

**Mid-Term Evaluation of
UNEP's Medium-term Strategy
2010 - 2013**

**Business Processes,
Systems, and Structures**

Working Paper

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Prepared by:

**Dr Robert Malpas
Conservation Development Centre**

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
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1. Introduction & Background

1. The UNEP Medium-Term Strategy (2010-2013) introduced an innovative, results-oriented approach to the design and implementation of the UNEP Programme, based on six **new thematic priority areas**, each to be delivered by a sub-programme. To fully appreciate the extent of the paradigm shift in programme delivery that the new MTS represented, it is important to understand the programmatic and organisational *status quo* in UNEP prior to the launch of the new MTS in 2010.
2. Before the new MTS was put into place, UNEP's sub-programmes were aligned with the organisation's divisional structure, i.e.: Environmental Assessment and Early Warning; Environmental Law and Conventions; Environmental Policy Implementation; Technology, Industry and Economics; Regional Cooperation and Representation, and Communications and Public Information. This programme delivery arrangement is illustrated in the left-hand side of Figure 1 below.

Figure 1. UNEP's Revised Programme Structure as introduced by the MTS 2010-2013 and the PoW, 2010-2011



3. Each sub-programme in the Programme of Work (PoW) 2008-2009 therefore reflected the mandate, functions, and skills and experience sets of the respective divisions, which in turn had gradually evolved since UNEP's establishment in 1972 to respond to key "service areas" that the organisation was being called upon by its stakeholders to deliver, and that also in principle reflected the key areas of UNEP's comparative advantage (see the Relevance component of the evaluation for a further discussion of these aspects). For example, the Division on Environmental Law and Conventions (DELC) was and still is the focus for UNEP's services in support of the development and facilitation of international environmental law, governance and policy, the Division on Early Warning and Assessment (DEWA) provides services in carrying out environmental analyses, data and information for decision-making and action planning for sustainable development, and the Division of Communications & Public Information (DCPI) provides services in raising public awareness of environmental issues and communicating UNEP's core environmental messages.
4. For the 2008-2009 biennium, therefore, much of UNEP's work was delivered in the form of environmental support services that capitalised on UNEP's mandate, comparative advantages and competencies. This situation is reflected in the Expected Accomplishments (EAs) established in the PoW 2008-2009, which are largely service oriented. For example, under the DEWA Sub-Programme, EA (A) states "Participatory, policy-relevant and scientifically credible environmental assessments", whereas under the DELC Sub-Programme, EA(C) states "Enhanced environmental

legal frameworks aimed at sustainable development”. Similarly, under the DRC Sub-Programme, EA(A) states: “Process of policy deliberations and consensus-building globally and in the regions facilitated and supported”.

5. This predominantly service orientation, while built on UNEP’s comparative strengths, was of concern to both external and internal stakeholders for a variety of reasons. In particular, there was a concern that, by focussing UNEP’s programme and planning on service provision, the ability of the organisation to work towards the achievement of specific and tangible environmental and sustainable development results was diminished. This is illustrated by the indicators of the EAs established in the PoW 2008-2009, which chiefly relate to delivery of services (i.e. output level) rather than achievement of higher-level outcomes. For example, the indicator for EA(A) of the DEPI Sub-Programme was: “Increased number of implementation tools for integrated natural resources management and ecosystem restoration made available to international, national and local stakeholders”, and the indicator of EA(C) of the DELC sub-programme was: “Increased number of initiatives underway to improve existing or develop new legal frameworks”.
6. Not all EAs and EA indicators in the PoW 2008-2009 were service oriented, and a number reflect the environmental outcomes that UNEP was working towards achieving. Nevertheless, it is fair to say that the overall results framework presented in the PoW 2008-2009 did not provide a strong rationalisation of the actual environment-related outcomes that UNEP was trying to achieve. This lack of results orientation in turn brought into question whether UNEP was indeed achieving appropriate and sufficient environmental impacts, and adequately fulfilling its mandate as the world’s leading environmental authority.
7. Another concern of stakeholders with the programme structure in place prior to the MTS was the “monolithic” nature of the divisions, and the lack of cross-divisional collaboration and cooperation. This so-called “silo mentality” was of particular concern because of the growing complexity and inter-connectedness of the environmental challenges, such as climate change and ecosystem management, that UNEP was being called upon to address, and the increasing need to bring together a variety of UNEP’s service functions, such as policy and legal support, environmental assessment, and environmental communications, in an effective, efficient and integrated way to address them. It was perceived that this requirement could not easily be addressed within the existing divisional, service-oriented, sub-programme structure, but required a new approach which brought together the service skills-sets and capabilities of multiple divisions in addressing the priority environmental themes that were identified in the new MTS. This new collaborative and cross-divisional approach is illustrated in the right-hand side of Figure 1 above.
8. As Figure 1 illustrates, the new MTS sub-programmes cut across UNEP’s traditional divisional structure, with multiple divisions potentially being responsible for contributing to the delivery of each individual sub-programme. In line with the perceived weaknesses of the previous programme structure discussed above, the new programme structure had two fundamental objectives: 1) to enhance UNEP’s results orientation to address major environmental challenges, rather than simply to provide a range of potentially disparate environmental services; and 2) to enable the effective and efficient delivery of UNEP services in a complementary and synergistic manner to address these challenges, through greater cross-divisional collaboration and communication.
9. These two objectives are fundamental to the new directions advocated in the MTS 2010-2013 and the corresponding PoWs (2010-2011, 2012-2013). Subsequently, the realisation of these objectives has given rise to a wide-ranging process of organisational change within UNEP (often called the “reform process”) designed to deliver the major intentions of the MTS. This component of the evaluation examines the organisational change process, highlights areas where the reforms have been successful and others that have not succeeded, and makes recommendations for how the change process can be further strengthened in future.


10. This component of the Evaluation is guided by two underlying premises: Firstly, the need to keep at the forefront of the assessment the original twin aims of the MTS process: stronger results orientation towards addressing key environmental challenges, and better delivery of UNEP's services through leveraging synergies across the divisions. Secondly, the recognition that organisational change processes are inevitably complex and of a long-term nature, especially in an organisation such as UNEP that is constrained by its governance structures within the international community, by the organisational systems and processes that it must adhere to within the UN family, and also by the real-life challenges of environmental degradation that it is striving to address, and that place a significant workload on all of UNEP's staff.
11. For these reasons, the organisational change process must inevitably be a gradual and iterative one. Consequently this evaluation is looking at an early snapshot of a longer term process, which is strongly characterised by ongoing adaptive management according to lessons learnt.
12. A final point to note in this introduction is that this assessment of UNEP's business systems, processes and structures relating to MTS delivery has greatly benefitted, as has the reform process itself, from a variety of earlier planning and assessment exercises that have helped to guide and steer the organisational change process. These exercises are detailed in a range of documents listed in Annex 3 to this working paper, but notable among them are the "**Roadmap for the Development of the PoW 2010-2011**" which identified key elements of the change process needed to deliver on the MTS, and the **OIOS Audit of Internal Governance in UNEP**, carried out shortly after the launch of the MTS, which highlighted some of the major challenges facing UNEP in shifting to the new results-oriented and cross-divisional delivery approaches. The operationalisation of the MTS has also subsequently been addressed in a variety of UNEP policy and procedural documents which will be examined further in this section, most notably in the **UNEP Programme Accountability Framework**, established in April 2010.
13. Another important exercise that contributed to the guidance of UNEP's organisational change process was the **Formative Evaluation of the PoW 2010-2011 (FE)**, carried out by the UNEP Evaluation Office (EO) in the first part of 2011. The FE was as an in-depth assessment of the design of the PoW 2010-2011, identifying key strengths and challenges, and making a variety of evidenced suggestions on how best to strengthen MTS and PoW design in future. As such, the FE has been an important foundation document for this present Evaluation.
14. The main objectives of this component of the Evaluation were to:
 - ▶ Assess the current progress that has been made in reforming and strengthening UNEP's business systems, processes and structures in support of the delivery of the MTS;
 - ▶ Assess the efficiency and effectiveness of the reformed systems, structures and processes;
 - ▶ Identify key achievements and challenges in the organisational change process; and
 - ▶ Make recommendations on how further improvements in these organisational mechanisms can be made in future.
15. This component of the evaluation has identified a number of key ingredients of the organisational change process that has been undertaken in order to deliver the MTS, as follows:
 - ▶ Programme planning and the MTS
 - ▶ Accountability and authority for Programme delivery
 - ▶ UNEP's project portfolio and the MTS
 - ▶ Programme monitoring and reporting
 - ▶ Programme management
 - ▶ Programme evaluation
 - ▶ UNEP's strategic presence and the role of the Regional Offices

The evaluation's findings according to each of these aspects are discussed in the following sections.

2. Programme planning and the MTS

16. As introduced above, one of the key objectives of the MTS and the subsequent PoWs was to realign UNEP's programme from the traditional emphasis on delivery of products and services to a stronger focus on the achievement of higher level results and, ultimately, environmental impacts. This objective was underscored in the document **Roadmap to PoW Development**¹, which stated: *"In adopting a RBM approach, UNEP aims to move away from the routine practice of describing its work under each Expected Accomplishment listed traditionally in the PoW as publications, workshops, seminars and meetings. Instead, it will present its interventions aggregated to a higher level to allow for more results oriented planning... The intent is to have fewer but more focused interventions that correlate to the overall outcome of a given project or programme."*
17. To guide this reorientation towards RBM, UNEP utilised a hierarchy of planning frameworks, with the MTS itself providing the overall strategic focus and direction of the programme, and the Strategic Frameworks and PoWs providing increasing levels of results orientation, as illustrated in Figure 2 below. The overarching design intent for these planning frameworks was to provide a clear focus on results that were aligned with the organisation's mandate, priorities and comparative advantage (see the Relevance section of this evaluation). The aim was to develop a workplan for targeted, effective and efficient delivery of results and clear and transparent monitoring and evaluation of performance².

Figure 2. Hierarchy of MTS planning frameworks designed to steer RBM



18. In this planning hierarchy, the MTS provides the high-level results framework against which the overall performance of UNEP can be judged, while the Strategic Frameworks provide more detailed sub-programme strategies and indicators of achievement of the EAs. Finally, the PoWs provide a further elaboration of the means to be employed to achieve higher-level MTS objectives, specifically by identifying the outputs that are required to deliver on the MTS, together with indicators and budget.
19. In the event, the practical process that was employed to define the results framework put some constraints on the achievement of these ambitious aims. With regard to the process used to design the MTS itself, significant emphasis was placed on the need to engage and gain buy-in

¹ Approach to the Development of the UNEP PoW, 2010-2011 (Roadmap to PoW Development), May 2008

² UNEP PoW 2010-2011: Designing the activities to deliver the results. UNEP SMT, Mar 2009

from UNEP's external stakeholders, in particular the UNEP Governing Council working through the CPR MTS Working Group, as well as the UNEP-administered MEA secretariats, civil society and the private sector. This extensive external engagement meant that in its effort to be "all things to all people" the design of the eventual MTS results framework represented a compromise solution that attempted to encompass the differing priorities of the different stakeholders.

20. What this meant in practice was that the MTS EAs were formulated at an outcome level that was not realistically possible for UNEP alone to achieve, particularly over the four-year MTS timeframe. The inappropriate and ambitious formulation of the MTS' EAs is addressed in depth in the Formative Evaluation³, the more recent evaluations of the Disasters & Conflicts and Environmental Governance Sub-Programme evaluations, as well as in the Effectiveness and Impact section of this present evaluation. The important point to note here is that the MTS design process, perhaps because of the need to respond to the priorities of multiple stakeholders, did not ultimately produce a sufficiently robust results framework to adequately guide formulation of lower level results, such as the PoW Outputs.
21. Another consequence of the emphasis on external engagement in MTS design was that the MTS has been viewed by some UNEP staff as having been imposed on them from above, rather than having been generated through a process that involved significant staff participation. During the interviews carried out as part of this evaluation, a number of UNEP staff expressed the view that the MTS was seen as having been created by a small team in the Executive Office working with the CPR Working Group and other external stakeholders, and largely isolated from opportunities for engagement of rank-and-file UNEP staffers. While there are good reasons why UNEP senior management chose to emphasise achieving buy-in to the new approaches being advocated in the MTS with the UNEP Governing Council, the CPR and other external stakeholders, in hindsight, the lack of ownership over the process inside the organisation inevitably had consequences for the commitment of UNEP staff to the eventual product, and resulted in a widespread perception within the organisation that the MTS was essentially an alien construct, to be adhered to as far as was necessary in terms of resource allocation and performance reporting are concerned, but otherwise not to substantially impact on the "life as usual" work patterns and priorities within the traditional divisional structure (as discussed later in these findings).
22. As far as the PoWs were concerned (2010-2011 and 2012-2013), these were chiefly developed by the respective lead divisions for each of the six sub-programmes, and benefitted from a greater degree of internal participation. However, as has been pointed out by the FE, the PoW Outputs do not provide a strong causal logic to give substance to the bare bones provided by the MTS. For example, the FE observes that a high proportion of PoW 2010-2011 Outputs were formulated as outcomes rather than outputs⁴. Examining a total of 108 PoW Outputs, the FE found that only 56% were correctly defined as outputs according to the OECD-DAC definition, while 42% were actually defined at the outcome level. This again presents significant challenges for the achievement of RBM, and specifically for monitoring and reporting on progress in delivering the PoWs.
23. The inappropriate framing of the PoW Outputs was no doubt partially influenced by the similarly inappropriate framing of the EAs, but also by the need to create space to accommodate UNEP's existing extensive portfolio of project activities. The relationship between the PoW and UNEP's project portfolio is discussed further in section 4 below.

³ The FE points out that many MTS EAs define higher level outcomes that are beyond the exclusive control of UNEP, rather than the direct outcomes to be produced as a result of the implementation of the MTS. The evaluation notes that this weakens the underlying RBM principles that were a cornerstone of the MTS design.

⁴ The FE adopts the OECD-DAC definitions of outcomes and outputs, which are also the basis for this present MTS evaluation report. These are: Outcomes: The likely or achieved short-term and medium-term effects of an intervention's outputs; Outputs: The products, capital goods and services which result from a development intervention.


24. The FE concludes that *“in developing future Medium Term Strategies, the EA and indicators should be formulated to better align with basic principles of Results Based Management.... **UNEP needs to strengthen its results basis by showing the causal relationship between projects, PoW outputs and EAs**”*. The crucial question for the present evaluation is: “how best can this be achieved?” Key to answering this question is to understand how UNEP’s current programme planning processes address the needs of the organisation with respect to results-based and adaptive management and participation.
25. An important starting point is the recognition that the main existing elements of UNEP’s programme planning process - the MTS, Strategic Frameworks and the PoW - are all statutory documents that are developed according to strict timetables and defined formats that meet wider UN requirements, which means that they are inevitably inflexible, not easily subjected to adaptive management, and often not sufficiently participatory. Underscoring this aspect, the FE notes that although a number of weaknesses had been detected with regard to the results framework set out in the MTS and PoW, realistically it would not be possible to substantially revise the results framework until the preparation of the next MTS (2014-2017). This represents a major time lag in UNEP’s ability to learn from practical experience in implementing the MTS, which in turn inevitably undermines the relevance and effectiveness of the various planning documents in guiding UNEP’s activities and in achieving results-based management.
26. Formal, statutory programme planning in UNEP therefore ideally needs to be supplemented by an additional level of results-based planning, which is more comprehensive, flexible, and participatory, and not necessarily in lock-step with the formal timeframes that guide the preparation and approval of the MTS, SFs and PoWs. As part of the process of preparing the current MTS, SFs and PoWs, an attempt was made to address the need for this additional level of planning through the production of the **“Programme Frameworks”**, which were introduced by the UNEP SMT in the document **“UNEP PoW 2010-2011: Designing the activities to deliver the results”**, and that defined them as *“the planning documents that show the different sets of activities across all Divisions and Regional Offices necessary to achieve a given sub-programme objective or an Expected Accomplishment.”* In the same document, Programme Frameworks are assigned a crucial role in the practical delivery of the PoW. The document states that: *“Programme Frameworks are used in designing how the PoW is implemented across all divisions in a coordinated manner to achieve the sub-programme objective and EAs. This approach is required to ensure that projects and activities undertaken by each division and Regional Office together with partner agencies are cumulatively capable of achieving the sub-programme objectives”*. The Programme Frameworks were developed by the respective Sub-Programme Coordinators, working with other UNEP staff contributing to the sub-programme concerned.
27. While the intent of the Programme Frameworks is clearly defined, in reality they did not live up to their expected role in strengthening RBM in the implementation of the MTS, for several reasons. A crucial weakness that was identified by the FE was that the Programme Frameworks did not put in place a comprehensive and coherent causal logic between the EAs and PoW Outputs to be achieved and the projects that will achieve them. Instead, they limit themselves to a simple documentation of PoW Outputs and the related projects to deliver them. That is, the Programme Frameworks simply adopted the relatively superficial causal logic set out in the MTS and PoW, rather than elaborating a more comprehensive logic in their own right. The FE went on to argue that ideally the sub-programme’s causal logic needs to be developed early in the MTS and PoW preparation process before lower level results (i.e. outputs) are formalised and fixed in the formal planning process. However, in practice, the Programme Frameworks were put into place at a relatively late stage of the planning process, after the MTS and PoW had been prepared and approved.
28. In addition, because of their tight integration with the statutory planning process, the Programme Frameworks were unable to exhibit the adaptability that is ideally required for effective

- results-based planning based on lessons learnt and evolving circumstances, and soon became outdated and therefore largely irrelevant to the key users of the document - the sub-programme implementers.
29. The FE concluded that the Programme Frameworks in their current form do not represent a useful results construct, and that they play no meaningful role in programme implementation, monitoring and reporting. This evaluation endorses this conclusion. The sense of the present evaluation was that, rather than being critical planning documents that guided the day-to-day implementation of the sub-programmes and the delivery of RBM, the Programme Frameworks were more of a formality designed to demonstrate how UNEP's projects fitted into the MTS and PoW, and to facilitate fulfilment of resource allocation requirements.
 30. Despite these inherent weaknesses in the Programme Frameworks, the FE observed that the process of developing the Frameworks was recognised by Sub-Programme Coordinators as a useful exercise in promoting inter-divisional cooperation and joint planning in the preparation of project concepts. However, in hindsight, it would have been much more useful if the development of the Programme Frameworks could have taken place in advance of the MTS and the PoW, and if the comprehensive programme logic set out in the Programme Frameworks had served as a foundation for the MTS and PoW, rather than, as was the case, the other way around. For practical reasons, this was not feasible in this first cycle of the MTS and PoWs, but strengthening the role of the Programme Frameworks as UNEP's principal results-based and adaptive management planning tool, produced through a participatory process, should be a major goal in future UNEP planning cycles.
 31. The Final Report of the UNEP Task Team on Programme Management⁵ endorsed the need to reform the RBM planning process, concluding that: *"UNEP must continue to strengthen its strategic planning... The EAs in the next MTS are to be derived based on an analysis of the logical relationship between projects, PoW outputs and EAs."* The Meeting with Sub-Programme Coordinators on Programme Planning and Implementation⁶, held in April 2010, also discussed this aspect and concluded that: *"There is a clear need for a plan for the development of the PoW from the strategic framework to the end-of-process "operational" instruments for implementation and monitoring"*.
 32. **In conclusion**, UNEP's programme planning process has several key weaknesses which undermined the organisation's ability to achieve the RBM improvements that were a key objective of the MTS. To overcome these deficiencies, **this evaluation recommends** that the planning process is revised to strengthen the role of the Programme Frameworks in enabling a stronger element of iterative and participatory planning and adaptive management. This is illustrated in Figure 3 overpage.
 33. The key aspects to note from the figure are that: a) the Programme Frameworks should be an "in-house" ongoing planning process that is carried out largely independently of the timeframe of the statutory planning process; b) development of the Programme Frameworks should ideally precede the development of the MTS and PoWs, so that the statutory planning documents can take advantage of the lessons learnt from programme implementation captured by the Programme Frameworks; and c) the Programme Frameworks should be firmly anchored in the causal logic underlying the achievement of the respective EAs. It is important to note that it will not be possible to develop the Programme Frameworks in time for the current process of preparing the next MTS which is already far advanced. However, it is recommended that a start is now made on putting the revamped Programme Frameworks into place, so that they are ready in good time for the subsequent MTS.

⁵ UNEP Task Team on Programme Management and Implementation, Final Report, Sep 2011

⁶ Meeting with Sub-programme Coordinators on Programme Planning and Implementation, Apr 2010

Figure 3. Proposed revised UNEP planning cycle, showing the relationship between the in-house adaptive planning component (Programme Frameworks) and the statutory elements (MTS, SF and PoW)



3. Accountability and authority for Programme delivery

34. As stated in the introduction, two important aims of the MTS were to enable a stronger results orientation towards addressing key environmental challenges, and better delivery of UNEP's services through leveraging enhanced synergies and collaboration across the divisions. With regard the latter, the MTS mainly achieved this by establishing the six sub-programmes that cut across the traditional divisional boundaries, thereby moving away from the previous divisional alignment of the programme with very limited cross-divisional collaboration, which has been referred to as the "silo mentality". To support the implementation of the new sub-programmes, and to facilitate associated accountability for their delivery, the MTS architects advocated the introduction of a **matrix management** approach, in which day-to-day responsibility for the delivery of the overall programme continued to rest largely with the six divisions, while programmatic responsibility for the supervision of programme contents and reporting on achievements rested with a new "sub-programme construct", led by newly appointed Sub-Programme Coordinators, supervised by a "Lead Division" Director. Simply summarised, the divisions continued to be responsible for the "**how**" of the programme, while the Sub-Programme Coordinators (and their respective Lead Divisional Directors) were responsible for the "**what**".
35. Both the PoWs placed significant emphasis on the importance of the new matrix management approach. For example, the PoW 2010-2011 stated that "As there are many inter-linkages and positive synergies among the six thematic crosscutting priorities, a matrix approach has been adopted and achieving co-benefits will be pursued where appropriate. The approach is expected to strengthen RBM and **increase management accountability for programme delivery and resource utilization** [our emphasis] while at the same time ensuring that relevant sector expertise benefits all Sub-Programmes." The PoW 2012-2013 reiterated the importance of the matrix approach, stating that "In making the UN Secretariat's first formal attempt at matrix management, UNEP has strengthened its results focus and made better use of existing resources. It has done so through improved coordination and the elimination of duplication, overlap and the "silo mentality", or tendency of staff members to work in isolation from one another, characteristic of sub-programme specific divisions". The importance of the new matrix approach was also emphasised by some external observers, such as the MOPAN 2011 Assessment of UNEP⁷, which stated that

⁷ MOPAN 2011 Assessment of UNEP

“UNEP’s new matrix management approach also provides a more coherent and results-oriented approach to programming”.

36. However, not all commentary on the matrix approach has been positive. For example, the **OIOS Internal Audit of Internal Governance in UNEP** (Sept 2010) highlighted the urgent need for *“clear definition and assignment of authority, responsibility and accountability of the various divisions and staff members involved in the implementation of Sub-Programmes, as well as for coordination and integration of activities across divisions implementing Sub-Programmes and covering different geographical areas”*. In addition, interviews with UNEP staff carried out during the present evaluation, as well as respondents to the online survey of UNEP staff carried out as part of the ongoing OIOS Evaluation of UNEP, both highlighted a high degree of frustration and confusion, sometimes even disillusionment, with the way in which UNEP is implementing matrix management in practice. A small sample of some of the responses to the OIOS online staff survey is given below:

- ▶ *“The matrix approach has caused significant confusion, while adding extra requirements and bureaucratic burden to staff members.”*
- ▶ *“UNEP’s matrix approach has not been implemented effectively as Division Directors still make all major decisions. As no one is given the authority or the resources to produce more effective cross-cutting approaches, there seems to still be a strong segmentation of the programmes”.*
- ▶ *“The matrix approach is a phantom. Programme implementation is in virtually all cases dominated by Division-level priorities”.*
- ▶ *“The matrix approach has, at best, confused the overall programme delivery, in particular on the accountability and transparency”.*
- ▶ *“The matrix approach is confusing and not well understood, organized or coordinated. Sub-Programme Coordinators do not seem integrated into Division planning”.*

37. It is important to note here that the majority of staff concerns relate to the way in which UNEP has gone about implementing matrix management, rather than a broad disagreement or disillusionment with matrix management *per se*. As part of the on-line survey of UNEP staff carried out during this present evaluation, 58% of the survey’s respondents agreed that the matrix structure was supportive of sub-programme management, but they questioned the detail of how matrix management had been implemented. For example, survey respondents made the following comments:

- ▶ *“The Sub-Programme Coordinators are still tied too much with the Division leadership, and a silo approach still persists. The MTS does not seem to provide an effective level of conflict resolution to achieve real strategic institutional priorities, as the SPCs do not seem to have any authority to lead the SPs and rather the decision making still rests with Division Directors. This is problematic since some Divisions are not leading any SP at the moment, and as a result they are marginalised in decision-making and implementation. The current matrix structure works only for SPs that are resident in a particular division.”*
- ▶ *“The structure by SP has not been accompanied by the necessary management decisions: the matrix needs to be harmonized with the institutional structure. Currently, SPs exist only for planning and reporting; for implementation Divisions are still paramount.”*
- ▶ *“The role of Regional Offices is not clearly defined. The current matrix which is based on SPs vs. Divisions does not capture the issues of implementation through Regional Offices. The role of Regional Offices has not come to fruition programmatically, substantially or financially compared with the operational transformation that has been put in place (no outputs are en-*

trusted to Regional Offices, although deliverables are expected at regional and country level)."

38. The **UNEP Programme Accountability Framework** is the key policy document supporting the implementation of the new matrix management system. Approved in April 2010, the framework established new arrangements for accountability, responsibility and authority for delivering the six new sub-programmes through the new matrix structure. In the introduction to the framework, the rationale for the reform process is set out: *"to ensure management accountability for the delivery of UNEP's six cross-cutting Sub-Programmes, recognising that these are no longer reflected in the organisational structure, it is important to ensure clarity as regards responsibility for the results required in the Programmes of Work 2010-2011 and 2012-2013."*
39. The Accountability Framework defined the responsibility for PoW delivery of several different categories of division directors, including: the **Lead Division Director**, who was responsible for ensuring coherence and coordination and programme performance and reporting at Sub-Programme level; the **Coordinating Division Director**, who was responsible for the delivery of specific EAs; and the **Managing Division Director**, who was responsible for specific projects. The Accountability Framework also defined the roles and responsibilities of the six **Sub-Programme Coordinators**, who were amongst other things responsible for ensuring coherence, coordination, programme performance and reporting at Sub-Programme level, **under the supervision of the respective Lead Division Director**.
40. Based on lessons learnt in implementing the Accountability Framework, there has been a significant amount of subsequent discussion within the organisation with the aim of simplifying the matrix system and clarifying accountability and authority for the MTS and PoW implementation. This discussion began even as the Accountability Framework was still being finalised. For example, the Meeting with Sub-Programme Coordinators on Programme Planning and Implementation held in April 2010⁸ (the same month that the Accountability Framework was finalised) observed that *"Overlapping responsibilities for sub-programmes mitigate the strengthening of ownership of the PoW. There are too many levels of hierarchy and unnecessary roles assigned to different Divisions: lead, coordinating, accountable, managing, responsible Divisions."* To address this problem, the meeting recommended that the roles of Lead Division, Coordinating Division, Accountable Division, Managing Divisions and Responsible Divisions should be scrapped, and that the PoW implementation process could still remain intact without these functions. Instead, the meeting proposed that *"each PoW Output will show which Division is accountable, with DRC having a special role to ensure that outputs are regional balanced"*.
41. The Executive Management Retreat⁹ (30 Sept-1 Oct 2010) determined that a task team should be established to make proposals for reviewing and strengthening and taking urgent action with regard, amongst other issues, *"the assignment of responsibilities and the alignment of resources within divisions with regard matrix management"*. This subsequently led to the establishment of the UNEP Task Team on Programme Management, the Terms of Reference for which¹⁰ state that: *"UNEP Divisions and Regional Offices are no longer responsible for one programme that relates to their organizational structure but rather for different elements that correspond to sub-programmes that cut across the organizational structure...Challenges still remain as there are few incentives for achieving results that cut across the organizational structure. There is still not enough clarity in the responsibilities and accountabilities of Divisions, Regional Offices and Coordinators on what they are accountable for, including for PoW design, implementation (oversight), monitoring and reporting, and resource mobilization."*


⁸ Meeting with Sub-programme Coordinators on Programme Planning and Implementation, Apr 2010

⁹ UNEP Executive Management Team Retreat, 30 Sep-1 Oct 2010. Follow-Up Table

¹⁰ UNEP Task Team on Programme Management and Implementation. Terms of Reference, Mar 2011

42. Subsequently, the Final Report of the Task Team on Programme Management¹¹ concluded that “UNEP must continue to strengthen its efforts to increase clarity in accountability for the delivery of the MTS right from the initial planning stages. The next MTS will be a key opportunity.” Specifically, the Task Team report recommended that “the roles of Sub-Programme Coordinators must be clear so as to ensure appropriate accountability. The reporting lines of Sub-Programme Coordinators should be decided, according to the following options: Option 1: Coordinators report to the Lead Division Director; Option 2: Coordinators report to the Deputy Executive Director; Option 3: Coordinators have a reporting line to the Lead Division Director and a second reporting line to the Deputy Executive Director.” These recommendations of the Task Team were subsequently formalised in the UNEP Executive Director’s Management Note of 30th January 2012¹², which stated: “Sub-Programme Coordinators will have a reporting line to the Lead Division Director and a second reporting line to the Deputy Executive Director.”
43. Figure 4 below illustrates in diagrammatic form the key accountability and authority arrangements for MTS delivery that were initially defined in the Accountability Framework but which have subsequently been modified and simplified according to lessons learnt from practical implementation. To some extent, the diagram may oversimplify the present-day reality, but it is designed to illustrate the key features of the matrix management model as it is being implemented in practice at the time of this evaluation.

Figure 4. Diagram of UNEP’s current accountability arrangements for MTS delivery



44. The figure shows the three key accountable officers within the matrix management system (highlighted in yellow) as it is presently being implemented¹³:

¹¹ UNEP Task Team on Programme Management and Implementation, Final Report, Sep 2011

¹² UNEP Executive Director Management Note: Response to UNEP Task Team reports, internal and external evaluations, 30 January 2012

¹³ Note that the other division director responsibility that is identified in the Accountability Framework – the Coordinating Division Director – is in practice not being implemented. In addition, many UNEP documents, including the Programme Frameworks, refer to an Accountable Division Director. This report uses the terminology used in the Accountability Framework where the Accountable Division Director is referred to as the Managing Division Director. The Lead Division Director has overall responsibility for the entire Sub-Programme and its component EAs.

- ▶ The **Lead Division Director**, who has overall programmatic (technical) as well as implementation responsibility and accountability for the delivery of the entire sub-programme
- ▶ The **Managing Division Director**, who has day-to-day implementation responsibility and accountability for the delivery of those PoW Outputs and projects that are being implemented through their division, but limited programmatic accountability. Because the Lead Division Director is responsible for both programmatic and implementation aspects of the concerned sub-programme, the Managing Division Director is in theory accountable to the Lead Division Director for the implementation of their components of the sub-programme, although it is less clear that this aspect is being implemented in practice
- ▶ The **Sub-Programme Coordinator (SPC)**, who has programmatic responsibility for the coordination and facilitation of the relevant sub-programme, and is accountable to the Lead Division Director.

45. While a significant improvement on the much more complex accountability arrangements defined in the Accountability Framework, this evaluation is of the opinion that the current matrix model as illustrated in Figure 4 still has a number of flaws which have the potential of making the matrix system unworkable in practice:


- ▶ Matrix management is by definition a system of management whereby staff within an organisation have two reporting lines, the first to the head of their particular department, and the second to the head of a particular project or product area to which they are assigned. In the case of the UNEP's matrix model, this implies that for a successful matrix management approach, the concerned UNEP staff members should also appropriately have two defined reporting lines – the first to their divisional head (or branch/unit head) for day-to-day implementation aspects, and the second, for programmatic aspects, to the Sub-Programme Coordinator concerned, or else the responsible Lead Division Director. However, the dual reporting lines required by UNEP's matrix management model have not in reality been established, which inevitably calls into question the underlying principles of the model, and undermines its functionality. In this regard, the FE concluded that the model *“does not reflect true matrix management where an individual has two reporting superiors”*.
- ▶ In practice, there are no established reporting lines between staff implementing the sub-programmes and their respective SPC, leaving the SPC concerned with significant responsibility and accountability for the delivery of the sub-programme, but no actual authority to enable them to supervise staff in SP implementation. This is ultimately an unworkable situation which has caused considerable frustration to the SPCs as well as other UNEP staff participating in the sub-programmes. It has also placed a significant extra work burden on the staff concerned. Commenting on the role of the SPCs as set out in the Accountability Framework, the FE observed that the lack of management authority vested in the SPC position *“can impede SPCs from getting access to progress information from other divisions, limit their ability to influence project and programme design processes, and constrain their influence on resource allocation decisions to pursue alignment with sub-programme priorities.”* The stated justification for this arrangement was that UNEP's senior management did not want to create another separate power base within the organisation, with the Division Directors representing the traditional power axis, while the new SPCs representing the new one.
- ▶ For similar reasons, the accountability of the Managing Division Director for programme implementation is, as noted previously, unclear. According to the Accountability Framework, the Lead Division Director is overall responsible and accountable for the delivery of the concerned sub-programme, which implies that they are ultimately also accountable and responsible for the components of the sub-programme being implemented by other divisions. This in turn implies that there should be a reporting line established between the Managing Division Director and the Lead Division Director, although none such exists in practice. The out-

come is that the Lead Division Director is being held accountable for the implementation of components of the sub-programme over which they have no practical control.

- ▶ Another complication of the current matrix system is that in reality, the Lead Division Directors have both a programmatic role in overseeing the implementation of the entire sub-programme, as well as an implementation responsibility in delivering those PoW Outputs for which they are responsible; i.e., Lead Divisions are invariably also Managing Divisions. This gives rise to potential *“conflicts of divisional and Sub-Programme interest... for example, where resource allocations that are in line with the priorities and interests of the Sub-Programme shift resources away from the immediate control of the division”* (Formative Evaluation). In essence, this situation calls for a degree of impartiality between the Lead Divisional Director’s dual programmatic and implementation roles that some UNEP staff felt was not always being realised in practice.
 - ▶ As discussed in the Resource Allocation section of this evaluation, the situation is further complicated by the challenges involved in equitably allocating available non-project funding to the different participating divisions. For example, in the case of the Environmental Governance Sub-Programme, resources are split almost equally among DEWA, DELC, and DRC, with a smaller allocation of 5% to DCPI, and nothing to DEPI. This may or may not reflect the real distribution of effort between the various divisions in implementing the sub-programme (see Resource Allocation section). Where a particular sub-programme is largely contained within a division, these competing interests are less acute.
 - ▶ A final observation is that the operational responsibility of the Regional Offices in the current matrix management model is not yet clearly defined. This aspect is addressed later in this report when the roles and responsibilities of the ROs in delivering the MTS are considered in more detail (see section 8).
46. **In conclusion**, the current interpretation of matrix management in UNEP is not providing the clear lines of authority and accountability for programme delivery that are needed. The Accountability Framework put in place early on in the MTS cycle was in hindsight too complex, and established too many different forms of accountability for programme delivery than it was in practice realistic or desirable to achieve. While most UNEP staff still support the concept of the cross-cutting and priority issue-oriented sub-programmes, there is little confidence in the current way in which the sub-programmes are being delivered. In addition, several staff felt that the additional transactional costs involved in maintaining the current matrix structure are far too high. The current matrix model clearly needs to be clarified and simplified, and in practice, this process is already underway within the organisation, responding to lessons learnt and ongoing discussions about the optimal accountability arrangements.
47. **This evaluation recommends** a further revision of the matrix management model to provide clear lines of accountability and authority for the delivery of the sub-programmes. In particular, the evaluation recommends that a clear differentiation is established between the two major functional axes of the matrix; the “programmatic” axis (i.e., the responsibility for overseeing the technical delivery of the sub-programmes -WHAT), and the “implementation” axis (i.e., the responsibility for the day-to-day delivery of the programme -HOW)¹⁴. These two axes are not clearly differentiated in the present arrangements, in particular because of the dual programmatic and implementation roles of the Lead Division Director, and also because of the lack of accountability and authority associated with the position of Sub-Programme Coordinator. Figure 5 below compares the existing accountability arrangements with a revised model as proposed in this report.

¹⁴ This parallels with the differentiation of programme delivery and progress towards results performance monitoring discussed in the previous section.

Figure 5. Diagram of the proposed revised accountability arrangements for MTS delivery compared with the existing arrangements



48. The key features of the proposed revised matrix model are as follows:

- ▶ The programmatic supervision role of the Deputy Executive Director is substantially strengthened. An Office of the DED is created in which the Sub-programme Coordinators are located, working and reporting directly to the DED. As an alternative, it might be necessary to establish an additional DED post responsible for programmes (or Programme Director), so as to not overburden the current single DED who is also responsible for policies and intergovernmental processes.
- ▶ The role of Lead Division Directors for overseeing programmatic aspects of the Sub-Programmes is transferred to the DED, supported by the respective Sub-Programme Coordinators.
- ▶ The Division Directors report on both programmatic achievement and technical implementation aspects to the DED.
- ▶ The Branch Heads and Regional Office Directors have two reporting lines, with the first reporting line for day-to-day implementation aspects to their Division Director, and a second reporting line for programmatic aspects to the relevant Sub-Programme Coordinator.

49. The revised matrix structure suggested above benefits from significantly stronger and clearer accountability and authority for both the day-to-day implementation of the programme (chiefly vested in the Division Directors under the oversight of the DED) and for programmatic aspects (vested in the DED, supported by a team of SPCs). The suggested model also allows for an enhanced role for UNEP's Regional Offices.

50. **The Evaluation further recommends** that accountability and authority arrangements are adjusted and consolidated through the revision of the existing UNEP Accountability Framework, and effected through the provision of appropriate revised Delegations of Authority by the ED.

Role of the Sub-Programme Coordinators

51. The position of Sub-Programme Coordinator was the only significant new addition to UNEP's organogram in response to the MTS, as defined in the Programme Accountability Framework. Because of the pivotal nature of this new position as far as coordination and management of the new sub-programmes is concerned, the role of the SPCs has been the subject of much discussion within the organisation since the launch of the MTS.
52. The UNEP Programme Manual, defines the role of the SPC as "*facilitating the development of a PoW that cuts across all Divisions in UNEP in the relevant priority area, and subsequently facilitating a coherent implementation of activities across divisions to achieve measurable results for the sub-programme, ensuring implementation enables UNEP's ability to achieve results expected at the end of the biennium*". The Programme Manual notes that, while the SPCs work under the supervision of the Lead Division Director, their work spans across all Divisions to ensure an integrated and strategic approach to programme development.
53. The responsibilities of the SPC are defined in the Programme Accountability Framework as well as the more comprehensive SPC Terms of Reference. The TORs assign the SPCs with focal roles in terms of developing the strategy and programme of work for the concerned sub-programme, facilitating the development and approval of projects making up the sub-programme, and in programme implementation. However, the actual responsibilities for the SPC with regard programme implementation were not defined in the ToR.
54. With the benefit of experience and lessons learnt, it is clear that the original role of the SPCs as part of the new matrix management arrangements was an inappropriate one, for reasons of unclear accountability and authority described in the previous section. This report has put forward recommendations aimed at addressing these accountability and authority issues, and hopefully of clarifying and strengthening the role of the SPCs.
55. In addition, however, it will be important to consider the capacity of the existing SPCs to fulfil their anticipated strengthened role in programme coordination. In this regard, most incumbents of the current SPC positions are at the level of P5 within UNEP, which from the standpoint of this evaluation, seems to be the appropriate level of responsibility and capacity for this position. However, some incumbents are at the level of P3, which does not seem to be appropriate, and may have the effect of transferring a substantial amount of programme coordination responsibility and authority to the Lead Division Director.
56. Of equal importance in the effectiveness of this position is that all but one of the SPCs have to carry out their SPC duties alongside another role within their parent division. In this regard, the FE noted that there is "*an imbalance in the time availability and overall workload of the SPCs across Sub-Programmes because several SPCs have to carry out their sub-programme coordination tasks in addition to their existing job within their Division.*" In addition, for two sub-programmes – Governance and Climate Change - the current SPCs are in an interim role. This latter aspect may reflect the ambiguity of the SPCs role vis-à-vis the Lead Divisional Director, or other senior staff, within the division concerned.
57. **This evaluation recommends** that, alongside the proposed new matrix management and accountability arrangements proposed above, the position of the SPC should also be strengthened. Ideally, all SPCs should be at the level of P5 in the organisation, and should be full-time rather than part-time positions. As mentioned above, it is also proposed that the SPCs should be

located in the office of the proposed DED, Programme, so that their allegiance and priorities are primarily oriented towards the sub-programme concerned, rather than to a particular division¹⁵.

Internal collaboration

58. The Meeting with Sub-Programme Coordinators on Programme Planning and Implementation held in April 2010¹⁶ highlighted some of the emerging challenges that were being encountered in strengthening internal collaboration in delivering of the new MTS and its cross-divisional sub-programmes: *“In the past, where Divisions were exclusively responsible for one Sub-Programme, coordination within Sub-Programmes was achieved through regular intra-Division consultations. While Divisional coordination remains in place, there is no mechanism for the cross-divisional coordination now required by the new thematic Sub-Programmes.”*
59. The Terms of Reference of the UNEP Task Team on Programme Management (March 2011) also identified the importance of sub-programme coordination mechanisms, as well as the associated need to put in place incentives that would encourage and enable divisions and regional offices to work together to achieve cross-cutting results. However, in the final report of the Task Team (September 2011), the issue of internal collaboration mechanisms and the role of incentives seems to have been overtaken by the more challenging and conspicuous issues of accountability for sub-programme implementation, and resource allocation. As a result, the Task Team final report does not explicitly address the issue of how best to promote internal collaboration and the types of incentives that might be appropriate to encourage this. This seems to be an important gap in UNEP’s current reform process that needs to be addressed in more tangible ways in future.
60. The interviews carried out as part of the present evaluation, as well as the OIOS online survey of UNEP staff, provided mixed feedback on the degree to which the MTS and the associated reform process had actually promoted internal collaboration within the organisation in delivering the PoWs. For example, less than 50% of respondents to the OIOS staff survey agreed with the statement that “the matrix approach had increased inter-divisional cooperation in programme planning and implementation”, with some respondents stating that the reform process had led to a significant increase in inter-divisional cooperation, while others felt that cooperation may even have declined as a result of the new approaches. In general, however, it seems that most staff interviewed felt that the reform process had indeed led to an increase in collaboration **in the programme planning process**, in particular the preparation of the PoW and the subsequent Programme Frameworks, but that once these frameworks were in place, inter-divisional cooperation in the delivery process had been minimal. Again, this in part depended on the sub-programme concerned, with some sub-programmes, such as Climate Change, enjoying a higher level of inter-divisional collaboration than others.
61. **In conclusion**, although a major aim of the reform process associated with the MTS had been to increase collaboration in MTS delivery, it is clear that, at least as far as programme implementation is concerned, the traditional UNEP divisional structure and the geographical spread of the organisation continue to present significant barriers to greater collaborative working according to the principles and framework established by the MTS. The matrix management approach adopted by UNEP, which was aimed at facilitating greater cross-divisional collaboration, ultimately has been unable fully to realise this.

¹⁵ However, it has been pointed out to the evaluation that, while there are clear conflict of interest issues linked to having the SPCs remain in the divisions (and therefore accountable to one specific division director), the advantage is keeping the SPCs technically grounded by remaining involved - or at least fully informed - of day-to-day project development and implementation. Moving them to the DED Programme’s office therefore risks creating a gap or disconnect. The pros and cons of these two options will clearly need more discussion.

¹⁶ Meeting with Sub-programme Coordinators on Programme Planning and Implementation, Apr 2010

62. Since the delivery of UNEP's programme largely revolves around its project portfolio, probably one of the most powerful potential incentives is to prioritise those new projects which demonstrate a significant degree of inter-divisional and divisional-regional office collaboration in their design and implementation arrangements. The prioritisation of such projects will counterbalance the existing institutional incentives to simply develop projects within the framework of individual divisions¹⁷.
63. Other suggestions that have been made by various UNEP internal forums aimed at increasing collaboration include the establishment of specific sub-programme teams that cut across the divisions, and the regular convening of sub-programme meetings and other forums. While these mechanisms could potentially be of value in increasing internal communication and collaboration across individual sub-programmes, this evaluation questions whether UNEP's limited resources should be invested in bringing about this additional level of sub-programme bureaucracy. Rather, it is recommended that the sub-programme construct is best viewed as a programmatic overlay on the existing divisional organisational structure, rather than as a discrete and alternative organisational structure in its own right. As such, the emphasis should be placed on developing incentives for inter-divisional collaboration in sub-programme delivery, rather than on building up discrete and potentially costly sub-programme institutional mechanisms.

4. UNEP's project portfolio and the MTS

64. Projects represent the principal mechanism for delivering on the EAs defined in the MTS, and as such they are a crucial dimension of the achievement of results-based management. The UNEP Programme Manual describes projects as *'the "building blocks" that operationalize UNEP's achievement of results in the PoW and Programme Frameworks'*. This section looks at the process that was used to align UNEP's project portfolio with the higher-level results framework set out in the MTS and associated PoWs, and the degree to which this has enabled UNEP to implement its reform process. In this regard, it is important to recognise that the MTS and PoWs were not developed in a vacuum, where projects could be designed from scratch to address specific EAs and PoW Outputs. In reality, the MTS and the PoWs were developed in the context of an already well-established and substantial UNEP project portfolio that predated the MTS, in some instances by many years. All of these projects could not simply be terminated if they did not fit the MTS results framework, nor could they easily be redesigned in order to better fit the framework.
65. The chief mechanism for aligning the existing UNEP project portfolio with the EAs and PoW Outputs, and for identifying new project initiatives, was the Programme Frameworks, which altogether defined a total of 83 so-called "Project Concepts" which were intended to provide an explicit framework for decision making concerning the relevance of existing projects to the MTS results framework, and the requirement for developing new projects. In practice, each sub-programme approached this task in somewhat different ways. For example, some PF Concepts were essentially formulated as "Umbrella Projects", or "Project Areas", into which a number of smaller projects could potentially be fitted, while other Concepts were more akin to specific individual projects in their own right. The breakdown of the identified Project Concepts by Sub-Programme was as follows:
- | | |
|----------------------------|---|
| ▶ Climate Change | 10 concepts |
| ▶ Disasters and Conflicts | 22 concepts (incl. 7 continuing projects) |
| ▶ Environmental management | 14 concepts |

¹⁷ These divisional incentives include the requirement to meet the divisional budget, the ease of working with familiar divisional colleagues, communication challenges brought about by physical separation between some divisions, and the distinctive divisional cultures that have grown up over the years.

- ▶ Environmental Governance 12 concepts
- ▶ Harmful Substances & Hazardous Wastes 15 concepts
- ▶ Resource Efficiency 10 concepts

66. Following the approval of the PFs, it was then necessary to fit the 300+ projects already making up the UNEP project portfolio within the identified 83 approved Project Concepts, followed by winding up of any projects that were unable to fit. In the event, because the MTS EAs, and PF Project Concepts were relatively broad, it was relatively straightforward for most existing projects to be slotted into the results framework, whether or not they were in reality making a significant contribution to the MTS results framework. Other projects could not easily be fitted into the framework, but it seems that a number of them were continued nonetheless. Considering the commitments that these projects involved as far as the host countries and donors were concerned, this was a reasonable outcome, but because a clear distinction was not made between those projects that were significantly contributing to the MTS results framework and those that were not, but needed to be carried on nonetheless, the end result was that staff confidence in the entire process of aligning the UNEP project portfolio with the MTS results framework, and even to an extent in the results framework itself, seems to have been undermined. Some staff members suggested to the evaluation team that the MTS results framework simply represented a place where projects could be parked, and that the results framework had very little influence on the nature of the projects as such. This was described to the evaluation team by some staff as “hanging an existing project on an appropriate hook” provided by the MTS results framework.
67. Perhaps also as a consequence of the ease to which existing projects could be fitted into the MTS result framework, and an associated lack of confidence in the framework itself, there also appears to have been limited effort invested in designing new project activities specifically targeted at fulfilling the MTS results framework. However, there were some notable exceptions, such as the Climate Change Sub-Programme’s work on developing its new flagship areas, Ecosystem-Based Adaptation, REDD+ and Clean Technology Readiness. This situation appears to have begun to change, however, with the exercise to produce “Programme Framework Extensions” carried out in early 2012, in which each of the sub-programmes looked at both the MTS and PoW results framework and the alignment of projects with the framework based on lessons learnt during the PoW 2010-2011 biennium. This exercise seems to have initiated a renewed effort to look at the alignment of the sub-programme project portfolios with the MTS results framework, and to identify new projects that needed to be developed to address aspects of the results framework. Most comprehensive was the section on the Climate Change Sub-Programme, which made a concerted effort to examine the respective roles of existing projects, umbrella projects, and Climate Change flagship areas, including provision for winding up existing projects and their incorporation as appropriate in the flagship areas and umbrella projects. The work of the Climate Change Sub-Programme in this regard could provide a good foundation for a UNEP-wide revised process for the alignment of the project portfolio with the MTS results framework, established in good time for the next MTS round commencing in 2014.
68. **In conclusion**, the transition to the new MTS with its six new sub-programmes inevitably represented a major departure from the UNEP project portfolio *status quo* as it existed prior to the MTS, and it is to be expected that the transition to appropriate alignment with the new results framework, including determining which projects should be continued and which ones should be closed, would be a complex one that needed to be spread over an extended period. Nevertheless, it is clear that the Programme Frameworks with their Project Concepts did not provide a sufficiently robust framework to facilitate the necessary transition. Overall, there was a sense of life continuing as usual as far as the UNEP project portfolio was concerned, with existing projects simply being reorganised to fit within the new MTS results framework, and with only a limited number of new project ideas being prioritised. This situation seems to be now changing with the PoW 2012-2013, but there is still some way to go in putting into place robust mecha-

nisms for ensuring the alignment of the project portfolio with the higher-level MTS results framework.

69. **This evaluation recommends** that the process for aligning the project portfolio with the MTS results framework be strengthened in advance of the next MTS, 2014-2017. Key aspects to be considered for potential inclusion in the process include:

- ▶ The strengthening of the role of the Programme Frameworks in UNEP’s programme planning process, as described in section 2 above.
- ▶ As part of the strengthened PF, it is recommended that specific “flagship areas” should be defined to articulate the concerned sub-programme’s project delivery response to the MTS results framework, incorporating for each flagship area an explicit causal logic related to particular aspects of achieving the EA concerned, and providing appropriate guidance for the identification of specific projects. The work of the Climate Change Sub-Programme to put in place such flagship areas could serve as a good foundation for developing this aspect of the PFs.
- ▶ Coupled with the development of the PFs, which according to the recommendations given in section 2 above would happen in advance of the next MTS, it is recommended that a specific sub-programme by sub-programme review be undertaken by the SMT in conjunction with the Sub-Programme Coordinators concerned to examine the alignment of existing projects with the PF (and defined flagship areas), to identify specific requirements for the development of new project activities, and to identify projects that need to be wound up because of non-alignment with the results framework. In the case of projects that need to be wound up, an appropriate schedule should be established to do this, and in the meantime, these projects should continue as a legitimate element of the UNEP project portfolio. It is not clear whether such an explicit process of aligning the project portfolio with the MTS results framework was actually carried out for the last MTS, but even if an attempt was made, the crucial missing ingredients were the revised Programme Frameworks and the suggested flagship areas.
- ▶ Related to this, the Task Team on Programme Management recommended that the responsibilities of the PAG with regard to review of the PoW and corresponding project portfolio should in future be performed by the SMT, with QAS continuing to provide the secretariat services for this function. The report further recommends that the SMT should have *“at least three dedicated meetings annually on programme planning, performance review, monitoring, and evaluation to ensure systematic attention of management on the programme”*. This recommendation is confirmed by the UNEP ED’s Management Note of 30 January 2012, which states: *“commencing at the time of review of the next PoW, the SMT will take on the function of the PAG....Commencing immediately, SMT will also dedicate sufficient time in regular meetings to reviewing the outcome of programme planning, monitoring and evaluation work to ensure a high level of management attention on the outcome of these processes, and their findings.”*

5. Programme monitoring and reporting

70. UNEP’s **Programme Performance Monitoring Policy** comprehensively describes the key elements of, and institutional framework for, monitoring and reporting on programme performance. The policy sets out the principles and requirements that determine and guide the monitoring and assessment of the implementation of the PoW, the provision of feedback on performance, and the process of making adjustments in programme delivery to ensure that UNEP is able to deliver its programmed commitments and achieve expected results. The policy is complemented by a **Programme Performance Monitoring Plan**, which outlines a schedule and approach for programme performance monitoring and reporting. The plan also provides further

details on processes, workplans, and roles and responsibilities in monitoring and reporting. Efforts have also been made to strengthen capacity for RBM, through the **UNEP RBM Training Programme**¹⁸.

71. Monitoring of the MTS and the PoWs is essentially carried out at two main levels: monitoring of progress made in achieving the MTS' EAs, i.e. programme effectiveness, and monitoring of actual delivery of the PoW and Project Outputs compared to inputs, i.e. programme efficiency. The third level of programme performance monitoring is impact, which is addressed as part of ex-post evaluations coordinated by the UNEP Evaluation Office (see section 7 below). For each of these dimensions, there are three key aspects to consider: 1) the indicators that have been established to monitor performance; 2) the processes put into place to track the indicators; and 3) the reporting systems that then synthesise and present information against the indicators. Each of these aspects is considered below.

Monitoring indicators

72. Concerning **EA-level outcome indicators** (as established in the Strategic Frameworks), the Formative Evaluation called into question the validity and usefulness of these indicators. As noted previously, the MTS EAs themselves were largely established at a very broad and ambitious level beyond that which UNEP alone could realistically deliver on, especially within the four-year cycle of the MTS. Linked to this, the FE noted that, while the majority of the EA-level indicators were quantitative in nature, they were often vague and did not usefully measure actual progress towards the achievement of the EA in question. The FE concluded that *"The fact that the indicators at EA level are often not capturing UNEP's performance in PoW implementation seriously calls into question their use for progress reporting to the CPR/Governing Council...It is certainly not a viable approach to use the current EA performance indicators for frequent monitoring of UNEP's programmatic performance"*.
73. This Evaluation shares the FE's concerns about the appropriateness of the current EA indicators. In carrying out the more detailed Impact and Effectiveness assessments at the sub-programme level (see the Effectiveness & Impact section of this evaluation) it was evident that the quantitative EA achievement indicators did not provide a good foundation for realistically measuring UNEP's progress towards achieving the EAs. For example, simply setting an EA indicator as the number of countries that had adopted a particular protocol or policy fails to capture the complexity and diversity of the activities that UNEP is actually implementing. It also raises important questions about the validity of the measurement itself. Would the countries concerned have adopted the policy or protocol concerned in the absence of UNEP's intervention (i.e. can the outcome be attributed to UNEP), and what does "adoption" in this case actually mean in practice? This sort of over-simplification of EA indicators devalues UNEP's actual contribution towards achieving an EA, and at the same time, because of the subjective nature of the measurement, gives scope for manipulating achievements to suit the desired result. Such EA indicators certainly do not provide a good foundation on which to strengthen UNEP's results-based management processes.
74. The FE recommended that in developing future MTS's, the EA indicators identified should be better aligned with the principles of results-based management, and specifically should be SMART¹⁹. In this regard, a good foundation has now been established for enhancing both outcome and output level indicators in the revised UNEP Programme Manual (see section 6 below). When combined with more realistic EAs that are established at the immediate outcome level, it should be possible to develop more realistic EA indicators, applying the principles outlined in the Programme Manual.

¹⁸ UNEP RBM Training Programme. Project Document, June 2011

¹⁹ SMART: Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Attributable, Relevant, and Time-bound.

75. At the **project outcome level**, indicators are by definition usually designed to measure progress towards bringing about changes in the behaviour and practices of the project's beneficiary groups. These behavioural and practice changes inevitably take a long time to achieve, sometimes even beyond the immediate timeframe of the project concerned. As such, it is usually not possible to comprehensively measure changes in outcome indicators within the timeframe of the project – these may only be noticeable towards the end of the project concerned.
76. At the **PoW Output level**, the PoWs 2010-2011 and 2012-2013 define broad targets for PoW Outputs and, by implication, associated indicators. For example, in the PoW 2012-2013, under EA(a) of the Ecosystem Management Sub-Programme, Output 1: *“Ecosystem-focused adaptation and vulnerability assessments and associated capacity development actions are undertaken...”* has a target of four countries. The implicit indicator for this target is therefore the number of countries that have undertaken ecosystem-focussed adaptation and vulnerability assessments. In addition to these broad targets and indicators in the PoWs, some project documents also provide indicators for PoW Outputs, but the Formative Evaluation points out that in these cases, the indicators are biased towards those dimensions of the PoW Output that are relevant for the project concerned. An additional complication highlighted by the FE is that each project's own output indicators are also formulated in a way that is specific to the project concerned, rather than the PoW Output they are contributing to, which means that it is not possible to use these indicators to aggregate performance to the PoW Output level.
77. Overall, the FE concluded that *“at two key levels in the PoW RBM framework, EAs and PoW Outputs, UNEP does not have reliable performance indicators. A better approach for monitoring performance in PoW implementation is to capture progress towards the delivery of PoW Outputs and EAs **through the achievement of verifiable milestones**”²⁰.* This evaluation agrees with the FE's conclusions in this regard.
78. With regard **project outcome milestones, this Evaluation recommends** that UNEP should begin a process of identifying and monitoring project outcome milestones that reflect the causal logic of the project concerned, and that enable key dimensions of this logic, especially the achievement of key outcome and impact drivers, to be monitored. For example, if the outcome of a particular project is for a participating government to incorporate ecosystem management approaches into its development planning processes, a key milestone may be that the government carries out key legislative and policy reforms to enable this to happen. In some circumstances, the milestone concerned may be the same as one of the project's own output indicators, but some milestones identified from the causal logic may not be an integral part of the project itself. For example, a significant milestone towards achieving the outcome may be that the country's Parliament adopts the necessary policy and legislation changes, which while crucial to the eventual achievement of the outcome, is unlikely to be within the scope of the project to deliver.
79. The revised UNEP Programme Manual introduces the concept of project outcome milestones, but does not go into any detail of how these should in practice be formulated. **It is recommended** that the elaboration of an EA's causal pathways and appropriate generic milestones should ideally be part of the process of developing the revised Programme Frameworks (see section 2 above), and both the generic EA causal pathways and milestones can then form the basis for developing the specific causal logic and milestones for both flagship areas as well as individual projects being implemented under the concerned Programme Framework (see section 4 above). The achievement of outcome milestones should also be monitored in PIMS, and this information should be consolidated to the EA and Sub-Programme level, as is currently the case with the Programme Performance Report's monitoring of performance against EA indicators (see below).

²⁰ The Programme Manual defines a milestone as “a scheduled event signifying the progression or completion of work towards a project output and ultimately the project outcome. Milestones are key events that provide a measure of progress and a target for the project team to aim at.”

80. With regard **project output milestones**, UNEP has already made significant progress in introducing and monitoring project output milestones, and these milestones form a crucial element of UNEP's performance monitoring systems discussed in the next section.

Performance monitoring systems

81. As with the establishment of indicators, UNEP's monitoring systems are also divided into two: monitoring of higher-level outcomes (EA), and monitoring of the delivery of PoW Outputs. To complicate matters, there are also two parallel monitoring systems in operation, the UN-wide monitoring system, the **Integrated Monitoring and Documentation Information System (IMDIS)**, and UNEP's own performance monitoring system, the **Programme Information Monitoring System (PIMS)**.
82. **IMDIS** is the UN system's online for planning, monitoring and reporting of results-based programme performance. The critical aspect of the IMDIS structure is that it monitors performance at the output level against a predefined set of IMDIS monitoring or "deliverables" categories, to which individual **PoW Outputs** are assigned as part of the process of preparing the UNEP PoWs and Programme Frameworks. Furthermore, the IMDIS categories are largely established at what in the UNEP results framework would be termed activities, not outputs. For example, PoW Output #1 under EA(a) of the Climate Change Sub-Programme: "*Vulnerabilities to Climate Change and adaptation of critical ecosystems are assessed and findings are integrated into national decision-making...*" is assigned to IMDIS category "Non-recurrent publications", with a target of 4 publications. While the production of publications is indeed one of the activities to be carried out as part of this Output, it is clearly not a useful indicator of delivery of the overall Output. In reality, UNEP could produce the four publications concerned without making any substantive progress in achieving the Output as defined above, or alternatively, it could make strong progress in achieving the Output without necessarily producing the identified publications. In sum, the IMDIS deliverable has in practice little to do with the achievement of the Output.
83. The pattern is repeated across most of the categories established by IMDIS, which is largely geared to measuring performance in terms of specific deliverables, rather than more profound achievement of outputs and outcomes as defined in the MTS results framework.
84. **At the EA level**, IMDIS uses a qualitative description of progress towards the achievement of the EA similar to that used in the UNEP Performance Progress Reports. As with the PPRs, this qualitative information may often be more helpful in understanding achievement of EAs, but a constraint of IMDIS is that there is a tight limit on the amount that can be written about any particular EA, which can undermine the usefulness of this information.
85. In sum, whereas IMDIS may have been an appropriate results-based management tool for measuring performance against outputs under previous UNEP programme cycles that largely focussed on deliverables, it is increasingly anachronistic as a results-based management tool as far as UNEP's present results framework as defined in the MTS and PoWs is concerned. It is largely for these reasons that UNEP has developed the role of its own PIMS system as a results-based management tool that is more closely aligned with the MTS and the results-based management needs of the organisation.
86. In the long term, the UN is in the process of instituting a new Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) system-wide solution called **Umoja**, which will begin to be introduced to the system in mid-2013 and is due to be completed by 2016. Although the full details of the new system are not yet known, it is to be hoped that it will allow results-based performance monitoring at the output and outcome levels that are defined in the UNEP results framework, not simply at the delivera-

bles level as presently is possible in IMDIS. It will also be important that Umoja has capacity for tracking financial performance, which is also not possible in IMDIS.

87. **PIMS** is UNEP's primary repository for project-specific information, and is designed to support the entire project management cycle from project design stage, through to approval, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. In addition to its more general importance in the management of project information at various stages of the project cycle, which in itself has important implications for RBM, PIMS plays an especially important role in terms of monitoring and reporting of progress in project implementation, in terms of recording information concerning progress towards PoW Output targets and the achievement of project milestones. PIMS reports feature an automated performance rating approach, with a dashboard based, "traffic light" system for simply illustrating progress towards achievement of project output milestones. The same dashboard approach is also used in the Programme Performance Reports, which provide a synthesis of PIMS monitoring data across an entire sub-programme (see below).
88. PIMS was originally designed as a project information monitoring system, but because of the demand for reporting on overall performance at the sub-programme level, it has gradually morphed into a programme monitoring system, although the fundamental characteristics and architecture of the system remain the same. Although the monitoring information provided by PIMS concerning project milestone achievement has been used to produce programme performance information and synthesis at the sub-programme level, it is important to note that currently PIMS is only able to provide synthesised information on progress made in project delivery, and thereby PoW Output delivery (i.e. programme efficiency), and is not yet capable (or at least is not currently being provided with the right forms of measurements), of actually measuring UNEP's progress towards achievement of the EAs (i.e. programme effectiveness). This is because, as noted above, PIMS currently only records lower-level project output milestones, rather than higher-level outcome milestones. The system would need to be overhauled and a second tier of milestones introduced into the architecture in order to be able to record and synthesise information on higher level milestones.
89. Nevertheless, for the purposes that it was designed, PIMS does seem to be a useful platform for recording project monitoring data, and despite some initial teething problems, it is now generating synthesised information on project output delivery. Most UNEP staff familiar with PIMS seemed to be relatively comfortable with the use of the system. Concern was, however, expressed about usefulness of the output milestones selected for monitoring in PIMS, which some staff felt did not provide a good measure of project progress. It was not clear whether this problem originated with the initial identification of milestones in project documents or by the project managers, or with the eventual selection of milestones for entry into PIMS by QAS; however, it does seem that the issue of identification of appropriate output milestones needs to be revisited, perhaps alongside a process to determine higher-level outcome milestones as discussed above. Training in the determination of both lower level output milestones and upper level outcome milestones is provided as part of the RBM training programmes that UNEP is in the process of implementing.

Performance reporting

90. Up until the time of this evaluation, UNEP has prepared a total of four Programme Performance Reports (PPRs), with the first being produced in October 2010 covering the January-June 2010 period of the PoW 2010-2011 biennium, and the latest in December 2011. There has been a significant evolution in the design of the PPRs over this period, but all of the reports are divided into an Overall Programme Performance Review followed by a more in-depth performance reporting by sub-programme. Each report is cumulative, so that the December 2011 report covers the entire PoW biennium, 2010-2011. All of the performance reports use a traffic light system to graphically illustrate the progress that is being made towards delivery of PoW Outputs, with the

January-June 2010 report being based on a qualitative self-assessment by the responsible officer for the Output in question.

91. In the Jan-Dec 2010 report, a new traffic light-style assessment of UNEP's progress towards achievement of the EAs was added to the report, based on the self-assessment of the EA indicators and their related baselines and targets carried out by the relevant Sub-Programme Coordinator. This was in an effort to enhance the contribution of the reporting to measuring UNEP's achievements at the outcome level, whereas the previous reporting had largely focussed at the PoW Output level. Considering the inappropriate nature of the EA indicators as discussed above, this quantitative reporting of achievement at the EA level was inevitably based on a weak foundation. On the other hand, the qualitative information concerning the achievement of EAs presented in the PPRs is often of significantly greater value, since this implicitly discussed the drivers and assumptions that were an important aspect of the causal logic underlying the EA concerned.
92. The Jan-Dec 2010 PPR appears to recognise this potential weakness of the presentation (perhaps responding to the earlier critique of the Formative Evaluation) and states that: *"The focus of the report is on performance measurement towards achieving results and not results measurement per se. Thus, even though this report does show some actual results achieved, evaluation is necessary for an objective verification of these results and the degree to which they can be attributed to UNEP."* However, this rider on the nature of the performance reporting does not entirely dispel the overall impression from the report that the traffic lights at the EA level represent actual achievement of the EA.
93. The Jan 2010-June 2011 PPR introduced a new approach to monitoring performance based on the new PIMS system, aggregating and analysing performance data for individual projects (through measurement against project milestones) towards the delivery of PoW Outputs, and ultimately to the delivery of EAs. As noted in the PPR, *"this monitoring and reporting process represents a significant change away from performance assessment based entirely on a consultative and self-assessment process towards a more systematic approach where progress is assessed against planned delivery in approved projects that contribute to given outputs and EAs in the PoW"*.
94. The Jan 2010-Dec 2011 PPR gives an overview of programme performance over the entire biennium of the PoW. Like the previous Jan 2010-Jun 2011 PPR, it presents an assessment of progress in delivering projects based on milestone data entered into PIMS, again aggregated to the EA level. However, this PPR also reintroduces an assessment of actual achievement of the EAs based, like the Jan-Dec 2010 PPR, on the assessments made against the indicators, targets and baselines provided in the Strategic Framework for the biennium. As with the previous annual PPR, the overall conclusions based on these weak indicators of achievement are misleading. For example, the Jan 2010-Dec 2011 PPR states that *"Performance indicators conclude that of the 21 expected accomplishments, 15 have been fully achieved, with five partially achieved, and one insufficiently achieved, indicative of a good overall performance."* Considering the ambitious nature of the EAs in the first place and the weakness of the associated indicators, this statement is unjustified, and undermines rather than reinforces UNEP's efforts to make progress towards strengthening its results-based management. As discussed previously, the solution is formulation of more robust EAs formulated at the immediate outcome level and their associated indicators, followed by the identification and monitoring of higher-level project outcome milestones in PIMS.
95. Besides the weaknesses in the PPR's outcome level performance reporting, another important weakness of the PPRs is the practice of consolidating project delivery (i.e. project output level) information up to the level of the Expected Accomplishments. Although this practice seems to be anticipated in the Programme Performance Monitoring Policy, this evaluation suggests that summing delivery performance information to the level of the EAs gives an inaccurate and mis-

leading impression of UNEP's true achievements in delivering outcomes. Thus the statement made in the Jan 2010-Jun 2011 PPR that "out of 21 Expected Accomplishments in the PoW, five are rated "on track", six are "partly on track" and ten require "management attention" is potentially misleading, because it gives the impression that the performance information provided actually reflects the achievements that UNEP was making at the EA level. What is actually meant is that, within the framework of the respective EAs, the cumulative delivery of the concerned projects is either on track or not on track - i.e., this is purely a measure of UNEP's implementation performance (efficiency), not of the progress towards upper level outcomes (effectiveness).

96. This is not to say that the idea of aggregating project implementation performance data is an inappropriate one *per se*. This evaluation feels that such information is a useful indication of UNEP's implementation performance, but that it would be much more useful and less misleading to present the information according to the **relevant accountable divisions**, so that they can indeed be held accountable for the delivery of the projects for which they are responsible, rather than by EAs, which essentially holds no-one accountable, except perhaps the Lead Division Director for the sub-programme concerned (who ideally should not be held accountable for projects that are being delivered by another division).
97. Related to this, the Programme Performance Monitoring Policy states that "*Performance in the delivery of programmed commitments is monitored through measuring and assessing progress against approved workplans and budget allocations*". However, as far as can be seen, divisional workplans are not currently being used as a basis for planning and performance monitoring, by either PIMS or IMDIS. The potential for enhancing the role of divisional (and regional office) workplans in UNEP's programme management is discussed in section 6 below.
98. **In conclusion**, this evaluation feels that the introduction of PIMS as a basis for the preparation of PPRs represented a significant advance in UNEP's results-based management, provided that the monitoring information being entered into the system is appropriately robust.²¹ However, the PPRs have two weaknesses: firstly, the reporting of achievements at the outcome level relies on weak EA indicators, which in turn are linked to overly ambitious EAs. This aspect is best addressed by strengthening the EAs so that they are at the immediate outcome level, strengthening indicators, and putting into place and monitoring higher-level outcome milestones. Secondly, the way in which the PPRs are aggregating output milestone information to the EA level is inappropriate and gives a false impression of actual achievements at the outcome level, as opposed to project level delivery performance.
99. This evaluation recommends that in future, project output level performance information is instead consolidated **to the level of the division which is accountable for the delivery of the projects and PoW Outputs concerned**. In this way, delivery performance information will be aligned with the operational structure of the organisation, which is as it should be.

6. Programme management

100. As the performance monitoring systems and accountability policies and structures necessary to implement the MTS and its associated PoWs were put into place as described in the previous sections, UNEP has also made parallel efforts to strengthen its programme management systems and structures. These efforts have included the development of a revised and expanded **Pro-**

²¹ However, this depends to a degree on how rigorously the sub-programme concerned implements the system. For example, the in-depth evaluation of the Environmental Governance Sub-Programme noted that once PIMS was introduced, performance measurements appeared to be significantly more realistic, with red and yellow traffic lights appearing across the sub-programme. However, by the end of the biennium, all traffic lights were green again, which either meant that significant progress had been made, or that the sub-programme had taken a more generous approach towards its progress. Similar situations were reported to exist with the other sub-programmes.

gramme Manual²² to guide the overall implementation of the programme, as well as new project design frameworks aimed at improving the standard of UNEP's projects, their focus on the results framework set out in the MTS and PoW, and their overall orientation towards strengthening UNEP's results-based management. Much of this work has been led by the Quality Assurance Section (QAS), which has now been incorporated into the UNEP Office of Operations (OfO).

The UNEP Programme Manual

101. Work on revising the UNEP Programme Manual began in 2009, but it was not until May 2012 that the Manual was eventually released in draft form. The delays incurred may have in part reflected the iterative and extended nature of the organisational reform process, which meant that it was not possible to put in place the principles and practices of programme management that are elaborated on in the manual until a relatively late stage in the process. Another possible contributing factor was a lack of clear ownership over the manual within UNEP.
102. Whatever the reasons for the delay in releasing the revised manual, the lack of clear programme management guidelines has inevitably impacted on the process of putting into place the new programme management arrangements, and has meant that UNEP staff had to learn about the new management systems and processes "on the hoof", rather than from guidelines and explanations set out in the manual. In addition, the delay in releasing the revised manual has meant that it has had limited impacts on the implementation of the MTS at the time of this evaluation, and it is much too early to assess the eventual impacts of the manual on programme design, implementation and monitoring.
103. Nevertheless, in the view of this evaluation, the eventual revised manual provides a strong foundation for strengthening UNEP's programme delivery and RBM. The manual provides a comprehensive framework covering all these aspects, which has been influenced by lessons learnt in the implementation of the MTS to date, and builds on recommendations and lessons learnt provided by internal UNEP evaluations such as the Formative Evaluation, sub-programme evaluations, RBM training, as well as external reviews such as the MOPAN 2011 Assessment of UNEP²³. Important components of the Programme Manual with respect to enhancing RBM include:
- ▶ An overview of UNEP's Results Framework and Programme Cycle
 - ▶ A description of roles and responsibilities in UNEP for programme delivery
 - ▶ A comprehensive description of Theory of Change approaches to programme and project design, implementation and monitoring in the UNEP context
 - ▶ A description of UNEP's project review and approval procedures
 - ▶ A description of UNEP's project monitoring and reporting systems and procedures
 - ▶ A description of project evaluation procedures

Project Design

104. With regard project design, the Formative Evaluation notes that great strides have been made in improving project design as the result of the new project document format, and the associated efforts of QAS and the Project Review Committee. However, the FE also observed that required revisions to project designs were often inadequately reflected in the final project documents, and that QAS often approved projects with recognised shortcomings in order to keep the PoW preparation process on track. The FE goes on to note that projects included in the 2010-2011 PoW were prepared under sub-optimal conditions, partially through timing constraints and also because of the absence of an up-to-date programme manual to serve as a reference to project designers. The Final Report of the Task Team on Programme Management also emphasises

²² UNEP Programme Manual. Draft, May 2012

²³ MOPAN 2011 Assessment of UNEP

the need for UNEP to improve the quality of projects so that the organization can fully deliver PoW results.

105. This evaluation also had the opportunity to look at the current UNEP project document template which was prepared in 2009, before the current MTS was put into place. The template therefore predates the recommendations provided in the FE concerning the need to elaborate a comprehensive causal logic for the project as a foundation for the project document. In this regard, more work is needed to strengthen this aspect of the current project template.
106. A critical issue with regard project design mentioned earlier in this report is the lack of project design funds in UNEP. Thus although the revised Programme Manual introduces a “**Project Preparation Template**” which amongst other things includes a proposed delivery plan and budget for project preparation, in practice, there is very little available funding in the organisation for project preparation, and very often UNEP staff are compelled to utilise funding from existing projects to design new ones, rather than accessing dedicated project preparation funding. This often means that the project preparation process has to be curtailed, with limited time and resources available for stakeholder analyses, baseline studies, or the preparation of a robust causal logic defining the project. If UNEP is to improve the quality of its projects, it will not only be necessary to strengthen the project design template, but also to ensure that funding is set aside for project preparation, preferably to be accessed across the organisation, both divisions and regional basis, on a competitive basis.

Divisional workplans

107. The final dimension of programme management that, from the point of view of this evaluation, has important implications for the effectiveness and efficiency of the delivery of the programme, especially in terms of the matrix management and accountability arrangements, concerns the specific performance management systems in place at the divisional and sub-divisional level. These comprise the divisional workplans and the UN’s Electronic Performance Appraisal System (e-PAS) on which individual work responsibilities are planned and performance assessed. This section of the report mainly focusses on the divisional workplans. A more in-depth discussion of e-PAS can be found in the Finance & Resource Allocation section of this evaluation.
108. Divisional workplans represent a potentially crucial element of UNEP’s programme management systems in support of the MTS, since they provide an opportunity for the division concerned to set out their detailed work plans towards the implementation of the results framework, both in terms of individual projects contributing towards the results framework, as well as other non-project activities that are crucial to the achievement of results but which are not necessarily ideally captured in the project delivery mechanism. Divisional workplans also potentially provide the basis for resource allocation. In essence, the divisional workplans have the possibility of providing the appropriate implementation dimension of UNEP’s planning and performance management to complement the programmatic dimension that should be played by revised and improved Programme Frameworks as discussed in section 2 above.
109. The role of divisional workplans was discussed by the Formative Evaluation, which stated that “*Divisional workplans are key to achieving transparency in resource allocation and programme delivery and should be prepared.*” According to the FE, QAS has recommended that divisional workplans should include a presentation of:

- ▶ activities needed to achieve the results (including partnerships with external agencies) showing responsible staff member
- ▶ time line and milestones for each set of activities
- ▶ allocation of staff time for each set of activities

- ▶ budget allocation at IMIS object code level for Environment Fund and Extra-budgetary funds per activity
 - ▶ management activities with allocation of staff time and budget
 - ▶ standalone activities and indirect costs
 - ▶ resource mobilisation needs
110. The importance of the divisional workplans was also confirmed by the ED's Management Note (January 2012) which stated that *"Divisional workplans constitute the baseline data against which OfO can assess the extent of alignment with the PoW and the steps needed to bring about alignment... This also requires that individual e-PAS workplans of staff must be designed in line with division workplans"*. The important role of divisional workplans was also emphasised by the UNEP Task Team on Programme Management, which stated that *"UN rules require that divisional workplans are systematically developed against which staff plan their work"*
111. Most of UNEP's divisions appear to be already preparing divisional workplans, and in this regard, most respondents to the online survey of UNEP professional staff carried out as part of the present evaluation were aware of their own division's workplan. Only DELC staff members (two thirds of them) responding that they were unaware of the existence of a formal division workplan, although priority areas had been discussed in internal meetings. In addition, the majority of staff across all divisions, with slight differences among them, indicated that they had developed individual workplans linked to the division's objectives.
112. However, while divisional workplans are being prepared, it is less clear whether they are fulfilling their potential role in programme management, and specifically in defining, monitoring and reporting on the specific contributions that are being made by the individual divisions to the delivery of the six sub-programmes. Currently, the functions of defining, monitoring and reporting on the contributions of the divisions seems to have been almost entirely aligned to the project delivery mechanism. For example, the Programme Frameworks set out which projects are to deliver on the concerned sub-programme, and which division is accountable for delivering each project. Similarly, the PIMS system and PPRs are currently oriented around monitoring the project delivery mechanism. Some additional non-project related monitoring and reporting may be occurring in IMDIS, but as discussed previously, IMDIS is less than ideal for reporting on UNEP's output-level performance information, and also does not incorporate a financial and resource allocation component.
113. As a result, according to the information provided to the evaluation by UNEP staff, a significant proportion of UNEP's work, especially what is referred to as its normative activities (see Relevance section) are, because they are not currently projectised, not being subjected to an appropriate process of management oversight and approval, and thereafter to monitoring and reporting in PIMS and in the PPRs.
114. **In conclusion**, this evaluation suggests that divisional workplans are currently an underutilised planning and performance tool for the defining, monitoring and reporting on the implementation of the MTS and the PoWs, especially those aspects that are not presently captured by the project delivery mechanism. Up until now this role has been partially, and inadequately, fulfilled by the Programme Framework documents, and to an extent by the PoWs themselves. With the proposed shift to making the Programme Frameworks more strategic documents that demonstrate the causal logic underlying the sub-programmes, the need to fill the implementation gap by the divisional workplans becomes all the more important.
115. **This evaluation recommends** that the process of developing divisional (and regional office – see below) workplans should be fully instituted as an integral and instrumental component of UNEP's programme management processes. Like UNEP's projects, these workplans should establish milestones for other aspects of the division's work that are not included in the project deliv-

ery mechanism. PIMS should then incorporate delivery milestones for broader workplans as well as projects, and this information should in future be consolidated up to the divisional level, rather than the EA level as at present.

7. Programme evaluation

116. UNEP's **Evaluation Policy**²⁴ sets out UNEP's approach to evaluating the organisation's performance based on the MTS. It describes the objectives, roles and functions of evaluation within UNEP, the institutional framework within which evaluation operates, and the general processes by which evaluation is operationalized. The policy emphasises that UNEP's evaluations will focus on results and states that *"The evaluation of UNEP's delivery of results in its MTS is built upon the results of evaluations of the sub-programmes as embodied in the organisation's PoWs. Evaluations at a sub-programme level are informed by evaluations of each EA in the PoW, which are informed by project level evaluations."*
117. The Professional Peer Review of UNEP's Evaluation Function²⁵ concluded that UNEP's evaluation function is independent, well-established and that evaluation has been growing in importance through the reform process, and with increasing focus on managing for results. The Review noted that, while the bulk of evaluations undertaken are terminal project evaluations, there has been a move to higher-level strategic evaluations through the Formative Evaluation of the PoW, and the on-going comprehensive sub-programme evaluations. The review recommended that increased focus should be placed on strategic evaluations in line with UNEP's strategic and programmatic priorities and in order to feed into higher-level decision making.
118. As is apparent from the findings presented in this section of this evaluation report as well as in other sections, the UNEP EO's Formative Evaluation of the PoW 2010-2011, prepared in July 2011, was an innovative and comprehensive early overview of the MTS reform process, that made significant implications for the ongoing implementation of the MTS and the two PoWs, contributing to the ongoing process of adaptive management that has characterised the MTS reform process. As such, the FE is very much a forward looking and practical management review document, rather than a rearward looking and abstract formal evaluation. This section of the present evaluation report builds on the earlier findings of the FE. Wherever possible, the emphasis in this report has been to build on these earlier recommendations, and to extend and strengthen them according to subsequent developments and lessons learnt.
119. Besides the FE, the other two key EO evaluations that are of significant importance to this present evaluation are the ongoing in-depth evaluations of the sub-programmes, of which two, relating to the Disasters & Conflicts and Environmental Governance Sub-Programmes, are currently at the draft report stage. Like the FE, these two sub-programme evaluations build on the Theory of Change approaches that have been widely adopted by the EO. The emerging findings and recommendations of these two sub-programme level evaluations have been taken into account in formulating the findings and recommendations of this evaluation.
120. With the exception of GEF project evaluations, no evaluations have yet been undertaken of UNEP projects that are contributing to the current MTS. The main reason is that it is too early in the delivery of these projects for them to be evaluated, and also because of the constraints on the EO's time in setting up and overseeing project-level evaluations alongside the already heavy workload with undertaking GEF evaluations and evaluations of the six sub-programmes. Nevertheless, because of the crucial role played by projects in delivering on the MTS, it will clearly be

²⁴ UNEP Evaluation Policy, September 2009

²⁵ Professional Peer Review of the UNEP Evaluation Function, Mar 2012

important to launch a limited number of pivotal project evaluations for each of the sub-programmes in the near future.

121. **In conclusion**, UNEP's evaluation function has made significant contributions to the ongoing implementation of the MTS organisational reform process and to the strengthening of results-based management within the organisation. The usefulness of these evaluations to the organisation can be seen by the way in which UNEP has already begun incorporating many of the recommendations emerging into the ongoing reform process.

8. UNEP's strategic presence and the role of the Regional Offices

122. UNEP's network of Regional Offices has a vital role to play in the delivery of the PoW, especially with regard the regional and country level priorities that are identified in the **Bali Strategic Plan** (BSP - see the Relevance section of this report for more information on the BSP). Responding to the needs and priorities identified in the BSP, the **Dalberg Report on UNEP's Strategic Presence**²⁶ highlighted the key issues that needed to be addressed in strengthening UNEP's strategic presence, including:

- ▶ What will be the role and function of UNEP's presence in the regions in relation to Headquarters?
- ▶ What will be the reporting relationship between staff across UNEP offices?
- ▶ Where, how and when will UNEP strengthen its presence in selected, strategic locations?

123. The issues identified in the Dalberg Report were subsequently taken up in the UNEP policy document **Moving Forward with UNEP's Strategic Presence 2010 – 2013**²⁷, which established the objective of UNEP's move towards a strategic presence model as *"to deliver on one UNEP-wide PoW in a coherent, coordinated and integrated manner by all components of the Secretariat, in the most efficient and cost effective manner"*. The document states that *"a transition period from now until the end of 2009 is required to build capacity both in the Divisions and in the regions for executing their respective functions, including facilitating the regional delivery of UNEP's PoW 2010-2011 through the Regional Offices."* The document also describes the respective roles of Headquarters Divisions and the Regional Offices in delivering the PoW, including a definition of the reporting relationships between regionally-based divisional staff vis-à-vis their host regional office and parent division.

124. The Meeting with Sub-Programme Coordinators on Programme Planning and Implementation²⁸ reiterated the need to strengthen the delivery of the PoW in the regions and to ensure that UNEP's work at the country level is brought in line with the UN country planning process. Specifically, the meeting recommended that the interaction between regional offices and Sub-Programme Coordinators should be strengthened, and that the roles of the Regional Offices in delivering the PoW should be clarified. Subsequently, the SPC Meeting held in March 2011 recommended that Regional Coordinators should be recruited for each Sub-Programme in each regional office, with funding provided by the Environment Fund.

125. The progress that has been made in implementing the strategic presence policy and in strengthening the capacity of the ROs to deliver the PoW was reviewed in early 2012 in the UNEP ED's report entitled **Results of the Review of the Needs and Potential of Regional Offices**²⁹. The

²⁶ Moving UNEP towards a strategic presence model, Dalberg, Feb 2008

²⁷ Moving Forward with UNEP's Strategic Presence 2010 – 2013. Final Approved SMT Policy Paper, Jan 2009

²⁸ Meeting with Sub-programme Coordinators on Programme Planning and Implementation, Apr 2010

²⁹ UNEP PoW 2012–2013: Addendum - Results of the review of the needs and potential of regional offices. Report of the Executive Director, Feb 2012

report found that UNEP had made significant strides in building the “One UNEP” approach and in coordinating and supporting coherent implementation of the six sub-programmes at the regional and national levels, in particular by strengthening the capacity of Regional Offices to contribute to the delivery of the PoW, chiefly through the recruitment of additional sub-programme technical staff in the ROs. Most regional offices now host regional sub-programme focal points, that report to their host Regional Director and the concerned SPC. However, the position of sub-programme regional coordinators has yet to be systematically or permanently put in place, and it seems that these technical staff members often still perceive their loyalty to their division rather than to the regional office concerned. This may be because their salary costs are still ultimately associated with the division rather than the regional office, and also because the Regional Office’s management systems, processes and accountability arrangements for programme delivery have not yet been put in place.

126. The Review of the Needs and Potential of Regional Offices also concluded that there was still room for improvement in communication and collaboration between divisions and regional offices, and that mechanisms should be developed to enable the regional offices to be more directly involved in the MTS planning process so that the new strategy better reflects priorities and needs from the regions. Following up on this recommendation, the UNEP ED’s Management Note (January 2012) stated that *“the next PoW 2014-2015 and budget should include an enhanced mechanism for UNEP delivery in response to regional and country priorities in the MTS and PoWs for 2014-2017.”*
127. The interviews with Regional Office and DRC staff carried out during the present evaluation also suggest that good progress was being made in strengthening the role of the Regional Offices in the design and implementation of the MTS and PoWs, in particular through the process of holding regional forums to identify priorities for inclusion in the new MTS, the subsequent development of regional strategic analyses, and also the decision that the ROs should be involved in relevant PRC meetings to review projects impacting on their regions. However, while these steps have resulted in improvements in the ROs role in programme planning, there are still significant challenges with respect to developing and implementing an appropriate role for the ROs in programme implementation. For example, the online survey of UNEP professional staff carried out during the present evaluation suggested that divisions continue to work in the regions largely independently from one another, that the Regional Offices themselves are still little more than representational offices, and that it would require many years of capacity building before they become equal partners with Divisions in programme delivery. Survey respondents also felt that support to staff in the regions mainly comes from Divisional rather than SP focal points, that delegation to the ROs is still weak, and that consultation between divisions and the Regional Offices is usually last minute, usually when a problem occurs. On the other hand, respondents also felt that coordination and programming should increasingly happen at the regional office level, and that there needed to be a more systematic involvement of the ROs in programme delivery from the outset.
128. The current role of the Regional Offices in programme delivery is therefore largely one of providing support services to the divisions, such as liaison activities and assisting in establishing national and regional contacts and selecting partners, rather than of project development and implementation *per se*. The recent in-depth evaluation of the Disasters & Conflicts Sub-Programme reports on efforts made under the sub-programme to transfer responsibility for programme implementation in Haiti and Sierra Leone to the respective regional offices (ROALAC and ROA respectively) on an experimental basis. Both arrangements were only partially successful, chiefly because of the limited operational capacity, funding and delegated authority at the RO level to run the projects effectively. The D&C SP evaluation noted that the implementation role of the Regional Offices has been even more limited elsewhere. With regard the UNEP Country Programme in Afghanistan, the evaluation noted that the Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific (ROAP) was not equipped to run a programme that requires sustained country presence

and therefore the lead has remained with the Post-Conflict and Disaster Management Branch in Geneva. Similarly, the role of the Regional Office for Africa in the Sudan Country Programme has also been minimal, because the ROA had insufficient time and resources to play any real role in implementation.

129. While it is clear that up until now the regional offices have chiefly played a supportive role in implementation, nevertheless, the potential role that the ROs could play in this respect is broadly recognised. For example, the recent evaluation of the Environmental Governance SP pointed out that *“Through its service and support functions, the regional office network is UNEP’s strongest internal mechanism for cooperation and has strong potential for brokering operational linkages between projects involving different Divisions or EAs at the regional and country levels”*. This emphasises a crucial implementation role of the regional offices that goes well beyond the currently envisaged enhanced role in planning and programme formulation. But as demonstrated by the experience of the D&C SP, there are significant organisational barriers that will need to be overcome, not least capacity, to enable the regional offices to play this role.
130. Looking at this issue from a different perspective, it should also be recognised that other parts of UNEP work extensively at the country level, and that a two-way knowledge exchange and collaboration between the concerned branch and the regional office is often the most appropriate solution. For example, crisis response work in particular requires a specific set of skills and expertise that is unique to the Post Conflict & Disaster Management Branch (PCDMB). In circumstances such as these, building the capacity, skill sets and experience of each regional office to work in these specialist circumstances and areas would most likely not represent an efficient use of UNEP’s resources. What is needed in practice is a case-by-case assessment of whether the regional office is really best placed to lead implementation.
131. A potential way to begin addressing this issue of limited implementation capacity in the regions is proposed in the document **“Implementation of the PoW 2010-11 in the regions: Achievements and challenges faced in 2010”**, the key aspects of which were reinforced by the submission from the Director, DRC to the Task Team on Programme Management in April 2011. Besides emphasising the ongoing efforts to increase the involvement of the ROs in the development of the MTS and the PoWs through regional consultation and the development of regional strategic analyses to identify needs, as well as technical capacity building, these documents also put emphasis on the development of *“Regional Implementation Frameworks”* (RIFs), which it is proposed should be the chief mechanism for the implementation of the PoW at the regional level and the framework for resource allocation. It is also suggested that the RIF should integrate all projects to be delivered by the relevant Regional Office, and that they would enable improved cooperation, coordination and information-sharing between the ROs and sub-programmes as well as among sub-programmes working at the regional level.
132. In this regard, as a potential mechanism to correspond with the proposed Divisional workplans discussed in section 6 above, this evaluation suggests that the idea of strengthening the role of Regional Office annual workplans, so that they can serve a similar planning, resource allocation and accountability responsibility as this Evaluation has earlier recommended for the divisional workplans. Like the Divisional workplans, regional office workplans have the potential of providing a strong foundation for defining how the Programme Frameworks will be implemented within the region concerned, and also for making the case for the allocation of resources to identified projects³⁰. Regional office workplans will also help to define the capacity needs of the region concerned for implementing each of the sub-programmes, the potential synergies between different components of the sub-programmes at the regional level, and even synergies

³⁰ As with the divisional workplans, the regional office workplans should articulate how the respective Programme Frameworks will be implemented at the regional office level. They should therefore be produced in response to the PFs, not as an alternative to them.

across sub-programmes, and the respective roles of the regional office and the concerned division, branch or unit in delivering components of the sub-programmes.

133. Regional office workplans could also provide a foundation for building synergies between individual projects being implemented at the regional level, as well as for the development of cross-cutting projects that address multiple EAs and even multiple SPs at the regional level, and take advantage of the specific needs and opportunities (including fundraising opportunities) in the region concerned.
134. **In conclusion**, a strong strategic and policy foundation has been established for strengthening UNEP's strategic presence and the role of UNEP's Regional Offices in programme implementation, including the Bali Strategic Plan, the Dalberg Report on UNEP's Strategic Presence, and UNEP's policy document, Moving Forward with UNEP's Strategic Presence. Notwithstanding this policy foundation, it seems clear today that UNEP's Regional Offices are yet to fulfil their full potential in delivering on the MTS, PoWs and the goals set out in the BSP. Rather, the lead responsibility for the delivery of UNEP's regional and country level operations still rests with the divisions, especially the lead divisions, with the Regional Offices playing a chiefly service role in support of the divisions. Enabling the Regional Offices to play a more substantive role in programme implementation will ensure that UNEP's activities are regionally relevant and appropriate, that synergies between projects and sub-programmes at the regional level are capitalised upon, and that duplications of effort and lack of coordination at the country and regional level are reduced. Achieving this strengthened programme implementation role will require continuing efforts to enhance capacity at the regional level, supported by the necessary management systems and allocation of accountability and responsibility. UNEP has already made good progress in increasing the technical capacity of the Regional Offices through the assignment of technical staff from the different divisions to the different regions. However, it will also be important to recognise that in cases where specialist expertise and skills are required, it may not be appropriate and cost effective to develop this capacity in every regional office.
135. This evaluation **recommends** that UNEP prioritises the further development of the Regional Office's management systems, processes and accountability arrangements for programme delivery under the next MTS. One aspect of this would be to strengthen the role of the Regional Office workplans, which correspond to and serve similar functions as the Divisional workplans. Another aspect could be the development of specific projects at the regional level, designed to respond to regional dimensions of one or more of the sub-programmes, and to establish regional synergies in the delivery of the respective sub-programme(s).
136. It will also be important to further clarify the delegated accountability and authority of ROs with regard programme implementation, in line with the intent established in the Strategic Presence Policy. This should best be achieved in a revised Accountability Framework that takes into account the lessons learnt from the implementation of the institutional reform process since the previous Accountability Framework was developed and approved, and the realities of the institutional arrangements that have begun to emerge based on these lessons learnt.

Annex 1: List of persons interviewed

Name	Position
Executive Office	
Achim Steiner	Executive Director
Michelle Candotti	Chef de Cabinet
Corli Pretorius	Executive Assistant to the ED
Office of Operations	
Christophe Bouvier	Head, Office for Operations
Sheila Aggarwal-Khan	Former OiC of the Quality Assurance Service and Chief, Strategic Planning Unit
Michael Spilsbury	
Sari Sherman	
DEPI	
Ibrahim Thiaw	Director, DEPI
Jacqueline Alder	Coordinator, Marine and Coastal Ecosystem Branch
Keith Alverson	Head of the Climate Change Adaptation and Terrestrial Ecosystems Branch , DEPI
Neville Ash	Chief, Biodiversity Unit, DEPI
Musonda Mumba	Programme Officer, Climate Change Adaptation Unit, DEPI
David Osborn	Ecosystem Management SP Coordinator, DEPI
DRC	
Jiri Hlavacek	Deputy Director, OiC, DRC
Jochem Zoetelief	Programme Officer, DRC
Desta Mebratu	Deputy Director, Regional Office for Africa
Amy Fraenkel	Regional Director, Regional Office for North America
DEWA	
Peter Gilruth	Director, DEWA
Monika MacDevette	Chief, Capacity Development Branch and OiC, DEWA
Sunday Leonard	Scientific Assistant to Chief Scientist
DCPI	
Naomi Poulton	OiC, DCPI
Others	
John Scanlon	Director General, CITES

Annex 2. Evaluation Questions: Business Processes, Systems & Structures

Issue	Questions	Checklist/Indicators	Means of Verification/Sources of Information
A. Progress in strengthening UNEP's results orientation in MTS delivery	A.1 To what extent have UNEP's programme planning processes, systems and structures strengthened results orientation?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Functionality and complementarity of the different UNEP planning documents ▶ Adequacy of involvement in and ownership of the MTS and PoW preparation process in different parts of the organisation ▶ Complementarity between project and MTS results hierarchies ▶ Complementarity between bottom-up and top-down programme planning processes (*role of the Programme Frameworks) ▶ Appropriateness of programme and project design sequencing ▶ Flexibility of programme planning frameworks to adaptive management 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Desk review of PoW 2010-2011, PoW 2012-2013 and related Strategic Frameworks ▶ Desk review of Sub-Programme Strategies and Frameworks ▶ Desk review of MTS policy documents: Approach to the Development of the UNEP PoW, 2010-2011; UNEP PoW 2010-2011: Designing the activities to deliver the results; Formative Evaluation of UNEP's PoW 2010-2011 ▶ Interviews with SP Coordinators and Division Directors ▶ Interviews with QAS and EO
	A.2 To what extent have UNEP's programme management and monitoring processes, systems and structures strengthened results orientation?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Appropriateness of UNEP's programme/project design and implementation frameworks in facilitating results delivery ▶ Appropriateness of UNEP's monitoring and reporting mechanisms in facilitating results delivery ▶ Functionality of project milestones in tracking progress and performance ▶ Appropriateness of allocation of roles and responsibilities in undertaking monitoring activities ▶ Depth of understanding of RBM approaches of UNEP staff in divisions and regional offices 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Desk review of programme management frameworks: UNEP Programme Manual; Project Manual; Project Document template ▶ Desk review of UNEP Programme Performance Monitoring Policy and Monitoring Plan 2010-11 ▶ Desk review of programme management systems: PIMS, IMDIS and Programme Performance Reports ▶ Desk review of UNEP RBM Training Programme ▶ Interviews with QAS
	A.3 To what extent have UNEP's programme evaluation processes, systems and structures	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Functionality of UNEP EO evaluations in strengthening results orientation ▶ Responsiveness of PoW and other planning frameworks to UNEP EO evaluation findings and recommendations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Desk review of UNEP Evaluation Policy; Evaluation Synthesis Report 2010-2011 and Professional Peer Review of the UNEP Evaluation Function ▶ Interviews with EO

Issue	Questions	Checklist/Indicators	Means of Verification/Sources of Information
	strengthened results orientation?		
B. Progress in improving accountability for achieving MTS results	B.1 To what extent were roles, responsibility and accountability for MTS delivery appropriately assigned	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Appropriateness of responsibility and accountability of Sub-Programme Coordinators for Sub-Programme design, project design and approval, project implementation, and monitoring and reporting (*including SPC reporting lines) ▶ Appropriateness of roles and responsibilities of Divisions and Regional Offices for Sub-Programme design, project design and approval, project implementation and monitoring and reporting ▶ Adequacy of role of the Sub-Programme Coordinators in fostering inter-divisional collaboration 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Desk review of Programme Accountability Framework; OIOS Audit of Internal Governance in UNEP; MOPAN 2011 Assessment of UNEP Implementation Process Challenges, Feb 2010 ▶ Desk review of Terms of Reference for Coordinators of UNEP Sub-Programmes ▶ Interviews with Division Directors ▶ Interviews with Sub-Programme Coordinators ▶ Interview with Chairman of UNEP Task Team
	B.2 How have UNEP's management systems and structures and organizational incentives enabled appropriate accountability for MTS delivery?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Functionality of divisional work plans in supporting programme implementation ▶ Functionality of inter-divisional Programme Advisory Group (now SMT function?) and Project Review Committee in supporting programme implementation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Desk review of report of Task Team on Programme Management & Implementation; UNEP Executive Management Team Retreat, 30 Sep-1 Oct 2010. Follow-Up Table; Minutes of Meeting on PoW ▶ Interviews with Division Directors ▶ Interviews with Sub-Programme Coordinators ▶ Interview with Chairman of UNEP Task Team
C. Progress in improving internal and external collaboration and knowledge sharing in achieving MTS results	C. To what extent have the various components of the programme effectively and efficiently cooperated and coordinated their activities to deliver as one UNEP?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Adequacy of UNEP's regional capacity to deliver the PoW (*including considerations for enhanced physical presence at the regional and country level) ▶ Appropriateness of MTS delivery mechanisms at regional and country levels ▶ Appropriateness of collaboration and coordination between Divisions and Regional Offices in developing and delivering global and regional initiatives and activities in the regions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Desk review of UNEP Programme Accountability Framework; Moving Forward with UNEP's Strategic Presence 2010 – 2013; UNEP PoW 2012–2013: Addendum - Results of the review of the needs and potential of regional offices; Implementation of the PoW 2010-11 in the regions: Synthesis of achievements and challenges faced in 2010 ▶ Interviews with Division Directors ▶ Interviews with Regional Office Directors and Regional Programme Coordi-

Issue	Questions	Checklist/Indicators	Means of Verification/Sources of Information
	C.2 To what extent has UNEP been able to engage partners in MTS delivery?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Adequacy of efforts to promote joint activities and pooling of resources with other organizations and networks 	<p>nators</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Desk review of UNEP Partnership Strategy; UNEP Partnership Policy and Procedures, October 2011; UN OIOS Internal Audit Division; Internal Audit of UNEP project delivery arrangements via partnerships ▶ Interviews with Division Directors ▶ Interviews with Sub-Programme Coordinators ▶ Interviews with Regional Office Directors and Regional Programme Coordinators
	C.3 To what extent has information sharing within UNEP and with external stakeholders been improved?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Evidence of improved culture of individual and organizational learning ▶ Functionality of UNEP Intranet in enhancing knowledge sharing ▶ Extent to which the UNEP Science Strategy has been incorporated into the implementation of the PoW ▶ Extent to which Science Strategy has enhanced knowledge sharing within the organisation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Desk review of UNEP External Communications Strategy 2010–2013; PoW 2010-11 Communications & Capacity Development Strategy ▶ Interviews with Division Directors ▶ Interviews with Sub-Programme Coordinators ▶ Interviews with Regional Office Directors and Regional Programme Coordinators ▶ Desk review of UNEP Science Strategy

Annex 3. Bibliography of key MTS-related documents

ORGANISATIONAL PROCESSES, SYSTEMS AND STRUCTURES
RBM
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UNEP PoW 2010-2011: Designing the activities to deliver the results. UNEP SMT, Mar 2009
Formative Evaluation of UNEP's PoW 2010-2011, UNEP Evaluation Office, Jul 2011
OECD-DAC Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and RBM, 2002
UNEP Project Manual: formulation, approval, monitoring and evaluation. UNEP Programme Coordination & Management Unit, 2005
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PIMS Workflow Monitoring Architecture
UN Regulations and Rules Governing Programme Planning, the Programme Aspects of the Budget, the Monitoring of Implementation and the Methods of Evaluation. Secretary-General's bulletin, Apr 2000 (ST/SGB/2000/8)
UNEP Programme Performance Monitoring Policy, March 2010
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Accountability for MTS delivery
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UNEP Executive Management Team Retreat, 30 Sep-1 Oct 2010. Follow-Up Table
Minutes of Meeting on PoW Implementation Process Challenges, Feb 2010
Terms of Reference for Co-ordinators of UNEP Sub-Programmes for the Development and Implementation of the UNEP PoW (2010-2011), April 2008
Meeting with Sub-Programme Coordinators on Programme Planning and Implementation, Apr 2010
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UNEP Partnership Policy and Procedures, October 2011
UN OIOS Internal Audit Division. Internal Audit of UNEP project delivery arrangements via partnerships, Dec 2010
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