNEP (2007). Sudan: Post-conflict environmental assessment. Nairobi: United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP).

<sup>18</sup> World Food Programme (2012). Global Update – Food Security Monitoring, Rome: World Food Programme (WFP). <http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/ena/wfp245717.pdf>

demarcation, sharing of debt, and oil revenues and the use of the North's pipeline remained unresolved. Fighting in South Kordofan, Blue Nile, and Abyei threatens the stability of the peace, and there is on-going tensions and violence on both sides of the border.

20. Following the secession of South Sudan, a new cabinet in Sudan was formed in December 2011 led by the ruling National Congress Party (NCP). This includes representatives from 14 other parties and representatives of former rebel groups that have signed peace agreements with the NCP government. Other major opposition parties declined to participate, including Umma and People's Congress Parties. With 60 cabinet ministers, the new Government is the largest in Sudan's political history, reflecting the complexities and the political challenges confronting the country.



Figure 1. Political map of Sudan, 2013/19

<sup>19</sup> World Map Finder, [http://www.worldmapfinder.com/Map\\_Detail.php?MAP=63746&FN=sudan\\_map.jpg&MW=1200&MH=1507&FS=527&FT=jpg&WO=0&CE=1&CO=178&CI=0&IT=0&LC=1&PG=1&CS=utf-](http://www.worldmapfinder.com/Map_Detail.php?MAP=63746&FN=sudan_map.jpg&MW=1200&MH=1507&FS=527&FT=jpg&WO=0&CE=1&CO=178&CI=0&IT=0&LC=1&PG=1&CS=utf-)

21. Tensions in Darfur began building in the 1980s when severe drought drove many from Northern Darfur towards the south, increasing land competition. This problem was exacerbated by varying ideas about land ownership, and the abolition of the Native Administration in 1971/72 (reconstituted in a weaker form in 1986). In 2003 the Darfuri Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) rose up against the Government.
22. The UN estimates that 200,000-300,000 people have died in Darfur since the start of the current conflict in 2004. Some 4.7 million people are currently directly affected by the conflict, out of a total population of above 8 million. More than 2.6 million of these are IDPs and over 250,000 Darfuris are living in refugee camps in Chad<sup>20</sup>. Half of those affected by the conflict are children; of these, nearly 700,000 (the under-five population) have grown up knowing nothing but the conflict.<sup>21</sup> The conflict has diminished from the peak of 2003-05, but continues to disrupt social cohesion, including the loss of customary local governance for which Darfur was well known, while at the same time heightening tribal and/or ethnic divides that had not hitherto been problematic.
23. The 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) was concluded three years after the conflict in northern Sudan's Darfur region erupted, but it lacked credibility and did not hold, in part because it was signed by only one major rebel faction. Subsequently the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD) was finalized in May 2011 and on 14 July in the same year the Government of Sudan and the Liberation and Justice Movement signed a protocol agreement committing themselves to the Document, which is now the framework for the comprehensive peace process in Darfur<sup>22</sup>. It does not, however, include the three most prominent rebels groups in the region, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), and both factions of the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM-Minni Minnawi and SLM-Abdel Wahid), and there remain some important reservations over the viability of the peace accord.<sup>23</sup>
24. The security environment in Darfur varies between and within states. Although the overall level of fighting appears to have decreased compared with previous years, fighting continues between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and armed movements in some areas, such as eastern Jebel Marra. In other areas the security situation has improved, particularly in West Darfur, enabling around 60,000 combined returns of IDPs and refugees from Chad to return to areas of origin during the first nine months of 2011.
25. Much of Darfur remains off limits to the African Union/UN Mission in Darfur and aid groups, curtailing the peacekeepers' ability to protect civilians or monitor the human rights situation. The vast majority of Darfur's displaced population, estimated at 2.5 million people, remained in camps in Darfur and Chad. The peace agreement signed with the LJM did not stop sporadic fighting or address on-going human rights abuses and impunity. The Government, with support from AU/UN peacekeepers, has pursued controversial plans for a "domestic political process" to end the Darfur conflict.
26. In January 2012, President Bashir established two new states in Darfur, bringing the total to five as stipulated by the terms of the Doha Agreement: Central Darfur was created out of West Darfur, and East Darfur was created out of South Darfur; North Darfur remained as is. The Darfur Regional Authority, led by Tijani Sese, was also assigned a number of important responsibilities, including

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<sup>20</sup> Refugees International, December 2012, <http://www.refintl.org/where-we-work/africa/sudan>

<sup>21</sup> UNICEF (2012), Current Situation, Sudan. <http://www.unicef.org/sudan/emergency.html>

<sup>22</sup> UNAMID, <http://unamid.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=11060&language=en-US>

<sup>23</sup> See, for example, Security Council reports (December 2011, [http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2012-01/lookup\\_c\\_gIKWLeMTIsG\\_b\\_7916239.php](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2012-01/lookup_c_gIKWLeMTIsG_b_7916239.php)) and Enough Project (Aug 2012), 'Failing Sudan' Omer Ismail and Annette LaRocco.

reconstruction, reconciliation, and good governance of Darfur. Meanwhile, the influx of unspecified amounts of weapons from Libya as the Qaddafi regime disintegrated has been an additional aggravating factor in the on-going conflict. A number of rebel groups have openly rejected the Doha Agreement in order to avoid becoming irrelevant. Moreover, with the death of JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim in December 2011, the rebel group finds itself in disarray and has already broken into smaller factions, contributing to the proliferation of armed actors that are not abiding by any agreement.

27. Security in Darfur should be seen in a wider context that goes beyond the current conflict. The trio of customary law, traditional administration and government administrative structure (including its legal system), used to constitute the architecture under which security and conflict resolution mechanisms operated. Yet traditional leadership has been compromised not only by destabilization but also through the appointment of politically affiliated leaders; indeed, the capacity of the traditional system has deteriorated, weakening customary law mechanisms that helped mitigate ethnic and intertribal conflicts for centuries. The capacity and strength of government administrative and legal system which used to rely heavily on the traditional system for conflict resolution at low cost and speed, has declined quite rapidly.
28. With respect to disruption of the traditional systems, one recent analysis claims that “one of the main problems encountered by international actors, even since colonial times, is the difficulty in understanding the complexity and the fluidity of the Native Administration, which leads to clumsy attempts at simplification”.<sup>24</sup> The failure of the system has forced IDP communities to elect their own new leaders who trust neither the Government nor the traditional leadership. They have sought to engage the international community through the media, the UN, INGOs and other camp visitors. They have, in turn, established their own reconciliation mechanisms inside the camps. What now prevails is increasing tribal polarization, a trend that makes administration, justice and general security increasingly difficult.
29. In the course of the evaluation field work in Darfur many interlocutors, including Government, reinforced and reiterated the inextricable links between governance, environmental management and conflict prevention. Views expressed were: (i) the need for more delegation of powers, (ii) incorporation of traditional leadership practices into government legal framework, (iii) codification of land rights laws, (iv) regulation of migratory routes, and (v) improved water resources management.

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<sup>24</sup> Musa Abdel Jalil ,Tubiana and Tana (2012) - ‘Traditional Authorities Peacemaking Role in Darfur’.

## B. Evaluation approach and methods

### *Evaluation objectives and scope*

30. The Evaluation assesses the relevance and overall performance of UNEP-supported interventions in Sudan over the 7-year period from mid-2005 to December 2012 according to standard evaluation criteria (relevance, effectiveness, efficiency). The more difficult issues of sustainability and impact are, in part, addressed through a Theory of Change approach outlined below.
31. The Evaluation examines the relevance of UNEP's strategy for Sudan and its performance across its five main areas: (i) Environment policy; (ii) Environment mainstreaming; (iii) Integrated Water Resource Management; (iv) Community Environment management; and (v) Livelihoods (including pastoralist livelihoods and markets). The Evaluation also examines the factors affecting programme delivery and performance in terms of design and structure of the programme, effectiveness of management arrangements among UNEP, human and financial resources, partnership arrangements with Government agencies, donors, NGOs, other UN bodies, and regional bodies, and the programme monitoring and evaluation arrangements.
32. The evaluation is expected to inform the design of a follow-on project for SIEP. The UNEP 2012 programme consultation<sup>25</sup> confirmed UNEP's plans to continue its core role of supporting government policy and mainstreaming environment within aid programming in Sudan (Outputs 1 and 2 of the current project) and work with partners, predominantly in a subordinate technical role, to support the implementation of environmental best practice at state level in a few key areas in Sudan.
33. The evaluation comprises three sections and corresponding levels of analysis, with issues of effectiveness (and to a lesser extent efficiency) crossing all three:
  - **Relevance**, looking at the strategic alignment of the UNEP programme in relation to (i) the historical timeline; (ii) national policy; (iii) partners and donors; (iv) UNEP corporate policies; (v) international good practices for non-state providers working in fragile/conflict states; and (vi) the extent to which conflict/contextual analysis is incorporated in the country programme. Gender forms a cross-cutting theme and UNEP's staffing and administrative arrangements are also considered.
  - **The Results Achieved**, referring to UNEP's monitoring procedures, looks first at the two overarching themes of the country programme (i) environmental governance; and (ii) mainstreaming environmental considerations in UN programming. The four programme areas are then considered: integrated water resource management, climate change, community-based natural resource management, and pastoralism & livelihoods. Partnership issues are also considered.
  - **Likelihood of Sustainability and Impact** considers impact drivers assumptions that underpin issues of sustainability, referring to a Theory of Change used by the evaluation.

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<sup>25</sup> SIEP, 2012 Programme Consultation, UNEP.

<http://www.unep.org/disastersandconflicts/CountryOperations/Sudan/News/2012ProgrammeConsultation/tabid/106633/Default.aspx>

## ***Evaluation Matrix***

34. With respect to the three levels of analysis above, an Evaluation Matrix was designed that formed the 'spine' of the evaluation. It provides the main analytical framework against which data was gathered and analysed. The key questions contained in the ToRs were reflected in the Evaluation Matrix, presented in Annex 1. The OECD DAC standards for development evaluation (around which the evaluation questions are shaped) are integrated, as is the OECD DAC guidance for evaluating interventions in fragile states. Gender and exclusion are also mainstreamed.
35. Question 3 (results) returns to the key themes and indicators contained in the SIEP logframe. However, given that the evaluation also covers the period immediately prior to the SIEP, it is important to trace the associated contributory activities and results that led to the current country programme. There are limitations to UNEP's monitoring data prior to 2009, so the preferred approach is to focus on the effects (plausible contributions) and explanations (including possible alternative explanations).

## ***Data collection methods***

36. The evaluation adopted a **mixed-method approach**, combining qualitative and quantitative methods to maximise validity and reliability. The evaluation process applied these methods as follows:

### *Phase 1: Documentary review (Nov 2012)*

37. This phase involved a review and analysis of key programme documents, performance monitoring data, organisational data and financial/monitoring data. These included:
  - Relevant background documentation on the environment and environmental institutions in Sudan, including the UNEP PCEA;
  - Background documentation on UNEP's overall mandate and strategies and, more specifically, its engagement in Sudan, including: PoW documents (from 2006 onwards);
  - Relevant sub-programme strategies, the UNEP Medium Term Strategy 2010-13, relevant costed work plans, project design documents; Background documentation on UNEP partnerships with key actors in Sudan;
  - Country programme and project monitoring reports, including: Sub-programme performance reports, project progress and final reports, annual reviews with DFID.
  - Key partners – partner agencies, NGOs, Government engagement and contribution
  - Intended beneficiaries – who/where/why, including gender/exclusion recognition
  - Resource mobilisation – levels, contributors, changes over the period
  - Key design features (mode of transfer etc)
  - Any recognition of wider peacebuilding/statebuilding objectives, fragile states principles/good practice
  - Use of local partners for delivery - justification for selection, assessment of capacity
  - Availability of monitoring/reporting data from UNEP files
  - Letters of commendation from partners

### *Phase 2: Field site study (December – January)*

38. The field study phase had three aims: (a) To address areas where secondary data was unavailable, and / or requires deepening; (b) To capture explanatory factors and intervening variables – the ‘why and how’ questions; and (c) To integrate as far as possible the perspectives of key stakeholders – including those of the intended beneficiaries.
39. Analytical methods included:
- Interviews and surveys with UNEP staff involved in the planning and implementation of the country programme, including: relevant Sub-programme Coordinators, Division Directors and Branch Heads, the Country Programme Manager and project coordinators/managers.
  - Interviews with key partners and stakeholders, both at Head Quarters (via telephone or Email) and in Sudan, including selected representatives of UN and other international partners; Government partners (The Ministry of Water Resources; Higher Council of Environment and Natural Resources; Ministry of Environment, Forestry, Physical Development; Forestry Corporation; Council for development for Nomads etc.); Bilateral donors, DFID in particular, but also donors who do not fund UNEP-supported activities; civil society and major groups such as NGOs, local authorities, academia as well as the private sector.
  - Visiting interventions in the field, within the limits imposed by the security situation.
40. The Team Leader visited Khartoum (11 days) and El Fasher (5 days); the two national team members subsequently visited El Fasher and Nyala (8 days). The national consultants concentrated primarily on federal and state government issues – how UNEP’s programme is understood, implemented and communicated within and between government institutions. The Team Leader concentrated primarily on the relationship between UNEP and international partners (and their associated national counterparts).

### *Phase 3: Validation*

41. A 2-day validation workshop with Government, UN, NGO and donor partners was held in Khartoum in mid-February 2013. Subsequently, an advisory panel comprising invited individual experts, Government and DFID were given the opportunity to comment on the draft report. This dual process was an opportunity for response to the initial findings and recommendations while ensuring that any clarifications/factual corrections were made at the appropriate stage.

### ***Use of theory of change in evaluation***

42. In recent years there has been increasing discourse in the development community over how to incorporate a ‘theory of change’ both as a programme tool and as a means of measuring potential impact of an intervention<sup>26</sup>. Theory of change has now entered into the lexicon of development thinking<sup>27</sup>. It has yet to be used in any consistent manner by UNEP, though within the UN system

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<sup>26</sup> See, for example, Susan Nan, ‘Theories of Change and Indicator Development in Conflict Management and Mitigation’, USAID, 2010 for a useful introduction.

<sup>27</sup> A useful overview of current thinking and practice can be found in Isobel Vogel, ‘Review of the use of ‘Theory of Change’ in International Development’, DFID, April 2012.

there are precedents.<sup>28</sup>In the field of evaluation, the revised OECD/DAC guidelines will also include an exposition of the use of the approach<sup>29</sup>.

43. In this evaluation, a theory of change of the Sudan programme forms the basis for the performance assessment. Methodologically, it underpins much of the forthcoming analysis. The programme theory (of change) depicts the logical sequence of desired changes (also called “causal pathways” or “programme logic”) to which the programme is expected to contribute. It shows the causal linkages between changes at different results levels (outputs, outcomes, intermediate states and impact), and the actors and factors influencing those changes.
44. In most cases, UNEP will not have entire control over the processes towards achieving outcomes and impact. The programme theory therefore includes the drivers (external factors on which UNEP tries to have influence) and assumptions (external factors on which UNEP has little to no influence) that may either promote or inhibit the various change processes identified. For example, government institutions need adequate resources to translate enhanced policies into implementation. UNEP could simply assume that these resources will be forthcoming in which case adequate resource availability is an “assumption”. On the other hand, UNEP may be able to produce additional outputs or build on partnerships to increase the likelihood that government institutions will acquire adequate funding to implement policy. In that case, adequate resource availability becomes a “driver”.
45. Since the ‘contribution to peace’ is an explicitly stated intention of the SIEP, it is important to relate the programme theory of change to other forms of analysis. Conflict analysis/assessment and theory of change are related but distinct concepts. The first identifies and delineates a problem and its causes; the second establishes a hypothesis for how an intervention might change the context in which the problem resides, and how to measure whether in fact it has.

### ***Evaluation in a high risk and volatile environment***

46. *Security and access constraints.* The UNEP programme in Sudan is necessarily mediated by the environment described above, including security and access. For good reason, it may not follow standard intervention logics or operational plans. The main limitations to evaluability are linked to this context: security and access constraints; data paucity; volatility of context; time lags; and an inability to robustly assess impact. We return to a discussion of risks later in the report.
47. *Time lag constraints* are inherent: the evaluation cut off date was December 2012 (for results), but there were methodological challenges in accruing data (qualitative and quantitative) over the previous seven years. This not only pertains to project recipients, but also to staff and partners who are no longer in situ. Interviews were conducted with past staff members; fortunately, several current staff members and partners have been involved with the programme for many years, so continuity and institutional memory was to some extent possible.

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<sup>28</sup> In Latin America, for example, UNDP collaborated with HIVOS to produce ‘ Theory of Change: a thinking and action approach to navigate the complexity of social change processes’, UNDP/HIVOS, May 2011.

<sup>29</sup> See, for example, ‘Evaluating Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding’ , DAC Network on Development Evaluation, June 2011, <http://www.oecd.org/dac/evaluationofdevelopmentprogrammes/dcdndep/48373020.pdf>

### III. UNEP in Sudan

#### A. Portfolio

48. UNEP has been providing environmental support to Sudan since the 1990s. Sudan has participated in numerous regional GEF projects in the Nile Basin area, such as OzonAction Projects and projects on Capacity strengthening and Technical Assistance for the Implementation of Stockholm Convention National Implementation Plans, Cogen for Africa, and Demonstration of Sustainable Alternatives to DDT and Strengthening of National Vector Control Capabilities in Middle East and North Africa. Sudan is also a party to several UN environmental conventions such as UNFCCC from 1993 and CBD from 1995 and has received technical and financial assistance from the GEF, UNDP and UNEP to meet its obligations towards their implementation.
49. After the signing of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, UNEP conducted a Post-Conflict Environmental Assessment (PCEA) to examine environmental issues such as forest and freshwater resources, governance, desertification, linkages between conflict and the environment, impacts of population displacement, and impacts of international aid. The assessment was completed in 2007 with 85 recommendations and a total budget of US\$ 120 million. UNEP's work in Sudan follows up on the PCEA recommendations and the implementation of these recommendations are an impact indicator of the programme in the current SIEP logical framework.<sup>30</sup>
50. Table 1 below presents the UNEP-supported projects in Sudan since mid-2005. The focus has been on environment policy, environmental mainstreaming, forestry, integrated water resource management, community environment management, livelihoods and, very recently, waste management. In 2007 a country office was established in Khartoum to provide assistance to the Government, civil society and other UN agencies to tackle Sudan's environmental challenges. During the first phase of the programme, from 2007 to 2009, five projects were designed with UNDP, UNICEF and FAO. Of these, three were implemented to take on recommendations from the PCEA by addressing problems relating to water resources, timber and energy and environment mainstreaming within the large UN humanitarian programme.
51. For our purposes here, the only on-going project reviewed is the Sudan Integrated Environment Programme (SIEP). This is an integrated programme that encompasses many of the above themes; there is thus a degree of continuity in the country programme that has allowed for a more strategic medium-term outlook likely to continue through the next SIEP phase from end-2013.

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<sup>30</sup> Sudan Integrated |Environment Project document, 2009

**Table 1. Projects designed and implemented under the UNEP Sudan Country Programme**

	Project name	Duration	Funding	Partners
	Sudan Post-Conflict Environmental Assessment	Dec 2005- June 2007	Gov. of Sweden and UK	
Phase I	Darfur integrated water resource management Project	Oct 2007- June 2009	DFID: US\$ 0.88M	UNICEF
	Darfur Aid and the Environment Project	July 2007- June 2009; June 2008- Dec 2009	DFID: US\$ 1,1M CHF/ UNDP	
	Darfur Timber and Energy project	March 2008- March 2010	USAID: US\$ 1.4M (through UNEP)	FAO as the main implementing agency
Phase II	Sudan Integrated Environment Project	July 2009- June 2013	DFID: US\$ 27M [80% UNEP and 20% UNOPS] (Sudan and South-Sudan)  Italy: US\$ 1.2MI	Diverse Government, international and civil society partners

52. The on-going SIEP aims to further address the issues of environmental degradation and resource scarcity, sustainable and equitable environmental governance and peace building. Ensuring sustainable and equitable sharing of natural resources by strengthening environmental governance is at the heart of the programme. The core of the work comprises a range of capacity building activities, including (i) support to government officials to mainstream environmental considerations into policies and practices, and (ii) strengthening the capacity of civil society to influence decision-making.

53. The supporting demonstration projects (the largest component of which are implemented by UNOPS) are intended to showcase solutions to local environmental management issues and at the same time build capacity and encourage partners to take over activities once UNEP funding ends. For instance, the UNICEF/UNEP groundwater monitoring in IDP camps in Darfur is of vital importance to the wider relief programme, but also links to the strengthening of practices within the Groundwater and Wadis Department of the Ministry of Water Resources.

54. The main themes<sup>31</sup> of the SIEP project are:

- Climate change and forestry
- Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM)
- Livelihoods – particularly pastoralist livelihoods
- Community-Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) – particularly Community Environmental Action Plans (CEAPs)

55. The role of both Government and traditional leadership is important in managing the relationship between these components, so forums for interaction have been developed. With the SIEP project

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<sup>31</sup> In 2010 DFID and UNEP jointly agreed that the project be organised by theme rather than geographically and the logical framework was redrafted accordingly.

due to be completed by mid-2013, a key question is the extent to which these four themes have (or might) produce results greater than the sum of their parts – how impact can be multiplied<sup>32</sup>. The revised Logical Framework (including results for 2012) for the SIEP project is presented in Annex 2.

56. Some key staff and partners have, over the last seven years, produced a series of publications either under the UNEP banner or in collaboration with other institutions (Tearfund, Tufts University). This constitutes an accumulative library on environment-related issues, the anchor for much of UNEP's activity over the years, and a major advocacy resource. More recently the SIEP project has provided information and case studies emerging from research, consultations, study tours, and the implementation of projects. They then serve as models to be adopted, modified – or rejected – by Sudanese decision-makers in the development of policies and institutions.
57. The Sudan country programme is managed by the UNEP Division of Environmental Policy Implementation (DEPI), more specifically by its Conflict and Disaster Management Branch (PCDMB) based in Geneva. The programme is managed from Khartoum by a UNEP Country Programme Manager, who has the overall responsibility of the programme and is accountable for its delivery. There are also programme coordinators in Khartoum (one for strategy and one for project management), and project officers in Khartoum as well as in El Fasher and Nyala.

## **B. UNEP donors and partners**

58. The main donor of UNEP-supported interventions in Sudan during the period under review was DFID providing close to US\$27M of funding. In addition, funding has been received from the Government of Italy (US\$1.2M) and from USAID (US\$1.4M), and also some smaller amounts from the EU for individual activities, such as workshops. Sweden co-financed the PCEA together with DFID.
59. UNEP's Government counterpart is the Ministry of Environment, Forestry and Physical Development (MEFPD) that (with the exception of the work with Tufts University) is responsible facilitating collaboration with other parts of the Government, with main implementing partners being the Forestry National Corporation (FNC), the Higher Council for Environment and Natural Resources (HCENR) regarding climate change adaptation work and the Groundwater and Wadis department of the Ministry of Water Resources and Electricity (MWRE)<sup>33</sup> regarding Integrated Water Resources Management.
60. The strongest civil society partnership has been established with the Darfur Development and Reconstruction Agency (DRA) which grew from an advocacy group created in the early 1990s into an NGO operational in the field. UNEP also has (through Tufts University) collaborated with the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) and SOS Sahel on pastoralist livelihoods training, and with ProAct on the CEAP project.
61. Within the UN system, partnerships have been established with UNICEF on water monitoring and reporting, FAO on timber and energy, UNOPS on water security and infrastructure projects, and UNDP on energy and climate change adaptation. More recently, a new partnership has been established with UNFPA regarding population and environment in post-conflict context, and there is a proposed collaboration with UN-HABITAT on urban planning. These projects are further elaborated below.

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<sup>32</sup> This was one of the main issues discussed in a Consultation Workshop held in Khartoum in early 2012.

<sup>33</sup> Former Ministry of Irrigation and Water Resources

62. The main science partner is Tufts University (USA - Massachusetts) that has a long history of working in Darfur and existing connections with Sudanese researchers. Tufts University conducts much of its research through Sudanese scientists. UNEP's current three year collaboration with Tufts is on livelihoods and environment in Sudan focusing on two separate but related fields; pastoralism and pastoralist livelihoods, and markets and trade in the Darfur region.

### **C. Theory of Change of the UNEP programme in Sudan**

63. We note that UNEP Sudan has in the last two years articulated a theory of change for its key activities. The programme theory presented by the Sudan country programme in the documents "Relationships and Resources"<sup>34</sup> is based on the evolving insight of the project team that environmental governance strongly links institutional capacities to vertical and horizontal collaborative relationships between institutions and user groups of the natural resource base (see Box 1). Based on this and further reading of strategic documents<sup>35</sup> and stakeholder consultations, the Evaluation Team has reconstructed a more complete programme theory of the UNEP programme in Sudan, and has used this for much of the evaluative narrative that runs through the report. Figure 2 (next page) gives a graphical representation of the programme theory (of change) used by the evaluation, showing the results chain or causal logic from the programme's immediate outcomes up to its intended impact.

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<sup>34</sup> Brendan Bromwich, "Relationships and Resources", UNEP, November 2011, and UNEP Khartoum (2012), 'Relationships and Resources: Quality of relationships as an indicator in peace-building and capacity building' (slide presentation, November 2012).

<sup>35</sup> For example: SIEP Programme Consultation, 2012 (Workshop Report).




Figure 1. Reconstructed theory of change of the UNEP Sudan Country Programme


64. The programme's ultimate goal or expected impact is **to assist the people of Sudan to achieve peace, recovery and development on an environmentally sustainable basis**. Based on the premise that poor environmental governance at all levels (from the federal level down to the community level) is one of the main causes for local conflict about natural resources, environmental degradation and poverty, the UNEP programme seeks to contribute, in the medium term, to **enhanced governance of water, land and forest resources at federal, state and community level**. This should lead to three strongly inter-related intermediate states towards impact: **more sustainable and equitable access to natural resources by different user groups, better adaptation of livelihoods to the changing environment, and reduced local conflicts over natural resources**.
65. Enhanced environmental governance at all levels would be achieved by two expected outcomes. In the first place, UNEP seeks to build **capacity of national service actors (Government, civil society, research and academia, and traditional administration) in the areas of IWRM, CC adaptation, sustainable forest management, pastoralist concerns and community-driven environmental management**. This is the most direct outcome of the UNEP programme in Sudan, indicated as an "immediate outcome" in the programme theory. The first component of the programme "Output 1: Environmental Governance" is all about achieving this immediate outcome. The dimensions of service actor "capacity" that receive most attention by UNEP are awareness and understanding of environmental issues and approaches, strengthening of the policy and institutional framework, implementation skills and facilitation of a common vision and collaborative relationships between different service actors.
66. Recognizing that the direct participation of communities in natural resources management is an essential condition for good environmental governance at all levels, a second important expected outcome of UNEP's work is that **the capacity of communities is enhanced to sustainably, equitably and jointly manage their natural resource base in a context of changing livelihood objectives, assets and external conditions**. The programme seeks to contribute to this by demonstrating approaches for community participation in natural resource management (CEAPs), which is the subject of a separate component of the programme "Output 4: Community environment management". These demonstrations are done in partnership with -and to be up-scaled by- service actors. The programme logic, then, is that the entry point to achieving community-driven NRM is to enhance the capacity of service actors (currently NGOs and FNC) so that they can in turn enhance the capacity of communities, but the medium-term outcome (enhanced governance) presupposes a much larger scale than the current demonstrations.
67. The programme logic recognises a number of key drivers that are essential to "push change" up the results chain. One of these is **mainstreaming of environmental concerns and sustainable environmental approaches in UN and other international organisations' strategies and programmes**, to which another programme component is dedicated: "Output 2: Environmental mainstreaming". This important driver should help strengthen and up-scale the capacity building efforts of the programme both at service actor (immediate outcome) and community level (medium-term outcome), but also directly influence environmental governance in the country e.g. around IDP camps and peacekeeping settlements.
68. Another important driver, appearing at several levels in the programme theory, is the **availability of adequate financial resources** to ensure that the enhanced capacities of stakeholders translate into tangible environmental services, or for directly managing natural resources at the local level. Financial resources are also essential to sustainability and adaptation of livelihoods in a changing environment. The environmental mainstreaming driver mentioned above has a strong influence on

the financial resources driver because a large portion of financing in the environmental sector is dependent on donor contributions.

69. There are two other important drivers which are related to relationships between stakeholders. One is the **effective collaboration between communities and service actors**, Government in particular. This trust is essential if government actors are to be able to facilitate environmental management and access to services required by the community. Another is the **power and influence that the UNEP/UN supported service actors actually have within political spheres at federal and state level** in Sudan. Indeed, UNEP relationships are largely with the technical arm of Government - the quite narrow band of the technical arm of Government directly related to environment and natural resources - while environmental governance involves and depends on all parts of Government.
70. The programme also makes a number of assumptions about external factors assumed to be in place on which the programme has no influence. An important assumption is made, for instance, that **natural resource management know-how and technology (inputs, equipment and infrastructure) will be readily available at the local level for use**. This depends, of course, on the **presence of a strong service and input delivery system at the local level**, which might to a large extent rely on the development of the **private sector**. Higher-up in the programme theory, the assumption is made **that external drivers for socio-economic development in Sudan will be in place and that non-environmental drivers for conflict will disappear**, both essential for lasting peace, recovery and sustainable development. The risk management strategy of the programme takes these assumptions into account and suggests mitigating actions in case these higher-level assumptions would not hold.

**Box 1. Theory of change of SIEP based on the relationships model**

In the theory of change currently presented and used by the programme, enhancing relationships (i.e.collaboration) between different stakeholders shapes the main causal pathway towards impact. It is based on the assumption that equitable and participatory environmental governance is akin to promoting conditions for peace over natural resources. If effective, then ultimately good governance includes the promotion of good relationships at community level. To achieve this, Government needs effective relationships with communities, and a coherent approach within Government to addressing environmental issues. Therefore UNEP works to improve collaboration within Government, between Government and communities with a view to promoting collaboration amongst communities.



However, enhanced environmental governance is not only an issue of collaboration, and certainly not all UNEP's work in Sudan has enhancing collaborative relationships as its main objective. The evaluation believes that improved environmental governance (including a shared common vision) depends on service actor and community capacity. This encompasses the full range of capacity dimensions (awareness and understanding, policies and strategies, implementation skills) that need to be improved to achieve enhanced environmental governance at a large scale in Sudan. Also, the theory of change above does not consider a number of essential, external factors affecting the change processes such as availability of financial resources, accessibility of technical know-how and equipment providers at the local level etc.

## IV. Key evaluation findings

72. Findings from the evaluation are organized in three sections: relevance, results achieved and likelihood of sustainability and impact. Internal factors affecting performance are addressed in boxes throughout the chapter to provide further explanations and details on issues referred to in the main text.

### A. Relevance

#### The programme before SIEP

73. The 'storyline' of UNEP in Sudan is essentially one of building on the major impetus provided by the PCEA in 2007. Of the 85 recommendations in the PCEA, 44 were addressed to UNEP itself and UNDP. UNEP took the unusual step of establishing a country office in the same year; and three projects were launched over the next three years now clustered under Phase 1 of the UNEP Sudan strategy. From 2009 these three initiatives were consolidated and further developed into a single integrated project, the SIEP that launched Phase 2 of the country strategy. There is thus a continuity in the programme history wherein much of the baseline data as well as developed partnerships led to the greater coherence (and single monitoring structure) of the SIEP.

74. One should be cautious, however, not to retrospectively assign 'strategy' to a loose configuration of projects selected by a very limited donor base. UNEP Sudan was, and still is, a project-funded office, entirely dependent on donor funding on three-year project cycles. There was little preconceived inter-linkage between the three Phase 1 projects. Nevertheless, some continuity and a degree of coherence was afforded by building relationships in Government through a small number of ministries and departments while retaining the same senior UNEP staff in-situ across the years.

75. The 2007 PCEA highlighting the mutually reinforcing dynamics between conflict and environmental degradation, thus launching the central premise for UNEP's work in Sudan: a strong evidence-based advocacy on environmental issues both within national policy and also with the UN Agencies and other organisations who were heavily involved with rehabilitation and recovery in the aftermath of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The PCEA was one of the most comprehensive post-conflict environmental assessment ever produced by UNEP and included baseline information on:

- Land degradation and desertification, exacerbated by increasing numbers of IDPs as well as large mechanized agriculture schemes;
- Inadequate rural land tenure and the lack of rural incentives to invest in and protect natural resources;
- Deforestation, notably in north, central and eastern Sudan where two-thirds of the forests disappeared between 1972 and 2001;
- The issue of groundwater and watershed management where infrastructure has been sorely neglected and under-prioritised;
- The central importance of environmental governance, improving the operation of older and government-managed facilities, as well as influencing policy and management approaches.

76. March 2008 saw the launch of the **Darfur Timber & Energy Project**<sup>36</sup> jointly implemented by FAO and UNEP in Darfur. This two year USAID-funded project (officially ended December 2009) aimed at assisting displaced populations and conflict affected communities in Darfur in the sustainable use of fuel wood, developing community forests and carrying out a comprehensive study to address the critical issue of fuel wood shortages and associated deforestation surrounding major settlements in Darfur. About 30% of the budget was assigned to communication and knowledge development (published reports, website development, a fuel wood resource management survey, etc). Although not independently evaluated, project documents suggest that initial results were sufficiently encouraging for FAO to expand the programme beyond IDP settlements from 2010 and to include rural and urban areas.<sup>37</sup> We comment below on future collaborations between UNEP and FAO.
77. Another important outcome of the PCEA was the DFID-funded joint UNEP/UNICEF **Darfur Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) project** (October 2007-September 2009). UNICEF managed the WASH cluster in Sudan, and the aim was to mainstream IWRM into decision making at all levels in order to promote sustainable use of water resources in Darfur. The project was supplemented by UNEP research<sup>38</sup> that in turn built on research by Tearfund.<sup>39</sup> Substantial support was also provided by Oxfam. The first component was to provide a technical helpdesk on water resources with a focus on water security for displaced populations. Beyond this, UNEP provided the technical input for monitoring groundwater in IDP camps and communities in 2007-8. Some 49 ground water level loggers were installed and at least a further 15 wells monitored with manual dipping. This work was led by UNICEF, GWWD, WES and Oxfam.<sup>40</sup> Again, it is important to highlight continuity here. IWRM is now a central theme of UNEP's work in Sudan and the initial project was picked up as one of the four components of the SIEP. We comment further on this below.
78. In 2009 the Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF) was the conduit through which UNEP developed the **Darfur Aid and Environment project**. The purpose was to mainstream environmental issues in the humanitarian and early recovery programmes of UN and partner agencies. Some of the planned outputs (knowledge products, awareness raising, technical assistance, environmental screening and project development and brokerage) were common across all UNEP projects; in this respect, the measurement of results and attribution relating to this specific project is not easy. We note, however, that all components of the project were continued in the SIEP, with more tangible results recorded (see below).
79. Important though these projects were in raising awareness, their actual impact in the context of one of the most traumatic periods in Darfur's history was circumscribed by resource constraints and security, and therefore very localised. Many critical environmental concerns - waste management and oil production, for instance - were identified in the PCEA but not addressed. UNEP relies heavily on partner uptake of findings and recommendations contained in the PCEA; the administrative, staff and financial resources of UNEP were themselves insufficient to have addressed the totality of these. Nevertheless, the Phase 1 projects – and the associated activities of NGOs and academic partners – helped build the foundations and rationale for the SIEP.

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<sup>36</sup> The two important component of this were the Woodfuel Integrated Supply/Demand Overview Mapping (WISDOM) and the Fuel Efficient Stoves (FES).

<sup>37</sup> FAO (January 2012), 'Natural Resource Management for Food and Nutrition Security in Darfur: Strategic Framework'.

<sup>38</sup> For instance UNEP (2008), *Water resource management in humanitarian programming in Darfur: The case for drought preparedness (2008)*, Geneva, October 2008.

<sup>39</sup> Tearfund, Darfur (2007): *Water supply in a vulnerable environment*.

<sup>40</sup> UNEP (2008) *ibid*. The results were captured in UNICEF (2007), *Darfur's IDPs Groundwater Resources: Capacities, depletion risks and contingency planning*.

## ***Alignment with national policy and priorities***

80. The backdrop in Sudan is one of tension between the long-term impact of conflict on economic development and institutional sustainability on the one hand, and the short-term stabilization goals of post-conflict development, on the other. With the Five Year Strategic Development Plan (2011-2016) and the Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Plan (IPRSP) the Government has defined a road-map for economic growth, peace, stability and development. The development objectives include effective decentralized government, efficient planning and public expenditure management, transparency and accountability. The IPRSP recognises the risks of a reduction or diversion of public spending away from essential or basic services to people in the areas affected by conflict. These include reduced services in, for example, clean drinking water, infrastructure, and environmental development.<sup>41</sup> Importantly, environment is a cross-cutting theme but is not highlighted as a major action area within either the IPRSP or the Strategic Plan.
81. The current state of environmental governance in Sudan is characterised by: (i) poor inter-ministerial coordination and a lack of common vision; (ii) likewise between Government and customary institutions; and (iii) legislative and institutional pluralism at state and federal levels. Beyond the technical ministries there would appear to be a lack of political will to raise environmental issues to more than just checks and balances<sup>42</sup>. It is important to remember that UNEP's key counterpart, the MEFPD, is by no means as politically or financially powerful as, for example, the Ministries of Energy and Mining, Oil or Transport, Roads and Bridges who all control sectors with a very important environmental dimension. It is therefore important to also engage with these Ministries and sectors on environmental issues.
82. Natural resources management authority has to a large extent been decentralised to the Stat level. Investing resources in policy change at federal level would, then, need to be balanced with state-level advocacy and assistance to avoid potential top-down sclerosis. The Interim National Constitution of Sudan (2005) gave each state the right to develop, conserve, and manage natural resources, including state forest reserves. The associated land commissions in each state were ambiguous, however, when it came to policy development and monitoring; most were mandated only to make recommendations, but the Darfur Land Commission took on policy development and arbitration over land disputes. Also, although customary rights are recognised in the Constitution, the political authority of customary structures and institutions is not mentioned. Moreover, representation of pastoralists and farmers are not recognised in the Land Commissions.<sup>43</sup>
83. The implication here is that UNEP's influence can only be expected within a narrow set of government policies, the confines of which are to a large extent determined by UNEP's financial standing. A feature of fragile states is the propensity for ministries to compete for scarce aid resources (including UNEP). An injection of financial incentives allows for a level of activity hitherto discouraged or suppressed while at the same time the activity itself can increase political capital for the ministry concerned amidst a plethora of government bodies.
84. The PCEA indicated a strong link between resource degradation and conflict in Darfur where exponential population growth and environmental deterioration were contributing factors, further aggravated and sustained by political, tribal and ethnic differences. Emerging from this and

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<sup>41</sup> African Development Bank Group, Sudan Country Brief, October 2010.

<sup>42</sup> For example, the Ministry of Industry and the Ministry of Petroleum each have an environmental unit.

<sup>43</sup> 'Environmental Governance in Sudan: an expert review', UNEP, 2012.

supportive literature was a central question that was subsequently to become the cornerstone of the SIEP programme and strategy: how could sustainable policies and institutions be developed and strengthened to assist the multiple (and sometimes competing) livelihood groups to manage access to natural resources and adapt to processes of change? UNEP flagged a number of strategic areas of support, notably IWRM, natural resource management and climate change, community forest management and sustainable livelihoods. Broadly speaking, the evaluation found these to be the priority areas expressed by government partners<sup>44</sup>, though the UNEP remit is still quite narrow. Government partners were keen to point out that no work has yet been done, for example, on urban environmental hazards, environmental consequences of oil exploration and gold mining, waste management and water purity treatment. Given the size of the Sudan Cabinet, it is inevitable that some ministries will feel relatively neglected. For instance, on alternative energy issues the Ministry of Science and Technology informed the evaluation team that UNEP has not yet engaged with them on either alignment with respect to policy issues or on the alternative technology. The Minister would welcome such a partnership and dialogue.<sup>45</sup> In highly deforested lands alternative energy sources (biogas, solar and improved stoves) might provide an attractive option for long term biomass conservation; they give incentives for communities to get engaged in reforestation programmes while availing capacity building opportunities for alternate energy users and technicians through its well established Energy Research Center. We again stress, however, the limitations of UNEP's resources to engage in these important issues.

### ***Alignment with partners and donors***

85. The vision statements and joint concept notes developed in consultation with government partners are key to UNEP's work in aligning its programme to stakeholder priorities. At the same time, when official planning documents may have diminished relevance as a result of protracted conflict, as in Darfur, UNEP's bottom up and participatory approach is crucial to rebuilding trust and engagement of an otherwise de-motivated system of governance.
86. The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) decentralized power to the states, giving them a higher level of autonomy. The challenge at the time of the 2007 PCEA was that despite there being high levels of knowledge and skills among individuals, government departments were under resourced and ineffective, with environmental governance being scattered among various small government bodies, with little coordination between them and duplicated responsibilities. UNEP's first task was to identify the environmental actors in Sudan. This was done effectively, particularly at federal (Khartoum) level through partnering with the Ministry of Environment and Physical Development (MEPD), the key government counterpart, as well as the Higher Council for Environment and Natural Resources (HCENR) and numerous councils and departments at the state level such as the Forestry National Corporation (FNC) and the Ministry of Water Resources<sup>46</sup>.
87. UNEP's primary donor, DFID (UK Aid) in July 2011 issued its Operational Plan 2011-15 in which it is committed to a focus on achieving optimum Value for Money in programme design and implementation<sup>47</sup>. Water and Sanitation and Climate Change are two of the strategic priorities listed in the Plan. Governance is still a central component of DFID's Sudan work, but with the intention of

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<sup>44</sup> The process of ensuring that UNEP is 'on track' with government priorities has included a series of consultations that include, for instance, the Darfur Livelihood workshops 2007, El Fasher Climate Conference 2010, IWRM vision statements 2010, LPG vision statement 2010, Programme consultation 2012, and DJAM consultations 2012.

<sup>45</sup> Interview with Minister of Science and Technology, December 2012.

<sup>46</sup> Now the Ministry of Water Resources and Electricity.

<sup>47</sup> The SIEP was designed before the new DFID business case format, so no specific value for money measures or indicators were developed for this programme.

building a stronger evidence base on levels of poverty and need. DFID's average annual spend in Sudan since 2010 has been about £130 million<sup>48</sup>, but this has been for the 'two Sudans' and DFID financial support for the Republic is likely to reduce in 2013<sup>49</sup>. If the current SIEP budget is retained (£6.8/annum) it will constitute a significant percentage of DFID's Sudan portfolio.

### ***Alignment with UNEP corporate policy***

88. The UNEP Division of Environmental Policy Implementation (DEPI) is accountable for the delivery of the Sudan country programme, with the programme being managed through the DEPI Post-Conflict and Disaster Management Branch (PCDMB) based in Geneva. The head of PCDMB (who is also the Disasters and Conflicts Sub-programme Coordinator) has the authority to approve contracts, expenditures, project revisions and MoUs. He has, however, little input to the day-to-day management or design of Sudan projects, this being essentially in-country.
89. The Sudan projects under PoW 2006-2007 and 2008-2009 were in line with the Expected Accomplishments (EA) and the Sub-programme objectives. The EA (c) was "*Enhanced capacity at the international, regional, sub-regional and national levels to prevent, reduce the risk of, prepare for and respond to environmental emergencies and to conduct post-disaster/ conflict assessments and clean-up*".<sup>50</sup> Contributing to this is Sub-Programme 3 – Policy Implementation: "*To enhance implementation of environmental policies, legislation and management practices and to mitigate the environmental impact of emergencies and post-conflict situations on sustainable development*"
90. The SIEP falls under the Disasters and Conflicts Sub-programme, EA(2) & EA(3) Programme Framework and is expected to contribute to the Expected Accomplishment 3: "*The Post Conflict Environmental Assessment and recovery process contributes to improved environmental management and the sustainable use of natural resources*".
91. The associated Programme of Work Outputs are:
- #231 "Environmental policy and institutional support provided to post-crisis countries";
  - #233 "Ecosystem restoration and management projects catalyzed for sites damaged by conflicts or disasters";
  - #235 "Environmental considerations integrated into UN peacebuilding and recovery activities in post-crisis countries and regions".
92. Although the programme design fits under UNEP Mid-Term Strategy and Programme of Work, and complies with higher level results statements, the evaluation team was struck by the apparent disjuncture between the *modus operandi* of UNEP Nairobi and the realities of managing a country programme. The dominant corporate paradigm that links international conventions, regional bodies and national Government – and the implicit implication that environment is to be protected from people rather than for people – sits uneasily with the emerging consensus in Sudan that environment is managed for people's livelihoods. The disengagement of Nairobi is not in itself an impediment to the Sudan programme (though, as we shall see, the administrative arrangements have had direct negative results and reputational impact), but it runs contrary to best practice in terms of strategic engagement in a fragile state.

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<sup>48</sup> Bilateral Aid Review: Technical Report, March 2011 (Annex), DFID London.

<sup>49</sup> DFID Sudan website, <http://www.dfid.gov.uk/sudan>

<sup>50</sup> For a comprehensive overview and evaluation of UNEP Expected Accomplishments, Mid-Term Review and Programme of Work, see Spilsbury et al, *Formative Evaluation of UNEP's Programme of Work, 2010-2011*, UNEP Evaluation Office, July 2011.

## **Box 2. Gender issues**

The UNEP Disasters and Conflicts strategy puts some emphasis on the 'practical' application of gender considerations, including women as beneficiaries in projects. The *Darfur timber and energy project* had explicitly incorporated gender issues; introducing fuel efficient stoves was intended to improve women health and security, not least because they are the main collectors of fuel wood. The SIEP project document states that the role of women in natural resource management would be improved, though there were no gender-specific activities in the project design. Nevertheless, gender-sensitivity training was included in, for example, the IWRM component of SIEP. Gender disaggregated data is available for various outputs and capacity building activities are conducted to ensure gender-balanced participation<sup>51</sup>.

Addressing gender inequality and disparity in the management of natural resources has not been a strategic priority of UNEP. The participation of women at various levels of the programme has certainly been encouraged, but this has been incidental and not a central tenet of programme objectives. The evaluation had an opportunity to ground-test gender awareness and found, surprisingly, not a single female member in one of the CBO network team meetings attended in the presence of Practical Action and the 11 member council in El Fasher. The evaluation did not, however, examine levels of gender sensitivity in the representation of women within the community based management committees (70 CBOs over the six localities of El Fasher).

### ***Alignment with international good practice in fragile states***

93. In a volatile and ever-changing conflict environment UNEP to some extent has had to be reactive to events. The weight of the portfolio shifted increasingly towards what could be done rather than the more ambitious broad sweep of UNEP's sub-programme objectives. The evaluation notes, however, that the recognition of risk simply forms part of the 'operational landscape' of proposed projects. The working environment and political economy of a war-torn country required, for example, an effective appraisal of needs and risks and a sequence of activities and a means of measuring progress against objectives. The PCEA provided the contextual analysis but not a sequence to the proposed interventions.
94. As we have argued in Section 2 above, the drivers of conflict cannot always be conflated with social and economic deprivation. These may be the symptoms, not the causes of conflict. Equally important, are the proximate causes of violence - political tensions and relationships that can quickly flare up. These can be, for instance, the ambitions and ability of local 'strong men' to harness support through predatory activity<sup>52</sup>. In its baseline analysis and literature on pastoralism UNEP and partners recognise, for instance, the political imperatives that drive the acquisition of greater amounts of cultivated lands and the consequent closure of migratory routes for herds.
95. "Taking context as the starting point"<sup>53</sup> requires a thorough and sound information base. The discourse over humanitarian/development space extends to 'political space'. UNEP's political neutrality is enmeshed with its mandatory obligation to work closely with a Government whose legitimacy and acceptance is questioned by significant sections of the population. The challenge is

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<sup>51</sup> The evaluation team observed a high level of female participation in the adaptation (pastoralist) workshops held in Darfur, notably from government departments.

<sup>52</sup> In recent years considerable work has been done on the issue of general Armed Violence Reduction in addition to (though separate from) the understanding of conflict resolution and reduction (See OECD DAC work on Armed Violence Reduction).

<sup>53</sup> OECD DAC Fragile States Principles

how to promote wider democratic practice while retaining a working partnership with government institutions; and what is the appropriate balance between the two. UNEP is actively engaged with civil society organisations to find a balance – for example, its partnerships with SECS, DRA etc.

96. The recently published ‘New Deal’ for engagement in fragile states re-emphasises country ownership and leadership, and will undoubtedly influence UNEP’s key donors.<sup>54</sup> Recognising the importance of state building per se, it also challenges international donors to work more closely with NGOs/CDCs, shifting the emphasis from “supply” to more “demand-side” activities (such as support to civil society, anti-corruption awareness and to the media). UNEP does, indeed, work through both government and civil society entities, with the choice based on (a) national ownership and (b) technical competence, but pragmatic considerations are also a necessary criterion, e.g. who is available and likely to deliver? The decision to work with Government is also informed by the fact that international organisations generally have a greater turnover of staff than Government, so time invested in the latter has greater impact and continuity.

### ***UNEP’s analysis of context***

97. In Sudan the widely acknowledged strength of UNEP has been the production and dissemination of a series of research publications – some pre-dating the opening of the country office – that continue to be used both as advocacy documents and as baseline technical evidence in support of programme objectives. Consultation in addition to technical analysis is also prioritised. The evaluation found frequent verbal and written reference to these documents, both from Government and from the international community working in Darfur; the publications are listed in the Bibliography (Annex 3). In particular, UNEP and partners’ work on IWRM, pastoralism<sup>55</sup> and the associated work on market analysis have strongly influenced wider inter-agency policy; for example, the incorporation of ideas in “Beyond Emergency Relief”<sup>56</sup>.
98. Under the Darfur Alternative Energy Project, from 2008 UNEP began to develop a set of ‘Environmental Codes of Best Practice’, a reference source for agencies working in the sector. A proactive website and environmental helpdesk were also set up though the evaluation found little evidence of this being used<sup>57</sup>. It did, however, lead to the brokering \$1.8M for IOM to start an environmental programme that included environmental vulnerability mapping and the pioneering of the CEAP process in Darfur, and for supporting the design of the CHF Green Pot allocation for the environment. The international NGO ProAct undertook the work on the environmental codes, but they failed to register with the Government to work in Sudan, causing administrative delays of almost a year, made worse by the unexpected departure of the ProAct in-country representative. The

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<sup>54</sup>International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (2011): “A New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States”, <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/35/50/49151944.pdf>. This includes the adoption of a set of seven peacebuilding and statebuilding goals (PSG) that are to be considered at the UN general assembly in September 2012. The PSG are: 1) Foster inclusive political settlements and processes, and inclusive political dialogue. 2) Establish and strengthen basic safety and security. 3) Achieve peaceful resolution of conflicts and access to justice. 4) Develop effective and accountable government institutions to facilitate service delivery. 5) Create the foundations for inclusive economic development, including sustainable livelihoods, employment and effective management of natural resources. 6) Develop social capacities for reconciliation and peaceful coexistence. 7) Foster regional stability and co-operation. <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/12/30/44927821.pdf>

<sup>55</sup> UNEP (2012). On the Hoof: The Livestock Trade in Darfur. Research collaboration between UNEP and Tufts University in Sudan.

<sup>56</sup> UN (2010), Beyond Emergency Relief, Office of the RC/HC, September 2010.

<sup>57</sup> This finding is confirmed by the review of the Humanitarian Environmental Integration Programme (ProAct, MAY 2011) which found that although the existence of the UNEP website was highlighted by UNEP Khartoum in the guidance paper circulated to all agencies participating in the annual Work Plan development, none of the persons interviewed for the review knew of its existence, or indeed any document pertaining to environmental integration. Nevertheless, “Since 2007 there appears to have been an improvement in the degree to which environmental issues have been considered in humanitarian programming although this has not been consistent or sustained across all institutions. Evidence of this was found in UNDAF (2010 and 2011) annual country programmes of all UN bodies included in this review. This was also the case among INGOs and national NGOs” p15, Sec 3.2.1

DFID Annual Review for 2010 states that “the work is no longer running on schedule.”<sup>58</sup> However, a linked output that appears to be gaining some level of interest in recent months is the task force comprising representatives from UN agencies, NGOs and civil society representatives - the Environmental Technology Task Force (ENTEC)<sup>59</sup>.

99. Tufts University has done a significant amount of analysis of local conflict in Darfur, looking at the issue within a livelihoods framework.<sup>60</sup> UNEP has co-funded much of this work, and has contributed to linking it more directly to federal and state governance structures. The changing dynamics of the region as a whole – including the impact of war, climate change, and uprooted population - are key sources of stress in the interaction between communities, and between communities and Government. Contained within these studies is the contrasting evidence of what happens when livelihoods are disrupted or neglected. Negative coping strategies can include the shift to firewood collection, militia control of charcoal trade, and other more direct conflict related livelihood choices such as young men joining militia.<sup>61</sup>
100. Perhaps most importantly, the encroachment on traditional pasture lands by the increasing demand for cultivation to serve a growing sedentary population means that the number of negotiations necessary for a pastoralist to undertake has expanded enormously. UNEP has persuasively argued that in order to resolve local conflict there is a need to look at higher levels of governance in addition to local Government. A focus on environmental governance at all levels – and the more complete analytical approach that this entails - closes the gap between peace building and capacity building precisely because the negotiating arena and exchange of views between stakeholders requires greater levels of mutual understanding.<sup>62</sup>
101. Related to this, an interesting new analytical approach being developed by UNEP is the ‘Relationships and Resources’ that draws on the work of the UK-based Relationship Foundation and its various offshoots<sup>63</sup>. The contextual starting point for UNEP was one in which environmental policy, mandates and implementation were (and still are to a large extent) fragmented and piecemeal.<sup>64</sup> If the UNEP programme claims to prioritise joint action between organisations with common environmental interests, the challenge is in developing objective indicators that measure the intended (and unintended) impacts of interventions in institutions and on the individuals within those institutions.
102. An important initiative – again through partnership with Tufts University - was the launch of a regular market information networking system that tracks the shifting patterns of trade, markets and prices in Darfur (see Section III above). Though strictly beyond UNEP’s mandate, the livestock and commodity market information system makes available weekly data to the Government, FAO, WFP and the food security cluster group, and has fast become an essential gauge of the political economy

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<sup>58</sup> DFID, ‘Annual Review, SIEP, 2010’

<sup>59</sup> ENTEC is a UNEP-chaired forum for promoting environmental technologies in Darfur with representatives of the Darfurian civil society and other UN agencies.

<sup>60</sup> Young et al, ‘Livelihoods, Power and Choice: The vulnerability of the Northern Rizaygat, Darfur, Sudan’, UNEP/Tufts University, 2009; Young et al, ‘Livelihoods Under Siege’, Tufts University, Feinstein International Famine Center, 2005.

<sup>61</sup> Young et al (2009) *ibid*.

<sup>62</sup> B. Bromwich, Relationships and Resources: Quality of relationships as an indicator in peace building and capacity building.

<sup>63</sup> A formal set of relational audit tools and facilitative processes has been developed and these have subsequently been widely used to assess and develop relationships within private, public and third sector organisations. See <http://www.relationshipsfoundation.org/Web/>

<sup>64</sup> A stark example of this is the 2002 Forest and Renewable Natural Resources law, set for FNC, that made legal reference to an inter-ministerial integrated approach, yet many of the named institutions are unaware of such legal text.

surrounding the conflict and its consequences<sup>65</sup>. The bulletin reports are distributed widely to national and international operational agencies, and often contain recommendations backed by empirical evidence<sup>66</sup>.

103. As we have stressed elsewhere in this report, there is a widespread perception, particularly within the international community, that a small organization like UNEP can too easily be drawn into a closeted academic environment where the measure of progress is the number and quality of publications produced. To fully capitalize on the work done so far, UNEP will need to activate and apply its advocacy strategy in a more direct fashion. Using the publications as a bedrock, a concerted dissemination strategy might include media outlets, short briefs (in Arabic), video films, etc. At the same time, the analysis itself needs to more directly confront the wider pressing issues voiced by stakeholders in Darfur. These would include, for example, gaps on customary laws, and laws governing land tenure and communal grazing which themselves induced conflict. The issue of ranching should also be tackled head-on since there is a pervasive opinion in many levels of Government that pastoralism is inappropriate to the modern state.

### **Box 3. Staffing and administration issues**

Administrative services (local recruitment, procurement, management of local accounts and disbursement of payments, logistical support etc.) are provided by UNDP Sudan. UNAMID provides security services within Darfur and air transport services between Khartoum and Darfur, the latter alongside WFP UNHAS. In addition, staff in Darfur is reliant on the assistance of other agencies, such as OCHA for office space and transportation.

Of greater concern to the evaluation were UNEP's inefficient administrative and management arrangements in relation to its own management structures. The quadrangular jurisdiction between UNEP HQ in Nairobi, DEPI (PCDMB) in Geneva, UNDP Khartoum and the country office is at best inefficient and, in some cases, directly obstructive to the programme. It has resulted in some long delays in procurement and financial disbursement, and associated reputational damage. The Regional Office for Africa (ROA) has not visited the Sudan office in over two years and has provided no technical assistance; yet despite the fact that the Sudan programme receives no core funding from the Environment Fund, 13% of project funds are directed to 'support services' in Nairobi and Geneva<sup>67</sup>.

Contractual arrangements with partners have been a key issue. The Country Manager is authorized to recruit local staff; but all procurements over \$2,500 must be through Geneva which itself has a threshold of \$200,000. Anything above this must be through Nairobi. The financial agreement with Tufts University thus took more than a year to complete. There was a 6-7 month delay in the contract for CEAPs with DRA.<sup>68</sup> The contract with HCENR (\$800,000) was split into three packages to facilitate more speedy delivery -, two through Geneva, and the third through Nairobi. Staff procurement has been another key challenge. UNEP's recruitment process target is 230 days for an international staff member, and at least three months for national staff<sup>69</sup>. Two consequences emerge: first, UNEP has missed opportunities to

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<sup>65</sup> An example is the weekly trend analysis of livestock and commodity prices, through market monitoring network that provides an early warning signal for difficult times ahead. For example, in Malha in 2011, eleven sheep were bartered for one sack of grain; this and associated figures influenced the policy of establishing a strategic reserve.

<sup>66</sup> An example of the monitoring bulletin can be found at <http://sites.tufts.edu/feinstein/files/2012/12/North-Darfur-Vol-2-No-3.pdf>

<sup>67</sup> UNEP Disasters & Conflicts Sub-Programme Evaluation: Sudan Country Case Study, May 2012.

<sup>68</sup> 4<sup>th</sup> Interim Narrative Report, Sept-Dec, DRA.

<sup>69</sup> Interview with Country Manager, December 2012.

attract and retain good staff; second, the default position has been to recruit consultants through the relatively less cumbersome contractual process through Geneva.

## B. Results Achieved

104. It is not our intention here to list all the indicators of progress made against all project elements – for the last two years, these are covered in Annex 2, with planned and actual milestones. UNEP has for 2011 and 2012 an impressive comprehensive file with supportive documents containing qualitative and quantitative results that were reviewed by the evaluation team. Prior to this, no systematic M&E system was developed, though a narrative record of progress on a quarterly basis is available for 2010 through Progress Reports issued in Geneva.<sup>70</sup> Added to these have been three DFID Annual Reviews of the SIEP (2010, 2011 and 2012) that provide an independent overview of progress against indicators.
105. Omitting those relating to South Sudan (accounting for 12.5% of funding), the SIEP has 5 outputs and 14 output indicators. For our purposes here we will provide only summary evaluative judgment on the achievements attained by the two cross-cutting themes (environmental governance; mainstreaming policy) and four sub-themes (IWRM, Climate Change, Community-Based Natural Resource Management, and Pastoralism & Livelihoods). Some of the descriptive elements of these themes have already been covered above. In doing so, we refer back to the programme theory of change and the inherent assumptions behind the programme design (Section IV).

### Box 4. Programme monitoring

Monitoring reports have been available only from 2009 onwards. In addition, projects have not been independently evaluated but annual reviews have been conducted with DFID. A progress review of the on-going SIEP was conducted in 2010 under the auspices of DFID, which recommended a thorough review of the project logframe to distribute work rather along thematic than geographical lines and to better serve the purpose of a monitoring tool. In the UNEP Programme Information and Management System (PIMS), however, the project is still being measured against the old logframe<sup>71</sup>, thus the project has two logframes, one for UNEP and one to serve the reporting requirements for DFID. The outcomes and outputs stated in PIMS and the DFID logframe are quite different. Programme monitoring and reporting has been much more strongly targeted to DFID than to UNEP and the country programme is more focused on following the 'DFID logframe'. For the purposes of this evaluation, therefore, the CPE followed the DFID logframe (Annex\_\_\_).

Prior to 2010, project monitoring and documentation had only been intermittent but has much improved since 2011 with the SIEP. Since much of UNEP's work is process oriented, impact monitoring relies on a combination of (i) sourcing environmental policy and statement (Government and UN in particular) that is attributable to UNEP, plus accolades<sup>72</sup>; (ii) tracing changes in attitude and work practice, especially among those who have participated in UNEP events, trainings and exchanges; and (iii) the leverage exerted by UNEP in brokering new funds for environmental activity.

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<sup>70</sup> These are the 2010 UNEP Disasters and Conflicts Programme 'Quarterly Progress Reports'. The reports cover all UNEP countries covered by the Geneva office, with the Sudan country programme being well covered in terms of summary achievements.

<sup>71</sup> Outcomes against which progress is reported in PIMS are (i) National institutions for environmental awareness and governance strengthened; (ii) Improved conditions for sustainable peace and livelihoods in Darfur from the scope attributable from the improved environmental sustainability including drought preparedness, IWRM, livelihoods and adaptation to changing demographics and environmental context; (iii) Effective in-country UNEP representation and management strengthened and maintained; (iv) Environmental and natural resource management improved within humanitarian, recovery and development aid architecture; (v) The post conflict environmental assessment and recovery process contributes to improved environmental management and sustainable use of natural resources; (vi) Strategy for adaptation to climate variability and change strengthened within national/ regional planning; and (vii) Management of the environment improved in southern Sudan.

<sup>72</sup> Referred to in the monitoring books as "Shukranagrams". (Shukran=thanks in Arabic).

There have been no clear monitoring systems for the community-based NRM activities (CEAPs). The implementing agency, DRA, acknowledges that a satisfactory M&E system should have been in place well before now, and UNEP has begun some training in this respect. Likewise in the surface water infrastructure work of IWRM, there is little impact monitoring of the benefits accrued by the surrounding population. It is revealing that both these weaknesses are in 'hardware' project sites; UNEP's strength would appear to be in the more upstream advocacy and policy areas.

### ***Enhanced capacity of service actors for environmental governance***

106. The key immediate outcome discussed here is the integration of environmental issues into policies of Government at state and federal level, measured in three ways: (i) the number of new processes of government policy or strategy alignment, reform or development relating to environment; (ii) the number of new national and state government policies and strategy that integrate climate change and participatory environmental governance issues; and (iii) the level of capacity of environmental stakeholder institutions. In all three, UNEP's achievements exceeded planned milestones (see Annex 2).
107. Beneficiary and stakeholder feedback in the evaluation was predominantly positive, recognizing UNEP's catalytic role in shaping and promoting policy dialogue. UNEP has encouraged, funded, and leveraged funds for seminars led by government officials following their exchange visits to east Africa (Kenya and Tanzania) and South Africa. From 40-100 government technical staff, Native Administration and others attended seminars in each of the three Darfur states. Through its advocacy strategy UNEP has had some influence on the environmental architecture of the Sudan Government. By 2010 four states in Sudan had established Ministries of Environment, two with direct advice from UNEP, with a further six having environmental departments. UNEP also had considerable influence on ensuring that three out of five components of the Government's strategy for Darfur included environmental concerns (desertification, forestry and water management).
108. Following the PCEA, UNEP, UNDP and the Nile Basin Initiative funded the development of a 'National Environment Development Plan' for Sudan. The Plan was never approved and is now redundant due to the separation of South Sudan. Subsequently, UNEP provided both technical input and consultative space for various government bodies to develop vision statements and (in the case of IWRM) a fully comprehensive strategy. In terms of outputs, these have included:
- **An on-going National Adaptation Plan (NAP) revision on climate change.** National climate change policy in Sudan is the responsibility of the Government's Higher Council for Environment and Natural Resources (HCENR) which is the Sudan Government focal point for the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and will be responsible for developing the second National Communication by 2013. UNEP's role is in monitoring, with some technical input to the training of state personnel who will be responsible for conducting a vulnerability and adaptation assessment across 17 states. The evaluation notes the improved institutional arrangements now at state level, including increased inter-ministerial dialogue and involvement of NGOs.
  - **Wetlands protection and management:** UNEP aims to support MEFPD in undertaking a national wetlands inventory and, subsequently, developing wetland management plans.
  - **REDD + (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation) national strategy development in Sudan.** The UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office in 2012 provided a small grant to support the FNC develop a national REDD+ strategy. This enabled a UNEP consultant to join the Sudan delegation at four international conferences, while UNEP itself supported travel costs for Sudan delegates. A follow-up UNEP/UNDP/FAO project has yet to be funded, though a 'framework for action' is drafted.

- **Assistance/coaching to two new ministries** with environmental mandates: Ministry of Water Resources and Environment; Ministry of Environment Youth and Tourism. UNEP has also provided advice during the establishment of the Ministry of Water Resources in South Kordofan.
  - Provision of support to the Ministry of Water Resources and Electricity to articulate a **National Water Vision** (still to be formally endorsed), a priori to the synthesis of the national policy framework.
  - New **Natural Resources Framework Law under preparation with Government of South Darfur** – UNEP has received a formal request and helped prepare a joint concept note that lays out responsibilities and action.
109. Some recent UNEP studies have helped consolidate findings and provide a useful baseline, notably on the interface of traditional and formal government systems. Moreover, they have enabled UNEP to conceptualise the challenges of the programme logic. Three pieces of research relating specifically to the issue of environmental governance:
- “Governance for Peace over Resources – A review of transitions in environmental governance across Africa as a resource for peace-building and environmental management in Sudan”
  - “Relationships and Resources” – this paper looks at how quality of relationships can be assessed and promoted amongst stakeholders in the environment. Stakeholders in this context refer to communities, Government and other organisations.
  - “Environmental Governance in Sudan – an Expert Review of Policies and Institutions”. This review, undertaken by two senior Sudanese environmental academics describes and reviews environmental policies and institutions in Sudan.
110. The links between governance, environment, livelihoods and conflict in Sudan are complex<sup>73</sup>. No single organization can adequately address these alone, but UNEP’s comparative advantage has been its quiet diplomacy and inclusive manner in which Government and civil society have been persuaded to collaborate and address common problems. For example, evidence-based training and awareness raising on pastoral livelihoods is not something that has been done before in Darfur.<sup>74</sup> The danger is that the impact of this progressive approach is muted precisely because it is undertaken in a quasi-academic manner – publications, workshops – and among those senior/middle managers or NGO representatives who already have a propensity towards working in this way<sup>75</sup>. On the other hand, the approach has been well-received, building capacity among key people in Darfur and elsewhere to articulate the rationale of pastoral livelihoods.
111. The need to link research and policy to effective implementation of change in the management of natural resources was frequently mentioned by stakeholders; but the comment was often accompanied by the demand for far greater resources (and, indeed, UNEP staff time) than are currently available. However, the readiness of government officials to participate at workshops level with community and civil society representatives is an important indicator of improved relationships and a preliminary opening of ‘space’ for dialogue. The risk is that the current inter communal and

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<sup>73</sup> Coinciding with the writing of this evaluation, UNEP’s new publication on ‘Environmental Governance in Sudan’ (Yagoub Abdallah Mohammed and Omer Egemi, UNEP, 2012) was published online at the UNEP site, <http://www.unep.org/sudan/>. Along with a good stakeholder analysis, it explores in some depth the interrelationship between policy and institutional reform on the one hand, and the key environmental challenges confronting Sudan on the other.

<sup>74</sup> The evaluation witnessed the most recent adaptation workshop in El Fasher that included state government officials, civil society, academics, and representatives of pastoralist groups.

<sup>75</sup> There are exceptions such as the Humanitarian Aid Commission who have cautiously welcomed the inclusive manner in which these workshops are conducted.

political triggers of violence are more immediate and pervasive, and UNEP has little chance of abating the impact of these.

112. With the exception of a very limited village-level engagement through the CEAP project, there has been little opening yet for inter-communal dialogue on the environmental issues that sharply define or contribute towards conflict in Darfur. An area/catchment based project such as the expected forthcoming EU funding of the Wadi El Ku project – if undertaken in the participatory manner that UNEP has championed elsewhere – might be an opportunity to firmly link a demonstration project to the consolidation of policy and practice at national level. More importantly it might also be an opportunity to measure impact against changing attitudes through a longitudinal survey.

#### **Box 5. Partnerships**

The UNEP Strategy for Sudan emphasizes the importance of establishing strong partnerships with the Government of Sudan, other UN organizations and civil society. The selection of a diversity of partners has been, to some extent, affected by the unstable political situation of the country. In 2009 numerous international NGOs, UN agencies and individuals were expelled from the country. Among the 16 NGOs expelled was Oxfam and CARE, working in the water sector, some of whom were UNEP implementing partners. UNEP was forced to re-think the drought preparedness strategy and to work increasingly with Government and other local counterparts.

Alongside its work with civil society, UNEP has at all levels promoted cross government collaboration on environment, including collaboration between state and federal ministries. At the heart of this approach is programme ownership by Sudanese entities, facilitated through regular consultations and the development of shared vision documents. These include the Shared concept note on Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) with MWRE and MEFPD and the vision documents that precede it. The work on climate change at national level is also guided by a joint project note with HCENR. A Vision statement on climate change and recovery in Darfur has been developed at a major government workshop and this also guides project development and implementation.

UNEP's key NGO and academic partners have a long history of working in Darfur and in all cases the UNEP component of their work is additional and complementary to a wider portfolio. Tufts University has been in Darfur since 2004 and regards its research as demand-driven and neutral; unlike UNEP, it is not mandated to work with Government. Its wider remit is on conflict and resilience that dovetails with UNEP's more specific environment interests. In terms of facilitating information sharing between partners, UNEP has, for instance, supported furnishing and computers (including a web portal) for the Environmental Information Center (Khartoum) of the Sudanese Environment Conservation Society (SECS)<sup>76</sup>.

The NGO DRA has been in Darfur since 2007, and the UNEP-supported CEAP project is part of DRA's wider umbrella interest, the Community Empowerment and Strengthening Project (CESP), funded by EU, Oxfam America, and Christian Aid. The evaluation found DRA to be a competent and committed NGO, with a clear understanding of conflict and community capacity variables in Darfur. These, combined with DRA's own capacity constraints have necessarily resulted in a slow unfolding of the CEAP process. The realities of evolving a CEAP to the level of full self-sufficiency are apparent; as we have suggested elsewhere in the evaluation, the time, intensity and resource commitments necessary to bring such a programme 'to scale' are beyond the

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<sup>76</sup> The NGO/network SECS was established in 1975. Now funded by EU, NOVIB and Concern, it has 130 branches countrywide, and 21 in Darfur. Its current emphasis is on climate change and root causes of conflict, school projects in three states, and rights-based learning.

resources (and arguably the mandate) of UNEP. At present, the CEAPs are still a useful demonstration and replicable model that could be picked up by an alternative development actor with more appropriate and dedicated resources.

113. UNEP's most profound impact has most likely been the promotion of IWRM in Sudan. The historical emphasis on water supply especially by the humanitarian community may have inadvertently led to negative environmental damage. UNEP's advocacy and research championed the links between water and other natural resources; between water, livelihoods (and, by extension, climate change); and, on a very practical level, the relationship between ground and surface water and the issue of recharge. Starting with a stakeholder consultation in Darfur in 2009-2010, it soon became apparent that this integrated approach was little understood. UNEP sponsored the knowledge exchange between Sudan and South Africa<sup>77</sup>, one result of which was the State Minister of the Ministry of Irrigation and Water Resources (MIWR) requesting UNEP to support their work in promoting IWRM as a national policy and practice. The participation of the State Water Corporation in the exchange was of particular significance since the Water, Environment and Sanitation (WES) division within this (funded by UNICEF and the federal Government) is sizeable and influential.
114. An indication of how IWRM is becoming embedded in national policy is the elevation of the Groundwater and Wadis Department of the MIWR (now MWRE).<sup>78</sup> Five working groups have been formed by the ministry<sup>79</sup> marking an important signal of intent to develop a comprehensive inter-ministerial vision. Behavioural change takes time, but in South Darfur, for instance, the State Water Corporation is asking for the development of a state policy (a direct consequence of the South Africa exchange); in North Darfur there is a move to create a Master Plan for water supply to El Fasher, spearheaded by the Director-General of the State Water Corporation. In addition, GWWD established the IWRM Coordination Unit at the Federal level to facilitate implementation of the IWRM programme at national and state levels. The Unit reports directly to the Director General of GWWD. Its main role is to promote and work as a catalyst for IWRM and as a link between UNEP and the Ministry.
115. The two outreach visits to Kenya and Tanzania also helped in building knowledge on communal land use, tenure and management; systems of summer and winter grazing patterns; and the legal frameworks which underpin resource utilization and water supply as well as management. As a result of these visits one participant decided to look into reactivating the old Savannah land use management system, which he found analogous to the group ranch system in Kenya. Also all participants decided to carry the lessons from Kenya and Tanzania back to their respective States to share amongst a wider group of stakeholders for reflection and discussion. The sharing of this experience resulted in discussions and recommendations, with a clear willingness shown by respective States to begin to explore constructive solutions to natural resource management, use and tenure challenges.

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<sup>77</sup> There were two exchange trips: a delegation of technical experts in 2010, and a delegation (14) of more senior politicians in 2011. The exchange has included several visits to Sudan from an official of the Water Research Commission (Dept of Water Affairs) of South Africa to help develop a common cross-ministerial vision for IWRM in Sudan.

<sup>78</sup> The MIWR in 2012 was merged with Electricity – now the Ministry of Water Resources and Electricity (MWRE) – which could prove to be a setback if, with the newly appointed Minister, the priorities shift disproportionately towards hydro-electric infrastructure.

<sup>79</sup> Food security, Industrial Growth, Water & Environment, Water Research & Media, Water Supply & Service. UNEP is represented in just one – the Water & Environment group.

116. The work with HCENR in developing national adaptation plans (NAPs) at both federal and state levels of government has been particularly useful in pushing the climate change agenda. One measure of sustainability of this will be when, upon completion, Sudan will be eligible to access funding from the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. At the same time UNEP has made some inroads into promoting sustainable forest management practices and sustainable energy solutions in government policies and UN programming. This includes input into a comprehensive study on forest resources and forest use in Darfur in 2008<sup>80</sup>, done in conjunction with the Environmental Technology Task Force (ENTEC<sup>81</sup>). The aim of the study was to inform humanitarian programming and assist the preparation of future recovery activities; however, the evaluation could find no information on how the study was used or what influence the findings had on humanitarian programming.
117. Generally, the findings would suggest that as a result of UNEP interventions, government institutions, both at federal and state levels, were better informed, and therefore better equipped to instigate change internally. The levels of acknowledgement and appreciation of UNEP's inputs is represented not only verbally but also through the numerous "shukranagrams" (appreciation letters) issued by government bodies to UNEP. However, the evaluation was unable to determine whether this has translated into a more efficient execution of government policy as such. Without a baseline level of efficiency from which to start – and lacking a thorough institutional analysis beyond the impressions given by project participants – we can only comment on the much-apparent capacity and financial constraints at state level in particular. The evaluation found that UNEP 'tested the water' in a number of areas, and seized opportunities as they arose when the political climate was conducive to policy development. In some cases, notably in IWRM, these opportunities were created by UNEP. Likewise, the FNC is now seeking the assistance of UNEP to review and/or promulgate past laws, particularly following the separation of the South, in order to factor in climate change issues and address the new equity based elements of conflict and environment. The FNC is also keen to extend the use of the CEAP model; we comment on this further below.
118. The crucial link with actual projects on the ground (discussed further below) has been a vital ingredient in demonstrating tangible outcomes to policy initiatives. Lacking the resources of larger operational agencies such as UNICEF and USAID partners, UNEP's catalytic role has been in finding where gaps exist and creating the necessary steps - through advocacy, advice and support – towards a more cohesive and sustained approach by government bodies. We find that UNEP capitalized on its own areas of competence, but has inevitably raised expectations beyond its own means. At the same time, UNEP's visibility has been low, and where important contributions have leveraged action by others (e.g. UNICEF's work on IWRM), these are not always fully acknowledged as a result.
119. Finally, the politically volatile climate in Sudan, including changes in ministries and staff turnover, suggests that gains made in one year can so easily be reversed in the next. The reiteration of objectives of the pre-2009 projects in the SIEP in part points to there being a new generation (as well as new levels) of government open to dialogue and advocacy.

### ***Mainstreaming environmental considerations in UN programming***

120. This project "output" is actually a key driver for the immediate outcome assessed above to lead to actual change in environmental governance in Sudan. UNEP is the focal point of environment within

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<sup>80</sup> *The Destitution, distortion and deforestation: The impact of conflict on the timber and wood fuel trade in Darfur* (2008) was the first, followed by *WISDOM Darfur: Land cover mapping and wood energy analysis of Darfur's IDP regions* (2010).

<sup>81</sup> ENTEC is a UNEP chaired forum for promoting environmental technologies in Darfur with representatives of the Darfurian civil society and other UN agencies.

the UN system in Sudan and the programme has, over the seven years under review, been partnered with programmes under UNFPA, UNICEF, UNOPS, FAO, and UNDP. There has also been some collaboration with UN-HABITAT who co-chair ENTEC.<sup>82</sup>

121. UNEP has had a high level of influence on the *UN and partners WorkPlan for Darfur* for both 2011 and 2012, as well as the current *UNDAF*<sup>83</sup>. As is common practise worldwide, all sectors are expected to integrate four cross-cutting issues into their programming. These are early recovery (UNDP), gender (UNIFEM), HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) and the environment (UNEP). In line with commitments contained within the SIEP, UNEP in 2011 was able to introduce a pilot environment 'marker' for projects registered in Sudan. This is essentially a way in which UNEP can vet project design against a set of basic environmental good practice principles. The Humanitarian Environmental Integration Project was proposed as a means of developing minimum environmental standards<sup>84</sup>, tailored to the situation in Sudan. The CHF had, in 2009, set up a special fund – the “Green Pot” – to support the implementation of specific environmental projects, and in 2011 UNEP was able to screen about 300 projects<sup>85</sup>. Although the method was specific to Sudan, it was picked up by OCHA in Geneva<sup>86</sup> and used in two respects: as a standard method in the 2012 CAP Guidelines and now being tested in Afghanistan<sup>87</sup>.
122. The weaknesses in using markers are immediately apparent – and these are not specific to environmental markers. The marker is a self-assessment tool, not very comprehensive or thorough, and there is no monitoring of compliance (hence, no sanctions for non-compliance). At the project submission stage within the CHF there has never been a project rejected as a result of the screening, possibly because core humanitarian indicators have a much higher status. UNEP in 2012 began discussions over including environmental monitoring questions in the CHF process<sup>88</sup>, but OCHA itself will need to develop an internal capacity to strengthen monitoring in general. There are several sector-specific advisors in OCHA Sudan but no Environment Advisor.
123. Environmental issues advocated by UNEP were particularly prominent in “*Darfur – Beyond Emergency Relief*” – the UN planning document<sup>89</sup>. All these planning documents were endorsed by the Government of Sudan. Building on the El Fasher Climate Change Conference that produced a shared vision document<sup>90</sup>, *Beyond Emergency Relief* identified four priorities to address the underlying factors behind the insecurity in Darfur. Three of these – Strengthening Governance, Environment and Livelihoods – directly link to UNEP’s work. The first pertains to the wider UNEP remit of environmental governance; and the third to longer-term strategies for sustainable livelihoods - support to farmers and pastoralists, and enhancing understanding of and strengthening links to markets.

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<sup>82</sup> UNEP, FAO, UNDP and HABITAT funded a Concept Paper in conjunction with the Ministry of Planning on the issue of urban planning, with a strong environmental component. There were long delays and some hesitation over UNEP’s involvement, but the project now appears to be revived under the new D-JAM.

<sup>83</sup> United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) for Sudan 2009-2012

<sup>84</sup> UNEP had suggested in 2011 the notion of a ‘gold standard’ for agencies willing to take a lead on environmental issues. Interestingly, the Sudan-specific nature of minimum standards in some cases contradicted the established SPHERE standards, particularly where a disparity existed between IDP camps and surrounding populations.

<sup>85</sup> A further 250 projects were screened by UNEP in South Sudan.

<sup>86</sup> One outcome has been the production of the Flash Environmental Assessment Tool (FEAT, 2009), produced by the Joint UNEP/OCHA Environmental Unit.

<sup>87</sup> Discussions are also underway about using the method in DRC.

<sup>88</sup> Environmental monitoring questions have been included in the CHF process for 2012/13 and are present in the CHF project sheets.

<sup>89</sup> *Beyond Emergency Relief: Longer-term trends and priorities for UN agencies in Darfur*. September 2010

<sup>90</sup> ‘Environment and Recovery in Sudan’, <http://climatechange.sudanct.net/vision>

124. Other than the regular use of its administration and financial management systems<sup>91</sup>, surprisingly little work has been done with UNDP. Eleven joint concept notes exist but these have not led to substantive action as yet<sup>92</sup>. UNEP was initially housed in the Conflict Prevention and Recovery Unit of UNDP Khartoum in line with a global MoU between the two agencies. UNDP provided some programme support to the Darfur Aid and Environment project (now completed), and UNDP is a partner in the climate change and adaptation component of SIEP<sup>93</sup>. There is also some progress in drafting a framework for action for UN-REDD+, in cooperation with UNDP and FAO, to be funded with a grant from the UK Embassy.
125. Despite initial intentions, UNDP has found it difficult to work on livelihoods support in Darfur<sup>94</sup>, and this has reinforced UNEP's niche entry point in this respect. In 2011 UNEP offered to include a reflection on how advocacy on natural resources could be included in the UNDP Darfur Community Peace and Stability Fund (DCPSF) for Nyala. Despite the presentation of a Concept Note by UNEP, the DCPSF secretariat was initially reluctant to include it<sup>95</sup>. Subsequently, however, UNEP has worked closely with DCPSF in developing environmental screening checklist for projects submitted through it<sup>96</sup>. Their emphasis has been on enhancing employment opportunities and vocational training; yet UNDP is in many respects the natural partner for UNEP on issues of environmental governance.
126. By contrast, the collaboration with UNICEF in monitoring ground water in IDP camps in Darfur has been a clear success.<sup>97</sup> UNICEF has been the main partner in IWRM, and the evaluation notes the high levels of usage and effectiveness of the groundwater monitoring. However, despite its success, the current \$173,000 project is only a small component of UNICEF's \$15 million WASH programme, and the placement of two UNEP staff in the UNICEF office in El Fasher has entailed substantial security/logistics costs which are becoming onerous as UNICEF has had to rapidly downsize its presence in the face of limited new funding<sup>98</sup>.
127. The Darfur Timber and Energy project (completed March 2010) was undertaken with FAO. The learning from this project encouraged a subsequent joint Strategic Framework for Natural Resource Management in Darfur drafted with FAO, with a focus on livelihoods, soil protection and deforestation.
128. UNEP is currently fostering stronger links with UNFPA on population dynamics and the environment through closer coordination and collaboration with the National Population Council (NPC). The project (Population Dynamics and Environment in Sudan) has the objective to "understand the inter-linkages of population dynamics and environmental degradation in Sudan, and their potential to contribute to the peace and development process through guiding environmental, population, and economic policy-making". The concept note and Agreement designates two phases: (i) research/analysis, consultations with stakeholders and building of perspectives, and (ii) detailing

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<sup>91</sup> In Sudan the services for local recruitment, procurement and disbursement of payments are provided by UNDP. The evaluation notes that this can make the procedures complex and time consuming.

<sup>92</sup> Currently the potential brokering of \$5M GEF funding for UNDP to follow up to the NAPA using the shared approach on IWRM is the most promising area.

<sup>93</sup> This is in assisting the Higher Council for Environment and Natural Resources (HCENR), Sudan's Government Focal Point for the UNFCCC, to develop the country's second National Communication under UNFCCC by 2013 (the first NAP was completed in 2007 in collaboration with UNDP and funded by GEF).

<sup>94</sup> UNDP's 2004-2009 project - *Reduction of Resource-Based Conflicts Among Pastoralists and Farmers* - was to be undertaken in North Darfur, but security impediments forced them to move the project to Kordofan, Upper Nile and the Sobat Basin.

<sup>95</sup> At this time the DCPSF was not fully integrated into UNDP.

<sup>96</sup> There will be a training workshop on the implementation of these guidelines in April 2013 led by UNEP.

<sup>97</sup> This built on prior research reflected in the 2008 publication *Water resource management in humanitarian programming in Darfur: The case for drought preparedness*.

<sup>98</sup> Interview with UNICEF representative, Dec 2012.

the possible areas for quick-impact and larger scale programming. This project links with on-going global initiatives such as the latest deliberations on Cancun Adaptation Framework - COP17 in Durban.

129. An important outcome of UNEP's advocacy has been the brokering of approximately \$30 million funding for other agencies to implement projects that build on UNEP's research and policy work. Examples<sup>99</sup> include:
- DRA applying directly for funds from the Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF) and becoming a co-funded partner of the EU-sponsored market analysis project in Darfur;
  - UNEP was part of the core technical management of the Darfur International Water Conference and of the follow up committee, including the development of a specific follow up package for the Qatari Government with an IWRM component of \$62M and a climate component of \$8M;
  - The Sudan Government has pledged 30% co-funding for the Wadi El Ku initiative (and for the Darfur International Water Conference);
  - IOM funding for environmental vulnerability mapping and CEAPS (\$1.8m) with additional funding from Christian Aid to work on CEAPs with the North Darfur Sustainable Action Group (SAG)<sup>100</sup>.
130. UNEP was able to raise the profile of environmental issues in the UNAMID/UNCT Integrated Strategic Framework for Darfur from September 2010, and on the Darfur International Water Conference. Each reflecting links between environmental degradation, livelihoods, governance and conflicts. Again, though, there has been little follow-through in terms of engagement with UNAMID over, for instance, the environmental impact of Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) and the potential links between UNEP's pastoralism work and the civil-political work in UNAMID. More worryingly, there has been environmental damage wrought by exponential growth in housing and associated infrastructure around the UNAMID mission and projects. UNEP tried to impress upon UN agencies the use of sun-dried stabilised soil blocks for construction purposes, which would significantly reduced the demand for poles and fuel wood for brick kilns<sup>101</sup>. No monitoring data is available to confirm if these suggestions were taken up.
131. Both UNAMID and OCHA lamented the fact that UNEP has had little input in the monitoring of environmental impact of the on-going returnee programme. It is striking that UNEP appears to be a victim of its own success. For instance, the UN Country Team in the last decade did not give appropriate attention to issues of pastoralism; UNEP has now brought this issue to the fore, but is unable to provide the requested follow-through and advice at programme design stages of the various UN agencies.
132. The wider concern – expressed by all UN agencies interviewed by the evaluation - is that despite the quality of UNEP's written outputs, it has little follow-through in terms of technical engagement within the UNCT. A frequent comment from both Government and UN agencies was that UNEP's intellectual output is not a sufficient condition for change in itself, and – more critically – the knowledge, momentum and promise of these documents could be lost unless matched by deliverable results on the ground. UNEP has neither the financial nor staff resources to participate fully in the numerous inter-agency technical working groups in Darfur; their influence is therefore

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<sup>99</sup> See DFID Annual reports on SIEP, 2010 and 2012.

<sup>100</sup> The NGO ProAct, UNEP's previous partner, is a partner in this.

<sup>101</sup> Review of the Humanitarian Environmental Integration Programme (ProAct, MAY 2011).

'passive'.<sup>102</sup> UNEP rarely requests items on the agenda of the UNCT; no single UNEP staff member is assigned clear responsibility over this area of work. As the OCHA representative stated: *"In ten years we've spent over \$10 billion on humanitarian aid in Sudan, yet environmental issues have only recently began to feature prominently. Now that agencies are waking up to the importance of the issue (in no small part due to UNEP's efforts) there is a degree of frustration that UNEP is unable to respond to the increasing demand for their services and advice."*<sup>103</sup>

133. UNEP's status - or lack of status in not having an accredited representative in Sudan - has become a more pressing issue as its profile rises. The evaluation was frequently informed by both Government and UN (including the office of the RC/HC) that the existing representation is insufficient not only for the kind of sustained advocacy, advice and support built over the last 5 years, but also for the entry-level political engagement that this entails. It is also a financial issue: with a formally established country representation UNEP could access UNEP core funding as well as possible future funds through the Peace Building Fund (PBF). The management of natural resources is currently within Priority Area 3 of the PBF. In 2011 worldwide some \$43.5 million was disbursed to 16 UN agencies; of this, just under \$12 million was allocated to Sudan<sup>104</sup>. Although the PBF has been approached by the UN and Sudan Government for funding in Darfur, this will depend on progress on the peace process.

### ***Integrated Water Resource Management***

134. We have already noted that the acceptance and incorporation of IWRM in national and sub-national policy has been one of the most marked achievements of UNEP in Sudan. The IWRM concept rests on six main pillars: initial assessment of water resources (total budget and needs); monitoring of changes (discharge-recharge); water resource policy and strategy; implementation of activities; capacity support; and evaluation of impact. On the technical design the evaluation noted the lack of a fully signed project document that stipulates and defines UNEP's strategy and approach to IWRM, implementation arrangements, and programmatic partnership with the Government and field operations. It has not, therefore, been possible to fully gauge the chronological and logical sequence of the six pillars pertaining to the IWRM. The Groundwater and Wadis Directorate alluded to these omissions, suggesting that the absence of a comprehensive project document did not allow it to open a bank account for international funding, which would be an important institutional step forward. Meanwhile the Ministry of Finance was unable to release the Government Counterpart Contribution (GCC), which would otherwise strengthen implementation of activities of the IWRM initiative.

135. Three information sessions on Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) were conducted in Darfur in October 2010, together with the WASH sector and government partners. These sessions led to the drafting of a 2011 IWRM plan for the three Darfur states, which was endorsed by the Government. An accompanying and crucial positive policy change has also been the shift from geographical boundaries (states) to catchment areas (that can cross state boundaries) as the 'unit of water management', and hence the increasing propensity for inter-departmental and inter-state cooperation, often facilitated by UNEP.

136. There have been staffing gaps in UNEP that have adversely affected its work. The Darfur IWRM project manager was transferred to Juba in 2011, leaving a gap of some 9 months before a consultant

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<sup>102</sup> The point was made strongly by the RC/HC in Sudan who commented on a perceived level of academic detachment within UNEP's work portfolio.

<sup>103</sup> OCHA Head of Office, Dec 2012

<sup>104</sup> Peacebuilding Fund, <http://www.unpbf.org/what-we-fund/>

took up the work. Access delays<sup>105</sup> (visa and travel permits not issued by Government) further hampered work<sup>106</sup>, particularly on the proposed work on developing a series of Master Plans<sup>107</sup> on IWRM. UNEP held consultations with government counterparts in El Fasher, Nyala and Khartoum and agreed the approach to the Master Plan work including templates for the technical appraisal of projects proposed for the catchment areas. Although the intention to produce Master Plans is reflected in the Darfur Joint Assessment Mission (DJAM), work is behind schedule on these.

137. Work on physical infrastructures (accounting for about 23% of the total SIEP budget) has made some progress in the last three years. The Dams Rehabilitation/Construction Project is being implemented through UNOPS, who have a direct contract with DFID but have technical assistance and project leadership from UNEP.<sup>108</sup> In 2009 there was an MoU drafted between UNOPS and DFID. It was not well elaborated in terms of design and planning as the intent was to start up the project quickly and learn as it progressed. Lessons learned would then be applied to an anticipated second phase. At the time there was an urgency to undertake infrastructure works. By the end of 2011 UNEP had provided project brokering and environmental screening for 11 dam repair projects. There was also an MOU (unsigned) drafted by UNEP in March 2012 to delineate how the two organizations would coordinate the final activities of the project.
138. UNEP initially provided UNOPS with four sites. However, there was a long delay before more sites were identified, effectively shutting down UNOPS' project team (which then focused on a second water project which started up in Darfur) for almost a year until new sites were provided. Some technical failures ensued. The Abu Delig dam suffered a breach during the wet season as a result of monitoring deficiencies and UNOPS is now engaging supervisory engineers via non-UN contracts in order to ensure, where security allows, closer supervision of all sites. The Abu Shouk check structure (not a dam as such) also failed. This occurred for several reasons: (1) there was insufficient knowledge of catchment and flow conditions, as well as the lack of repair of the upstream Haloof dam; (2) there was an absence of flow data for the design; and (3) there was an extreme flood event. UNOPS takes full responsibility for the failure and UNEP/UNOPS/DFID have recently approved a survey of all failed dams in Darfur so that future implementing agencies can have a better understanding of conditions there.
139. UNEP has further helped identify and broker funds for four urban water supply projects in Darfur designed to reduce drought risks. The Darfur International Water Conference, of which UNEP was part of the core technical management, instigated the precedent that 30% of pledges should be allocated to resource management issues and 70% to supply side interventions. Prior to this the water sector was only addressing WASH issues. The precedent was established with the identification of a specific IWRM 'package' of \$62 million from the Qatari Government.
140. One of the more promising developments in terms of future strategy and continuity is the drafted EU-funded (7.5 million euro) geographically based project on watershed management in Wadi El Ku. The project will be an opportunity to test and implement the SIEP results in an area/catchment based project. It also represents a hybrid version of working with NGOs and Government, the latter having

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<sup>105</sup> A P3 Dams Project manager position in Darfur attracted only one inexperienced applicant in 2010. The difficulty of attracting suitable staff is compounded by the present level B security status.

<sup>106</sup> The consultant has only managed to be in Darfur for 6 weeks within a 6 month contract.

<sup>107</sup> Master Plans include developing and implementing national/regional strategies and programmes with regard to IWRM; improving efficiency of water use, establishing public-private partnership; and developing gender sensitive policies and programmes.

<sup>108</sup> The infrastructure projects fall under the SIEP. The initial 2009 MOU was between UNOPS and DFID.

pledged 30% co-funding for this initiative. On the technical side, gully erosion, sheet erosion, forestry, water harvesting, water supply and sustainable livelihoods will be considered as an integrated package. Overall management will dwell more on engaging direct beneficiaries and other main stakeholders through potentially establishing institutions such as Water Users Association and an overarching Water Board to be mandated with strategic and policy issues. For the system to effectively function, new legislation for catchment areas has to be sanctioned.

## ***Climate Change***

141. In paragraph 114 we described the work done by UNEP in supporting climate change policy revision – a joint project with the HCENR. On the basis of a jointly produced Concept Note, agreement has been reached on a climate change project including detail of its main phases of implementation. In terms of outcomes, the number of new national and state government policies and strategy that include climate change and participatory environmental governance issues has exceeded expectations. But a challenge remains in transforming this into effective implementation and a change in peoples' lives.
142. UNEP's SIEP project has directly contributed towards, and refined, the analysis over the interrelationships between climate change, population pressure and (particularly pastoralist) livelihoods. For example, stressing the decline in rainfall has been replaced with a more succinct discussion over increasing variability and the increase in rain since the 1980s - an important difference in outlook. SIEP's (UNEP/Tufts) adoption of a livelihoods lens allows a more nuanced appraisal of the links between environment and conflict<sup>109</sup>. The understanding that emerges is that where rainfall is scarce and unpredictable, pastoralism can be a more appropriate livelihood strategy than rain-fed agriculture. In the face of entrenched political opinion and practice on the ground, UNEP and partners continue to 'mainstream' this understanding through dialogue and consultation processes at all levels (civil society, Government, pastoralist communities) that form part of the SIEP process.
143. The forthcoming vulnerability and adaptation assessments to be conducted in 17 states will go some way to addressing this. It comes on the back of two important consultations: (i) the Darfur International Water Conference – at which UNEP was part of the core technical management team and of the follow up committee - held in July 2011 in which a donor appeal document was developed to attract funding for 65 projects<sup>110</sup> implementable by a range of UN agencies and government institutions on sustainable water management and adaptation to climate change; and (ii) the EU-organized workshop on Mainstreaming Climate Change into National Development Planning in November 2011 (part of the UNEP/EU partnership) enabled the Ministries of Environment, Forestry and Physical Development and Finance to debate the issue.
144. The more recent comprehensive work with IWRM and climate change in Darfur has consolidated some of this strategic thinking, but no outcome-level results regarding climate change adaptation could be expected at this stage. UNEP claims that the community-level CEAPs are an important gauge of the incorporation of change within local environmental governance and its impact on climate

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<sup>109</sup> See, for example, the workshop report and draft programme strategy for the SIEP: 2012 Programme Consultation (UNEP). Also the various papers presented in Marcel Leroy (ed), *Environment and Conflict in Africa: Reflections on Darfur*, University for Peace (2009) and Brenden Bromwich, 'Environmental Degradation and Conflict in Darfur: implications for peace and recovery', *Humanitarian Practice Network*, Issue 39, July 2008, ODI, London.

<sup>110</sup> The pledging conference about \$500 million, but very little of this has been committed. Very few of the 65 projects have been undertaken, but UNEP has capitalised on the process through bringing IWRM to the fore.

change adaptation, but the evaluation found little evidence of this. The CEAPs are still a pilot project-based capacity building endeavour with a potential for scaling up (through the FNC, for example), but are a long way from making an impact 'at scale'. Countrywide, UNEP has assisted in the creation of Environment Ministries in 15 states which unfortunately were dissolved recently by the Federal Government in its efforts to reduce public expenditures. Nevertheless, UNEP continues to provide technical and physical capacity in terms of research, policy advice, information, office equipment, and funding to attend international conferences. Inevitably in under-resourced entities, this creates demands, high expectations and a constant demand to 'do more'.

145. Forest depletion has been one of the major side effects of the war, with the breakdown of any regulatory mechanisms and the increasing demand for new housing and fuel in IDP settlements. UNEP's so-called DDD report<sup>111</sup> and its joint programme with FAO and FNC – the Darfur timber and energy project – have both contributed to enhancing awareness and capacity within FNC, local communities and NGOs in forest management. According to the final report of the project, about 50% of the planted seedlings survived and the women who were trained in production of fuel-efficient stoves have further trained over 50,000 other women<sup>112</sup>.
146. Although alternative energy has not been a central pillar of UNEP's work (and is not in the portfolio of SIEP), a study<sup>113</sup> and workshops by ENTEC, funded by the Common Humanitarian Fund, on the potential demand for Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) did have encouraging outcomes. A series of government-sponsored consultative workshops were held in Khartoum and Darfur in late 2010-early 2011 to discuss the economic, environmental and health benefits of LPG compared to conventional energy options. The Government has been keen to develop new policy processes; and in very practical terms the Ministry of Petroleum issued a directive for subsidies to be directly passed on to the end user through sales at the Sudanese Petroleum Company. In Nyala, the price of LPG halved. No direct attribution is claimed by UNEP, but by supporting initiatives of the various ministries concerned there will have been a positive impact on consumption of wood resources, and might also have been increased personal security for women who in some cases will no longer need to walk long distances outside the secured areas to fetch firewood<sup>114</sup>.
147. UNEP's work on environmental mainstreaming within the UNDAF has been well received by stakeholders, including GWWD. The resulting Natural Resource Management, Climate Change and Disaster Risk Reduction are now recognised as key stand-alone intervention areas for the UN in Sudan. The UNDAF has only just been approved, so it too early to judge environmental impacts.

### ***Community-based natural resource management***

148. In the programme theory of change, community-driven NRM is considered an important longer-term outcome and a strong contributor to overall enhanced environmental governance in the country.

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<sup>111</sup> Destitution, Distortion and Deforestation: the impact of conflict on the timber and woodfuel trade in Darfur (UNEP/ENTEC, 2008).

<sup>112</sup> UNEP and partners in Sudan Joint Programme on Environment and Natural Resources Management: Darfur Timber and Energy Project. Final Report. FAO Energy Operations and Rehabilitation Division, 2008

<sup>113</sup> Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG): Demand, Supply and Future Perspectives for Sudan, synthesis workshop report, 12-13 December 2010.

<sup>114</sup> UNEP Disasters & Conflicts Sub-programme Evaluation: Sudan Country Case Study, May 2012.

149. The Community Environmental Action Plan (CEAP) model<sup>115</sup> identifies environmental priority needs (mostly concentrated around water, forests and livelihoods) and solutions to address them at a community level. In addition to funding small projects in the recipient village, the CEAP process also brings together pastoralists and farmers, looks at migratory routes, and designs interventions to be of mutual benefit to both groups. Also included in the model is a demonstration of key component of REDD+ work. As the key government implementing partner, FNC are developing 20 CEAPs under SIEP. However, in terms of visible results on the ground, the key implementing agency is the national NGO, the Darfur Reconstruction Agency (DRA). The approach is not exclusive to UNEP; indeed, the programme itself built on previous work by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and ProAct<sup>116</sup>.
150. With DRA, seven villages were selected for the pilot. By the end of 2011 only two had fully developed CEAPS - two adjoining villages close to El Fasher in North Darfur. Another in North Darfur was under development in 2012, with four in adjoining states also under development. DRA has a CEAP team of 11-14 trained staff in North Darfur, and an implementation team in El Fasher and Nyala.<sup>117</sup>
151. The most outstanding model for CEAP has been that in Maba village (N.Darfur) that started in June 2010. By 2012 the Maba CEAP committee was able to sign contracts itself with the FNC (for seedling production), SAG for fuel-efficient stoves, with WES for well-drilling equipment, and with ARC for the provision of fodder seeds<sup>118</sup>.
152. The UNEP project manager and DRA CEAP team in Nyala and El Fasher raised interest in the CEAP process with FNC in all five Darfur states. With UNEP support they are now expanding the use of this approach, though this is still at the preliminary stage. There is thus a potential multiplier effect of this type of capacity building that links Government and civil society institutions. Meanwhile, UNEP has only one staff member assigned directly to the development of CEAPs (with DRA) and it remains debatable whether UNEP has the capacity for project implementation even at this relatively small scale.
153. The evaluation found a significant disconnect between the (relatively costly) small-scale outputs of CEAP and the upstream policy that these are supposed to influence regarding community involvement in local natural resources management. The CEAP model itself entails high transaction costs and intensive capacity building at the NGO and community levels which might be better undertaken by agencies other than UNEP, leaving UNEP to work on linking the work more directly with national policy through, for example, the replication work of FNC. Looking ahead, UNEP has proposed bringing the CEAPs into a more generically titled Community Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM). The emphasis would then be on integration across the other SIEP themes so that best practice in community engagement informs all aspects of the programme<sup>119</sup>.
154. One option for UNEP is to seek an alternative international organisation to oversee and fund the DRA-led element of the programme. UNEP would then concentrate fully on helping FNC to scale up,

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<sup>115</sup> The model derives from the work of the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) originally tested in East Africa from 1997.

<sup>116</sup> IOM was one of the agencies expelled from Sudan in 2009 and three of the four CEAPs developed by them were picked up in the second phase of the UNEP programme.

<sup>117</sup> The project was started with the help of a Swiss NGO, ProAct, but this support was withdrawn after about a year.

<sup>118</sup> 5<sup>th</sup> Interim Narrative Report, January-April 2012, DRA.

<sup>119</sup> Report on the 2012 Programme Consultation on SIEP.

including the development of a viable strategy over a number of years. Advocacy over funding and technical assistance in project development would be the appropriate intervention level for UNEP. In pursuit of a more integrated portfolio, the forthcoming EU-funded Wadi El Ku catchment project might be an opportunity to encourage the creation of CEAP(s) within the project area.

### ***Pastoralism and livelihoods***

155. UNEPs close collaboration with Tufts University and the steady accumulation of acclaimed research and literature on livelihoods and pastoralism makes this component of its work one of the most readily recognized. The objective has been to enhance the livelihood conditions of pastoralists by promoting in-depth understanding of pastoralist livelihoods among decision makers. The strategy was to build the capacity of pastoralist leaders, professionals and other stakeholders to influence decision making; to improve monitoring and analysis of markets and trade in Darfur in order to better understand how conflicts affect livelihoods; and to identify pastoralist-related policy gaps through a comprehensive policy review.
156. The **pastoralist project** helps promote understanding of pastoralists' livelihoods systems among local, national and international stakeholders and to strengthen the capacity of pastoralist leaders, organizations and other advocates to articulate the rationale for pastoralism. Tufts University has itself developed five components of their pastoralist project: (i) stakeholder mapping and survey, plus the development of a network; (ii) pastoralist policy review (foundational working papers); (iii) adaptation of a "Pastoralism Policy Options" course for Sudan; (iv) promotion of the use of 'Livestock Emergency Guidelines and Standards' (LEGS); and (v) pastoralism action research (two studies: the economic value of pastoralism in Sudan, and (forthcoming) livestock mobility and resilient livelihoods). In the final stages of SIEP 1, Tufts is planning to study pastoralist mobility through a combination of GPS tracking, interviews, and possibly some form of crowd sourcing.
157. The foundational research reports related to this work include a Stakeholder Mapping<sup>120</sup> and two key studies - *Livelihoods, power and choice*<sup>121</sup> (examining the livelihoods of camel herding pastoralists of Northern Darfur) and *On the Hoof*<sup>122</sup> (examining livestock trade in Darfur, how conflict impacts upon it, and how livestock trading can be supported to better sustain livelihoods). The International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) have developed a successful training course on Pastoralism and Policy in East Africa<sup>123</sup>, and UNEP/ Tufts/ SOS Sahel is currently working with a national Adaptation Team to test and use this course in Sudan. The adaptation materials have been prepared for modules 1 and 2, three training workshops were completed by end-2012, and excellent evaluations from participants have been received<sup>124</sup>. It is expected that all three modules will be used in training from early 2013.
158. At the end of 2011 the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (Geneva) requested, through the RC/HC, that a UN Pastoralist Steering Committee chaired by UNEP be created. This now has 11 participating agencies, has undertaken a survey of agency activities and will, in early 2013 produce a

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<sup>120</sup> H.Young et al, 'Pastoralism and Pastoralists in Sudan: A stakeholder mapping and survey'

<sup>121</sup> H.Young et al, 'Livelihoods, Power and Choice: the vulnerability of the Northern Rizaygat, Darfur, Sudan'. (Tufts, January 2009)

<sup>122</sup> M. Buchanan-Smith et al, 'On the Hoof: Livestock Trade in Darfur' (UNEP, September 2012)

<sup>123</sup> This consists of three modules: Module 1 analyses the internal dynamics of pastoral systems, Module 2 analyses the policy challenges and options for pastoralism, while Module 3 focuses on skills to advocate for change but needs full adaptation to the context of pastoralism in Sudan.

<sup>124</sup> Workshop reports include: 'Pastoralism Policy Training: First Testing Workshop Report', December 2011, and 'Pastoralism Policy Training: Second Testing Workshop Report'; April 2012.

series of lessons and options for future interventions. Cross-fertilization of ideas from elsewhere in Africa, particularly through the International Institute of the Environment and Development (IIED), and links to existing programmes of SOS Sahel Sudan and the DRA, are apparent. Also notable is the engagement of the al Massar Organization for Nomads, the Nomads Development Council and more recently with the Ministry of Animal Resources, Fisheries and Range.

159. It is important to note that this is an action research project of Tufts, partly funded by UNEP. The Livestock Emergency Guidelines and Standards component, for instance, is not included in the joint agreement. The relationship between UNEP and Tufts has been complementary; UNEP promotes evidence-based advocacy for equitable and sustainable environmental governance and Tufts undertakes action research and training in support of sustainable livelihoods. Each institution has its own set of stakeholders, which are natural complements to one another, but the challenge is how to better institutionalise the learning that comes from UNEP's and Tufts' processes so that respective partners and stakeholder groups might fully benefit.
160. Closely linked to this is the **trade and market monitoring project** that is helping to deepen analysis and understanding of the shifting patterns of trade and markets in Darfur on an on-going basis for key agricultural and livestock commodities; identify how livelihoods and the economy can be supported through trade; and identify peace-building opportunities through trade. The next stage under the current programme is to undertake an in-depth study of the cash crop trade in Darfur, drawing and building on findings from the market monitoring work as a foundation.
161. The marketing project has a strong capacity building element in which Tufts supports the Darfur Development and Reconstruction Agency (DRA) to develop market monitoring in North Darfur State (established 2010), West Darfur (2012) and later in South and Central Darfur (2013). DRA has 7 CBOs monitoring 15 markets across North Darfur State and on-going market monitoring in West Darfur also.
162. The evaluation found no dissenting voices in respect of the profound impact both these projects are having on the thinking and approaches adopted by the international community. The DFID's Annual Report on SIEP suggests, for example, that a possible spin-off of UNEP's work "balances a narrow focus on rights ...with an approach that pays more heed to economic and environmental sustainability – to enable adaptation to post conflict paradigms and the profound impact of climate change in the Sahel."<sup>125</sup>
163. On the other hand, the project represents only a cautious beginning in the process of influencing government policy; and, indeed, in shifting the parameters of conflict-related arguments over land usage in Darfur. For example, although one of the objectives of the project is to strengthening the capacity of pastoral leaders and other advocates to articulate the rationale of pastoralism and argue for its inclusion in state and national policies, the dialogue and training to date has only occasionally involved pastoralists themselves; and the evaluation was not able to ascertain just how representative the two nomad umbrella organizations are.

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<sup>125</sup> DFID (2012), SIEP Annual Report.

## C. Likelihood of sustainability and impact

### *Sustainability*

164. UNEP's intervention logic – and by extension the premise upon which an exit strategy would rely – is that attitudinal change from the top down and from the bottom up reaches a 'critical mass' when policy translates to changed and permanent practice. UNEP is not unique in having a combined process of capacity development, consultation and research as the mainstay of their programme, but it does make the challenge to 'prove' the impact and sustainability of these activities all the more difficult. As mentioned above, where changes occur (particularly at a macro level) we should be cautious of assigning, at best, contribution, but certainly not direct attribution. Moreover, although government commitment to continue funding activities spawned by UNEP might be an important milestone in sustainability, it is not the sole gauge of success.
165. On capacity building UNEP's record of workshops and supported outreach programmes in a number of national, regional and international events is impressive. These include, inter alia, alternate energy use (LPG) workshop; pastoral rangeland management and tenure systems in Kenya and Tanzania; Africa-Adaptation workshop on climate change, held in Addis Ababa that selected Sudan as a member of the Africa-Adaptation Network; and FNC and HCENR delegates' participation in climate change talks in Vietnam which led to the Cancun Agreement and the COP17 meeting South Africa. UNEP has also promoted active dialogue with the Sudanese Environmental Conservation Society (SECS) on their plans to create a project on environmental awareness and climate change at community level through activation of their branches in Darfur. The weakness is that UNEP gives greater emphasis on capacity building of individuals rather than institutions, inevitably leading to a measurement of impact that depends on expressed levels of enthusiasm (participation of individuals leading to "shukranagrams" and accolades) by those selected individuals.
166. The outputs in each of the SIEP themes will need to coalesce in a more tangible and measurable manner than has hitherto been the case, to make a greater combined outcome and impact. Pastoralist livelihoods analysis should inform water resource management policy work, for example. And, as we have stressed elsewhere in the report, a more concerted effort is needed to channel outputs of the themes through the humanitarian mainstreaming work to influence the humanitarian work plan and other planning processes for 2013.
167. Looking ahead, UNEP acknowledges that a new baseline survey for the environment is needed following the secession of South Sudan. The MEFPD has requested UNEP to undertake this follow up to the PCEA. On the economic front, it will support the need for better data that links the contribution of the natural environment to the gross domestic product (GDP) with a view to promoting investment into sustainable natural resources management. In terms of consolidating environmental knowledge, UNEP is currently undertaking a project to scan and archive a large number of development studies (mostly grey literature) conducted in Sudan since the early 1950s<sup>126</sup>. The aim is to develop an online data library accessible to all. The studies cover a range of issues from physical, biological and socio-economic sectors, and especially documents on geology, water resources and soils.

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<sup>126</sup> Some of the scanned materials are linked to an archive in Cranfield University (UK) and there is an interest from the Rift Valley Institute to also use the material.

## ***Impact drivers and assumptions***

168. The reconstructed programme theory of change (please refer back to figure 1 p.23) suggests a linear pathway between the immediate outcome “enhanced capacity of service actors (Government, civil society, research and academia, traditional administration)” and the medium-term outcome “enhanced governance of natural resources at federal, state and community levels”. The programme theory also shows that enhanced community capacity to manage natural resources is another important medium-term outcome that, in the next step of the ladder, contributes to overall improved environmental governance in the country. There are several drivers and assumptions required to realise these medium-term outcomes: mainstreaming of concepts and approaches in UN and other international partners, financial resources, power and influence of service actors, trust between service actors and communities, and availability of technical know-how. The presence of these drivers and assumptions determines the likelihood of the immediate programme outcome to lead to medium-term outcomes and ultimately to impact.
169. The driver “mainstreaming in UN and other international organisations” has already been extensively discussed under results achieved (paragraphs 118-131). The enhancement of trust relationships between services actors and communities is part of the community-based NRM component and the livelihoods component of the programme. However, unlike the relationships being developed between service actors (within Government and between Government and non-government actors) there is no monitoring information available from the programme on progress made in enhancing trust relationships between service actors and communities. Closer collaboration with government actors on CEAPs, as intended now with FNC, may contribute to building trust between those agencies and the local communities involved but this has yet to be monitored.
170. As regards financial resources, UNEP’s brokering of new resources from the international community has been notable, though this has taken place within a shrinking pool of potential donors. The financial climate and opportunities for new funding in Sudan will remain limited in the absence of a durable peace agreement in Darfur. Sudan (including South Sudan) has been the largest humanitarian aid recipient in the world for several years<sup>127</sup>, yet the 2012 UN Work Plan (for the North) received less than 60% of the requested appeal. Meanwhile development funds remain subdued. The 2013 UN Work Plan appeal stands at \$983.4 million; by March 2013 committed funds to this were under 2%<sup>128</sup>. Doubtless, this will increase, but the general trend has been a diversion of resources to South Sudan and comparatively less attention given to Darfur and elsewhere.
171. Financial shortfalls have been made worse by the general reticence of the Khartoum Government to allow access to Darfur. This reached a head in 2012 when the UN Security Council on July 31 expressed “deep concern at increased restrictions and bureaucratic impediments” to the movement of personnel and equipment to assist war-affected populations<sup>129</sup>. Meanwhile, the incentives for private business development in Darfur and elsewhere are poor. UNDP noted in 2010 the disincentives to private enterprise in Darfur, including “the lack of physical infrastructure (that) increases the transaction costs for micro- and small enterprises. In addition, limited market information flows discourage market entry and formalisation, particularly for ....rural micro-

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<sup>127</sup> Trends from 2006-2011, reported in Alnap (2012), ‘The State of the Humanitarian System’, ODI, London, July 2012.

<sup>128</sup> OCHA Financial Tracking Service, <http://fts.unocha.org/pagelader.aspx?page=emerg-emergencyDetails&appealID=992>

<sup>129</sup> <http://www.rnw.nl/africa/bulletin/darfur-funding-jeopardy-without-aid-access-us-envoy>

entrepreneurs".<sup>130</sup> It would not, therefore, be easy to meet the demands for greater technical inputs that might come from building the capacities of community groups to the level where they are able to obtain NRM advice, equipment, environmental infrastructure works and technology maintenance services.

172. The higher up the pathway to change the more likely it is that exogenous factors will intervene and potentially undermine the objectives. For example, a reduction in local conflict over NRM emanating from the above logic makes two important assumptions: that non-environmental drivers of recovery and development improve while other non-environmental drivers of conflict do not increase. These are large assumptions, and obviously beyond UNEP's control. All the assumptions regarding scaling up will depend on a safer working environment for all partners.

173. A sobering reality is that currently UNEP operates only in areas near to the major towns. Conflict continues to severely impact access to populations in rural areas. For example, clashes between the Arab Abbala and Beni Hussein tribes over control of a gold mine of Jebel 'Amer (North Darfur) broke out in January 2013, creating the largest number of IDPs (about 100,000) seen in Darfur for several years. For two months<sup>131</sup> there was hardly any access along the northern routes; reports of deteriorating sanitation and water supplies were of particular concern to aid agencies<sup>132</sup>. Yet these intermittent shocks simply exacerbate a more fundamental reality: for many people, the war has debilitated the prospects and impetus for even medium-term planning. It has also heightened levels of distrust between communities and local government. The evaluation team was told on many occasions that most rural communities simply take it for granted that government services will not be forthcoming. Rebuilding trust will take more than a few meetings; it requires a sea-change in attitudes in order to reconstruct the social contract that binds government and citizens in this area of the world.

174. UNEP has produced a series of Risk Assessments (on a quarterly basis, as required by DFID). These include mitigating strategies for 'worse case' scenarios such as the deterioration of the political environment or increased conflict. Mitigation strategies rely primarily on the national partners and an associated plethora of assumptions around their capacity and willingness to adapt to and absorb changes. One of the challenges to working in Darfur is that the possibility of finding alternative partners in the event of either evacuation or a hardening of government attitudes towards aspects of the programme is very limited.

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<sup>130</sup> Abdelmajid Khojali and Lene Hansen (2010), Microfinance Assessment Consultancy to Darfur, Sudan', UNDP, Feinstein International Centre and IOM, June 2010.

<sup>131</sup> A tentative ceasefire agreement was reached in March 2013.

<sup>132</sup> Sudan Tribune, February 14<sup>th</sup> 2013, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article45526>

## V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

175. In just a few years UNEP has established a recognisable niche in three key respects: first, through the PCEA, setting the standard for a quality and comprehensive environmental assessment that remains relevant five years later; second, the source of reputable and influential research backed by stakeholder analysis on natural resource management, particularly on livelihoods and pastoralism; third, through an inclusive dialogue process, raising the quality of environmental debate and policy within some key government institutions. The constraints to success are primarily related staffing and resources, and the fact that expectations have been raised which cannot be satisfied in the current aid climate. UNEP has somehow become a victim of its own success.
176. UNEP has an uncontested reputation as the instigator and advocate of quality baseline research that has necessarily been confined to succinct sectors and geographical areas. It would be unreasonable to criticize UNEP for not having directly engaged with, for example, the oil or transport industries when at any one time the country office comprises 6-8 international staff, 5-6 senior Sudanese staff, and has been open for only five years. Sudan is not a blank canvas upon which 'environmental work' can be written; there are complex political and historical reasons why some areas of work – IWRM and pastoralism, for instance – have gained greater traction than others. However, it was clear to the evaluation that both the Government and international partners are convinced more than ever that environment and conflict are inseparable. Yet, we were unable to determine the extent to which a change in attitude among some key individuals translates into higher priority given to environmental issues in areas where natural resources are falling under high pressures exerted by various users.
177. We have explored the manner in which a programme theory of change (or programme logic) can and should be used from the design through to the evaluation phase of a programme cycle. This is particularly important in a conflict setting where assumptions of a link between lower level outcomes and higher level peacebuilding outcomes/impacts are made but rarely verified. As we have indicated above, the continuing volatile situation in Darfur (and indeed in many other areas of Sudan, not least the border areas with South Sudan) presents major challenges to the scaling up of a programme that would rely on a degree of stability that has yet to be realised. In addition to the agreed indicators within a project logframe, there should be a regularly updated broader analysis that takes into account risk assessment, conflict analysis and a review of how the 'drivers' of change are impacting upon the core activities of the programme.

### ***Recommendation 1***

*A comprehensive programme theory of change should be developed for the next programme cycle, along with indicators and a means of reporting on the drivers and pathways of change. These should include not only those indicators influenced by UNEP, but also exogenous factors that are likely to impact upon the programme.*

178. The maturation of the Sudan programme would suggest that UNEP should now evolve from a single donor project office to a fully functioning UN office with an evolving country brief. If this runs contrary to UNEP corporate policy, there is a disjuncture between the desire to engage more fully in fragile states and the institutional architecture available to do so. Even without a full in-country representation the dysfunctional management arrangements currently in place between Nairobi, Geneva and Khartoum need to be revised to take into account the requirements of working flexibly and with a degree of decentralized authority commensurate with the demands of working in a fragile state.

**Recommendation 2**

*Administrative arrangements and procedures for a country-level programme should include flexible and appropriate human and financial procurement procedures, including a stronger delegation of authority to the country level and the possibility to fast-track administrative and operational requests when needed.*

179. One of the weaknesses in UNEP's programme logic is the way in which 'influence' and associated outcomes are measured; yet this is so central to the assumptions of the programme. The SIEP logframe understandably limits itself to tangible indicators such as the number of environment-related processes or policies that have been introduced into Government over time. It does not, however, capture the internal dynamics of how precisely UNEP's influence translates to policy change. The recent UNEP review of environmental governance in Sudan has helped to map out what these governance institutions are and the relationship between them. What is needed now is a more concerted effort to explain (a) how these institutions function internally; (b) how policy decisions are made; (c) how such policy is used at federal and state levels; and (d) the extent to which UNEP attribution/contribution towards policy change can be asserted.

**Recommendation 3**

*More robust monitoring and evaluation methods should be developed for measuring the contribution UNEP has on institutional development. As well as policy changes, these should include indicators on influence, attitude change, replication, management development and financial commitments.*

180. Beyond performance indicators of the individual projects, the evaluation asked whether the strategic direction and priorities of UNEP should now be reconfigured. The conclusion is that no radical changes should be made to core programme activities, but that some resources within these should be redirected. The programme has become too fragmented as lines of enquiry and opportunity have been subject to the ebb and flow of events, particularly in Darfur.

181. UNEP's 2012 Programme Consultation<sup>133</sup> re-emphasises UNEP's central focus on environmental governance. Conversely, the evaluation found a significant demand from government sources for greater efforts to be directed towards alternate energy sources<sup>134</sup> and linking climate with forestry – the weakest component of UNEP Sudan's work. Rather than redirecting activities towards, for example, solar or wind power, we suggest a more holistic integration of programmes in ecosystem management.

182. The compacting of peri-urban populations in some areas of Darfur and the accompanying strain on natural resources (as opposed to just water supply) suggests that a more integrated and mutually compatible programme is called for. Environmental regeneration, desertification, poverty eradication and sustainable livelihoods all require up-scaling of UNEP's programme. The FNC and Rural Water Corporation stressed that UNEP should move beyond purely knowledge management and piloting small projects into full scale programming. Given the size of UNEP, this is unrealistic, but the evaluation concurs with the view that greater linkages between UNEP projects need to be reflected not just at discussion/workshop levels, but also on the ground. The cumulative benefits that lend

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<sup>133</sup> SIEP 2012 Programme Consultation: Workshop report and draft programme strategy for consultation.

<sup>134</sup> The evaluation discussions with the Ministry of Science and Technology were over promoting alternative technologies such as solar, wind, biogas and bio-fuel.

themselves to conflict prevention would be better served if resources were concentrated in designated geographical areas. The obvious unit would be the catchment area (such as Wadi El Ku), not least because UNEP has managed to leverage additional interest and funding for these.

***Recommendation 4***

*To avoid project fragmentation, UNEP in its next SIEP phase should promote integrated NRM projects that capitalize on the accumulative benefits of infrastructure (dams, etc), forestry, policy work (IWRM master plans, CC) and community initiatives (CEAPs) in the same catchment area. The exceptions are those projects that are part of a larger UN humanitarian effort.*

183. The transition from an exclusively rights-based approach in humanitarian programming to a more sustainable development approach that takes account of the real constraints of maintaining large concentrated populations in a dryland environment is a discourse rarely entered into. UNEP has yet to engage fully in the 'big debates' over rapidly expanding peri-urban settlements (protracted IDP presence) and the radical shifting patterns of rural population Sudan as a whole. The attendant plethora of 'durable solution' projects emanating from international organizations suggests a more concerted effort by UNEP to advise upon - and monitor - the environmental impact of aid and engage more substantively on population issues.
184. The experience gained through developing the Humanitarian Environment Marker for projects in Darfur is already attracting attention elsewhere in the world. However, a more comprehensive package is required for this to be more than just 'check listing' environmental markers. Assessments are needed during and after project implementation, with effective mechanisms for feedback to the agencies concerned. Greater staff and time allocations need to be given to engaging more fully in inter-agency working groups in Darfur and at the national level. Attention and proffered advice should be given to immediate environmental concerns surrounding issues such as return/resettlement of IDPs, durable solutions to protracted camp settlements, and the impact agency projects themselves have on the environment. Closer collaboration with the UNAMID, RC/HC and OCHA offices is required.
185. All this has serious cost implications. UNAMID's Water and Environment Unit already has a staff of almost 100 and it is unclear what significant difference a UNEP advisory role would play here. However, at the UNCT level there is a persuasive argument that, in the next SIEP stage, 'mainstreaming' environment among UN agencies requires at least a dedicated UNEP staff member embedded in OCHA.

***Recommendation 5***

*A UNEP Environmental Advisor should be assigned to OCHA with a view to (i) increasing the monitoring of environmental markers ascribed to participating UN agencies, particularly those in which environment is a central component, (ii) developing a realistic and independent monitoring system that can be used by agencies themselves, along with a public reporting system, and (iii) developing global methods and guidelines that can be used similar situations elsewhere in the world.*

186. The marked uptake of IWRM and community environmental management in government policy is a notable success of UNEP's advocacy and programmatic activity. A measure of policy commitment and sustainability will be the leveraging of environmental funds from federal and state budgets. UNEP's mantra has been that these are government-owned activities supported by UNEP. Ownership

should, then be demonstrated and reinforced with government strategy and budget lines assigned to sustaining these activities.

**Recommendation 6**

*Within the next SIEP project cycle, UNEP should incorporate a clear request and commitment from Government of Sudan partners towards co-funding of certain projects. For example (i) IWRM policy reform within the Ministry of Water Resources and Electricity should now be matched with committed funds; (ii) Forestry National Corporation should commit to a designated budget for CEAP expansion.*

187. Progress in implementing the pilot community environment CEAP model has been slow. Though there are some capacity constraints among chosen partners, this is not the main reason. It is simply an inevitable consequence of working in a highly fragile social environment where building trust takes time. Access and security constraints are compounded by the additional transaction costs of direct field engagement. We stress that, as with the infrastructure projects, the management of field projects is not UNEP's key area of competence. Moreover, although the link with higher policy and advocacy is theoretically ascertained, it is only tenuous in practice and would depend on a significant scaling up of CEAPs to reach the desired impact on NRM management 'at scale'.

188. An appropriate implementation agent to work with DRA should be sought, allowing UNEP to concentrate on its advisory role with respect to the FNC. A phased hand-over of management and training of the DRA-implemented programme should begin as soon as possible on the understanding that this will not entail project closure as such, and that UNEP will continue to provide technical advice and support where necessary.

**Recommendation 7**

*UNEP should no longer be directly responsible for the CEAP process; this is more appropriately implemented by an operational agency that UNEP should seek at the earliest opportunity. UNEP's role should be to advocate community-driven NRM at policy level.*

189. Despite the high quality of knowledge materials produced by UNEP, these have yet to be effectively communicated beyond the relatively small coterie of UNEP partners. There are no capacity building activities targeted to, for example, media, and private sector businesses or to schools and other educational institutions. Also, despite a reticence towards self-promotion of a country programme anchored in a participatory approach, there was from government and national partners a strong request for greater visibility of UNEP to better serve an advocacy strategy and help allay suspicions over what UNEP is and what it is promoting. An effective advocacy strategy might also take up issues such as land tenure, communal grazing rights and customary laws, and a more direct engagement with pastoralists.

**Recommendation 8**

*UNEP should further develop and implement a dissemination strategy to raise political and public awareness with specified targets and outputs, including the use of media outlets, logos at project sites, public opening ceremonies, etc.*

## Annex 1. Evaluation Matrix

1: What has been the strategic alignment of the UNEP programme?		
Intended results (outcome)	Sub-questions / performance markers / indicators	Methods and data sources
a) objectives and related activities relevant to the developmental/environmental needs of the Sudan population;	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Objectives / activities respond to relevant national needs analyses e.g. MDG progress reports, etc</li> <li>- Identified UNEP priority groups reflect those of national analyses / policy priorities</li> <li>- Needs and priorities identified in PCEA and most recent strategic consultations</li> </ul>	<p>Documentary and trend analysis (national and international statistics; core country standard indicators, livelihoods analyses. Interviews and focus groups.</p>
b) strategies and objectives aligned with those of national development plans and priorities (government)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Strategies / objectives based on national policies, strategies, priorities at state and local levels.</li> <li>- National structures and processes / sectoral co-ordination mechanisms are used where feasible / appropriate</li> <li>- National performance monitoring systems used where feasible / appropriate</li> </ul>	<p>Additional area-based data from NGOs and/or research institutions.</p> <p>Documentary analysis – government/ donor policies, plans and strategies (beyond broad objectives e.g. PRS)</p> <p>Interviews / focus groups</p>
c) strategies and objectives harmonised with those of implementing partners	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Programme aligned with objectives and complementary activities of partners</li> <li>- National / NGO performance monitoring systems used where feasible / appropriate</li> </ul>	<p>Documentary analysis – UNEP strategies and plans</p>
d) strategies and objectives harmonised (and mainstreamed) with UN country team	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Opportunities taken for joint activities and pooling of resources with other</li> </ul>	

	<p>organizations and networks</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Effective relationships and influence to mainstream environmental concerns in UN country strategy</li> </ul>	<p>Documentary analysis (OECD Fragile States principles monitoring report; DAC guidance on supporting statebuilding)</p>
<p>d) strategies and objectives consistent with corporate UNEP policies and approaches</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- UNEP's comparative advantage (and strengths/weaknesses) taken into account</li> <li>- Extent to which the creation of a dedicated country team has increased support for, and performance of, the PoW</li> </ul>	
<p>e) strategies and objectives in line with main donors (DFID in particular)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Collaboration over log frames; consistency of reporting, frequency of consultation.</li> </ul>	
<p>f) operational activities aligned with international good practices for non-state providers (NSPs) working in fragile/conflict states</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Programmes coherent with FS principles / New Deal guidance for NSPs</li> <li>- Programmes explicitly recognise and are oriented towards peacebuilding / statebuilding objectives</li> <li>- Programmes have explicit capacity-building objectives</li> <li>- Development objectives are explicitly aligned with international good practice</li> </ul>	
<p><b>Conclusions question:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>o To what extent has the UNEP country programme (especially in terms of its capacity building activities and selection of target groups) been aligned to the development needs of Sudan? (relevance, coverage)</li> <li>o To what extent has the PoW been successfully aligned with national and partner actor priorities? (relevance)</li> <li>o To what extent has the PoW been situated within an analysis of longer-term and interconnected problems of the context? (connectedness)</li> <li>o To what extent has the PoW been designed and operated to respond to the needs of the fragile and conflict-affected environment of Sudan? (connectedness)</li> <li>o To what extent has the PoW been positioned for maximum effectiveness in the context? (comparative advantage, strategic positioning)</li> </ul>		
<p><b>Question 2: What have been the factors driving strategic decision-making?</b></p>		

<b>Intended results (outcome)</b>	<b>Sub-questions / performance markers / indicators</b>	<b>Methods and Data sources</b>
a) Sufficient use of contextual and sectoral analysis for conflict drivers, climate change issues and environmental needs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Programmes explicitly reference analytical basis / relevant data (environmental damage; conflict and security)</li> <li>- Efforts made to commission analysis where gaps exist</li> <li>- Optimal use made of knowledge management, communication and follow-up in commissioned work</li> </ul>	<p>Documentary analysis – PCEA +</p> <p>Recent strategic reviews</p> <p>Use of national data and efforts to update</p> <p>Cross-reference with other UN/NGO data</p> <p>Interviews with head of sub-units / heads of units</p>
b) Availability of sufficient technical expertise (either internal or through partnership) to strategically manage the different interventions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Sufficient technical expertise available in key substantive areas of the portfolio</li> <li>- Strategic decision-making structures ensure maximum use of available technical expertise</li> <li>- Appropriate development of mitigation strategies (e.g. use of partnerships) to address gaps in expertise where necessary</li> <li>- operational implications of UNEP country presence analysed, putting in place adequate administrative arrangements and allocated adequate human and financial resources to priority areas</li> </ul>	<p>Organisational enquiry - best use has been made of the financial, human and time resources at hand (e.g. by taking note of any wastage or cost/time-saving measures) to deliver quality outputs contributing to country objectives. Interviews / focus groups with staff.</p>
c) Appropriate monitoring and evaluation systems to support strategic decision making;	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Quality M&amp;E and data systems available for use</li> <li>- Appropriateness of performance indicators to cover the various components of the POW</li> <li>- Dedicated and high-capacity M&amp;E partner complement</li> <li>- Systematic use of M&amp;E systems and feedback loops to inform implementation and decision-making</li> <li>- Evidence of lesson learning in programme / strategy design /</li> </ul>	<p>Organisational enquiry - M&amp;E systems in use and reporting mechanisms, Knowledge management mechanisms</p> <p>Documentary review - Operations documents</p>

	decision-making	
d) Appropriate internal coherence and external coordination	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Projects/sub-projects and supporting activities internally coherent with each other. Optimal use of synergies/complementarities</li> <li>- Clear roles and responsibilities between stakeholders and partners identified</li> <li>- Communication and knowledge management thoroughly planned; dissemination of knowledge and follow up apparent</li> <li>- Evidence of sufficient adaptation to changing needs on the ground</li> <li>- Efficient use of UNEP financial, human and time resources to deliver PoW objectives. Optimal continuity of staff.</li> </ul>	<p>Documentary review - Operations documents</p> <p>Recent strategic reviews incl. staffing</p> <p>Interviews with key partners (UN, NGO, bilaterals)</p>
e) Strategic and representative selection of projects to complement policy and research work.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- quantity, quality and usefulness of project outputs</li> <li>- field-based and policy-focussed support backed by advocacy strategy</li> <li>- communication/awareness for the reproduction/up-scaling of pilot activities</li> </ul>	<p>Trend analysis - Chronological analysis of key events over period</p>
f) Strategic adjustment of the UNEP programme in response to gender, social exclusion issues, funding, partner, security and other circumstances	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Decision-making over period responsive to changes in population need profile</li> <li>- Decision-making over period responsive to contextual (including national policy and governance / fragility and security / political economy) change</li> <li>- Strategy and individual project designs incorporate gender and wider social exclusion issues</li> </ul>	

g) Stability and continuity of country programme funding	- Whether the significant proportion of funding from one donor (DFID) has distorted the allocation of resources towards some priority areas and away from others				
	- UNEP success in securing alternative funds				
	- Balance between financial and programme management in UNEP country office				
<b>Conclusions questions</b>					
1. To what extent has PoW design / implementation been informed by / generated relevant analysis? ( <i>relevance</i> )					
2. How responsive / adaptive has the PoW been to the changing needs of the context / target populations? ( <i>relevance</i> )					
3. To what extent has decision-making been evidence-based, responsive to context and adequately technically informed?					
4. What have been the main influences on PoW content? (political economy, funding, policy and political priorities etc)? ( <i>coherence</i> )					
5. To what extent have UNEP activities facilitated an enabling environment where stakeholders are encouraged to take ownership, replicate and scale-up activities? ( <i>sustainability</i> )					
<b>Q3: What have been the performances and results of the UNEP country programme? (<i>contribution analysis</i>)</b>					
<b>PoW theme</b>	<b>Intended results (Outcome)</b>	<b>Interim intended results (Outputs)</b>	<b>Progress towards results</b>	<b>Effects and explanations</b>	<b>Data sources</b>
<b>Environmental governance</b>	Integration of environmental issues into policies of government at state and federal level	Services and products provided (training, advice, policy reviews, research). Institutional strengthening (e.g. setting up of Environment Ministry units)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Planned versus achieved milestones</li> <li>- Number of effective level relationships with partners (government, UN, civil society)</li> <li>- Perceived value of UNEP's programme under SIEP to its partners</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Effects (plausible contributions) of UNEP interventions/ strategies on results</li> <li>Explanatory factors including alternative explanations</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Use of sub-regional data where available, including other NGO/local government triangulated data.</li> <li>Field study data for triangulation per sub-project.</li> <li>Explanatory</li> </ul>

		<p>Management and supervision processes adequate</p> <p>Effective information sharing between partners and between government departments</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Number of new national/state policies that integrate climate change and participatory environmental governance</li> <li>- Level of investment in communication and awareness by UNEP</li> <li>- Improved level of capacity of environmental stakeholder institutions</li> </ul>		<p>factors – field study reports including interviews with key partners at local level</p> <p>Targeting – field study reports CEAPs and partners</p>
<p><b>Mainstreaming environmental policy and practice among development partners</b></p>	<p>Mainstreaming of the environment in UN and other donor programmes and projects, and leveraging resources to implement these</p>	<p>Extent to which UNEP has provided catalytic and influential inputs to leverage new resources and programmes within the wider UN system</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- UNEP activities broker new projects/programmes</li> </ul>	<p>Effects (plausible contributions) of UNEP interventions/ strategies on results</p> <p>Explanatory factors including alternative explanations</p>	<p>Donor/UN workplan screened, guidelines developed</p> <p>Percentage use of EIA in UN workplans</p> <p>Number of environmental initiatives launched and financial leverage achieved</p>
<p><b>Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM)</b></p>	<p>Introduction and inclusion of IWRM in government, UN and NGO programmes in Darfur</p>	<p>Number of additional beneficiaries (disaggregated by sex) benefiting from Community Drought</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Planned versus achieved milestones</li> </ul>	<p>Effects (plausible contributions) of UNEP interventions/ strategies on results</p> <p>Explanatory</p>	<p>Use of sub-regional data where available, including other NGO/local government triangulated data.</p>

		Mitigation (CDM) and dam infrastructure		factors including alternative explanations	Field study data for triangulation per sub-project.  Explanatory factors – field study reports including interviews with key partners at local level  Targeting – field study reports CEAPs and partners
<b>Climate Change and Forestry</b>	Introduction of sustainable forest management in policies, institutions and processes of government and partners	Extent of capacity development in FNC and perceived added comparative advantage of UNEP  Inter-ministerial coordination promoted through UNEP intervention	- Support for REDD+, training and validation		
<b>Community-based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM, particularly Community</b>	Community environmental management projects demonstrated and scaled	Model UNEP CEAPs set up.  Relationship to similar	- Planned versus achieved milestones		Field study data for triangulation per sub-project.  Explanatory factors – field study

<b>Environmental Action Plans, CEAPs)</b>	up by government and UN	schemes, and perceived added advantage of UNEP			reports including interviews with key partners at local level  Targeting – field study reports CEAPs and partners
<b>Livelihoods – particularly pastoralist livelihoods</b>	Improved national awareness, understanding, policies and programmes relating to the pastoralist livelihoods, markets and trade.	Publication & dissemination of Sudan-specific information, analysis and strategic guidance to pastoralist-related policies and programmes  Strengthened capacity of pastoral leaders, professionals and other advocates to articulate the rationale for pastoralism and argue for its inclusion in national policies, programmes and peace processes.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Planned versus achieved milestones</li> <li>- Quality market monitoring data and analysis available to government and international agencies</li> <li>1)</li> <li>- Advisory support to marketing monitoring</li> </ul>	Effects (plausible contributions) of UNEP interventions/ strategies on results  Explanatory factors including alternative explanations	Stakeholder mapping and survey report of stakeholder perceptions of policy issues and current challenges.  Adaptation Team and Pastoral Reference Group established and fully engaged  Development of networks  Best practice case studies and reviews; research as key reference for livestock/cash crop policy?  Market monitoring data

					generated and data analysis available (Darfur)
<b>Conclusions questions</b>					
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. What is the overall progress towards UNEP's strategic objectives? What are the explanatory factors for success and failure?</li> <li>2. What have been the main barriers to achievement? How successfully have these been negotiated?</li> <li>3. What is the likely contribution of the PoW towards national environment / development objectives in Sudan? (<i>probable impact</i>)</li> <li>4. What is the likely contribution of the PoW towards wider peacebuilding goals in Sudan? (<i>probable impact</i>)</li> <li>5. Have there been any unintended effects of UNEP programming? Why have these occurred, and what are their implications for future operations / strategising?</li> </ol>					

**Notes:**

Over the seven year period under review we look at outcomes and interim data that might suggest improvements and trends towards a final goal. Hence we use Contribution Analysis, defined as: 'A plausible association can be said to have made if the following criteria are met: (1) a reasoned theory of change is set out, (2) the activities of an intervention are shown to have been implemented as set out in the theory of change, (3) the chain of expected results can be shown to have occurred and (4) other influencing factors have either been shown not to have made a difference or their relative contribution has been recognised.' (Mayne, 2001).

## Annex 2. UNEP Log frame and provisional results for 2011-12

The outputs on this table have been renumbered as the original outputs 4 and 7 applied only to Southern Sudan

SUDAN INTEGRATED ENVIRONMENT PROJECT					
IMPACT	Impact Indicator 1		Milestone 2011	Milestone 2012	Target (2013)
To assist the people of Sudan to achieve peace, recovery and development on an environmentally sustainable basis.	Number of Post Conflict Environmental Assessments implemented in whole or modified form	Planned	6 PCEA recs	12 PCEA recs	18 PCEA recs
		Achieved	17	18 (a further 23 in progress)	
	Impact Indicator 2		Milestone 2011	Milestone 2012	Target (2013)
	Level of integration of environmental issues into Darfur and North-South peace process documents	Planned	2 environmental issues	3 environmental issues	4 environmental issues
		Achieved	4	7 (3 new in 2012)	

OUTCOME	Outcome Indicator 1		Milestone 2011	Milestone 2012	Target (2013)
Improved sustainable and equitable governance, management and use of environmental resources, contributing to MDG no 7	Number of relationships between government, UN and civil society institutions developed to "effective" level with conditions that allow collaborative joint programming on environment	Planned	5 new collaborative institutional relationships made effective to enable joint implementation	5 new collaborative institutional relationships made effective to enable joint implementation	5 new collaborative institutional relationships made effective to enable joint implementation
		Achieved	5	11 (6 new in 2012)	
	Outcome Indicator 2		Milestone 2011	Milestone 2012	Target (2013)
	Value of UNEP's programme under SIEP to its partners and stakeholders	Planned	3 Partners defined UNEP's programme as "Highly valued"	5 Partners defined UNEP's programme as "Highly valued"	7 Partners defined UNEP's programme as "Highly valued"
		Achieved	10	30 (20 in 2012)	

<b>OUTPUT 1</b>	<b>Output Indicator 1.1</b>		<b>Milestone 2011</b>	<b>Milestone 2012</b>	<b>Target (2013)</b>
<b>Environment policy</b> Integration of environmental issues into policies of government at state and federal level.	Number of new processes of government policy or strategy alignment, reform or development relating to environment	<b>Planned</b>	2	4	6
		<b>Achieved</b>	4	9	
	<b>Output Indicator 1.2</b>		<b>Milestone 2011</b>	<b>Milestone 2012</b>	<b>Target (2013)</b>
	Number of new national and state government policies and strategy that integrate climate change and participatory environmental governance issues	<b>Planned</b>	1	2	3
<b>Achieved</b>		3	6		
<b>IMPACT WEIGHTING (%)</b>	<b>Output Indicator 1.3</b>		<b>Milestone 2011</b>	<b>Milestone 2012</b>	<b>Target (2013)</b>
<b>20%</b>	Level of capacity of Environmental stakeholder institutions	<b>Planned</b>	Partnership with 2 new SMOE/federal or CS organisations	Partnership and 4 staff trained in 2 new SMOE/federal or CS organisations	Partnership and 4 staff trained in 4 new SMOE/federal or CS organisations
		<b>Achieved</b>	6	16	

<b>OUTPUT 2</b>	<b>Output Indicator 2.1</b>		<b>Milestone 2011</b>	<b>Milestone 2012</b>	<b>Target (2013)</b>
<b>Environment mainstreaming</b> Mainstreaming of the environment in UN and other donor programmes and projects, and leveraging resources to implement these	Number of screenings, assessments and mitigations of environmental impact of aid programmes/projects	<b>Planned</b>	2011 Donor/UN workplan screened, guidelines developed	2012 Donor/UN workplan screened, 1 EIA enabled 20% of UNCT use guidelines	2013 Donor/UN workplan screened, 3 EIA enabled 40% of UNCT use guidelines
		<b>Achieved</b>	2	3	
	<b>Output Indicator 2.2</b>		<b>Milestone 2011</b>	<b>Milestone 2012</b>	<b>Target (2013)</b>
	Number of environmental initiatives launched and additional funds leveraged for environmental programming	<b>Planned</b>	2 initiatives launched \$15 M leveraged	3 initiatives launched \$25 M leveraged	5 initiatives launched \$35 M leveraged
<b>Achieved</b>		9 Initiatives launched, More than \$18M	16 initiatives launched. \$26.6		

			brokered	leveraged	
<b>IMPACT WEIGHTING (%)</b>	<b>Output Indicator 2.3</b>		<b>Milestone 2011</b>	<b>Milestone 2012</b>	<b>Target (2013)</b>
15%	Existence of a Strategy for UNEP continuity in Sudan	<b>Planned</b>	Strategy in circulation, donors approached	Final Strategy agreed, donors prioritised	Full continuity strategy under implementation, funds in place
		<b>Achieved</b>	Strategy, emerging with government, targeted sharing.	Strategy shared with EU, DFID. Possible partnerships with UNDP, UNOPS, UNHABITAT, UNFPA.	

<b>OUTPUT 3</b>	<b>Output Indicator 3.1</b>		<b>Milestone 2011</b>	<b>Milestone 2012</b>	<b>Target (2013)</b>
<b>Integrated Water Resource Management</b> Introduction and inclusion of IWRM in government, UN and NGO programmes in Darfur	Number of additional beneficiaries (disaggregated by sex) benefiting from Community Drought Mitigation (CDM) and dam infrastructure	<b>Planned</b>	200,000 CDM 104,000 beneficiaries from dams [#M, #F]	400,000 CDM 168,000 beneficiaries from dams [#M, #F]	500,000 CDM 168,000 beneficiaries from dams [#M, #F]
		<b>Achieved</b>	552,442 CDM 138,000 beneficiaries from dams (M: 69000, F: 69000)	692,069 CDM, 292,250+ beneficiaries from dams (M:148,125, F: 148,125)	
	<b>Output Indicator 3.2</b>		<b>Milestone 2011</b>	<b>Milestone 2012</b>	<b>Target (2013)</b>
	Number of beneficiaries of IWRM masterplans in state capitals and Wadi basins	<b>Planned</b>	0 beneficiaries [3 state governments collaborating with IWRM masterplans]	1.0M beneficiaries [from 2 IWRM masterplans]	1.3M beneficiaries [from 3 IWRM masterplans]
		<b>Achieved</b>	0 / 3	1 Masterplans prepared (Estimated 1.4 Million)	

				Beneficiaries once the masterplans are prepared)	
<b>IMPACT WEIGHTING (%)</b>	<b>Output Indicator 3.3</b>		<b>Milestone 2011</b>	<b>Milestone 2012</b>	<b>Target (2013)</b>
15%	Number groundwater and surface water sites monitored	<b>Planned</b>	20 groundwater sites 0 surface water sites	40 groundwater sites 6 surface water sites	60 groundwater sites 6 surface water sites
		<b>Achieved</b>	43	GWS 53/SWS 0 (6 identified)	

<b>OUTPUT 4</b>	<b>Output Indicator 4.1</b>		<b>Milestone 2011</b>	<b>Milestone 2012</b>	<b>Target (2013)</b>
<b>Community environment management</b> Community environmental management projects demonstrated and scaled up by government and UN	Number of model UNEP CEAPs	<b>Planned</b>	3 CEAP processes with plans established	3 CEAP Implementing projects Further 4 CEAP processes with plans established	7 CEAP Implementing projects
		<b>Achieved</b>	3	7 (additional 2 in preparation)	
<b>IMPACT WEIGHTING (%)</b>	<b>Output Indicator 4.2</b>		<b>Milestone 2011</b>	<b>Milestone 2012</b>	<b>Target (2013)</b>
15%	Number of CEAPs of government, UN and other agencies	<b>Planned</b>	3	10	20
		<b>Achieved</b>	3	3 (additional 20 in preparation)	

OUTPUT 5	Output Indicator 5.1		Milestone 2011	Milestone 2012	Target (2013)
<b>Livelihoods</b> Improved national awareness, understanding, policies and programmes relating to pastoralist livelihoods, markets and trade	Publication & dissemination of Sudan-specific information, analysis and strategic guidance to pastoralist-related policies and programmes	<b>Planned</b>	** Review of pastoralism policy in Sudan and at least 1 policy briefing paper published ** Fieldwork underway for first pastoralism research study	** Minimum of 3 policy briefing papers published ** 1st Pastoralist Livelihoods study published ** Review of emergency livestock programming in Sudan	** At least 5 policy briefing papers published ** Findings of research studies become key references for pastoralist livelihood policy and programming decision-making ** 2 major reforms to key policies affecting pastoralism, which promote and protect sustainable livelihoods for an estimate 8 million people (6m in N, 2m in S) from pastoralist communities across Sudan.
		<b>Achieved</b>	1. 5 studies on review of pastoralism policy in Sudan in draft. 2. Fieldwork Underway		

	<b>Output Indicator 5.2</b>		<b>Milestone 2011</b>	<b>Milestone 2012</b>	<b>Target (2013)</b>
	Strengthened capacity of pastoral leaders, professionals and other advocates to articulate the rationale for pastoralism and argue for its inclusion in national policies, programmes and peace processes.	<b>Planned</b>	** Stakeholder mapping and survey report of stakeholder perceptions of policy issues and current challenges. **Adaptation Team and Pastoral Reference Group established and fully engaged	** Development of a national (north and south) stakeholder network of at least 100 individuals and institutions influencing or engaged with pastoralism ** at least 3 Sudan specific best practice case-studies and reviews developed for incorporating into the Sudan specific LEGS trainings and feeding into the global training ** Training of 3 trainers as part of the 'Pastoralism and Policy' course training. ** Adaptation of Module 1 and Module 2 of pastoralism policy options course.	**Pastoralism training materials (LEGS and Policy Options) taken up by at least two universities or institutes. ** Active stakeholder network mobilized and raising awareness on at least two specific policy issues. ** LEGS adopted as the quality standards by a recognized national institution and at least two regional coordination fora. ** Sudan Policy options course targeted at senior government decision-makers
		<b>Achieved</b>	Stakeholder mapping report completed. Adaptation team and PRG established and engaged		
<b>IMPACT WEIGHTING (%)</b>	<b>Output Indicator 5.3</b>		<b>Milestone 2011</b>	<b>Milestone 2012</b>	<b>Target (2013)</b>
<b>15%</b>	Quality market monitoring data and analysis available to government and international agencies	<b>Planned</b>	* Market monitoring network established in N Darfur ** Market monitoring data generated and data	**Continued advisory support to N Darfur monitoring network including 2 facilitated workshops. ** Advisory	** 20 CBOs with strengthened capacity to collect and analyze market data in Darfur and to influence livelihoods programming

			analysis begun N Darfur ** First market monitoring bulletin published N Darfur ** Darfur livestock trade study fieldwork completed	support to new market monitoring network in W Darfur incl. 2 facilitated workshops. ** Darfur livestock trade study published	** Local partners supported by other donors to continue market monitoring ** Findings of research studies become key references for livestock and cash crop policy and programming decision-making
		<b>Achieved</b>	3 Market Monitoring Bulletins published; all else completed		

## Annex 3. Persons Met

<i>Government of Sudan</i>	
Dr Abdelazim Mirghani Ibrahim	Director General, Forests National Corporation (FNC)
Dr Hannadi/Dr Saida/Somayo	FNC officers
Abdalla Gaafar	FNC
Dr Saida Khalil	FNC
Saida Mohammed Hassan	FNC, Project Unit
Ms. Sumaya Omer	FNC Climate Change
Dr Mohi El Din El Kabir (Coordination Unit) Engineer Badradin (Director General)	Groundwater & Wadis Directorate, Ministry of Water Resources & Electricity.
Mohammed Al Agib	Legislative Assembly, South Darfur
Nizar Alhaweera	Nomads Development Council
Bashir Abdullah Mohammed	Ministry of Animal Resources, Fisheries and Rangelands, East Darfur
Hassan Abdelgadir Hilal (Minister) Dr Babiker (Undersecretary)	Ministry of Environment, Forestry and Physical Development
Adil Mohammed Ali	Higher Council for Environment & Natural Resources
Isamil El Guzuli	Coordinator, Climate Change Unit, HCENR
Nagim ElDein Gtbi	Climate Change Unit, HCENR
Rihab Ahmed Hassan	Climate Change Unit, HCENR
Dr. Eisa Bashari	Minister, Science and Technology
Dr. El Fadil El Fadlabi	Director, Energy Research Center

Dr. Hassan Basir	Ministry of Science and Technology
Mr. Waheed Abbas	Energy Research Center
Mr. Omer Abdel Rahman	Director, Groundwater, El Fasher
Mr. Mohammed Mohi El Din	Director, Rural Water Corporation, El Hasher
Mr. Ahmed Ebrahim Isameil	Director, Land Resources
Mr. El Fatih Abdel Aziz	Land Resources, Nyala
Mr. Mohammed Abdel Rahman	Director, Survey Department, Nyala
Mr. Hayder Ahmed Yousif	Director, FNC, Nyala
Mr. El Nayal Bahar El Din	Director, Groundwater, Nyala
Dr. Abdel Rahman El Tahir	Agricultural Research Corporation, Nyala
<b><u>UNEP</u></b>	
Robin Bovey	Senior Advisor/Country Director
Brendan Bromwich	Programme Coordinator
Altan Butt	Project Advisor
Robert Neil Munro	Consultant
Keith Simpson	Consultant
Tayalla El Madani	IWRM Officer
Ms. Alawiyya Jamal	Population Specialist
Ms. Mey Ahmed	Climate Change Specialist
Ms. Corinna Bothe	Environmental Advisor
Ms. Magda Nassef	Project Manager, Environment and Livelihoods, Darfur
Paul Kerkhof	Consultant
Dr Hamid Omar Ali	Senior Water Consultant

Ms. Eiman Karar	Consultant
Dr. Abu El Gasim Adam	El Fasher
Ahmed Abdella Manais	El Fasher
<b>UN Agencies</b>	
Oriano Micaletti (Director a.i.)	UNAMID – Humanitarian, Protection Strategy Coordination Division
Hussein Hamdi	UNAMID EL Fasher
Zurab Elzarov	UNAMID, El Fasher
Olushola Ismail (Chief, El Fasher)	UNICEF
Ram Koirala (WASH Manager, El Fasher)	UNICEF
Pontus Ohrstedt (Conflict Prevention and Recovery unit)	UNDP
Amin Sharkawi (Dep. Representative)	UNDP
Hanan Abdalla Mutwakil (Prog. Analyst)	UNDP
Ms. Shama Mekki, Programme Assistant	UNDP
Ms. Pamela Delargy (Rep.)	UNFPA
Trond Jensen (Dep. Head of Office)	OCHA
Mark Cutts (Head of Office)	OCHA
Esteban Sacco (Darfur Coordinator)	OCHA
Ms. April Pham (IASC Gender Advisor)	OCHA
Jeffrey McMurdo (Head of Office)	UNOPS
Wael Al-Ashab	UN-HABITAT
Ms. Sabine Schenk	FAO
Mohammed Salah El Din	FAO, Nyala

Ali Za'tari	RC/HC, Sudan
<b>NGOs</b>	
Salih Abdemajid Eldouma (Exec.Dir)	SOS Sahel Sudan
Mohammed Sidiq (Country Manager)	Practical Action
Ms.Helen Young	Tufts University
Ms.Margi Buchanen-Smith	Tufts University
Ced Hesse	IIED
Dr Yagoub Abdallah Mohammed	Chair of Environment Society
Yousuf El Tayeb Elnour (Exec.Dir)	Darfur Reconstruction Agency (DRA)
Mahmoud Hussain Adam (Darfur Prog.Manager)	DRA
Hind Adam Ali (CEAP Coordinator)	DRA
Ms.Suad Sulaiman	Sudanese Environment Conservation Society SECS)
Muawiyah Shadad (Exec.Dir)	SECS
Mohammed Mahi El Din	SOS
<b>Individual Consultants</b>	
Hasan Mohammed Kaskous	Ex-Minister of Water Resources, South Darfur
Dr Abdelaziz Karamalla Gaiballa	Sudan University of Science & Technology
Dr Yousif Takana	Consultant
Clive Bates	Previous Country Programme Manager, UNEP
<b>Donors</b>	

Simon Narbeth (Social Dev. Advisor)	UK Aid
Robert Watt (Programme Team Leader)	UK Aid
Ms.Euarda Mendonca-Gray (Prog. Manager)	UK Aid